- Neuroethics and Philosophy in Responsible Research and Innovation: The Case of the Human Brain Project.Arleen Salles, Kathinka Evers & Michele Farisco - 2019 - Neuroethics 12 (2):201-211.details
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Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2016 - Synthese 195 (11):4785-4816.details
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What About a Reductionist Approach? Comments on Terry Horgan.Christian Sachse - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):201-205.details
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What about a reductionist approach? Comments on Terry Horgan.Christian Sachse - 2007 - Erkenntnis 67 (2):201 - 205.details
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Conservative Reduction of Biology.Christian Sachse - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):33-65.details
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Two solutions to the neural discernment problem.Bradford Saad - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2837-2850.details
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Should Reductive Physicalists Reject the Causal Argument?Bradford Saad - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):263-279.details
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A causal argument for dualism.Bradford Saad - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506.details
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The new associationism: A neural explanation of the predictive powers of the cerebral cortex. [REVIEW]Dan Ryder & Oleg Favorov - 2001 - Brain and Mind 2 (2):161-194.details
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Separating the Theological Sheep from the Philosophical Goats.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2021 - Journal of Analytic Theology 9:205-222.details
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Kim’s dilemma: why mental causation is not productive.Andrew Russo - 2016 - Synthese 193 (7):2185-2203.details
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Core affect and the psychological construction of emotion.James A. Russell - 2003 - Psychological Review 110 (1):145-172.details
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Minding one's cognitive systems: When does a group of minds constitute a single cognitive unit?Robert Rupert - 2005 - Episteme 1 (3):177-188.details
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Embodiment, Consciousness, and the Massively Representational Mind.Robert D. Rupert - 2011 - Philosophical Topics 39 (1):99-120.details
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Physical emergence, diachronic and synchronic.Alexander Rueger - 2000 - Synthese 124 (3):297-322.details
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Grounded Shadows, Groundless Ghosts.Ezra Rubenstein - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):723-750.details
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What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists.Don Ross & David Spurrett - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):603-627.details
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Religion on which the devout and skeptic can agree.Matt J. Rossano - 2007 - Zygon 42 (2):301-316.details
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How Mary defeated the Zombies; Destabilizing the Modal argument with the Knowledge argument.Amber Ross - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 61 (5-6):499-519.details
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Agnosticism as a third stance.Sven Rosenkranz - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):55-104.details
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Synthetic phenomenology.Ron Chrisley - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (1):53-70.details
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On the brain and emotion.Edmund T. Rolls - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (2):219-228.details
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Phenomenal Blending and the Palette Problem.Luke Roelofs - 2014 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):59-70.details
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Panpsychism, intuitions, and the great chain of being.Luke Roelofs & Jed Buchanan - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2991-3017.details
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Dennettian Panpsychism: Multiple Drafts, All of Them Conscious.Luke Roelofs - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (3):323-340.details
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Consciousness and the world.Johannes Roessler - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):163-173.details
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Some Rudimentary Problems Pertaining to the Construction of an Ontology and Epistemology of Shamanic Journeying Imagery.Adam J. Rock & Stanley Krippner - 2008 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 27 (1):12-19.details
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Physicalism and Supervenience: A Case for a New Sense of Physical Duplication.Michael Roche - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):669-681.details
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Does the Concept of “Altered States of Consciousness” Rest on a Mistake?Adam J. Rock & Stanley Krippner - 2007 - International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 26 (1):33-40.details
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Causal Overdetermination and Kim’s Exclusion Argument.Michael Roche - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (3):809-826.details
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To structure, or not to structure?Philip Robbins - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):55-80.details
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Topological supervenience: A mathematical framework for exploring supervenience.David Robson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).details
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The phenomenal stance.Philip Robbins & Anthony I. Jack - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (1):59-85.details
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The ins and outs of introspection.Philip Robbins - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):617–630.details
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Russellian Monism and Epiphenomenalism.William S. Robinson - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (1):100-117.details
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Parsing the rainbow.Pendaran Roberts - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1793-1811.details
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Jackson's apostasy.William S. Robinson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):277-293.details
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An ecumenical response to color contrast cases.Pendaran Roberts - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Stem Cell Research on Embryonic Persons Is Just.Aaron Rizzieri - 2012 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 9 (2):195-203.details
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Wait, But Why? Challenging the Intuitive Force of Substance Dualism.Sarah Lane Ritchie - 2021 - Scientia et Fides 9 (1):241-255.details
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The Zombie Attack, Perry’s Parry, and a Riposte: A Slight Softening of the “Hard Problem” of Consciousness.J. Brendan Ritchie - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):55-65.details
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Two Myths of Psychophysical Reductionism.Restrepo Ricardo - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):75.details
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Thinking about Physicalism.Restrepo Ricardo - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):84.details
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Nietzsche's Sensualism.Mattia Riccardi - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (2):219-257.details
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Can Interventionists Be Neo-Russellians? Interventionism, the Open Systems Argument, and the Arrow of Entropy.Alexander Reutlinger - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (3):273-293.details
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Consciousness.Nicholas Rescher - 2015 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 2 (1):11-18.details
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On 'Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy'.Huiming Ren - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):347-351.details
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Functional Properties are Epiphenomenal.Matthew Rellihan - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1171-1195.details
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Unarticulated constituents.François Recanati - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 25 (3):299-345.details
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HOT theories of meaning: The link between language and theory of mind.Anne Reboul - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):587–596.details
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