- Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Autonomy in moral and political philosophy.John Christman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Agent-causation and agential control.Markus Ernst Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.details
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What is self-control?Edmund Henden - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):69 – 90.details
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(2 other versions)Discussion – Velleman on action and agency. [REVIEW]Alfred R. Mele - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 121 (3):249 - 261.details
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Second-order desire accounts of autonomy.Dennis Loughrey - 1998 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 6 (2):211 – 229.details
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Magical agents, global induction, and the internalism/externalism debate.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (3):343 – 371.details
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Responsible psychopaths.Patricia S. Greenspan - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (3):417 – 429.details
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Autonomy and the authority of personal commitments: From internal coherence to social normativity.Joel Anderson - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (2):90 – 108.details
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Alfred Mele's metaphysical freedom?E. J. Coffman & Ted A. Warfield - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):185 – 194.details
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Moral responsibility and the psychopath.Walter Glannon - 2008 - Neuroethics 1 (3):158-166.details
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On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.details
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(3 other versions)The impossibility of moral responsibility.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 75 (1-2):5-24.details
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Selective hard compatibilism.Paul Russell - 2010 - In J. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. Silverstein (eds.), Action, Ethics and Responsibility: Topics in Contemporary Philosophy, Vol. 7. MIT Press. pp. 149-73.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Surveying Freedom: Folk Intuitions about free will and moral responsibility.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (5):561-584.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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(1 other version)Free Will and Luck.Alfred R. Mele - 2006 - New York, US: Oxford University Press.details
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Kane, luck, and the significance of free will.Alfred R. Mele - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):96-104.details
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On free will, responsibility and indeterminism: Responses to Clarke, Haji, and Mele.Robert Kane - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (2):105-121.details
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Indeterminism and Frankfurt‐type examples.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):42-58.details
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Agent causation and the problem of luck.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 86 (3):408-421.details
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Free choice, effort, and wanting more.Randolph Clarke - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (1):20-41.details
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On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.details
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Wittgenstein, consciousness, and the mind.Pär Sundström - 2005 - Sorites 16 (December):6-22.details
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Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):425-438.details
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Indeterministic Choice and Ability.Ishtiyaque Haji & Ryan Hebert - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (2):191-203.details
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THE CONTOURS OF FREE WILL SCEPTICISM.Simon Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails
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Natural Compatibilists Should Be Theological Compatibilists.Taylor Cyr - 2022 - In Leigh Vicens & Peter Furlong (eds.), Theological Determinism: New Perspectives. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press. pp. 119-132.details
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The Indeterministic Weightings Model of Libertarian Free Will.John Lemos - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (3):137-156.details
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The phenomenology and metaphysics of the open future.Derek Lam - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (12):3895-3921.details
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Manipulated Agents: Replies to Fischer, Haji, and McKenna.Alfred R. Mele - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):299-309.details
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On Manipulated Agents and History-Sensitive Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):285-298.details
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From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
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(1 other version)Does Situationism Threaten Free Will and Moral Responsibility?Michael McKenna & Brandon Warmke - 2017 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 14 (6):698-733.details
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Moral responsibility and manipulation: on a novel argument against historicism.Alfred R. Mele - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):3143-3154.details
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Why Compatibilists Must Be Internalists.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (4):473-484.details
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What’s Wrong with Designing People to Serve?Bartek Chomanski - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (4):993-1015.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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Moral Responsibility, Luck, and Compatibilism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):193-214.details
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The Consequence argument and the Mind argument.Dana Nelkin - 2001 - Analysis 61 (2):107-115.details
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Concerning the resilience of Galen Strawson’s Basic Argument.Michael Anthony Istvan - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):399-420.details
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Character control and historical moral responsibility.Eric Christian Barnes - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (9):2311-2331.details
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(1 other version)Synchronic Self-control is Always Non-actional.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1997 - Analysis 57 (2):123-131.details
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The Liberating Power of Commercial Marketing.Thomas Boysen Anker, Klemens Kappel & Peter Sandøe - 2010 - Journal of Business Ethics 93 (4):519-530.details
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From being unaccountable to suffering from severe mental disorder and (possibly) back once again to being unaccountable.Christer Svennerlind - 2015 - Dialogues in Philosophy, Mental and Neuro Sciences 8 (2):45-58.details
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On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
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Agency.Markus Schlosser - 2015 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Manipulation Argument, At the Very Least, Undermines Classical Compatibilism.Yishai Cohen - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):291-307.details
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Trust and Autonomous Agency.Marina Oshana - 2014 - Res Philosophica 91 (3):431-447.details
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