Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.
    Libertarians like Robert Kane believe that indeterminism is necessaryfor free will. They think this in part because they hold both (1) thatmy being the ultimate cause of at least part of myself is necessary forfree will and (2) that indeterminism is necessary for this ``ultimateself-causation''. But seductive and intuitive as this ``USCLibertarianism'' may sound, it is untenable. In the end, nometaphysically coherent (not to mention empirically valid) conception ofultimate self-causation is available. So the basic intuition motivatingthe USC Libertarian is ultimately (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Between Theory and Praxis: Art as Negative Dialectics.Rebecca Longtin Hansen - 2013 - Studies in Social and Political Philosophy 21:36-51.
    This paper takes up Adorno’s aesthetics as a dialectic between philosophy and art. In doing so, I argue that art provides a unique way of mediating between theory and practice, between concepts and experience, and between subjectivity and objectivity, because in art these relations are flexible and left open to interpretation, which allows a form of thinking that can point beyond itself. Adorno thus uses reflection on art as a corrective for philosophy and its tendency towards ideology.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Practical Necessity and the Constitution of Character.Roman Altshuler - 2013 - In Alexandra Perry & Chris Herrera (eds.), The Moral Philosophy of Bernard Williams. Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 40-53.
    Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of practical necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Zygote Argument is invalid: Now what?Kristin Mickelson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2911-2929.
    This paper is based on the comments I gave to Alfred Mele regarding his original Zygote Argument during my presentation at a small workshop on manipulation arguments in Budapest back in 2012. After those comments, Mele changed the conclusion of his original Zygote Argument (OZA) from a positive, explanatory conclusion to a negative, non-explanatory conclusion--and, correspondingly, redefined 'incompatibilism' so that it would no longer refer in his work to the view that determinism precludes (undermines, eliminates, destroys, etc.) free will, but (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Two Potential Problems with Philosophical Intuitions: Muddled Intuitions and Biased Intuitions.Jeanine Weekes Schroer & Robert Schroer - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1263-1281.
    One critique of experimental philosophy is that the intuitions of the philosophically untutored should be accorded little to no weight; instead, only the intuitions of professional philosophers should matter. In response to this critique, “experimentalists” often claim that the intuitions of professional philosophers are biased. In this paper, we explore this question of whose intuitions should be disqualified and why. Much of the literature on this issue focuses on the question of whether the intuitions of professional philosophers are reliable. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Rational Abilities and Responsibility.Laura W. Ekstrom - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):459-466.
    For a symposium on Dana Nelkin's Making Sense of Freedom and Responsibility.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Dealing with the past: responsibility and personal history.Kyla Ebels-Duggan - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):141-161.
    I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Review of "Free Will and Modern Science", R. Swinburne , 2011. [REVIEW]Markus Schlosser - 2012 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):463-466.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The metaphysical importance of the compatibility question: comments on Mark Balaguer’s Free Will as an Open Scientific Problem.Michael McKenna - 2012 - Philosophical Studies (1):1-12.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Traction without Tracing: A Solution for Control‐Based Accounts of Moral Responsibility.Matt King - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):463-482.
    Control-based accounts of moral responsibility face a familiar problem. There are some actions which look like obvious cases of responsibility but which appear equally obviously to lack the requisite control. Drunk-driving cases are canonical instances. The familiar solution to this problem is to appeal to tracing. Though the drunk driver isn't in control at the time of the crash, this is because he previously drank to excess, an action over which he did plausibly exercise the requisite control. Tracing seeks to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • What Makes a Manipulated Agent Unfree?Chandra Sekhar Sripada - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):563-593.
    Incompatibilists and compatibilists (mostly) agree that there is a strong intuition that a manipulated agent, i.e., an agent who is the victim of methods such as indoctrination or brainwashing, is unfree. They differ however on why exactly this intuition arises. Incompatibilists claim our intuitions in these cases are sensitive to the manipulated agent’s lack of ultimate control over her actions, while many compatibilists argue that our intuitions respond to damage inflicted by manipulation on the agent’s psychological and volitional capacities. Much (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   49 citations  
  • The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Noûs 46 (2):326-354.
    In this paper, we do three things. First, we put forth a novel hypothesis about judgments of moral responsibility according to which such judgments are a species of explanatory judgments. Second, we argue that this hypothesis explains both some general features of everyday thinking about responsibility and the appeal of skeptical arguments against moral responsibility. Finally, we argue that, if correct, the hypothesis provides a defense against these skeptical arguments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   40 citations  
  • Incompatibilist (Nondeterministic) Theories of Free Will.Randolph Clarke & Justin Capes - 2021 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To have free will is to have what it takes to act freely. When an agent acts freely—when she exercises her free will—what she does is up to her. A plurality of alternatives is open to her, and she determines which she pursues. When she does, she is an ultimate source or origin of her action. So runs a familiar conception of free will.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Utilitarian epistemology.Steve Petersen - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1173-1184.
    Standard epistemology takes it for granted that there is a special kind of value: epistemic value. This claim does not seem to sit well with act utilitarianism, however, since it holds that only welfare is of real value. I first develop a particularly utilitarian sense of “epistemic value”, according to which it is closely analogous to the nature of financial value. I then demonstrate the promise this approach has for two current puzzles in the intersection of epistemology and value theory: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Revisionist Accounts of Free Will: Origins, Varieties, and Challenges.Manuel Vargas - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook on Free Will, 2nd Edition. Oxford University Press.
    The present chapter is concerned with revisionism about free will. It begins by offering a new characterization of revisionist accounts and the way such accounts fit (or do not) in the familiar framework of compatibilism and incompatibilism. It then traces some of the recent history of the development of revisionist accounts, and concludes by remarking on some challenges for them.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Free will and mental disorder: Exploring the relationship.Gerben Meynen - 2010 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 31 (6):429-443.
    A link between mental disorder and freedom is clearly present in the introduction of the fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-IV). It mentions “an important loss of freedom” as one of the possible defining features of mental disorder. Meanwhile, it remains unclear how “an important loss of freedom” should be understood. In order to get a clearer view on the relationship between mental disorder and (a loss of) freedom, in this article, I will explore (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Scanlon on intention and permissibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2010 - Analysis 70 (3):578-585.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • An alternative proof of the universal propensity to evil.Pablo Muchnik - 2009 - In Sharon Anderson-Gold & Pablo Muchnik (eds.), Kant's Anatomy of Evil. New York: Cambridge University Press.
    In this paper, I develop a quasi-transcendental argument to justify Kant’s infamous claim “man is evil by nature.” The cornerstone of my reconstruction lies in drawing a systematic distinction between the seemingly identical concepts of “evil disposition” (böseGesinnung) and “propensity to evil” (Hang zumBösen). The former, I argue, Kant reserves to describe the fundamental moral outlook of a single individual; the latter, the moral orientation of the whole species. Moreover, the appellative “evil” ranges over two different types of moral failure: (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   10 citations  
  • Four views on free will. By John Martin Fischer, Robert Kane, Derk Pereboom, and Manuel Vargas.Anthony Dardis - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (1):147-153.
    Summary and brief critical evaluation of 4 views on free will (Kane, Fischer, Pereboom, Vargas).
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral responsibility.Andrew Eshleman - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    When a person performs or fails to perform a morally significant action, we sometimes think that a particular kind of response is warranted. Praise and blame are perhaps the most obvious forms this reaction might take. For example, one who encounters a car accident may be regarded as worthy of praise for having saved a child from inside the burning car, or alternatively, one may be regarded as worthy of blame for not having used one's mobile phone to call for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   54 citations  
  • Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    To be autonomous is to be a law to oneself; autonomous agents are self-governing agents. Most of us want to be autonomous because we want to be accountable for what we do, and because it seems that if we are not the ones calling the shots, then we cannot be accountable. More importantly, perhaps, the value of autonomy is tied to the value of self-integration. We don't want to be alien to, or at war with, ourselves; and it seems that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   68 citations  
  • Free Will, Art and Morality.Paul Russell - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):307 - 325.
    The discussion in this paper begins with some observations regarding a number of structural similarities between art and morality as it involves human agency. On the basis of these observations we may ask whether or not incompatibilist worries about free will are relevant to both art and morality. One approach is to claim that libertarian free will is essential to our evaluations of merit and desert in both spheres. An alternative approach, is to claim that free will is required only (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.
    Experimental philosophy is the name for a recent movement whose participants use the methods of experimental psychology to probe the way people think about philosophical issues and then examine how the results of such studies bear on traditional philosophical debates. Given both the breadth of the research being carried out by experimental philosophers and the controversial nature of some of their central methodological assumptions, it is of no surprise that their work has recently come under attack. In this paper we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   112 citations  
  • On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.
    In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • The Bounds of freedom.Galen Strawson - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-460.
    The shortest form of the Basic Argument against free will and moral responsibility runs as follows: [1] When you act, you do what you do—in the situation in which you find yourself—because of the way you are. [2] If you do what you do because of the way you are, then in order to be fully and ultimately responsible for what you do you must be fully and ultimately responsible for the way you are. But [3] You cannot be fully (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   57 citations  
  • Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    “Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   90 citations  
  • On an argument for the impossibility of moral responsibility.Randolph Clarke - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):13-24.
    Galen Strawson has published several versions of an argument to the effect that moral responsibility is impossible, whether determinism is true or not. Few philosophers have been persuaded by the argument, which Strawson remarks is often dismissed “as wrong, or irrelevant, or fatuous, or too rapid, or an expression of metaphysical megalomania.” I offer here a two-part explanation of why Strawson’s argument has impressed so few. First, as he usually states it, the argument is lacking at least one key premise. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   35 citations  
  • Humean compatibilism.Helen Beebee & Alfred Mele - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):201-223.
    Humean compatibilism is the combination of a Humean position on laws of nature and the thesis that free will is compatible with determinism. This article's aim is to situate Humean compatibilism in the current debate among libertarians, traditional compatibilists, and semicompatibilists about free will. We argue that a Humean about laws can hold that there is a sense in which the laws of nature are 'up to us' and hence that the leading style of argument for incompatibilism?the consequence argument?has a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   78 citations  
  • Harnessing Collective Intentionality for Climate Action: An Institutional Perspective on Sustainability.Giulio Pennacchioni - forthcoming - Topoi:1-12.
    This paper explores the epistemic and moral responsibility individuals and institutions bear for climate change and sustainability. Highlighting challenges individuals face in understanding climate information, it emphasises the pivotal role of governments and intergovernmental institutions in exercising collective intentionality regarding climate change mitigation and sustainability education. Despite the commendable efforts of other collective entities, such as NGOs and climate movements, this responsibility belongs solely to national governments and intergovernmental institutions because they have a unique ability to create social rules. However, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Indirect evaluative voluntarism.Alex Horne - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Is genuine self‐creation – understood as self‐directed value‐acquisition – possible? Many philosophers think not. I disagree. I explain why a recent attempt to solve the problem fails and use it to motivate an alternative proposal: indirect evaluative voluntarism. Indirect evaluative voluntarism is not only well‐suited to explaining how self‐creation is possible; it also unifies two important aspects of our doxastic lives, viz. responsibility for the acquisition of both evaluative and non‐evaluative beliefs.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Responsibility Must Look Back.Daniel Coren - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):255-263.
    I argue that to remove all backward-looking grounds and justification from the practice, as some theorists recommend, is to remove (not revise) moral responsibility. The most paradigmatic cases of moral responsibility must feature desert and retributive elements. So, moral responsibility must be (at least partially) backward-looking. When we hold people responsible, one reason we do so is that we believe that they deserve punishment or reward simply in virtue of the action for which we hold them responsible. None of this (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Moral Luck.Andrew C. Khoury - forthcoming - In David Copp, Tina Rulli & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Normative Ethics. Oxford University Press.
    The problem of moral luck arises due to a particular tension in our thought. On the one hand, we seem readily inclined to endorse the principle that moral responsibility, that is, one’s praiseworthiness or blameworthiness, cannot be affected by luck, that is, by factors over which one lacks control. But, when we examine our actual practices, we find that our moral judgments are highly sensitive to luck. This resulting tension between principle and practice is the problem of moral luck, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Responsibility Skeptics Should Be More Skeptical.Aarthy Vaidyanathan - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):95-100.
    Menges (2022) seeks to identify the kind of blame that should be at issue in debates between skeptics and anti-skeptics about responsibility. Menges argues that such blame is constituted by responses that the target has a claim against, and by the blamer’s thought that they have forfeited this claim due to their bad action and state while engaged in that action. I identify a class of blame responses that Menges mistakenly excludes and offer an alternative, more general, account in which (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Why history matters for moral responsibility: Evaluating history‐sensitive structuralism.Taylor W. Cyr - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):58-69.
    Is moral responsibility essentially historical, or does an agent's moral responsibility for an action depend only on their psychological structure at that time? In previous work, I have argued that the two main (non‐skeptical) views on moral responsibility and agents’ histories—historicism and standard structuralism—are vulnerable to objections that are avoided by a third option, namely history‐sensitive structuralism. In this paper, I develop this view in greater detail and evaluate the view by comparing it with its three dialectical rivals: skepticism about (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • “Free will” is vague.Santiago Amaya - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):7-21.
    This paper argues that “free will” is vague. The argument has two steps. First, I argue that free will is a matter of degrees and, second, that there are no sharp boundaries separating free decisions and actions and non‐free ones. After presenting the argument, I focus on one significant consequence of the thesis, although others are mentioned along the way. In short, considerations of vagueness help understand the logic behind so‐called manipulation arguments, but also show why these arguments are ultimately (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Philosophy instruction changes views on moral controversies by decreasing reliance on intuition.Kerem Oktar, Adam Lerner, Maya Malaviya & Tania Lombrozo - 2023 - Cognition 236 (C):105434.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert.Leonhard Menges - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):615-636.
    Many philosophers characterize a particularly important sense of free will and responsibility by referring to basically deserved blame. But what is basically deserved blame? The aim of this paper is to identify the appraisal entailed by basic desert claims. It presents three desiderata for an account of desert appraisals and it argues that important recent theories fail to meet them. Then, the paper presents and defends a promising alternative. The basic idea is that claims about basically deserved blame entail that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • "A Comprehensive Understanding of Free Will".Shathy Akter - 2021 - Anwesan 20 (1995-7947):169-184.
    A proper examination shows that the existing definitions of free will are incomplete and implausible as, in addition of being partial, they involve various problems for why they fail to capture the idea of freedom in a true sense. In the present paper, the loopholes and incompleteness of these existing definitions have been identified. Besides, it has been argued in this paper that a complete and plausible definition of free will must contain both the surface freedom and the deeper freedom. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Sexual Violence and Two Types of Moral Wrongs.Ting-An Lin - 2024 - Hypatia:1-20.
    Although the idea that sexual violence is a “structural” problem is not new, the lack of specification as to what that entails blocks effective responses to it. This paper illustrates the concept of sexual violence as structural in the sense of containing a type of moral wrong called “structural wrong” and discusses its practical implications. First, I introduce a distinction between two types of moral wrongs—interactional wrongs and structural wrongs—and I argue that the moral problem of sexual violence includes both (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Moral Agency.Timothy Nailer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Adelaide
    While there is a vast philosophical literature exploring the conditions under which it is appropriate to hold individuals morally responsible for their actions, relatively little attention has been paid to the related question of which kinds of individuals merit these responsibility ascriptions. Under normal circumstances, typical adult human beings are held morally responsible for their behaviour but infants and nonhuman animals are not. In this thesis, I aim to account for this difference. That is, I aim to give an analysis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Indecision and Buridan’s Principle.Daniel Coren - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.
    The problem known as Buridan’s Ass says that a hungry donkey equipoised between two identical bales of hay will starve to death. Indecision kills the ass. Some philosophers worry about human analogs. Computer scientists since the 1960s have known about the computer versions of such cases. From what Leslie Lamport calls ‘Buridan’s Principle’—a discrete decision based on a continuous range of input-values cannot be made in a bounded time—it follows that the possibilities for human analogs of Buridan’s Ass are far (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.
    Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Free Will Skeptics Can Have Their Basic Desert and Eat It Too.Leigh Vicens - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 1:1-12.
    In this essay, I argue that if we assume with free will skeptics that people lack moral responsibility, or at least a central form of it, we may still maintain that people are ‘basically’ deserving of certain treatment in response to their behavior. I characterize basic-desert justifications for treatment negatively, as justifications that do not depend on consequentialist, contractualist, or relational considerations. Appealing to attributionist accounts of responsibility as well as the symbolic value of protest, I identify protest as a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Philosophical Defense of Misanthropy.Toby Svoboda - 2022 - New York: Routledge.
    This book argues that it can be both reasonable and appropriate to adopt a certain kind of misanthropy. The author defends a cognitivist version of misanthropy, an attitude whose central feature is the judgment that humanity is morally bad. Misanthropy is often dismissed on moral grounds. Many people hold that malice toward human persons is problematic and vulnerable to moral objections. In this book, the author advocates for cognitivist misanthropy. He defends an Asymmetry Thesis, according to which a morally bad (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Law and Violence.Alexander Guerrero - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 22 (1).
    The law marks a significant difference between violent and non-violent criminal actions. Violent crimes are typically met with more severe punishments and consequences than non-violent crimes. Even in discussions of criminal justice reform, the refrain remains: violent crime is different; those convicted of violent crimes are different; and it is appropriate to respond to violent crime differently. This article argues that the violent/non-violent distinction cannot bear the normative weight placed on it and that we should jettison violence and move to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Blame It on the AI? On the Moral Responsibility of Artificial Moral Advisors.Mihaela Constantinescu, Constantin Vică, Radu Uszkai & Cristina Voinea - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-26.
    Deep learning AI systems have proven a wide capacity to take over human-related activities such as car driving, medical diagnosing, or elderly care, often displaying behaviour with unpredictable consequences, including negative ones. This has raised the question whether highly autonomous AI may qualify as morally responsible agents. In this article, we develop a set of four conditions that an entity needs to meet in order to be ascribed moral responsibility, by drawing on Aristotelian ethics and contemporary philosophical research. We encode (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Against Legal Punishment.Nathan Hanna - 2022 - In Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 559-78.
    I argue that legal punishment is morally wrong because it’s too morally risky. I first briefly explain how my argument differs from similar ones in the philosophical literature on legal punishment. Then I explain why legal punishment is morally risky, argue that it’s too morally risky, and discuss objections. In a nutshell, my argument goes as follows. Legal punishment is wrong because we can never sufficiently reduce the risk of doing wrong when we legally punish people. We can never sufficiently (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The inescapability of moral luck.Taylor W. Cyr - 2021 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 10 (4):302-310.
    I argue that any account attempting to do away with resultant or circumstantial moral luck is inconsistent with a natural response to the problem of constitutive moral luck. It is plausible to think that we sometimes contribute to the formation of our characters in such a way as to mitigate our constitutive moral luck at later times. But, as I argue here, whether or not we succeed in bringing about changes to our characters is itself a matter of resultant and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • (2 other versions)(草稿) バーナード・ウィリアムズによる系譜学の擁護と「道徳の系譜学」(Bernard Williams' defense of genealogy and his genealogy of morality).Kazuki Watanabe - manuscript
    This manuscript explores Bernard Williams' discussion of the nature of genealogy. Also, I attempt to reconstruct his genealogy of the morality system.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • What's Luck Got to do with the Luck Pincer?Jesse Hill - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (4):837-858.
    Luck skepticism is the view that no one is ever morally responsible for anything because of the nature and ubiquity of luck. One acclaimed argument in favor of this view is Neil Levy’s luck pincer. The luck pincer holds that all morally significant acts or events involve either present luck, constitutive luck, or both and that present and constitutive luck each negate moral responsibility. Therefore, no one is ever morally responsible for any action or event. I argue that this argument (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark