- Parental Compromise.Marcus William Hunt - 2022 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 25 (2):260-280.details
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Moral Disagreement and Moral Education: What’s the Problem?Balg Dominik - 2023 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (1):5-24.details
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Conciliation, Uniqueness, and Rational Toxicity.David Christensen - 2014 - Noûs 50 (3):584-603.details
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Social Epistemology.Cailin O'Connor, Sanford Goldberg & Alvin Goldman - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Social epistemology.Alvin Goldman - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Rational Suspension.Alexandra Zinke - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1050-1066.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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Conscientious Non-objection in Intensive Care.Dominic Wilkinson - 2017 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 26 (1):132-142.details
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Is Justification Dialectical?Jan Willem Wieland - 2013 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 3 (3):182-201.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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Peer disagreement and counter-examples.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1773-1790.details
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A new solution to the problem of peer disagreement.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 63 (8):795-811.details
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The Epistemology of Education.Lani Watson - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (3):146-159.details
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Problems with Rowland’s Practical Conciliationism.Yuzhou Wang - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (4):1639-1648.details
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Epistemic Permissiveness and the Problem of Philosophical Disagreement.Mark Walker - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (2):285-309.details
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A Paradox About Our Epistemic Self-Conception: Are You an Über Epistemic Superior?Mark Walker - 2022 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 12 (4):285-316.details
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A different kind of dream-based skepticism.Michael Veber - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1827-1839.details
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Confidence, Evidence, and Disagreement.Katia Vavova - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S1):173-183.details
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Peer Disagreement, Evidence, and Well-Groundedness.Han van Wietmarschen - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (3):395-425.details
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The Reliability of Armchair Intuitions.Krist Vaesen, Martin Peterson & Bart Van Bezooijen - 2013 - Metaphilosophy 44 (5):559-578.details
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Explaining Higher-order Defeat.Marco Tiozzo - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):453-469.details
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Religious belief and the epistemology of disagreement.Michael Thune - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (8):712-724.details
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Is higher-order evidence evidence?Eyal Tal - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3157-3175.details
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Disagreement and easy bootstrapping.Eyal Tal - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):46-65.details
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A Dilemma for Higher-Level Suspension.Eyal Tal - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (4):685-699.details
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Peer-Disagreement about Restaurant Bills and Abortion.Martin Sticker - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (4):577-604.details
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Unanimous Consensus Against AGM?Rush T. Stewart - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (4):222-231.details
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Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.details
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The Method of Cases in Context. [REVIEW]Alison Springle - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (4):597-608.details
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Gaslighting, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence.Andrew D. Spear - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):229-241.details
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Gaslighting, Confabulation, and Epistemic Innocence.Andrew D. Spear - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):229-241.details
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Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice.Andrew D. Spear - 2018 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62:1-24.details
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Epistemic dimensions of gaslighting: peer-disagreement, self-trust, and epistemic injustice.Andrew D. Spear - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (1):68-91.details
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Disagreement and epistemic improvement.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14641-14665.details
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Unconfirmed peers and spinelessness.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (4):425-444.details
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Plato's Phaedo on Disagreement and Its Role in Epistemic Improvement.Tonguc Seferoglu - 2020 - Ancient Philosophy Today 2 (1):24-44.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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The Significance of Significant Fundamental Moral Disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):802-831.details
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The intelligibility of moral intransigence: A dilemma for cognitivism about moral judgment.Richard Rowland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (2):266-275.details
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The epistemology of moral disagreement.Richard Rowland - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (2):1-16.details
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Moral Error Theory Without Epistemic Error Theory: Scepticism About Second-Personal Reasons.Richard Rowland - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):547-569.details
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Disagreement and Intellectual Scepticism.Andrew Rotondo - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):251-271.details
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Disagreement and the First‐Person Perspective.Gurpreet Rattan - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (1):31-53.details
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A higher-order approach to disagreement.Mattias Skipper Rasmussen, Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Jens Christian Bjerring - 2018 - Episteme 15 (1):80-100.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Deep Disagreement (Part 1): Theories of Deep Disagreement.Chris Ranalli & Thirza Lagewaard - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (12):e12886.details
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Suspending is Believing.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - Synthese (3):1-26.details
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Wittgensteinian Hinge Epistemology and Deep Disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Topoi 40 (5):1117-1125.details
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Inferior Disagreement.Maura Priest - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (3):263-283.details
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Intellectual humility and the epistemology of disagreement.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1711-1723.details
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