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  1. Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):529-66.
    Voluntary acts are preceded by electrophysiological (RPs). With spontaneous acts involving no preplanning, the main negative RP shift begins at about200 ms. Control experiments, in which a skin stimulus was timed (S), helped evaluate each subject's error in reporting the clock times for awareness of any perceived event.
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  • Time and the observer: The where and when of consciousness in the brain.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):183-201.
    _Behavioral and Brain Sciences_ , 15, 183-247, 1992. Reprinted in _The Philosopher's Annual_ , Grim, Mar and Williams, eds., vol. XV-1992, 1994, pp. 23-68; Noel Sheehy and Tony Chapman, eds., _Cognitive Science_ , Vol. I, Elgar, 1995, pp.210-274.
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  • Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • The Experimental Evidence for Subjective Referral of a Sensory Experience Backwards in Time: Reply to P. S. Churchland.Benjamin Libet - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (June):182-197.
    Evidence that led to the hypothesis of a backwards referral of conscious sensory experiences in time, and the experimental tests of its predictions, is summarized. Criticisms of the data and the conclusion by Churchland that this hypothesis is untenable are analysed and found to be based upon misconceptions and faulty evaluations of facts and theory. Subjective referral in time violates no neurophysiological principles or data and is compatible with the theory of "mental" and "physical" correspondence.
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  • The timing of sensations: Reply to Libet.Patricia Smith Churchland - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (3):492-7.
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  • Begging the question against phenomenal consciousness.Ned Block - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):205-206.
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  • Voluntary intention and conscious selection in complex learned action.Richard Jung - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):544-545.
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  • The timing of conscious experience: A critical review and reinterpretation of Libet's research.Gilberto Gomes - 1998 - Consciousness and Cognition 7 (4):559-595.
    An extended examination of Libet's works led to a comprehensive reinterpretation of his results. According to this reinterpretation, the Minimum Train Duration of electrical brain stimulation should be considered as the time needed to create a brain stimulus efficient for producing conscious sensation and not as a basis for inferring the latency for conscious sensation of peripheral origin. Latency for conscious sensation with brain stimulation may occurafterthe Minimum Train Duration. Backward masking with cortical stimuli suggests a 125-300 ms minimum value (...)
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  • Problems with the psychophysics of intention.Bruno G. Breitmeyer - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):539-540.
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  • Mental summation: The timing of voluntary intentions by cortical activity.John C. Eccles - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):542-543.
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  • Do we “control” our brains?Donald M. MacKay - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):546-546.
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  • Conscious wants and self-awareness.Robert Van Gulick - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):555-556.
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  • Escape from the Cartesian Theater.Daniel C. Dennett & Marcel Kinsbourne - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):234-247.
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  • Free will and the functions of consciousness.Bruce Bridgeman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):540-540.
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  • The where in the brain determines the when in the mind.M. Jeannerod - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):212-213.
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  • Consciousness and motor control.Arthur C. Danto - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):540-541.
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  • Timing volition: Questions of what and when about W.James L. Ringo - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):550-551.
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  • On subjective back-referral and how long it takes to become conscious of a stimulus: A reinterpretation of Libet's data.Susan Pockett - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-61.
    The original data reported by Benjamin Libet and colleagues are reinterpreted, taking into account the facilitation which is experimentally demonstrated in the first of their series of articles. It is shown that the original data equally well or better support a quite different set of conclusions from those drawn by Libet. The new conclusions are that it takes only 80 ms for stimuli to come to consciousness and that “subjective back-referral of sensations in time” to the time of the stimulus (...)
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  • The uncertainty principle in psychology.John S. Stamm - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):553-554.
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  • Consciousness as an experimental variable: Problems of definition, practice, and interpretation.Richard Latto - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):545-546.
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  • Mind before matter?Geoffrey Underwood & Pekka Niemi - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):554-555.
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  • Neural/mental chronometry and chronotheology.Gerald S. Wasserman - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):556-557.
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  • Ambiguities in the subjective timing of experiences debate.Ronald C. Hoy - 1982 - Philosophy of Science 49 (June):254-262.
    Some recent physiological data indicate that the “subjective timing” of experiences can be “automatically referred backwards in time” to represent a sequence of events even though the earlier portions of associated neurophysiological activity are themselves insufficient to elicit the experience of any sensation. The challenge, then, is to explain how subjects can experience what they do in the reported ways when, if one looked just at certain neurophysiological activity, it would seem that perhaps subjects should report their sensations differently. The (...)
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  • Brain mechanisms of conscious experience and voluntary action.Herbert H. Jasper - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):543-543.
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  • Conscious decisions.Chris Mortensen - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):548-549.
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  • Physical, neural, and mental timing.Wim van de Grind - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):241-64.
    The conclusions drawn by Benjamin Libet from his work with collegues on the timing of somatosensorial conscious experiences has met with a lot of praise and criticism. In this issue we find three examples of the latter. Here I attempt to place the divide between the two opponent camps in a broader perspective by analyzing the question of the relation between physical timing, neural timing, and experiential timing. The nervous system does a sophisticated job of recombining and recoding messages from (...)
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  • Problems in the timing of conscious experience.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):191-97.
    Libet's (2000) arguments in defense of his interpretation of his experimental results are insufficient. The claims of my critical review (Gomes, 2008) do not suffer with his new statements.
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  • Is consciousness integrated?Max Velmans - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):229-230.
    In the visual system, the represented features of individual objects (shape, colour, movement, and so on) are distributed both in space and time within the brain. Representations of inner and outer event sequences arrive through different sense organs at different times, and are likewise distributed. Objects are nevertheless perceived as integrated wholes - and event sequences are experienced to form a coherent "consciousness stream." In their thoughtful article, Dennett & Kinsbourne ask how this is achieved.
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  • How long is now? Phenomenology and the specious present.Susan Pockett - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (1):55-68.
    The duration of “now” is shown to be important not only for an understanding of how conscious beings sense duration, but also for the validity of the phenomenological enterprise as Husserl conceived it. If “now” is too short, experiences can not be described before they become memories, which can be considered to be transcendent rather than immanent phenomena and therefore inadmissible as phenomenological data. Evidence concerning (a) the objective duration of sensations in various sensory modalities, (b) the time necessary for (...)
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  • The interpretation of Libet's results on the timing of conscious events: A commentary.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):221-230.
    A commentary on articles by Klein, Pockett, and Trevena and Miller, in this issue, is given. Average shift in the point of subjective equality , calculated by Klein on Libet's data, and corresponding change in mean shift, calculated by Libet et al. , may be “corrected,” taking as a reference point the end of the minimum train duration. Values obtained, if significant, indicate a latency for conscious sensation of the skin stimulus of at least 230 ms. Pockett's main conclusions are (...)
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  • When timing the mind should also mind the timing: Biases in the measurement of voluntary actions.Steve Joordens, Marc van Duijn & Thomas M. Spalek - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):231-40.
    Trevena and Miller provide further evidence that readiness potentials occur in the brain prior to the time that participants claim to have initiated a voluntary movement, a contention originally forwarded by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl . In their examination of this issue, though, aspects of their data lead them to question whether their measurement of the initiation of a voluntary movement was accurate. The current article addresses this concern by providing a direct analysis of biases in this task. This (...)
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  • Libet's temporal anomalies: A reassessment of the data.Stanley A. Klein - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):198-214.
    Benjamin Libet compared the perceived time of direct brain stimulation to the perceived time of skin stimulation. His results are among the most controversial experiments at the interface between psychology and philosophy. The new element that I bring to this discussion is a reanalysis of Libet's raw data. Libet's original data were difficult to interpret because of the manner in which they were presented in tables. Plotting the data as psychometric functions shows that the observers have great uncertainty about the (...)
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  • Timing of conscious experience: Reply to the 2002 commentaries on Libet’s findings.Benjamin Libet - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
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  • Pardon, your dualism is showing.Charles C. Wood - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):557-558.
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  • Cinema 1-2-Many of the Mind.Adina L. Roskies & C. C. Wood - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):221-223.
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  • Intralevel mental causation.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2011 - Frontiers of Philosophy in China 6 (3):402-425.
    This paper identifies and critiques a theory of mental causation defended by some proponents of nonredutive physicalism that I call “intralevelism.” Intralevelist theories differ in their details. On all versions, the causal outcome of the manifestation of physical properties is physical and the causal outcome of the manifestation of mental properties is mental. Thus, mental causation on this view is intralevel mental to mental causation. This characterization of mental causation as intralevel is taken to insulate nonreductive physicalism from some objections (...)
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  • Theory and evidence relating cerebral processes to conscious will.Benjamin Libet - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):558-566.
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  • The selfless consciousness.Antonio R. Damasio - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):208-209.
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  • Models of conscious timing and the experimental evidence.Benjamin Libet - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):213-215.
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  • Mental representation: Always delayed but not always ephemeral.Roger N. Shepard - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):223-224.
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  • Brain physiology and the unconscious initiation of movements.R. Näätänen - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):549-549.
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  • Conscious intention is a mental fiat.Eckart Scheerer - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):552-553.
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  • Brain stimulation and conscious experience.Daniel A. Pollen - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (3):626-645.
    Libet discovered that a substantial duration (> 0.5-1.0 s) of direct electrical stimulation of the surface of the somatosensory cortex at threshold currents is required before human subjects can report that a conscious somatosensory experience had occurred. Using a reaction time method we confirm that a similarly long stimulation duration at threshold currents is required for activation of elementary visual experiences (phosphenes) in human subjects following stimulation of the surface of the striate cortex. However, the reaction times for the subject (...)
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  • The where and when of what?Michael V. Antony - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):201-202.
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  • UnCartesian materialism and Lockean introspection.William G. Lycan - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):216-217.
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  • Libet's dualism.R. J. Nelson - 1985 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 8 (4):550-550.
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  • (1 other version)Why neural correlates of consciousness are fine, but not enough.Ruediger Vaas - 1999 - Anthropology and Philosophy 3 (3):121-141.
    The existence of neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) is not enough for philosophical purposes. On the other hand, there's more to NCC than meets the sceptic's eye. (I) NCC are useful for a better understanding of conscious experience, for instance: (1) NCC are helpful to explain phenomenological features of consciousness – e.g., dreaming. (2) NCC can account for phenomenological opaque facts – e.g., the temporal structure of consciousness. (3) NCC reveal properties and functions of consciousness which cannot be elucidated either (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • (1 other version)Remaking responsibility: complexity and scattered causes in human agency.Joshua Fost & Coventry Angela - 2013 - In Tangjia Wang, Proceedings of the 1st International Conference of Philosophy: Yesterday, Today & Tomorrow. Global Science and Technology Forum. pp. 91-101.
    Contrary to intuitions that human beings are free to think and act with “buck-stopping” freedom, philosophers since Holbach and Hume have argued that universal causation makes free will nonsensical. Contemporary neuroscience has strengthened their case and begun to reveal subtle and counterintuitive mechanisms in the processes of conscious agency. Although some fear that determinism undermines moral responsibility, the opposite is true: free will, if it existed, would undermine coherent systems of justice. Moreover, deterministic views of human choice clarify the conditions (...)
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  • On the alleged illusion of conscious will.Marc van Duijn & Sacha Bem - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):699-714.
    The belief that conscious will is merely "an illusion created by the brain" appears to be gaining in popularity among cognitive neuroscientists. Its main adherents usually refer to the classic, but controversial 'Libet-experiments', as the empirical evidence that vindicates this illusion-claim. However, based on recent work that provides other interpretations of the Libet-experiments, we argue that the illusion-claim is not only empirically invalid, but also theoretically incoherent, as it is rooted in a category mistake; namely, the presupposition that neuronal activity (...)
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