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  1. Testing free will.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Neuroethics 3 (2):161-172.
    This article describes three experiments that would advance our understanding of the import of data already generated by scientific work on free will and related issues. All three can be conducted with existing technology. The first concerns how reliable a predictor of behavior a certain segment of type I and type II RPs is. The second focuses on the timing of conscious experiences in Libet-style studies. The third concerns the effectiveness of conscious implementation intentions. The discussion of first two experiments (...)
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  • Free will strikes back: Steady-state movement-related cortical potentials are modulated by cognitive control.Hein Thomas van Schie, Ivaylo Borislavov Iotchev & Félix René Compen - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 104 (C):103382.
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  • Spontaneous Decisions and Free Will: Empirical Results and Philosophical Considerations.Joana Rigato, Masayoshi Murakami & Zachary Mainen - 2014 - Cold Spring Harbor Symposia on Quantitative Biology 79:177-184.
    Spontaneous actions are preceded by brain signals that may sometimes be detected hundreds of milliseconds in advance of a subject's conscious intention to act. These signals have been claimed to reflect prior unconscious decisions, raising doubts about the causal role of conscious will. Murakami et al. (2014. Nat Neurosci 17: 1574–1582) have recently argued for a different interpretation. During a task in which rats spontaneously decided when to abort waiting, the authors recorded neurons in the secondary motor cortex. The neural (...)
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  • Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.
    In its classical form, epiphenomenalism is the view that conscious mental events have no physical effects: while physical events cause mental events, the opposite is never true. Unlike classical epiphenomenalism, contemporary forms do not hold that conscious men­ tal states always lack causal efficacy, only that they are epiphenomenal relative to certain kinds of action, ones we pre-theoretically would have thought consciousness to causally contribute to. Two of these contemporary, empirically based challenges to the efficacy of the mental are the (...)
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  • Time and the brain: neurorelativity: The chronoarchitecture of the brain from the neuronal rather than the observer's perspective.Frank Scharnowski, Geraint Rees & Vincent Walsh - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):51-52.
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  • On experimental and philosophical investigations of mental timing: A response to commentary.Gilberto Gomes - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):304-307.
    Reinterpretations of Libet's results have received support from most commentaries. Libet's arguments against alternative hypotheses are contested. Latency depends on intensity. Integration of intensity and duration explains the Minimum Train Duration. Analogies of Libet's timing of intentions with control experiments indicate biases of opposite signs, according to intramodal or intermodal results. Rosenthal's view of nonconscious intentions becoming conscious after a delay is favored. Compatibilist free will is discussed.
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  • Intentional binding effect in children: insights from a new paradigm.Annachiara Cavazzana, Chiara Begliomini & Patrizia S. Bisiacchi - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • Can Conscious Agency Be Saved?Elisabeth Pacherie - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):33-45.
    This paper is concerned with the role of conscious agency in human action. On a folk-psychological view of the structure of agency, intentions, conceived as conscious mental states, are the causes of actions. In the last decades, the development of new psychological and neuroscientific methods has made conscious agency an object of empirical investigation and yielded results that challenge the received wisdom. Most famously, the results of Libet’s studies on the ‘readiness potential’ have been interpreted by many as evidence in (...)
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  • The level of frontal-temporal beta-2 band EEG synchronization distinguishes anterior cingulate cortex from other frontal regions.M. Kukleta, P. Bob, M. Brázdil, R. Roman & I. Rektor - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (4):879-886.
    Recent findings indicate that complex cognitive functions are organized at a global level in the brain and rely on large-scale information processing requiring functional integration of multiple disparate neural assemblies. The critical question of the integration of distributed brain activities is whether the essential integrative role can be attributed to a specific structure in the brain or whether this ability is inherent to the cognitive network as a whole. The results of the present study show that mean values of the (...)
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  • Proximal intentions, intention-reports, and vetoing.Alfred Mele - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (1):1 – 14.
    Proximal intentions are intentions to do something at once. Are they ever among the causes of actions? Can agents “veto” or retract proximal intentions and refrain from acting on them in certain experimental settings? When, in controlled studies, do proximal intentions to press a button, for example, arise? And when does the agent's consciousness of these intentions arise? This article explores these questions—and evaluates some answers that have been offered—in light of the results of some recent research in neuroscience. Methods (...)
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  • Libet's timing of mental events: Commentary on the commentaries.Stanley Klein - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):326-333.
    This issue of Consciousness and Cognition presents four target articles and eight commentaries on the target articles. The present article presents comments on those commentaries, grouped into backward referral and volition categories. Regarding backward referral: I disagree with my fellow commentators and take the unpopular position of defending Libet's notion of backward referral. I join my fellow commentators in critiquing Libet's notion of a 500-ms delay. I examine several of the hypotheses suggested by other commentators for why cortical and lateral (...)
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  • Brain signals do not demonstrate unconscious decision making: An interpretation based on graded conscious awareness.Jeff Miller & Wolf Schwarz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:12-21.
    Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...)
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  • Cortical movement preparation and conscious decisions: Averaging artifacts and timing biases.Jeff Miller & Judy Arnel Trevena - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):308-313.
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  • Biases in the subjective timing of perceptual events: Libet et al. (1983) revisited.Adam N. Danquah, Martin J. Farrell & Donald J. O’Boyle - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (3):616-627.
    We report two experiments in which participants had to judge the time of occurrence of a stimulus relative to a clock. The experiments were based on the control condition used by Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl [Libet, B., Gleason, C. A., Wright, E. W., & Pearl, D. K. . Time of conscious intention to act in relation to onset of cerebral activities : The unconscious initiation of a freely voluntary act. Brain 106, 623–642] to correct for any bias in the (...)
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  • The rotating spot method of timing subjective events.Susan Pockett & Arden Miller - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (2):241-254.
    The rotating spot method of timing subjective events involves the subject’s watching a rotating spot on a computer and reporting the position of the spot at the instant when the subjective event of interest occurs. We conducted an experiment to investigate factors that may impact on the results produced by this method, using the subject’s perception of when they made a simple finger movement as the subjective event to be timed. Seven aspects of the rotating spot method were investigated, using (...)
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  • On Timing Relations between Brain and World.William P. Banks - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):141-143.
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  • Motion as a reference for positions.Wim van de Grind - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):218-219.
    Is the position of a moving target ? I argue that we should regard moving targets as the natural (veridical) position references. Motion is probably perceptually absolute, whereas position and time are relative quantities, as in physics. According to this view, processing delays are incorporated in the abstract local signs of motion signals. The flash-lag effect is one case in point.
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  • Mental and sensorimotor extrapolation fare better than motion extrapolation in the offset condition.Dirk Kerzel & Jochen Müsseler - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):206-207.
    Evidence for motion extrapolation at motion offset is scarce. In contrast, there is abundant evidence that subjects mentally extrapolate the future trajectory of weak motion signals at motion offset. Further, pointing movements overshoot at motion offset. We believe that mental and sensorimotor extrapolation is sufficient to solve the problem of perceptual latencies. Both present the advantage of being much more flexible than motion extrapolation.
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  • Backward referral, flash-lags, and quantum free will: A response to commentaries on articles by Pockett, Klein, Gomes, and trevena and Miller.Susan Pockett - 2002 - Consciousness and Cognition 11 (2):314-325.
    The first priority of this response is to address Libet's rebuttal of my reinterpretation of his data. Then, because many authors have commented on various aspects of the debate, the rest of the response is organized in terms of subject matter, not as replies to each individual commentator. First, I reply to an objection expressed by two separate commentators to part of my reinterpretation of those of Libet's data supposedly supporting backward referral. This leads to a brief discussion of the (...)
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  • Visuomotor extrapolation.David Whitney - 2008 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):220-221.
    Accurate perception of moving objects would be useful; accurate visually guided action is crucial. Visual motion across the scene influences perceived object location and the trajectory of reaching movements to objects. In this commentary, I propose that the visual system assigns the position of any object based on the predominant motion present in the scene, and that this is used to guide reaching movements to compensate for delays in visuomotor processing.
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  • The illusionist and the folk: On the role of conscious planning in intentionality judgments.Silvia Felletti & Fabio Paglieri - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (6):871-888.
    Illusionism is a prominent hypothesis about action control, according to which acts that we consider voluntary are nevertheless caused by unconscious brain events, and thus our subjective experience of consciously willing them is ultimately illusory. Illusionism can be understood as either an ontological thesis or a phenomenological claim, but both versions are vulnerable to a line of attack based on the role of long-term planning in action control. According to this objection, the evidence upon which illusionism rests is confined to (...)
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  • Timing of conscious experience: Reply to the 2002 commentaries on Libet’s findings.Benjamin Libet - 2003 - Consciousness and Cognition 12 (3):321-331.
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