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  1. Representation-hunger reconsidered.Jan Degenaar & Erik Myin - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3639-3648.
    According to a standard representationalist view cognitive capacities depend on internal content-carrying states. Recent alternatives to this view have been met with the reaction that they have, at best, limited scope, because a large range of cognitive phenomena—those involving absent and abstract features—require representational explanations. Here we challenge the idea that the consideration of cognition regarding the absent and the abstract can move the debate about representationalism along. Whether or not cognition involving the absent and the abstract requires the positing (...)
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  • Robots With Internal Models A Route to Machine Consciousness?Owen Holland & Rod Goodman - 2003 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 10 (4-5):4-5.
    We are engineers, and our view of consciousness is shaped by an engineering ambition: we would like to build a conscious machine. We begin by acknowledging that we may be a little disadvantaged, in that consciousness studies do not form part of the engineering curriculum, and so we may be starting from a position of considerable ignorance as regards the study of consciousness itself. In practice, however, this may not set us back very far; almost a decade ago, Crick wrote: (...)
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  • Creativity and emotion: Reformulating the Romantic theory of art.Joseph L. Flanders - forthcoming - Cognitio: Matter and Mind.
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  • Locked-in syndrome: a challenge for embodied cognitive science.Miriam Kyselo & Ezequiel Di Paolo - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (3):517-542.
    Embodied approaches in cognitive science hold that the body is crucial for cognition. What this claim amounts to, however, still remains unclear. This paper contributes to its clarification by confronting three ways of understanding embodiment—the sensorimotor approach, extended cognition and enactivism—with Locked-in syndrome. LIS is a case of severe global paralysis in which patients are unable to move and yet largely remain cognitively intact. We propose that LIS poses a challenge to embodied approaches to cognition requiring them to make explicit (...)
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  • Towards a Vygotskyan Cognitive Robotics: The Role of Language as a Cognitive Tool.Marco Mirolli - 2011 - New Ideas in Psychology 29:298-311.
    Cognitive Robotics can be defined as the study of cognitive phenomena by their modeling in physical artifacts such as robots. This is a very lively and fascinating field which has already given fundamental contributions to our understanding of natural cognition. Nonetheless, robotics has to date addressed mainly very basic, low­level cognitive phenomena like sensory­motor coordination, perception, and navigation, and it is not clear how the current approach might scale up to explain high­level human cognition. In this paper we argue that (...)
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  • Autopoiesis, Life, Mind and Cognition: Bases for a Proper Naturalistic Continuity. [REVIEW]Mario Villalobos - 2013 - Biosemiotics 6 (3):379-391.
    The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of the same functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and following Maturana’s autopoietic theory (...)
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  • Dreaming the Whole Cat: Generative Models, Predictive Processing, and the Enactivist Conception of Perceptual Experience.Andy Clark - 2012 - Mind 121 (483):753-771.
    Does the material basis of conscious experience extend beyond the boundaries of the brain and central nervous system? In Clark 2009 I reviewed a number of ‘enactivist’ arguments for such a view and found none of them compelling. Ward (2012) rejects my analysis on the grounds that the enactivist deploys an essentially world-involving concept of experience that transforms the argumentative landscape in a way that makes the enactivist conclusion inescapable. I present an alternative (prediction-and-generative-model-based) account that neatly accommodates all the (...)
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  • Assessing Artificial Consciousness.Igor Aleksander, Susan Stuart, Tom Ziemke, Ron Chrisley & Uziel Awret - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (7):95-110.
    While the recent special issue of JCS on machine consciousness (Volume 14, Issue 7) was in preparation, a collection of papers on the same topic, entitled Artificial Consciousness and edited by Antonio Chella and Riccardo Manzotti, was published. 1 The editors of the JCS special issue, Ron Chrisley, Robert Clowes and Steve Torrance, thought it would be a timely and productive move to have authors of papers in their collection review the papers in the Chella and Manzotti book, and include (...)
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  • Being there: Putting philosopher, researcher and student together again. [REVIEW]C. A. Hooker - 1998 - Metascience 7 (1):70-95.
    A SLOW revolution in cognitive science is banishing this century's technological conception of mind as disembodied pure thought, namely a material symbol manipulation, and replacing it with next century's conception: mind as the organisation of bodily interaction, intelligent robotics. Here is Clark: Intelligence and understanding are rooted not in the presence and manipulation of explicit, language-like data structures, but in something more earthy: the tuning of basic responses to a real world that enables an embodied organism to sense, act and (...)
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  • Towards a General Theory of Antirepresentationalism.Francisco Calvo Garzón - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):259-292.
    This work represents an attempt to stake out the landscape for dynamicism based on a radical dismissal of the information-processing paradigm that dominates the philosophy of cognitive science. In Section 2, after setting up the basic toolkit of a theory of minimal representationalism, I introduce the central tenets of dynamic systems theory (DST) by discussing recent research in the dynamics of embodiment (Thelen et al. [2001]) in the perseverative-reaching literature. A recent proposal on the dynamics of representation--the dynamic field approach (...)
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  • Practical success and the nature of truth.Chase Wrenn - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):451-470.
    Philip Kitcher has argued for a causal correspondence view of truth, as against a deflationary view, on the grounds that the former is better poised than the latter to explain systematically successful patterns of action. Though Kitcher is right to focus on systematically successful action, rather than singular practical successes, he is wrong to conclude that causal correspondence theories are capable of explaining systematic success. Rather, I argue, truth bears no explanatory relation to systematic practical success. Consequently, the causal correspondence (...)
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  • Six Views of Embodied Cognition.Margaret Wilson - 2002 - Psychonomic Bulletin and Review 9 (4):625--636.
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  • Transhumanismo, pregunta a la naturaleza humana.Giovanni Fernández Valdés - 2020 - Perseitas 9:389-421.
    El transhumanismo como filosofía e ideología tecnologicista tiene cada vez más adeptos y se coloca en los ámbitos académicos como una posición positiva, posible y deseable. Su implementación aparece solapada en una vida cotidiana que depende, como nunca antes, de los avances tecnológicos. La posición que manejaremos es que esta ideología, que sobredimensiona el papel de la tecnología en la sociedad, tiene una visión limitada respecto con los conflictos éticos, económicos y sociales que dimanan de sus presupuestos. El problema no (...)
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  • The problem of representation between extended and enactive approaches to cognition.Marta Caravà - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Bologna
    4Es approaches to cognition draw an unconventional picture of cognitive processes and of the mind. Instead of conceiving of cognition as a process that always takes place within the boundaries of the skull and the skin, these approaches hold that cognition is a situated process that often extends beyond human agents’ physical boundaries. In particular, supporters of the extended mind theory and of the enactive approach claim that embodied action in a perceptually complex environment is constitutive of cognitive processes, and (...)
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  • Making imagination even more embodied: imagination, constraint and epistemic relevance.Zuzanna Rucińska & Shaun Gallagher - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8143-8170.
    This paper considers the epistemic role that embodiment plays in imagining. We focus on two aspects of embodied cognition understood in its strong sense: explicit motoric processes related to performance, and neuronal processes rooted in bodily and action processes, and describe their role in imagining. The paper argues that these two aspects of strongly embodied cognition can play distinctive and positive roles in constraining imagining, thereby complementing Amy Kind's argument for the epistemic relevance of imagination "under constraints" and Magdalena Balcerak (...)
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  • Strong liberal representationalism.Marc Artiga - 2022 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (3):645-667.
    The received view holds that there is a significant divide between full-blown representational states and so called ‘detectors’, which are mechanisms set off by specific stimuli that trigger a particular effect. The main goal of this paper is to defend the idea that many detectors are genuine representations, a view that I call ‘Strong Liberal Representationalism’. More precisely, I argue that ascribing semantic properties to them contributes to an explanation of behavior, guides research in useful ways and can accommodate misrepresentation.
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  • Structural representations do not meet the job description challenge.Marco Facchin - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5479-5508.
    Structural representations are increasingly popular in philosophy of cognitive science. A key virtue they seemingly boast is that of meeting Ramsey's job description challenge. For this reason, structural representations appear tailored to play a clear representational role within cognitive architectures. Here, however, I claim that structural representations do not meet the job description challenge. This is because even our most demanding account of their functional profile is satisfied by at least some receptors, which paradigmatically fail the job description challenge. Hence, (...)
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  • Anti-representationalism: Not a Well-founded Theory of Cognition.Michael David Kirchhoff - 2011 - Res Cogitans 8 (2).
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  • The Emotional Mind: the affective roots of culture and cognition.Stephen Asma & Rami Gabriel - 2019 - Harvard University Press.
    Tracing the leading role of emotions in the evolution of the mind, a philosopher and a psychologist pair up to reveal how thought and culture owe less to our faculty for reason than to our capacity to feel. Many accounts of the human mind concentrate on the brain’s computational power. Yet, in evolutionary terms, rational cognition emerged only the day before yesterday. For nearly 200 million years before humans developed a capacity to reason, the emotional centers of the brain were (...)
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  • Robots as Powerful Allies for the Study of Embodied Cognition from the Bottom Up.Matej Hoffmann & Rolf Pfeifer - 2018 - In Albert Newen, Leon De Bruin & Shaun Gallagher (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of 4E Cognition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    A large body of compelling evidence has been accumulated demonstrating that embodiment – the agent’s physical setup, including its shape, materials, sensors and actuators – is constitutive for any form of cognition and as a consequence, models of cognition need to be embodied. In contrast to methods from empirical sciences to study cognition, robots can be freely manipulated and virtually all key variables of their embodiment and control programs can be systematically varied. As such, they provide an extremely powerful tool (...)
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  • The body as laboratory: Prediction-error minimization, embodiment, and representation.Christopher Burr & Max Jones - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):586-600.
    In his paper, Jakob Hohwy outlines a theory of the brain as an organ for prediction-error minimization, which he claims has the potential to profoundly alter our understanding of mind and cognition. One manner in which our understanding of the mind is altered, according to PEM, stems from the neurocentric conception of the mind that falls out of the framework, which portrays the mind as “inferentially-secluded” from its environment. This in turn leads Hohwy to reject certain theses of embodied cognition. (...)
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  • Complexity and individual psychology.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (2):203-219.
    In this paper we examine the question of whether complexity-like explanations can be applied to the psychology of individuals, and its implications for the scope of complexity explanations of social phenomena. We start by outlining two representational-cum-computational models of the mind—a symbolic model and a networks or connectionist one—and their pros and cons. Based on this we then outline a radical, non-representational and non-computational alternative model that has been gaining ground recently, and which has significant affinities with complexity explanations in (...)
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  • Predictive coding and representationalism.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2016 - Synthese 193 (2).
    According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...)
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  • Explaining Cognitive Phenomena with Internal Representations: A Mechanistic Perspective.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2015 - Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 40 (1):63-90.
    Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...)
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  • Action guidance is not enough, representations need correspondence too: A plea for a two-factor theory of representation.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2015 - New Ideas in Psychology:doi:10.1016/j.newideapsych.2015..
    The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive (...)
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  • Review of Andy Clark, Being There: putting brain, body, and world together again. [REVIEW]John Sutton - 1998 - Metascience 7:90-95.
    A slow revolution in cognitive science is banishing this century's technological conception of mind as disembodied pure thought, namely a material symbol manipulation, and replacing it with next century's conception: mind as the organisation of bodily interaction, intelligent robotics.
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  • Embodying the mind and representing the body.Adrian John Tetteh Alsmith & Frédérique de Vignemont - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):1-13.
    Does the existence of body representations undermine the explanatory role of the body? Or do certain types of representation depend so closely upon the body that their involvement in a cognitive task implicates the body itself? In the introduction of this special issue we explore lines of tension and complement that might hold between the notions of embodiment and body representations, which remain too often neglected or obscure. To do so, we distinguish two conceptions of embodiment that either put weight (...)
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  • Representations in Dynamical Embodied Agents: Re-Analyzing a Minimally Cognitive Model Agent.Marco Mirolli - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (5):870-895.
    Understanding the role of ‘‘representations’’ in cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated, dynamical cognition. To make progress, I follow the approach proposed by an influential representational skeptic, Randall Beer: building artificial agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors and assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve representations. Hence, I operationalize the concept of representing as ‘‘standing in,’’ and I look for representations in embodied agents involved in simple categorization tasks. In a (...)
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  • (1 other version)Neo-pragmatism and enactive intentionality.Shaun Gallagher & Katsunori Miyahara - 2012 - In Jay Schulkin (ed.), Action, perception and the brain: adaptation and cephalic expression. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
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  • Philosophy for the Rest of Cognitive Science.Nigel Stepp, Anthony Chemero & Michael T. Turvey - 2011 - Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):425-437.
    Cognitive science has always included multiple methodologies and theoretical commitments. The philosophy of cognitive science should embrace, or at least acknowledge, this diversity. Bechtel’s (2009a) proposed philosophy of cognitive science, however, applies only to representationalist and mechanist cognitive science, ignoring the substantial minority of dynamically oriented cognitive scientists. As an example of nonrepresentational, dynamical cognitive science, we describe strong anticipation as a model for circadian systems (Stepp & Turvey, 2009). We then propose a philosophy of science appropriate to nonrepresentational, dynamical (...)
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  • (1 other version)Structured Thoughts: The Spatial-Motor View.Benoit Hardy-Vallée & Pierre Poirier - 2005 - In Markus Werning, Edouard Machery & Gerhard Schurz (eds.), Applications to Linguistics, Psychology and Neuroscience. De Gruyter. pp. 229-250.
    Is thinking necessarily linguistic? Do we think with words, to use Bermudez’s (2003) phrase? Or does thinking occur in some other, yet to be determined, representational format? Or again do we think in various formats, switching from one to the other as tasks demand? In virtue perhaps of the ambiguous na- ture of first-person introspective data on the matter, philosophers have tradition- ally disagreed on this question, some thinking that thought had to be pictorial, other insisting that it could not (...)
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  • Cognitive maps and the language of thought.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2):377-407.
    Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation drawn from probabilistic robotics. These models involve computations defined over cognitive maps, which have geometric rather than logical (...)
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  • Coordinating with the future: The anticipatory nature of representation. [REVIEW]Giovanni Pezzulo - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (2):179-225.
    Humans and other animals are able not only to coordinate their actions with their current sensorimotor state, but also to imagine, plan and act in view of the future, and to realize distal goals. In this paper we discuss whether or not their future-oriented conducts imply (future-oriented) representations. We illustrate the role played by anticipatory mechanisms in natural and artificial agents, and we propose a notion of representation that is grounded in the agent’s predictive capabilities. Therefore, we argue that the (...)
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  • Reasons, robots and the extended mind.Andy Clark - 2001 - Mind and Language 16 (2):121-145.
    A suitable project for the new Millenium is to radically reconfigure our image of human rationality. Such a project is already underway, within the Cognitive Sciences, under the umbrellas of work in Situated Cognition, Distributed and De-centralized Cogition, Real-world Robotics and Artificial Life1. Such approaches, however, are often criticized for giving certain aspects of rationality too wide a berth. They focus their attention on on such superficially poor cousins as.
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  • Bodily structure and body representation.Adrian J. T. Alsmith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (3):2193-2222.
    This paper is concerned with representational explanations of how one experiences and acts with one’s body as an integrated whole. On the standard view, accounts of bodily experience and action must posit a corresponding representational structure: a representation of the body as an integrated whole. The aim of this paper is to show why we should instead favour the minimal view: given the nature of the body, and representation of its parts, accounts of the structure of bodily experience and action (...)
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  • Genic representation: Reconciling content and causal complexity.M. Wheeler & A. Clark - 1999 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 50 (1):103-135.
    Some recent cognitive-scientific research suggests that a considerable amount of intelligent action is generated not by the systematic activity of internal representations, but by complex interactions involving neural, bodily, and environmental factors. Following an analysis of this threat to representational explanation, we pursue an analogy between the role of genes in the production of biological form and the role of neural states in the production of behaviour, in order to develop a notion of genic representation. In both cases an appeal (...)
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  • A cognitive architecture that combines internal simulation with a global workspace.Murray Shanahan - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (2):433-449.
    This paper proposes a brain-inspired cognitive architecture that incorporates approximations to the concepts of consciousness, imagination, and emotion. To emulate the empirically established cognitive efficacy of conscious as opposed to non-conscious information processing in the mammalian brain, the architecture adopts a model of information flow from global workspace theory. Cognitive functions such as anticipation and planning are realised through internal simulation of interaction with the environment. Action selection, in both actual and internally simulated interaction with the environment, is mediated by (...)
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  • Modelling ourselves: what the free energy principle reveals about our implicit notions of representation.Matt Sims & Giovanni Pezzulo - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7801-7833.
    Predictive processing theories are increasingly popular in philosophy of mind; such process theories often gain support from the Free Energy Principle —a normative principle for adaptive self-organized systems. Yet there is a current and much discussed debate about conflicting philosophical interpretations of FEP, e.g., representational versus non-representational. Here we argue that these different interpretations depend on implicit assumptions about what qualifies as representational. We deploy the Free Energy Principle instrumentally to distinguish four main notions of representation, which focus on organizational, (...)
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  • From allostatic agents to counterfactual cognisers: active inference, biological regulation, and the origins of cognition.Andrew W. Corcoran, Giovanni Pezzulo & Jakob Hohwy - 2020 - Biology and Philosophy 35 (3):1-45.
    What is the function of cognition? On one influential account, cognition evolved to co-ordinate behaviour with environmental change or complexity. Liberal interpretations of this view ascribe cognition to an extraordinarily broad set of biological systems—even bacteria, which modulate their activity in response to salient external cues, would seem to qualify as cognitive agents. However, equating cognition with adaptive flexibility per se glosses over important distinctions in the way biological organisms deal with environmental complexity. Drawing on contemporary advances in theoretical biology (...)
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  • Author’s response.Andy Clarke - 1998 - Metascience 7 (1):95-104.
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  • Emotional cognitive steps towards consciousness.Will N. Browne & Richard J. Hussey - 2009 - International Journal of Machine Consciousness 1 (2):203-211.
    The academic journey to a widely acknowledged Machine Consciousness is anticipated to be an emotional one. Both in terms of the active debate provoked by the subject and a hypothesized need to encapsulate an analogue of emotions in an artificial system in order to progress towards machine consciousness. This paper considers the inspiration that the concepts related to emotion may contribute to cognitive systems when approaching conscious-like behavior. Specifically, emotions can set goals including balancing explore versus exploit, facilitate action in (...)
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  • Representationalism vs. anti-representationalism: A debate for the sake of appearance.Pim Haselager, Andre´ de Groot & Hans van Rappard - 2003 - Philosophical Psychology 16 (1):5-23.
    In recent years the cognitive science community has witnessed the rise of a new, dynamical approach to cognition. This approach entails a framework in which cognition and behavior are taken to result from complex dynamical interactions between brain, body, and environment. The advent of the dynamical approach is grounded in a dissatisfaction with the classical computational view of cognition. A particularly strong claim has been that cognitive systems do not rely on internal representations and computations. Focusing on this claim, we (...)
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  • Animal vs. human rationality-cum-conceptuality: a philosophical perspective on developmental psychology.Yakir Levin & Itzhak Aharon - 2022 - Mind and Society 21 (1):63-88.
    In this paper, we first extract from Susan Carey’s seminal account of the origin of concepts a notion of rationality, which is applicable to human infants and non-human animals; significantly different from the notions of rationality prevalent in behavioral ecology and yet, like these notions, amenable to empirical testing; conceptually more fundamental than the latter notions. Relatedly, this notion underlies a proto-conceptuality ascribable, by a key component of Carey’s account, to human infants and non-human animals. Based on a Kantian-inspired analysis (...)
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  • Are Minimal Representations Still Representations?1.Shaun Gallagher - 2008 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 16 (3):351-369.
    I examine the following question: Do actions require representations that are intrinsic to the action itself? Recent work by Mark Rowlands, Michael Wheeler, and Andy Clark suggests that actions may require a minimal form of representation. I argue that the various concepts of minimal representation on offer do not apply to action per se and that a non‐representationalist account that focuses on dynamic systems of self‐organizing continuous reciprocal causation at the sub‐personal level is superior. I further recommend a scientific pragmatism (...)
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  • Is my Memory an Extended Notebook?Paul Loader - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):167-184.
    Clark and Chalmer’s conception of spatially extended memory is underpinned by an objectified conception of biological memory. To the extent that this can be identified with a ‘storage’ approach to memory, criticisms of it are well known and an alternative approach, perhaps more suited to an enactive account of cognition, might be one which focuses on remembering as a type of action. In the Otto story the objectification of memory is apparent not only in C&C’s characterization of the notebook but (...)
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  • The extended mind: born to be wild? A lesson from action-understanding. [REVIEW]Nivedita Gangopadhyay - 2011 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (3):377-397.
    The extended mind hypothesis (Clark and Chalmers in Analysis 58(1):7–19, 1998; Clark 2008) is an influential hypothesis in philosophy of mind and cognitive science. I argue that the extended mind hypothesis is born to be wild. It has undeniable and irrepressible tendencies of flouting grounding assumptions of the traditional information-processing paradigm. I present case-studies from social cognition which not only support the extended mind proposal but also bring out its inherent wildness. In particular, I focus on cases of action-understanding and (...)
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  • Making Complexity Simpler: Multivariability and Metastability in the Brain.Andrew And Alexander Fingelkurts - 2004 - International Journal of Neuroscience 114 (7):843 - 862.
    This article provides a retrospective, current and prospective overview on developments in brain research and neuroscience. Both theoretical and empirical studies are considered, with emphasis in the concept of multivariability and metastability in the brain. In this new view on the human brain, the potential multivariability of the neuronal networks appears to be far from continuous in time, but confined by the dynamics of short-term local and global metastable brain states. The article closes by suggesting some of the implications of (...)
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  • How designers work - making sense of authentic cognitive activities.Henrik Gedenryd - 1998 - Dissertation, Lund University
    In recent years, the growing scientific interest in design has led to great advances in our knowledge of authentic design processes. However, as these findings go counter to the existing theories in both design research and cognitive science, they pose a serious challenge for both disciplines: there is a wide gap between what the existing theories predict and what designers actually do. At the same time, there is a growing movement of research on authentic cognitive activities, which has among other (...)
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  • Phenomenological coping skills and the striatal memory system.Elizabeth Ennen - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (4):299-325.
    Most cognitive scientists are committed to some version of representationalism, the view that intelligent behavior is caused by internal processes that involve computations over representations. Phenomenologists, however, argue that certain types of intelligent behavior, engaged coping skills, are nonrepresentational. Recent neuroscientific work on multiple memory systems indicates that while many types of intelligent behavior are representational, the types of intelligent behavior cited by phenomenologists are indeed nonrepresentational. This neuroscientific research thus vindicates a key phenomenological claim about the nature of intelligent (...)
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  • The Dynamical Challenge.Andy Clark - 1997 - Cognitive Science 21 (4):461-481.
    Recent studies such as Thelen and Smith, Kelso, Van Gelder, Beer, and others have presented a forceful case for a dynamical systems approach to understanding cognition and adaptive behavior. These studies call into question some foundational assumptions concerning the nature of cognitive scientific explanation and the role of notions such as internal representation and computation. These are exciting and important challenges. But they must be handled with care. It is all to easy in this debate to lose sight of the (...)
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