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  1. When the Window Cracks: Transparency and the Fractured Self in Depersonalisation.Anna Ciaunica, Jane Charlton & Harry Farmer - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 20 (1):1-19.
    There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter thetransparencyof basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity (...)
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  • Personal memories.Marina Trakas - 2015 - Dissertation, Macquarie University
    This thesis is intended to analyze a mental phenomenon widely neglected in current philosophical discussions: personal memories. The first part presents a general framework to better understand what personal memories are, how we access our personal past and what we access about our personal past. Chapter 1 introduces traditional theories of memory: direct realism and representationalism in their different versions, as well as some objections. I defend here a particular form of representationalism that is based on the distinction between content, (...)
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  • On the role of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty.Dylan Trigg - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (2):275-289.
    This essay considers the role of depersonalization in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. While there has been a modest amount of interest in depersonalization from a phenomenological perspective, a critical exploration of the theme of depersonalization in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking itself remains overlooked ; Colombetti and Ratcliffe. This is an oddity, given that the theme of depersonalization proves instructive in Merleau-Ponty’s account of the constitution of the subject, and appears within Phenomenology of Perception at key points in his thinking. This paper serves (...)
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  • Bodily feelings and felt inclinations.Rowland Stout - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):277-292.
    The paper defends a version of the perceptual account of bodily feelings, according to which having a feeling is feeling something about one’s body. But it rejects the idea, familiar in the work of William James, that what one feels when one has a feeling is something biological about one’s body. Instead it argues that to have a bodily feeling is to feel an apparent bodily indication of something – a bodily appearance. Being aware of what one’s body is apparently (...)
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  • Losing Ourselves: Active Inference, Depersonalization, and Meditation.George Deane, Mark Miller & Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.
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  • A critical examination of existential feeling.Jussi A. Saarinen - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):363-374.
    Matthew Ratcliffe has argued that existential feelings form a distinct class of bodily and non-conceptual feelings that pre-intentionally structure our intentional experience of others, the world, and ourselves. In this article, I will identify and discuss three interrelated areas of concern for Ratcliffe’s theory of existential feelings. First, the distinct senses in which existential feelings are felt as background bodily feelings and as spaces of possibility calls for further clarification. Second, the nature of the suggested bi-directional relationship between existential feelings (...)
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  • The interoceptive underpinnings of the feeling of being alive. Damasio’s insights at work.Emilia Barile - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 1 (3):1-23.
    The feeling of being alive still constitutes a major blind spot of contemporary affective sciences research. The mainstream view accepts it as an ‘umbrella notion’ comprising different states, such as M. Ratcliffe’s «feelings of being», T. Fuchs’s «feeling of being alive», E.M. Engelen’s «Gefühl des Lebendigseins», etc. In contrast, I argue for an account of the feeling of being alive as a unique feeling that can be described in several ways. Empirical support for this view comes mainly from Carvalho and (...)
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  • Emotion and the Unreal Self: Depersonalization Disorder and De-Affectualization.Nick Medford - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):139-144.
    Depersonalization disorder (DPD) is a psychiatric condition in which there is a pervasive change in the quality of subjective experience, in the absence of psychosis. The core complaint is a persistent and disturbing feeling that experience of oneself and the world has become empty, lifeless, and not fully real. A greatly reduced emotional responsivity, or “de-affectualization,” is frequently described. This article examines the phenomenology and neurobiology of DPD with a particular emphasis on the emotional aspects. It is argued that the (...)
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  • The rational role of the perceptual sense of reality.Paweł Gładziejewski - 2022 - Mind and Language 38 (4):1021-1040.
    Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...)
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  • Past and Future Explanations for Depersonalization and Derealization Disorder: A Role for Predictive Coding.Andrew Gatus, Graham Jamieson & Bruce Stevenson - 2022 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 16.
    Depersonalization and derealization refer to states of dissociation in which one feels a sense of alienation in relation to one’s self and environment, respectively. Whilst transient episodes often diminish without treatment, chronic experiences of DP and DR may last for years, with common treatments lacking a strong evidence base for their efficacy. We propose a theoretical explanation of DP and DR based on interoceptive predictive coding, and discuss how transient experiences of DP and DR may be induced in the non-clinical (...)
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  • Introduction to the Special Section on “Emotions and Feelings in Psychiatric Illness”.Anthony P. Atkinson & Matthew Ratcliffe - 2012 - Emotion Review 4 (2):119-121.
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