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  1. Making reasoning more reasonable: Event-coherence and assemblies.Günther Palm - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):470-470.
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  • Aristotelian Causation and Neural Correlates of Consciousness.Matthew Owen - 2020 - Topoi 39 (5):1-12.
    Neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) are neural states or processes correlated with consciousness. The aim of this article is to present a coherent explanatory model of NCC that is informed by Thomas Aquinas’s human ontology and Aristotle’s metaphysics of causation. After explicating four starting principles regarding causation and mind-body dependence, I propose the Mind-Body Powers model of NCC.
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  • A sensorimotor account of vision and visual consciousness.J. Kevin O’Regan & Alva Noë - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (5):883-917.
    Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...)
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  • Psychological implications of the synchronicity hypothesis.Stellan Ohlsson - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):469-469.
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  • A Higher-order, Dispositional Theory of Qualia.John O'dea - 2007 - Annals of the Japan Association for Philosophy of Science 15 (2):81-93.
    Higher-order theories of consciousness, such as those of Armstrong, Rosenthal and Lycan, typically distinguish sharply between consciousness and phenomenal character, or qualia. The higher-order states posited by these theories are intended only as explanations of consciousness, and not of qualia. In this paper I argue that the positing of higher-order perceptions may help to explain qualia. If we are realists about qualia, conceived as those intrinsic properties of our experience of which we are introspectibly aware, then higher-order perception might have (...)
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  • Computational and biological constraints in the psychology of reasoning.Mike Oaksford & Mike Malloch - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):468-469.
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  • Experience and the active mind.Alva Noë - 2001 - Synthese 129 (1):41-60.
    This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes (...)
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  • A Map of Consciousness Studies: Questions and Approaches.Takuya Niikawa - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:530152.
    This article aims to present a map of consciousness studies, which consists of a list of fundamental questions about consciousness and existing approaches to them. The question list includes five fundamental categories: Definitional, Phenomenological, Epistemological, Ontological, and Axiological. Each fundamental category is divided into more determinate questions. Existing approaches to each question are also classified into a few groups, presenting principal researchers who take each kind of approach. In the final section, I demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed map of (...)
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  • Neural correlates of consciousness reconsidered.Joseph Neisser - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):681-690.
    It is widely accepted among philosophers that neuroscientists are conducting a search for the neural correlates of consciousness, or NCC. Chalmers conceptualized this research program as the attempt to correlate the contents of conscious experience with the contents of representations in specific neural populations. A notable claim on behalf of this interpretation is that the neutral language of “correlates” frees us from philosophical disputes over the mind/body relation, allowing the science to move independently. But the experimental paradigms and explanatory canons (...)
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  • Sensory consciousness explained (better) in terms of 'corporality' and 'alerting capacity'.Erik Myin - 2005 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (4):369-387.
    How could neural processes be associated with phenomenal consciousness? We present a way to answer this question by taking the counterintuitive stance that the sensory feel of an experience is not a thing that happens to us, but a thing we do: a skill we exercise. By additionally noting that sensory systems possess two important, objectively measurable properties, corporality and alerting capacity, we are able to explain why sensory experience possesses a sensory feel, but thinking and other mental processes do (...)
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  • ‘Consciousness’ and Brain Functions: A Re-look from Functionalist Perspective.Suresh Muruganandam - 2022 - International Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):1.
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  • What we know and the LTKB.Stanley Munsat - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):466-467.
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  • Reviews. [REVIEW]Ioan Muntean, Patrick McGivern & Dean Rickles - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (1):107 – 121.
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  • Dynamical Emergence Theory (DET): A Computational Account of Phenomenal Consciousness.Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete & Shimon Edelman - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (1):1-21.
    Scientific theories of consciousness identify its contents with the spatiotemporal structure of neural population activity. We follow up on this approach by stating and motivating Dynamical Emergence Theory, which defines the amount and structure of experience in terms of the intrinsic topology and geometry of a physical system’s collective dynamics. Specifically, we posit that distinct perceptual states correspond to coarse-grained macrostates reflecting an optimal partitioning of the system’s state space—a notion that aligns with several ideas and results from computational neuroscience (...)
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  • Quantification is Incapable of Directly Enhancing Life Quality through Healthcare.Peter A. Moskovitz - 2013 - Open Journal of Philosophy 3 (4):18.
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  • Homing in on consciousness in the nervous system: An action-based synthesis.Ezequiel Morsella, Christine A. Godwin, Tiffany K. Jantz, Stephen C. Krieger & Adam Gazzaley - 2016 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 39:1-70.
    What is the primary function of consciousness in the nervous system? The answer to this question remains enigmatic, not so much because of a lack of relevant data, but because of the lack of a conceptual framework with which to interpret the data. To this end, we have developed Passive Frame Theory, an internally coherent framework that, from an action-based perspective, synthesizes empirically supported hypotheses from diverse fields of investigation. The theory proposes that the primary function of consciousness is well-circumscribed, (...)
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  • A new inverted spectrum thought experiment.Richard Montgomery - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):1963-1983.
    A version of the inverted spectrum thought experiment that disconfirms functionalism for the case of humans’ color experiences has typically been thought to require a certain kind of balancing act. What one needs, it has typically been thought, is a mapping of color experiences onto other color experiences that preserves the similarity and difference relationships among those experiences and the aspects of perceived colors underlying those similarities and differences. However, there are good reasons for being suspicious about whether that is (...)
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  • Reorganization of the Connectivity between Elementary Functions – A Model Relating Conscious States to Neural Connections.Jesper Mogensen & Morten Overgaard - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Closing in on the constitution of consciousness.Steven M. Miller - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.
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  • The Mismeasure of Consciousness: A problem of coordination for the Perceptual Awareness Scale.Matthias Michel - 2018 - Philosophy of Science (5):1239-1249.
    As for most measurement procedures in the course of their development, measures of consciousness face the problem of coordination, i.e., the problem of knowing whether a measurement procedure actually measures what it is intended to measure. I focus on the case of the Perceptual Awareness Scale to illustrate how ignoring this problem leads to ambiguous interpretations of subjective reports in consciousness science. In turn, I show that empirical results based on this measurement procedure might be systematically misinterpreted.
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  • On the dangers of conflating strong and weak versions of a theory of consciousness.Matthias Michel & Hakwan Lau - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (II).
    Some proponents of the Integrated Information Theory of consciousness profess strong views on the Neural Correlates of Consciousness, namely that large swathes of the neocortex, the cerebellum, at least some sensory cortices, and the so-called limbic system are all not essential for any form of conscious experiences. We argue that this connection is not incidental. Conflation between strong and weak versions of the theory has led these researchers to adopt definitions of NCC that are inconsistent with their own previous definitions, (...)
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  • Minority Reports: Consciousness and the Prefrontal Cortex.Matthias Michel & Jorge Morales - 2020 - Mind and Language 35 (4):493-513.
    Whether the prefrontal cortex is part of the neural substrates of consciousness is currently debated. Against prefrontal theories of consciousness, many have argued that neural activity in the prefrontal cortex does not correlate with consciousness but with subjective reports. We defend prefrontal theories of consciousness against this argument. We surmise that the requirement for reports is not a satisfying explanation of the difference in neural activity between conscious and unconscious trials, and that prefrontal theories of consciousness come out of this (...)
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  • Energy, information, detection, and action.Claire F. Michaels & Raoul R. D. Oudejans - 2001 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (2):230-230.
    Before one can talk about global arrays and multimodal detection, one must be clear about the concept of information: How is it different from energy and how is it detected? And can it come to specify a needed movement? We consider these issues in our commentary.
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  • The integrated information theory of consciousness: A case of mistaken identity.Bjorn Merker, Kenneth Williford & David Rudrauf - 2022 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 45:e41.
    Giulio Tononi's integrated information theory (IIT) proposes explaining consciousness by directly identifying it with integrated information. We examine the construct validity of IIT's measure of consciousness,phi(Φ), by analyzing its formal properties, its relation to key aspects of consciousness, and its co-variation with relevant empirical circumstances. Our analysis shows that IIT's identification of consciousness with the causal efficacy with which differentiated networks accomplish global information transfer (which is what Φ in fact measures) is mistaken. This misidentification has the consequence of requiring (...)
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  • Consciousness, type physicalism, and inference to the best explanation.Brian P. McLaughlin - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):266-304.
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  • Little “me”.Drew McDermott - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):217-218.
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  • The cognitive foundations of visual consciousness: Why should we favour a processing approach?Francesco Marchi & Albert Newen - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):247-264.
    How can we investigate the foundations of consciousness? In addressing this question, we will focus on the two main strategies that authors have adopted so far. On the one hand, there is research aimed at characterizing a specific content, which should account for conscious states. We may call this the content approach. On the other hand, one finds the processing approach, which proposes to look for a particular way of processing to account for consciousness.. Our aim, in this paper, is (...)
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  • Reflections on reflexive reasoning.David L. Martin - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):466-466.
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  • A Skeptical View on the Physics-Consciousness Explanatory Gap.Mario Martinez-Saito - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (6):1081-1110.
    The epistemological chasm between how we (implicitly and subjectively) perceive or imagine the actual world and how we (explicitly and “objectively”) think of its underlying entities has motivated perhaps the most disconcerting impasse in human thought: the explanatory gap between the phenomenal and physical properties of the world. Here, I advocate a combination of philosophical skepticism and simplicity as an informed approach to arbitrate among theories of consciousness. I argue that the explanatory gap is rightly a gap in our understanding, (...)
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  • The processing of information is not conscious, but its products often are.George Mandler - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):688-689.
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  • Empirical status of Block's phenomenal/access distinction.Bruce Mangan - 1997 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 20 (1):153-154.
    P/A (Block's phenomenal/access) confounds a logical distinction with an empirical claim. Success of P/A in its logical role has almost no bearing on its plausibility as an empirical thesis (i.e., that two kinds of consciousness exist). The advantage of P/A over a single-consciousness assumption is unclear, but one of Block's analogies for P (liquid in a hydraulic computer) may be used to clarify the notion of consciousness as cognitive “hardware.”.
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  • Epi-arguments for epiphenomenalism.Bruce Mangan - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):689-690.
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  • Consciousness is king of the neuronal processors.William A. MacKay - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):687-688.
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  • Carving the mind at its (not necessarily modular) joints.Jack C. Lyons - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (2):277-302.
    The cognitive neuropsychological understanding of a cognitive system is roughly that of a ‘mental organ’, which is independent of other systems, specializes in some cognitive task, and exhibits a certain kind of internal cohesiveness. This is all quite vague, and I try to make it more precise. A more precise understanding of cognitive systems will make it possible to articulate in some detail an alternative to the Fodorian doctrine of modularity (since not all cognitive systems are modules), but it will (...)
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  • UnCartesian materialism and Lockean introspection.William G. Lycan - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):216-217.
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  • Theta band activity in response to emotional expressions and its relationship with gamma band activity as revealed by MEG and advanced beamformer source imaging.Qian Luo, Xi Cheng, Tom Holroyd, Duo Xu, Frederick Carver & R. James Blair - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • A dilemma for Searle's argument for the connection principle.Kirk Ludwig - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):194-5.
    Objections to Searle's argument for the Connection Principle and its consequences (Searle 1990a) fall roughly into three categories: (1) those that focus on problems with the _argument_ for the Connection Principle; (2) those that focus on problems in understanding the _conclusion_ of this argument; (3) those that focus on whether the conclusion has the _consequences_ Searle claims for it. I think the Connection Principle is both true and important, but I do not think that Searle's argument establishes it. The problem (...)
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  • Dennett's mind.Michael Lockwood - 1993 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 36 (1-2):59-72.
    Drawing on data from contemporary experimental psychology and research in artificial intelligence, Dennett argues for a multiple drafts model of human consciousness, which he offers as an alternative to what he calls Cartesian materialism. I argue that the considerations Dennett advances do not, in fact, call for the abandonment of Cartesian materialism. Moreover, the theory presented by Dennett does not, as he claims, succeed in explaining consciousness; in particular, it fails to do justice to qualia. Illuminating though Dennett's discussion is, (...)
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  • Toward an identity theory of consciousness.Dan Lloyd - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):215-216.
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  • Consciousness: Only introspective hindsight?Dan Lloyd - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):686-687.
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  • Such stuff as dreams are made on? Elaborative encoding, the ancient art of memory, and the hippocampus.Sue Llewellyn - 2013 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 36 (6):589-607.
    This article argues that rapid eye movement (REM) dreaming is elaborative encoding for episodic memories. Elaborative encoding in REM can, at least partially, be understood through ancient art of memory (AAOM) principles: visualization, bizarre association, organization, narration, embodiment, and location. These principles render recent memories more distinctive through novel and meaningful association with emotionally salient, remote memories. The AAOM optimizes memory performance, suggesting that its principles may predict aspects of how episodic memory is configured in the brain. Integration and segregation (...)
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  • What is it Like to be a Group Agent?Christian List - 2016 - Noûs:295-319.
    The existence of group agents is relatively widely accepted. Examples are corporations, courts, NGOs, and even entire states. But should we also accept that there is such a thing as group consciousness? I give an overview of some of the key issues in this debate and sketch a tentative argument for the view that group agents lack phenomenal consciousness. In developing my argument, I draw on integrated information theory, a much-discussed theory of consciousness. I conclude by pointing out an implication (...)
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  • The many‐worlds theory of consciousness.Christian List - 2023 - Noûs 57 (2):316-340.
    This paper sketches a new and somewhat heterodox metaphysical theory of consciousness: the “many-worlds theory”. It drops the assumption that all conscious subjects’ experiences are features of one and the same world and instead associates different subjects with different “first-personally centred worlds”. We can think of these as distinct “first-personal realizers” of a shared “third-personal world”, where the latter is supervenient, in a sense to be explained. This is combined with a form of modal realism, according to which different subjects’ (...)
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  • Group Agency and Artificial Intelligence.Christian List - 2021 - Philosophy and Technology (4):1-30.
    The aim of this exploratory paper is to review an under-appreciated parallel between group agency and artificial intelligence. As both phenomena involve non-human goal-directed agents that can make a difference to the social world, they raise some similar moral and regulatory challenges, which require us to rethink some of our anthropocentric moral assumptions. Are humans always responsible for those entities’ actions, or could the entities bear responsibility themselves? Could the entities engage in normative reasoning? Could they even have rights and (...)
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  • What Is It Like to Be Someone Else?Daniel T. Linger - 2010 - Ethos: Journal of the Society for Psychological Anthropology 38 (2):205-229.
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  • Models of conscious timing and the experimental evidence.Benjamin Libet - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):213-215.
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  • Conscious functions and brain processes.Benjamin Libet - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):685-686.
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  • Automatic Processing of Emotional Words in the Absence of Awareness: The Critical Role of P2.Yi Lei, Haoran Dou, Qingming Liu, Wenhai Zhang, Zhonglu Zhang & Hong Li - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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