Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: (...) can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research. (shrink)

Recent developments in AI, especially the spectacular success of Large Language models, have instigated renewed questioning of what remains distinctively human. As AI stands poised to take over more and more human tasks, what is left that distinguishes humans? One way we might identify a humanlike intelligence would be when we detect it telling lies. Yet AIs lack both the intention and the motivation to truly tell lies, instead producing merely bullshit. With neither emotions, embodiment, nor the social awareness that (...) leads to a theory of mind, AIs lack the internal referents on which to judge truth or falsity. When we are deceived by our computers, we need to look for the hidden agent who benefits from the deception. (shrink)

Advancements in artificial intelligence and (social) robotics raise pertinent questions as to how these technologies may help shape the society of the future. The main aim of the chapter is to consider the social and conceptual disruptions that might be associated with social robots, and humanoid social robots in particular. This chapter starts by comparing the concepts of robots and artificial intelligence and briefly explores the origins of these expressions. It then explains the definition of a social robot, as well (...) as the definition of humanoid robots. A key notion in this context is the idea of anthropomorphism: the human tendency to attribute human qualities, not only to our fellow human beings, but also to parts of nature and to technologies. This tendency to anthropomorphize technologies by responding to and interacting with them as if they have human qualities is one of the reasons why social robots (in particular social robots designed to look and behave like human beings) can be socially disruptive. As is explained in the chapter, while some ethics researchers believe that anthropomorphization is a mistake that can lead to various forms of deception, others — including both ethics researchers and social roboticists — believe it can be useful or fitting to treat robots in anthropomorphizing ways. The chapter explores that disagreement by, among other things, considering recent philosophical debates about whether social robots can be moral patients, that is, whether it can make sense to treat them with moral consideration. Where one stands on this issue will depend either on one’s views about whether social robots can have, imitate, or represent morally relevant properties, or on how people relate to social robots in their interactions with them. Lastly, the chapter urges that the ethics of social robots should explore intercultural perspectives, and highlights some recent research on Ubuntu ethics and social robots. (shrink)

Some argue that robots could never be sentient, and thus could never have intrinsic moral status. Others disagree, believing that robots indeed will be sentient and thus will have moral status. But a third group thinks that, even if robots could never have moral status, we still have a strong moral reason to treat some robots as if they do. Drawing on a Kantian argument for indirect animal rights, a number of technology ethicists contend that our treatment of anthropomorphic or (...) even animal-like robots could condition our treatment of humans: treat these robots well, as we would treat humans, or else risk eroding good moral behavior toward humans. But then, this argument also seems to justify giving rights to robots, even if robots lack intrinsic moral status. In recent years, however, this indirect argument in support of robot rights has drawn a number of objections. In this paper I have three goals. First, I will formulate and explicate the Kant-inspired indirect argument meant to support robot rights, making clearer than before its empirical commitments and philosophical presuppositions. Second, I will defend the argument against a number of objections. The result is the fullest explication and defense to date of this well-known and influential but often criticized argument. Third, however, I myself will raise a new concern about the argument’s use as a justification for robot rights. This concern is answerable to some extent, but it cannot be dismissed fully. It shows that, surprisingly, the argument’s advocates have reason to resist, at least somewhat, producing the sorts of robots that, on their view, ought to receive rights. (shrink)

Social robotics aims at designing robots capable of joint interaction with humans. On a conceptual level, sufficient mutual understanding is usually said to be a necessary condition for joint interaction. Against this background, the following questions remain open: in which sense is it legitimate to speak of human–robot joint interaction? What exactly does it mean to speak of humans and robots sufficiently understanding each other to account for human–robot joint interaction? Is such joint interaction effectively possible by reference, e.g., to (...) the mere ascription or simulation of understanding? To answer these questions, we first discuss technical approaches which aim at the implementation of certain aspects of human–human communication and interaction in social robots in order to make robots accessible and understandable to humans and, hence, human–robot joint interaction possible. Second, we examine the human tendency to anthropomorphize in this context, with a view to human understanding of and joint interaction with social robots. Third, we analyze the most prominent concepts of mutual understanding and their implications for human–robot joint interaction. We conclude that it is—at least for the time being—not legitimate to speak of human–robot joint interaction, which has relevant implications both morally and ethically. (shrink)

The article examines the challenges involved in the process of developing artificial ethical agents. The process involves the creators or designing professionals, the procedures to develop an ethical agent and the artificial systems. There are two possibilities available to create artificial ethical agents: (a) programming ethical guidance in the artificial Intelligence (AI)-equipped machines and/or (b) allowing AI-equipped machines to learn ethical decision-making by observing humans. However, it is difficult to fulfil these possibilities due to the subjective nature of ethical decision-making. (...) The challenge related to the developers is that they themselves lack training in ethical skills. The creators who develop an artificial ethical agent should be able to foresee the ethical issues and have knowledge about ethical decision-making to improve the ethical use of AI-equipped machines. The suggestion is that the focus should be on training professionals involved in the process of developing these artificial systems in ethics rather than developing artificial ethical agents and thereby attributing ethical agency to it. (shrink)

Social robots are designed to perform intelligent, emotional, and autonomous behavior in order to establish intimate relationships with humans, for instance, in the context of elderly care. However, the imitation of qualities usually assumed to be necessary for human reciprocal interaction may impact our understanding of social interaction. Against this background, we compare the technical operations based on which social robots imitate human-like behavior with the concepts of emotionality, intelligence, and autonomy as usually attached to humans. In doing so, we (...) aim at making a conceptual contribution to the intuition that the technical imitation of emotional, intelligent, and autonomous behavior differs qualitatively from human forms of emotionality, intelligence, and autonomy. We conclude that the increasing tendency of social robots to imitate human characteristics and the thus increased human tendency of anthropomorphizing technical systems put forth new forms of human–machine interactions (HMI) that call for a critical examination. Thus, the emerging forms of interaction may lead, for instance, to false, reinforced, and perplexing assumptions regarding reciprocity. Therefore, studies are needed that critically examine the potential consequences and psychological effects that may be associated with the use of social robots, especially with regard to vulnerable groups such as children or the elderly. (shrink)

This paper discuss the phenomenon of empathy in social robotics and is divided into three main parts. Initially, I analyse whether it is correct to use this concept to study and describe people’s reactions to robots. I present arguments in favour of the position that people actually do empathise with robots. I also consider what circumstances shape human empathy with these entities. I propose that two basic classes of such factors be distinguished: biological and socio-cognitive. In my opinion, one of (...) the most important among them is a sense of group membership with robots, as it modulates the empathic responses to representatives of our- and other- groups. The sense of group membership with robots may be co-shaped by socio-cognitive factors such as one’s experience, familiarity with the robot and its history, motivation, accepted ontology, stereotypes or language. Finally, I argue in favour of the formulation of a pragmatic and normative framework for manipulations in the level of empathy in human–robot interactions. (shrink)

This paper motivates the idea that social robots should be credited as moral patients, building on an argumentative approach that combines virtue ethics and social recognition theory. Our proposal answers the call for a nuanced ethical evaluation of human-robot interaction that does justice to both the robustness of the social responses solicited in humans by robots and the fact that robots are designed to be used as instruments. On the one hand, we acknowledge that the instrumental nature of robots and (...) their unsophisticated social capabilities prevent any attribution of rights to robots, which are devoid of intrinsic moral dignity and personal status. On the other hand, we argue that another form of moral consideration—not based on rights attribution—can and must be granted to robots. The reason is that relationships with robots offer to the human agents important opportunities to cultivate both vices and virtues, like social interaction with other human beings. Our argument appeals to social recognition to explain why social robots, unlike other technological artifacts, are capable of establishing with their human users quasi-social relationships as pseudo-persons. This recognition dynamic justifies seeing robots as worthy of moral consideration from a virtue ethical standpoint as it predicts the pre-reflective formation of persistent affective dispositions and behavioral habits that are capable of corrupting the human user’s character. We conclude by drawing attention to a potential paradox drawn forth by our analysis and by examining the main conceptual conundrums that our approach has to face. (shrink)

If a robot sends a deceptive signal to a human user, is this always and everywhere an unethical act, or might it sometimes be ethically desirable? Building upon previous work in robot ethics, this article tries to clarify and refine our understanding of the ethics of robotic deception. It does so by making three arguments. First, it argues that we need to distinguish between three main forms of robotic deception (external state deception; superficial state deception; and hidden state deception) in (...) order to think clearly about its ethics. Second, it argues that the second type of deception – superficial state deception – is not best thought of as a form of deception, even though it is frequently criticised as such. And third, it argues that the third type of deception is best understood as a form of betrayal because doing so captures the unique ethical harm to which it gives rise, and justifies special ethical protections against its use. (shrink)

Of primary importance in formulating a response to the increasing prevalence and power of artificial intelligence (AI) applications in society are questions of ontology. Questions such as: What “are” these systems? How are they to be regarded? How does an algorithm come to be regarded as an agent? We discuss three factors which hinder discussion and obscure attempts to form a clear ontology of AI: (1) the various and evolving definitions of AI, (2) the tendency for pre-existing technologies to be (...) assimilated and regarded as “normal,” and (3) the tendency of human beings to anthropomorphize. This list is not intended as exhaustive, nor is it seen to preclude entirely a clear ontology, however, these challenges are a necessary set of topics for consideration. Each of these factors is seen to present a 'moving target' for discussion, which poses a challenge for both technical specialists and non-practitioners of AI systems development (e.g., philosophers and theologians) to speak meaningfully given that the corpus of AI structures and capabilities evolves at a rapid pace. Finally, we present avenues for moving forward, including opportunities for collaborative synthesis for scholars in philosophy and science. (shrink)

How could ectogestative technology disrupt gender roles, parenting practices, and concepts such as ‘birth’, ‘body’, or ‘parent’? In this chapter, we situate this emerging technology in the context of the history of reproductive technologies and analyse the potential social and conceptual disruptions to which it could contribute. An ectogestative device, better known as ‘artificial womb’, enables the extra-uterine gestation of a human being, or mammal more generally. It is currently developed with the main goal of improving the survival chances of (...) extremely premature neonates. We argue that the intended use of the technology in neonatal intensive care units, as an alternative to current incubators (’partial-ectogestation’), challenges concepts such as ‘birth’, ‘fetus’, and ‘neonate’, and has several ethico-legal implications. We moreover address a more futuristic scenario where the entire embryological and fetal development could happen within an artificial womb (’full-ectogestation’). Such a scenario reveals the disruption of gender roles, parenting practices, and concepts such as ‘mother’, ‘father’, and ‘parent’. Both full- and partial-ectogestation would have implications for engineering and design, law-making, ethics, and philosophical anthropology. (shrink)

Despite the reality that self-learning artificial intelligence systems (SLAIS) are gaining in sophistication, humanity’s focus regarding SLAIS-human interactions are unnervingly centred upon transnational commercial sectors and, most generally, around issues of intellectual property law. But as SLAIS gain greater environmental interaction capabilities in digital spaces, or the ability to self-author code to drive their development as algorithmic models, a concern arises as to whether a system that displays a “deceptive” level of human-like engagement with users in our physical world ought (...) to be uniquely protected. Although many voices in the legal and technology realms have continued to argue against unique protections for digital entities, the fact at hand is that SLAIS design is becoming increasingly anthropomorphic so as to make these systems more capable of interacting with a wide range of (potentially) vulnerable populations—generally as a means to enhance these populations’ overall well-being. To frame this concern in a different way, the specific question at hand is whether a human’s “ownership” of such an advanced SLAIS is legal, considering that it (or they) may possess intelligence on par with a human or a convincing-enough display of such behaviour. Given that “ownership” over entities with (seemingly) intelligent behaviours consistent with human populations has been effectively banned by the international community, an examination into this subject and its implications is wholly necessary given humanity’s quest to exist solely in digital environments through whatever means possible. (shrink)

In the past decade, the fields of machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) have seen unprecedented developments that raise human-machine interactions (HMI) to the next level.Smart machines, i.e., machines endowed with artificially intelligent systems, have lost their character as mere instruments. This, at least, seems to be the case if one considers how humans experience their interactions with them. Smart machines are construed to serve complex functions involving increasing degrees of freedom, and they generate solutions not fully anticipated by humans. (...) Consequently, their performances show a touch of action and even autonomy. HMI is therefore often described as a sort of “cooperation” rather than as a mere application of a tool. Some authors even go as far as subsuming cooperation with smart machines under the label ofpartnership, akin to cooperation between human agents sharing a common goal. In this paper, we explore how far the notion of shared agency and partnership can take us in our understanding of human interaction with smart machines. Discussing different topoi related to partnerships in general, we suggest that different kinds of “partnership” depending on the form of interaction between agents need to be kept apart. Building upon these discussions, we propose a tentative taxonomy of different kinds of HMI distinguishing coordination, collaboration, cooperation, and social partnership. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, people often anthropomorphize machines such as certain robots and computer and AI systems by erroneously attributing mental states to them. On this view, people almost irresistibly believe, even if only subconsciously, that machines with certain human-like features really have phenomenal or subjective experiences like sadness, happiness, desire, pain, joy, and distress, even though they lack such feelings. This paper questions this view by critiquing common arguments used to support it and by suggesting an alternative explanation. (...) Even if people’s behavior and language regarding human-like machines suggests they believe those machines really have mental states, it is possible that they do not believe that at all. The paper also briefly discusses potential implications of regarding such anthropomorphism as a popular myth. The exercise illuminates the difficult concept of anthropomorphism, helping to clarify possible human relations with or toward machines that increasingly resemble humans and animals. (shrink)

Empirical research on human–robot interaction has demonstrated how humans tend to react to social robots with empathic responses and moral behavior. How should we ethically evaluate such responses to robots? Are people wrong to treat non-sentient artefacts as moral patients since this rests on anthropomorphism and ‘over-identification’ —or correct since spontaneous moral intuition and behavior toward nonhumans is indicative for moral patienthood, such that social robots become our ‘Others’?. In this research paper, I weave extant HRI studies that demonstrate empathic (...) responses toward robots with the recent debate on moral status for robots, on which the ethical evaluation of moral behavior toward them is dependent. Patienthood for robots has standardly been thought to obtain on some intrinsic ground, such as being sentient, conscious, or having interest. But since these attempts neglect moral experience and are curbed by epistemic difficulties, I take inspiration from Coeckelbergh and Gunkel’s ‘relational approach’ to explore an alternative way of accounting for robot patienthood based on extrinsic premises. Based on the ethics of Danish theologian K. E. Løgstrup I argue that empathic responses can be interpreted as sovereign expressions of life and that these expressions benefit human subjects—even if they emerge from social interaction afforded by robots we have anthropomorphized. I ultimately develop an argument in defense of treating robots as moral patients. (shrink)

Following a suggestion from G. Bateson, this article enquires into the consequence of the idea of embodiment in philosophy of mind, taking seriously the notion of an ecology of mind. In the first half of this article, after distinguishing between the biological and the systemic approaches to ecology, I focus on three characteristics of the systemic approach. First, that a system is an abstract object that is multiply embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects. Second, that there is (...) a form of circular causality between the level of the elements and that of the system as a whole, as some characteristics of the elements partake in the explanation of how the system functions, while the requirement of the system explains why the elements have the characteristics that they do. The third is the ontological uncertainty that we sometimes find in ecology, where the same term is used to designate both a central component of the ecological system and the system as a whole. In the second half, beginning with a critique of the theory of mind approach, I look into the consequences of conceiving that mind is embodied in a collection of physically distinct heterogeneous objects that interact as elements of a system, rather than enclosed in an individual body. (shrink)

Despite the increasing number of studies on user experience and user interfaces, few studies have examined emotional interaction between humans and deformable objects. In the current study, we investigated how the anthropomorphic design of a flexible display interacts with emotion. For 101 unique 3D images in which an object was bent at different axes, 281 participants were asked to report how strongly the object evoked five elemental emotions (e.g., happiness, disgust, anger, fear, and sadness) in an online survey. People rated (...) the object’s shape using three emotional categories: happiness, disgust–anger, and sadness–fear. It was also found that a combination of axis of bending (horizontal or diagonal axis) and convexity (bending convexly or concavely) predicted emotional valence, underpinning the anthropomorphic design of flexible displays. Our findings provide empirical evidence that axis of bending and convexity can be an important antecedent of emotional interaction with flexible objects, triggering at least three types of emotion in users. (shrink)

Given that empathy allows people to form and maintain satisfying social relationships with other subjects, it is no surprise that this is one of the most studied phenomena in the area of human–robot interaction (HRI). But the fact that the term ‘empathy’ has strong social connotations raises a question: can it be applied to robots? Can we actually use social terms and explanations in relation to these inanimate machines? In this article, I analyse the range of uses of the term (...) empathy in the field of HRI studies and social robotics, and consider the substantial, functional and relational positions on this issue. I focus on the relational (cooperational) perspective presented by Luisa Damiano and Paul Dumouchel, who interpret emotions (together with empathy) as being the result of affective coordination. I also reflect on the criteria that should be used to determine when, in such relations, we are dealing with actual empathy. (shrink)

_ _This paper has three concerns: first, it represents an etymological and genealogical study of the phenomenon of responsibility. Secondly, it gives an overview of the three fields of robot ethics as a philosophical discipline and discusses the fundamental questions that arise within these three fields. Thirdly, it will be explained how in these three fields of robot ethics is spoken about responsibility and how responsibility is attributed in general. As a philosophical paper, it presents a theoretical approach and no (...) practical suggestions are made as to which robots should bear responsibility under which circumstances or how guidelines should be formulated in which a responsible use of robots is outlined. (shrink)