In a friendly interdisciplinary debate, we interrogate from several vantage points the question of “personhood” in light of contemporary and near-future forms of social AI. David J. Gunkel approaches the matter from a philosophical and legal standpoint, while Jordan Wales offers reflections theological and psychological. Attending to metaphysical, moral, social, and legal understandings of personhood, we ask about the position of apparently personal artificial intelligences in our society and individual lives. Re-examining the “person” and questioning prominent construals of that category, (...) we hope to open new views upon urgent and much-discussed questions that, quite soon, may confront us in our daily lives. (shrink)

In two experiments (total N=693) we explored whether people are willing to consider paintings made by AI-driven robots as art, and robots as artists. Across the two experiments, we manipulated three factors: (i) agent type (AI-driven robot v. human agent), (ii) behavior type (intentional creation of a painting v. accidental creation), and (iii) object type (abstract v. representational painting). We found that people judge robot paintings and human painting as art to roughly the same extent. However, people are much less (...) willing to consider robots as artists than humans, which is partially explained by the fact that they are less disposed to attribute artistic intentions to robots. (shrink)

Ethics plays a key role in the normative analysis of the impacts of technology. We know that computers in general and the processing of data, the use of artificial intelligence, and the combination of computers and/or artificial intelligence with robotics are all associated with ethically relevant implications for individuals, groups, and society. In this article, we argue that while all technologies are ethically relevant, there is no need to create a separate ‘ethics of X’ or ‘X ethics’ for each and (...) every subtype of technology or technological property—e.g. computer ethics, AI ethics, data ethics, information ethics, robot ethics, and machine ethics. Specific technologies might have specific impacts, but we argue that they are often sufficiently covered and understood through already established higher-level domains of ethics. Furthermore, the proliferation of tech ethics is problematic because (a) the conceptual boundaries between the subfields are not well-defined, (b) it leads to a duplication of effort and constant reinventing the wheel, and (c) there is danger that participants overlook or ignore more fundamental ethical insights and truths. The key to avoiding such outcomes lies in a taking the discipline of ethics seriously, and we consequently begin with a brief description of what ethics is, before presenting the main forms of technology related ethics. Through this process, we develop a hierarchy of technology ethics, which can be used by developers and engineers, researchers, or regulators who seek an understanding of the ethical implications of technology. We close by deducing two principles for positioning ethical analysis which will, in combination with the hierarchy, promote the leveraging of existing knowledge and help us to avoid an exaggerated proliferation of tech ethics. (shrink)

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers explore the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g., in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment that investigates the following three questions: (a) Are ordinary (...) people willing to ascribe deceptive intentions to artificial agents? (b) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (c) Do people blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than they presently receive. (shrink)

Henry Shevlin’s paper—“How could we know when a robot was a moral patient?” – argues that we should recognize robots and artificial intelligence (AI) as psychological moral patients if they are cognitively equivalent to other beings that we already recognize as psychological moral patients (i.e., humans and, at least some, animals). In defending this cognitive equivalence strategy, Shevlin draws inspiration from the “behavioral equivalence” strategy that I have defended in previous work but argues that it is flawed in crucial respects. (...) Unfortunately—and I guess this is hardly surprising—I cannot bring myself to agree that the cognitive equivalence strategy is the superior one. In this article, I try to explain why in three steps. First, I clarify the nature of the question that I take both myself and Shevlin to be answering. Second, I clear up some potential confusions about the behavioral equivalence strategy, addressing some other recent criticisms of it. Third, I will explain why I still favor the behavioral equivalence strategy over the cognitive equivalence one. (shrink)

The potential capacity for robots to deceive has received considerable attention recently. Many papers focus on the technical possibility for a robot to engage in deception for beneficial purposes (e.g. in education or health). In this short experimental paper, I focus on a more paradigmatic case: Robot lying (lying being the textbook example of deception) for nonbeneficial purposes as judged from the human point of view. More precisely, I present an empirical experiment with 399 participants which explores the following three (...) questions: (i) Are ordinary people willing to ascribe intentions to deceive to artificial agents? (ii) Are they as willing to judge a robot lie as a lie as they would be when human agents engage in verbal deception? (iii) Do they blame a lying artificial agent to the same extent as a lying human agent? The response to all three questions is a resounding yes. This, I argue, implies that robot deception and its normative consequences deserve considerably more attention than it presently attracts. (shrink)

Recent developments in AI, especially the spectacular success of Large Language models, have instigated renewed questioning of what remains distinctively human. As AI stands poised to take over more and more human tasks, what is left that distinguishes humans? One way we might identify a humanlike intelligence would be when we detect it telling lies. Yet AIs lack both the intention and the motivation to truly tell lies, instead producing merely bullshit. With neither emotions, embodiment, nor the social awareness that (...) leads to a theory of mind, AIs lack the internal referents on which to judge truth or falsity. When we are deceived by our computers, we need to look for the hidden agent who benefits from the deception. (shrink)

Artificial agents are progressively becoming more present in everyday-life situations and more sophisticated in their interaction affordances. In some specific cases, like Google Duplex, GPT-3 bots or Deep Mind’s AlphaGo Zero, their capabilities reach or exceed human levels. The use contexts of everyday life necessitate making such agents understandable by laypeople. At the same time, displaying human levels of social behavior has kindled the debate over the adoption of Dennett’s ‘intentional stance’. By means of a comparative analysis of the literature (...) on robots and virtual agents, we defend the thesis that approaching these artificial agents ‘as if’ they had intentions and forms of social, goal-oriented rationality is the only way to deal with their complexity on a daily base. Specifically, we claim that this is the only viable strategy for non-expert users to understand, predict and perhaps learn from artificial agents’ behavior in everyday social contexts. Furthermore, we argue that as long as agents are transparent about their design principles and functionality, attributing intentions to their actions is not only essential, but also ethical. Additionally, we propose design guidelines inspired by the debate over the adoption of the intentional stance. (shrink)

We are sometimes unsure of the moral status of our relationships with other entities. Recent case studies in this uncertainty include our relationships with artificial agents (robots, assistant AI, etc.), animals, and patients with “locked-in” syndrome. Do these entities have basic moral standing? Could they count as true friends or lovers? What should we do when we do not know the answer to these questions? An influential line of reasoning suggests that, in such cases of moral uncertainty, we need meta-moral (...) decision rules that allow us to either minimize the risks of moral wrongdoing or improve the choice-worthiness of our actions. One particular argument adopted in this literature is the “risk asymmetry argument,” which claims that the risks associated with accepting or rejecting some moral facts may be sufficiently asymmetrical as to warrant favoring a particular practical resolution of this uncertainty. Focusing on the case study of artificial beings, this article argues that this is best understood as an ethical-epistemic challenge. The article argues that taking potential risk asymmetries seriously can help resolve disputes about the status of human–AI relationships, at least in practical terms (philosophical debates will, no doubt, continue); however, the resolution depends on a proper, empirically grounded assessment of the risks involved. Being skeptical about basic moral status, but more open to the possibility of meaningful relationships with such entities, may be the most sensible approach to take. (shrink)

Considerable progress is being made in robotics, with robots being developed for many different areas of life: there are service robots, industrial robots, transport robots, medical robots, household robots, sex robots, exploration robots, military robots, and many more. As robot development advances, an intriguing question arises: should robots also encompass religious functions? Religious robots could be used in religious practices, education, discussions, and ceremonies within religious buildings. This article delves into two pivotal questions, combining perspectives from philosophy and religious studies: (...) can and should robots have religious functions? Section 2 initiates the discourse by introducing and discussing the relationship between robots and religion. The core of the article (developed in Sects. 3 and 4) scrutinizes the fundamental questions: can robots possess religious functions, and should they? After an exhaustive discussion of the arguments, benefits, and potential objections regarding religious robots, Sect. 5 addresses the lingering ethical challenges that demand attention. Section 6 presents a discussion of the findings, outlines the limitations of this study, and ultimately responds to the dual research question. Based on the study’s results, brief criteria for the development and deployment of religious robots are proposed, serving as guidelines for future research. Section 7 concludes by offering insights into the future development of religious robots and potential avenues for further research. (shrink)

The philosophical, legal, and HCI literature concerning artificial intelligence (AI) has explored the ethical implications and values that these systems will impact on. One aspect that has been only partially explored, however, is the role of deception. Due to the negative connotation of this term, research in AI and Human–Computer Interaction (HCI) has mainly considered deception to describe exceptional situations in which the technology either does not work or is used for malicious purposes. Recent theoretical and historical work, however, has (...) shown that deception is a more structural component of AI than it is usually acknowledged. AI systems that enter in communication with users, in fact, forcefully invite reactions such as attributions of gender, personality and empathy, even in the absence of malicious intent and often also with potentially positive or functional impacts on the interaction. This paper aims to operationalise the Human-Centred AI (HCAI) framework to develop the implications of this body of work for practical approaches to AI ethics in HCI and design. In order to achieve this goal, we take up the analytical distinction between “banal” and “strong” deception, originally proposed in theoretical and historical scholarship on AI (Natale in Deceitful media: artificial intelligence and social life after the turing test, Oxford University Press, New York, 2021), as a starting point to develop ethical reflections that will empower designers and developers with practical ways to solve the problems raised by the complex relationship between deception and communicative AI. The paper considers how HCAI can be applied to conversational AI (CAI) systems in order to design them to develop banal deception for social good and, at the same time, to avoid its potential risks. (shrink)

On virtue ethical grounds, Barbro Fröding and Martin Peterson recently recommended that near-future AIs should be developed as ‘Friendly AI’. AI in social interaction with humans should be programmed such that they mimic aspects of human friendship. While it is a reasonable goal to implement AI systems interacting with humans as Friendly AI, I identify four issues that need to be addressed concerning Friendly AI with Fröding’s and Peterson’s understanding of Friendly AI as a starting point. In a first step, (...) I briefly recapitulate Fröding’s and Peterson’s arguments for Friendly AI. I then highlight some issues with Fröding’s and Peterson’s approach and line of reasoning and identify four problems related to the notion of Friendly AI, which all pertain to the role and need for humans’ moral development. These are that one should consider the moral tendencies and preferences of the humans interacting with a friendly AI, it needs to be considered whether the humans interacting with a Friendly AI are still developing their virtues and character traits, the indirect effects of replacing humans with Friendly AI should be considered with respect to the possibilities for humans to develop their moral virtues and that the question whether the AI is perceived as some form of Artificial General Intelligence cannot be neglected. In conclusion, I argue that all of these four problems are related to humans moral development and that this observation strongly emphasizes the role and need for humans moral development in correlation to the accelerating development of AI-systems. (shrink)

Large language models now possess human-level linguistic abilities in many contexts. This raises the concern that they can be used to deceive and manipulate on unprecedented scales, for instance spreading political misinformation on social media. In future, agentic AI systems might also deceive and manipulate humans for their own purposes. In this paper, first, I argue that AI-generated content should be subject to stricter standards against deception and manipulation than we ordinarily apply to humans. Second, I offer new characterizations of (...) AI deception and manipulation meant to support such standards, according to which a statement is deceptive (resp. manipulative) if it leads human addressees away from the beliefs (resp. choices) they would endorse under “semi-ideal” conditions. Third, I propose two measures to guard against AI deception and manipulation, inspired by this characterization: “extreme transparency” requirements for AI-generated content and “defensive systems” that, among other things, annotate AI-generated statements with contextualizing information. Finally, I consider to what extent these measures can protect against deceptive behavior in future, agentic AI systems. (shrink)

Socially assistive devices such as care robots or companions have been advocated as a promising tool in elderly care in Western healthcare systems. Ethical debates indicate various challenges. An important part of the ethical evaluation is to understand how users interact with these devices and how interaction influences users’ perceptions and their ability to express themselves. In this review, we report and critically appraise findings of non-comparative empirical studies with regard to these effects from an ethical perspective.Electronic databases and other (...) sources were queried using a comprehensive search strategy generating 9851 records. Studies were screened independently by two authors. Methodological quality of studies was assessed. For 22 reports on 21 datasets using a non-comparative design a narrative synthesis was performed.Data shows positive findings in regard to attitudes and emotional reactions of users. Varying perception of a social relation and social presence are the most commonly observed traits of interaction. Users struggle with understanding technical complexities while functionality of the devices is limited. This leads to a behavioral alignment of users towards the requirements of the devices to be able to make use of them.This evidence adds to three important ethical debates on the use of socially assistive devices in healthcare in regard to (1) reliability of existing empirical evidence to inform normative judgements, (2) ethical significance of the social presence of devices and (3) user autonomy in regard to behavioral alignment. (shrink)

It is frequently demanded that AI-based Decision Support Tools (AI-DSTs) ought to be both explainable to, and trusted by, those who use them. The joint pursuit of these two principles is ordinarily believed to be uncontroversial. In fact, a common view is that AI systems should be made explainable so that they can be trusted, and in turn, accepted by decision-makers. However, the moral scope of these two principles extends far beyond this particular instrumental connection. This paper argues that if (...) we were to account for the rich and diverse moral reasons that ground the call for explainable AI, and fully consider what it means to “trust” AI in a descriptively rich sense of the term, we would uncover a deep and persistent tension between the two principles. For explainable AI to usefully serve the pursuit of normatively desirable goals, decision-makers must carefully monitor and critically reflect on the content of an AI-DST’s explanation. This entails a deliberative attitude. Conversely, calls for trust in AI-DSTs imply the disposition to put questions about their reliability out of mind. This entails an unquestioning attitude. As such, the joint pursuit of explainable and trusted AI calls on decision-makers to simultaneously adopt incompatible attitudes towards their AI-DST, which leads to an intractable implementation gap. We analyze this gap and explore its broader implications: suggesting that we may need alternate theoretical conceptualizations of what explainability and trust entail, and/or alternate decision-making arrangements that separate the requirements for trust and deliberation to different parties. (shrink)

Imagine a man chatting with his AI girlfriend app. He looks at his smartphone and says, ‘Finally, I'm being understood’. Is he deceiving himself? Is there anything morally wrong with it? The human tendency to anthropomorphize AI is well established, and the popularity of AI companions is growing. This article answers three questions: (1) How can being charmed by AI's simulated emotions be considered self‐deception? (2) Why might we have an obligation to avoid harmless self‐deception? (3) When is self‐deception in (...) emotional relationships with AI morally questionable, and can it be blameworthy? Regarding question 1, I describe being seduced by AI's simulated emotions as self‐deception, where desires bias beliefs. In response to question 2, I outline two ways to justify a prima facie obligation to avoid harmless self‐deception – instrumental and autotelic. For question 3, I highlight crucial factors to consider in assessing the blameworthiness of harmless self‐deception, such as the emotional and cognitive competences of the self‐deceiver, reasons for self‐deception, and its consequences for one's predispositions, self‐image, and other people. Moreover, I argue that the ethical requirement to avoid self‐deception does not easily translate into attributing blame to others for being self‐deceived. (shrink)

I argue in this paper that the claimed universal recognition of basic emotions corresponds to the recognition of conventionalized representations of emotions common in our culture. Section one presents some of the faces that people make in different circumstances, and argues that making faces is a form of action. Faces made function as narrative tools and as conversational tools. Section two compares and contrasts two conceptions of facial displays: basic emotion theories and the behavioral ecology view. The next section analyzes (...) and evaluates BET’s claim concerning the universal expression of emotions. Section four argues that the still pictures of posed emotions used by Ekman correspond to conventionalized iconographic representations of emotions in our culture. The last section asks whether present day social robots can make faces. They cannot for two reasons, I argue. First because of the dominance of BET in robotic research, second because robots do not need to enter into strategic negotiation with their human partners. The faces of robots simply reproduce conventionalized expressions of emotions, that they do paradoxically bear witness to the central relevance of the behavioral ecology view of facial displays. (shrink)

Nothing seems as certain as death. However, what if life continues digitally after death? Companies and initiatives such as Amazon, Storyfile, Here After AI, Forever Identity and LifeNaut are dedicated to precisely this objective: using avatars, records, and other digital content of the deceased, they strive to enable a digital continuation of life. The deceased live on digitally, and at times, these can even appear very much alive-perhaps too alive? This article explores the ethical implications of these technologies, commonly known (...) as Death Tech. With the advancement of artificial intelligence, Death Tech will inevitably transform mourning practices, our perception of death, and how we cope with its reality in the coming years. In this article, it is demonstrated that Death Tech can contribute to individual grief support, education, and a vibrant culture of remembrance. However, it is crucial to recognise that the Digital Afterlife is not a paradise but necessitates active designing and ethical deliberation. DOI 10.5771/0010-3497-2023-3-427. (shrink)

Personal AI is a new type of AI companion, distinct from the prevailing forms of AI companionship. Instead of playing a narrow and well-defined social role, like friend, lover, caretaker, or colleague, with a set of pre-determined responses and behaviors, Personal AI is engineered to tailor itself to the user, including learning to mirror the user’s unique emotional language and attitudes. This paper identifies two issues with Personal AI. First, like other AI companions, it is deceptive about the presence of (...) their emotions, which undermines the moral value of companionship. Second, Personal AI leads to a distinctly new form of deception concerning the origins of its emotions. Its emotional attitudes appear to belong to it, when in fact they are only reflections of the user. This results in what I dub “emotional bubbles”—the false impression that personal emotions are externally validated—which have at least two troubling implications. First, emotional bubbles prevent us from encountering emotional attitudes that differ from our own, which is likely to cripple emotional growth and the ability to form diverse social and emotional relationships. Second, if we assume, as some philosophers claim, that shared emotions are constitutive of shared values, it follows that Personal AI subverts joint moral deliberation. Users believe their personal values are externally validated, when they are only validated by themselves. Because of the absence of technovirtues able to handle this problem, I suggest that we proceed very cautiously with the development and marketing of Personal AI. (shrink)

The rapid advances in Artificial Intelligence and Robotics will have a profound impact on society as they will interfere with the people and their interactions. Intelligent autonomous robots, independent if they are humanoid/anthropomorphic or not, will have a physical presence, make autonomous decisions, and interact with all stakeholders in the society, in yet unforeseen manners. The symbiosis with such sophisticated robots may lead to a fundamental civilizational shift, with far-reaching effects as philosophical, legal, and societal questions on consciousness, citizenship, rights, (...) and legal entity of robots are raised. The aim of this work is to understand the broad scope of potential issues pertaining to law and society through the investigation of the interplay of law, robots, and society via different angles such as law, social, economic, gender, and ethical perspectives. The results make it evident that in an era of symbiosis with intelligent autonomous robots, the law systems, as well as society, are not prepared for their prevalence. Therefore, it is now the time to start a multi-disciplinary stakeholder discussion and derive the necessary policies, frameworks, and roadmaps for the most eminent issues. (shrink)

Socially inspired robotics involves drawing on the observation and study of human social interactions to apply them to the design of sociable robots. As there is increasing expectation that robots may participate in social care and provide some relief for the increasing shortage of human care workers, social interaction with robots becomes of increasing importance. This paper demonstrates the potential of socially inspired robotics through the exploration of a case study of the interaction of a partially sighted social worker with (...) a support worker. This is framed within the capability approach in which the interaction of a human and a sociable robot is understood as resulting in a collaborative capability which is grounded the relationship between the human and the robot rather than the autonomous capabilities of the robot. The implications of applying the case study as an analogy for human–robot interaction are expressed through a discussion of capabilities and social practice and policy. The study is attenuated by a discussion of the technical limits of robots and the extensive complexity of the social context in which it is envisaged sociable robots may be employed. (shrink)

In this paper we examine how the use of robots in caring for elders can impact the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We present a framework for understanding ‘meaningfulness in life’, and then apply that framework in discussing ways in which the use of robots to assist in activities of daily living can preserve, enhance or undermine the meaningfulness of elders’ lives. We conclude with a discussion of if and how having false beliefs about companion robots can affect meaningfulness in the (...) life of the person having those false beliefs. (shrink)

BackgroundSocially assistive devices (care robots, companions, smart screen assistants) have been advocated as a promising tool in elderly care in Western healthcare systems. Ethical debates indicate various challenges. One of the most prevalent arguments in the debate is the double-benefit argument claiming that socially assistive devices may not only provide benefits for autonomy and well-being of their users but might also be more efficient than other caring practices and might help to mitigate scarce resources in healthcare. Against this background, we (...) used a subset of comparative empirical studies from a comprehensive systematic review on effects and perceptions of human-machine interaction with socially assistive devices to gather and appraise all available evidence supporting this argument from the empirical side.MethodsElectronic databases and additional sources were queried using a comprehensive search strategy which generated 9851 records. Studies were screened independently by two authors. Methodological quality of studies was assessed. For 39 reports using a comparative study design, a narrative synthesis was performed.ResultsThe data shows positive evidential support to claim that some socially assistive devices (Paro) might be able to contribute to the well-being and autonomy of their users. However, results also indicate that these positive findings may be heavily dependent on the context of use and the population. In addition, we found evidence that socially assistive devices can have negative effects on certain populations. Evidence regarding the claim of efficiency is scarce. Existing results indicate that socially assistive devices can be more effective than standard of care but are far less effective than plush toys or placebo devices.DiscussionWe suggest using the double-benefit argument with great caution as it is not supported by the currently available evidence. The occurrence of potentially negative effects of socially assistive devices requires more research and indicates a more complex ethical calculus than suggested by the double-benefit argument. (shrink)

If existing or future robots appear to have some capacity, state or property, how can we determine whether they truly have it or whether we are deceived into believing so? John Danaher addresses this question by formulating his approach to what he refers to as superficial state deception (SSD) from the perspective of his theory termed ethical behaviourism (EB), which was initially designed to determine the moral status of robots. In summary, Danaher believes that focusing on behaviour is sufficient to (...) determine whether SSD occurs. My general claim is that Danaher’s approach to SSD based on EB is implausible since it results in the impossibility of conceptualizing SSD, e.g., it does not enable determining whether or not SSD occurs in a particular case. Moreover, I show how Danaher’s approach to SSD needs to be transformed to become plausible. To make my point, I (1) examine the main features of EB and distinguish its two versions by showing how Danaher revised the original EB in response to criticism; (2) discuss Danaher’s approach to the problem of deception from the perspective of EB; (3) criticize that approach by showing that it requires revisions analogous to those that have already been recommended in reference to EB, and (4) propose an alternative method for determining the presence of SSD that covers diverse, plausible approaches to SSD. (shrink)

Humans often unconsciously perceive social robots involved in their lives as partners rather than mere tools, imbuing them with qualities of companionship. This anthropomorphization can lead to a spectrum of emotional risks, such as deception, disappointment, and reverse manipulation, that existing approaches struggle to address effectively. In this paper, we argue that a Virtual Interactive Environment (VIE) exists between humans and social robots, which plays a crucial role and demands necessary consideration and clarification in order to mitigate potential emotional risks. (...) By analyzing the relational nature of human-social robot interaction, we discuss the connotation of such a virtual interactive environment that is similar to the emotional states aroused when reading novels. Building on this comprehension, we further demonstrate that manufacturers should carry out comprehensive Virtual Interactive Environment Indication (VIEI) measures during human-social robot interaction with a stricter sense of responsibility when applying social robots. Finally, we contemplate the potential contributions of virtual interactive environment indication to existing robot ethics guidelines. (shrink)