How should we understand the Confucian doctrine of the rectification of names (zhengming): what does it mean that an object’s name must be in accordance with its reality, and why does it matter? The aim of this paper is to answer this question by advocating a novel interpretation of the later Confucian, Xunzi’s account of the doctrine. Xunzi claims that sage-kings ascribe names and values to objects by convention, and since they are sages, they know the truth. When we misuse (...) names, we are departing from a sagely convention of naming. As sagely convention determines moral truth, departure from the linguistic convention of the sages is a departure from moral truth. On my interpretation of Xunzi, the rectification of names is not a doctrine about what is true, but a doctrine about how we aim at truth. We are aiming at descriptive truth when our language conforms to the correct name of an object according to what I call ‘Confucian conventionalism’. When we correctly aim at descriptive truth we can aim at moral truth. Therefore, I claim that the doctrine of the rectification of names is concerned with discerning the literal accordance of language with an object (what is descriptively, linguistically true), to determine what is normatively, or morally, true. According to Xunzi, moral truth is grounded in linguistic truth. (shrink)

Both an emphasis on logic and an emphasis on rhetoric lead to a kind of care for language. However, in early Greece this care for language through the lens of logic manifested in the drive to ‘get it right’, whereas in early China the care for language manifested in the pervasive concern for zhengming, for using names properly. For the early Chinese thinkers, especially the early Confucians, this was not predominantly a linguistic affair—zhengming is a key component of moral cultivation. (...) As we explore the ethical import of Confucian role ethics, we need to pay attention to the philosophical vocabulary of this worldview and to how our understanding of these crucial terms changes if persons are seen as relational—a central premise of Confucian role ethics. In this essay I argue against reading zhengming as fagu, merely a conservative retrieval of historical meaning, as suggested by the political philosopher Hsiao Kung-chuan, among others. Instead, I argue for three theses: (1) although stubbornly persistent, ‘rectification of names’ is not an adequate translation for zhengming; (2) the conservative reading of zhengming is problematic and needs to be rethought as an hermeneutic process intersecting past meanings, present circumstances, and future possibilities; and (3) zhengming is, in an important sense, the ‘art’ of Confucian role ethics, for achieving moral competency in this tradition is a matter of constantly revising one's roles and relationships. (shrink)

This study is a contribution to Chinese-Western dialogue of bioethics but perhaps the first one of its kind. From a Chinese-Western comparative ethical perspective, this work brings Chinese ethical theories, especially Confucian ethics, into a contemporary context of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS, and to see how the deeply-rooted thoughts of Confucius interact, compete, or integrate with concepts from Western ethical traditions. An underlying belief is that some ideas in Confucian ethics are important and insightful beyond their cultural and historical origins (...) in China and other Confucianism influenced societies.Methodologically, this thesis employs two approaches, conceptual normative analysis combined with critical interpretation. The ‘interpretive’ approach I employ, as an important methodology supplementing my normative analysis, not only deals with Chinese ancient texts, but also explains specific beliefs and practices in China.With a critical eye, this thesis carefully examines a number of key topics in the ethics of AIDS in China from a cross-cultural perspective. Topics including: views on personhood and the vulnerability of People Living with HIV/AIDS; prioritising and balancing the role of ‘harm reduction’ and the role of ‘eradication of deviant behaviour’ in AIDS policy in China; rights-based opt-out approach and duty-based family-centred approach in HIV testing and Biobanking; blood donation; moral responsibility and personal responsibility for health; and the popular rhetoric of ‘innocent infection’ versus ‘guilty infection’ in AIDS. My overall aim in this work is to present a cross-cultural bioethics study through the investigation of some ethical issues in AIDS in China from a Chinese-Western comparative perspective and also attempt to suggest a humane and effective policy for HIV/AIDS which I believe is appropriate to both traditions. I believe this work has contributed to our knowledge in three related but independent areas: the control of the epidemic of HIV/AIDS in China; medical ethics in China; and to both the methods and the utility of cross-cultural study of bioethics between China and the West. (shrink)

This paper examines the creation of Daoism in its earliest, pre-Eastern Han period. After an examination of the critical terms "scholar/master" and "author/ school", I argue that, given the paucity of evidence, Sima Tan and Liu Xin should be credited with creating this tradition. The body of this article considers the definitions of Daoism given by these two scholars and all of the extant texts that Liu Xin classified as "Daoist." Based on these texts, I then suggest an amended definition (...) of Daoism. In the conclusion, I address the recent claim that the daojia /daijiao dichotomy is false, speculating that disagreement over this claim arises from the context in which Daoism is considered: among the other pre-Qin "schools of thought" or among other world religion. (shrink)

The common approach to discussing Confucius’ advocacy of “correction of names” is to join the current academic debate about its meaning, usually in philosophical terms. Rather than joining in, however, this article describes the debate itself as a historically situated discourse largely dating from the early Republican era. I argue that Hu Shi 胡適 played a crucial but largely forgotten role in the creation of this discourse. While the core of the current discourse on zhengming consists of views that can (...) be traced to him, this discourse is nowadays often regarded as fact rather than a specific interpretation. By forgetting the historicity of this interpretation, academic reflection risks ossification and the loss of its critical spirit. The mere repetition of Hu Shi’s discourse is also contrary to his own spirit, which sought to call into question established views. (shrink)

Given wuwei 無為 describes the life praxis of the sage and statecraft of the enlightened ruler while also denoting the comportment of the Dao 道—an alternating state of quiet dormancy and creative activity—are the standard translations of wuwei as “nonaction” or “effortless action” up to the task? They are not, it will be argued, in that they fail to convey the true profundity of wuwei. The objective of this essay is twofold: to show that wuwei is better understood as “abiding (...) harmony” than nonaction, and to demonstrate this via a close reading of the Lüshi Chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Master Lü’s Spring and Autumn Annals) which makes wuwei the epicenter of its doctrine of “the Dao of the ruler.” Indeed, the Lüshi Chunqiu’s unique application of wuwei lies not only in its borrowing of Daoist and Legalist norms, but in having the ruler meet the following prerequisites: be without knowledge, keep the senses and heart-mind pure, be reliant on others, follow Yin 陰 and Yang 陽, and study the course of heaven and earth to know the ways of humanity. There is, therefore, more to wuwei than meets the eye. (shrink)