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Conditions of personhood

In Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press (1976)

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  1. The Virtuous Organization.Jane Collier - 1995 - Business Ethics, the Environment and Responsibility 4 (3):143-149.
    Can a business be said to demonstrate moral virtues, and does being virtuous mean that it is more likely to behave ethically?
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  • Education(al) Research, Educational Policy-Making and Practice.Charles Clark - 2011 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 45 (1):37-57.
    Professor Whitty has endorsed the consensus that research into education is empirical social science, distinguishing ‘educational research’ which seeks directly to influence practice, and ‘education research’ that has substantive value but no necessary practical application.The status of the science here is problematic. The positivist approach is incoherent and so supports neither option. Critical educational science is virtually policy-inert. The interpretive approach is empirically sound but, because of the value component in education, does not support education research either, or account for (...)
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  • The conception of a person as a series of mental events.Scott Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.
    It is argued that those who accept the psychological criterion of personal identity, such as Parfit and Shoemaker, should accept what I call the 'series' view of a person, according to which a person is a unified aggregate of mental events and states. As well as defending this view against objections, I argue that it allows the psychological theorist to avoid the two lives objection which the 'animalist' theorists have raised against it, an objection which causes great difficulties for the (...)
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  • A Qualified Defense of Personhood in Bioethics.Tanner Mathison & Andreas Kuersten - 2024 - American Journal of Bioethics 24 (1):23-26.
    Referred to as “a foundational concept” of bioethics, personhood has long figured prominently in discussions of entities’ moral status and attendant rights and duties (Farah and Heberlein 2007, 39)...
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  • Collective responsibility and an agent meaning theory.Michael McKenna - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):16–34.
    The article presents the nature of shared intentions and collective responsibility in simultaneous discussion of individualism, which views that collective agents and shared intentions are to be analyzed in relation between individual agents who are members of the collectives. It discusses as well the agent meaning theory that states that an agent moves against the interpretive background of action evaluation shared by the agent and the moral community.
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  • Animal welfare and individual characteristics: A conversation against speciesism.Marc Bekoff & Lofe Gruen - 1993 - Ethics and Behavior 3 (2):163 – 175.
    It seems impossible for a human being not to have some point of view concerning nonhuman animal (hereafter animal) welfare. Many people make decisions about how humans are permitted to treat animals using speciesist criteria, basing their decisions on an individual's species membership rather than on that animal's individual characteristics. Although speciesism provides a convenient way for making difficult decisions about who should be used in different types of research, we argue that such decisions should rely on an analysis of (...)
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  • Personal Identity, Possible Worlds, and Medical Ethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal (3):429-437.
    Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which intuiting across conceptually incongruent (...)
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  • Habits: bridging the gap between personhood and personal identity.Nils-Frederic Wagner & Georg Northoff - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
    In philosophy, the criteria for personhood (PH) at a specific point in time (synchronic), and the necessary and sufficient conditions of personal identity (PI) over time (diachronic) are traditionally separated. Hence, the transition between both timescales of a person's life remains largely unclear. Personal habits reflect a decision-making (DM) process that binds together synchronic and diachronic timescales. Despite the fact that the actualization of habits takes place synchronically, they presuppose, for the possibility of their generation, time in a diachronic sense. (...)
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  • Genetically modified animals, no human great apes.Carmen Velayos Castelo - 2008 - Arbor 184 (730).
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  • Moral Being in Contemporary Views of the Self.Robert L. Vance - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):713-729.
    ABSTRACT: Recent discussions of the nature of mind, emotion, and self have often intersected with renewed interest in the sources of morals and morality. In this article l examine proposals on these matters by Charles Taylor and two of his interlocutors, Thomas Wren and Justin Oakley. I describe and compare the “holistic” epistemological approaches of these three in their searches for the “moral self,” and then evaluate the adequacy of their correlative ontological proposals. Finally, I discuss the meta-ethical implications of (...)
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  • Moral Being in Contemporary Views of the Self.Robert L. Vance - 2006 - Dialogue 45 (4):713-729.
    ABSTRACT: Recent discussions of the nature of mind, emotion, and self have often intersected with renewed interest in the sources of morals and morality. In this article l examine proposals on these matters by Charles Taylor and two of his interlocutors, Thomas Wren and Justin Oakley. I describe and compare the “holistic” epistemological approaches of these three in their searches for the “moral self,” and then evaluate the adequacy of their correlative ontological proposals. Finally, I discuss the meta-ethical implications of (...)
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  • Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.
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  • The trouble with personhood and person‐centred care.Matthew Tieu, Alexandra Mudd, Tiffany Conroy, Alejandra Pinero de Plaza & Alison Kitson - 2022 - Nursing Philosophy 23 (3):e12381.
    The phrase ‘person‐centred care’ (PCC) reminds us that the fundamental philosophical goal of caring for people is to uphold or promote their personhood. However, such an idea has translated into promoting individualist notions of autonomy, empowerment and personal responsibility in the context of consumerism and neoliberalism, which is problematic both conceptually and practically. From a conceptual standpoint, it ignores the fact that humans are social, historical and biographical beings, and instead assumes an essentialist or idealized concept of personhood in which (...)
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  • Nonhuman intentional systems.H. S. Terrace - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):378.
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  • What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.
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  • Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.
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  • Self-knowledge and rationality.Thomas Spitzley - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):73 - 88.
    The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and (2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality is, indeed, a (...)
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  • Responsiveness as responsibility: Cavell's reading of Wittgenstein and King Lear as a source for an ethics of interpersonal relationships.Davide Sparti - 2000 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 26 (5):81-107.
    In this article I want to explore some questions that arise from the work of Stanley Cavell. My purpose is to examine lines of connections between Cavell's readings of Wittgenstein (specifically his notions of 'criteria', 'aspect blindness' and 'primitive reaction', with special reference to the philosophical problem of 'other minds') and Shakespeare, on the one side, and a certain dimension of the ethical, on the other. Although Cavell has rarely offered explicit remarks on the issue of morality, and is normally (...)
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  • Making up People: On Some Looping Effects of the Human Kind - Institutional Reflexivity or Social Control?Davide Sparti - 2001 - European Journal of Social Theory 4 (3):331-349.
    This paper is an account of the co-construction of categorical identity and personal identity among human beings. As people recognize themselves within a socially sanctioned categorical scheme, they reproduce that scheme, and hence institutional and personal reflexivity occur as a joint movement that, at the same time, can be seen as an exercise in social control. The inspirations for this account are lan Hacking's view about the distinctiveness of social kinds from natural kinds, and Dan Sperber's idea about cultural communication (...)
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  • Problems about corporate moral personhood.ThomasW Smythe - 1985 - Journal of Value Inquiry 19 (4):327-333.
    According to peter french, A corporation can be construed as a moral person in the same sense that you and I are persons. Whether this view is tenable is an open question. I examine the objections to this view made in the recent literature and find them wanting. I deal with the questions whether corporations can have intentions, Rights, And consciousness.
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  • Styles of computational representation.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):530.
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  • Adaptation and satisficing.John Maynard Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):370.
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  • Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.
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  • A better way to deal with selection.B. F. Skinner - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377.
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  • Lying, liars and language.David Simpson - 1992 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3):623-639.
    This paper considers the phenomenon of lying and the implications it has for those subjects who are capable of lying. It is argued that lying is not just intentional untruthfulness, but is intentional untruthfulness plus an insincere invocation of trust. Understood in this way, lying demands of liars a sophistication in relation to themselves, to language, and to those to whom they lie which exceeds the demands on mere truth-tellers.
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  • Free Will and the Structure of Motivation.David Shatz - 1986 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-482.
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  • Free will and the structure of motivation.David Shatz - 1985 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10 (1):451-82.
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  • Steps toward an ethological science.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377.
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  • The realistic stance.John R. Searle - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):527.
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  • Functional explanations and reasons as causes.Geoffrey Sayre-McCord - 1989 - Philosophical Perspectives 3:137-164.
    If we assume that a conceptual connection does hold between reasons and action, the arguments for both theses are strikingly simple. In defense of the first thesis, all that need be added is Hume's Principle: between cause and effect only a (logically) contingent relation holds. For given Hume's Principle, and the conceptual connection (which after all is not a contingent one), it follows that no causal connection holds. In defense of the second thesis, all that need be added is one (...)
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  • Instrumental intentionality.Lynne Rudder Baker - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (June):303-16.
    Many physicalists are committed to an austere dichotomy: either beliefs, desires and intentions are scientifically respectable or attributions of such attitudes are all false. One physicalist, Daniel Dennett, offers a third alternative, which seems to permit a kind of instrumentalism concerning attitudes. I argue that Dennett's attempt to reconcile an instrumentalistic account of attributions of attitudes with a thoroughgoing physicalism founders on unresolvable conflicts between his official theory and his actual treatment of key concepts. As a result, instrumentalism concerning attitudes (...)
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  • Will the argument for abstracta please stand up?Alexander Rosenberg - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):526.
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  • Content and consciousness versus the International stance.Alexander Rosenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375.
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  • Intentions and adaptations.H. L. Roitblat - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375.
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  • How to build a mind.H. L. Roitblat - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):525.
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  • International plovers or just dump brids?Carolyn A. Ristau - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373.
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  • The International stance faces backward.Howard Rachlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373.
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  • Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.
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  • Making Sense of Dignity: A Starting Point.Filimon Peonidis - 2020 - Conatus 5 (1):85.
    Although appeals to human dignity became quite popular after the end of War World II in various moral and legal settings, the term retained an air of semantic indeterminacy, and scholars are of opposing minds concerning its usefulness and significance. In this essay I intend to offer a sketch of a “deflationary” account of human dignity – viewed as one moral value among many others – according to which it is conceived as the minimal respect we prima facie owe to (...)
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  • Wherein lies the debate? Concerning whether God is a person.Ben Page - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (3):297-317.
    Within contemporary philosophy of religion there are three main ways in which God is conceptualised in relation to personhood:God is a person and so personal. God is non-personal, and so is not a person. God is a personal non-person. The first two of these options will be familiar to many, with held by most contemporary monotheist philosophers of religion and mainly by those who are pantheists., however, is a view some may not have come across, despite its proponents claiming it (...)
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  • The intentional stance and the knowledge level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.
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  • Thought experiments in personal identity: A dialogue with Beck, Wagner and Wilkes.Alfonso Muñoz-Corcuera - 2017 - South African Journal of Philosophy 36 (4):456-469.
    In a recent series of papers, Beck and Wagner have been arguing about the general role that thought experiments can play in the debate on personal identity, showing their disagreement about the famous criticisms that Wilkes’ launched against their use. In this article I come back to Wilkes’ criticisms to show that her position is deeply problematic. If we adopt instead the mental model account of thought experiments, we can accommodate Wilkes’ criticisms and justify the use of thought experiments in (...)
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  • Groups as fictional agents.Lars J. K. Moen - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Can groups really be agents or is group agency just a fiction? Christian List and Philip Pettit argue influentially for group-agent realism by showing how certain groups form and act on attitudes in ways they take to be unexplainable at the level of the individual agents constituting them. Group agency is therefore considered not a fiction or a metaphor but a reality we must account for in explanations of certain social phenomena. In this paper, I challenge this defence of group-agent (...)
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  • Dennett' rational animals: And how behavorism overlooked them.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):372.
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  • Parlez-vous baboon, Bwana Sherlock?E. W. Menzel - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):371.
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  • Intentions as goads.David McFarland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):369.
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  • David's Need for Mutual Recognition: A Social Personhood Defense of Steven Spielberg's A. I. Artificial Intelligence.Tuomas William Manninen & Bertha Alvarez Manninen - 2016 - Film-Philosophy 20 (2-3):339-356.
    In Steven Spielberg's A.I. Artificial Intelligence a company called Cybertronics is responsible for creating, building, and disseminating a large number of ‘mechas’ – androids built specifically to address a multitude of human needs, including the desire to have children. David, an android mecha-child, has the capacity to genuinely love on whomever he ‘imprints.’ The first of this kind of mecha, he is ultimately abandoned by his ‘mother’ Monica, and David spends the rest of the film searching for Pinocchio's Blue Fairy (...)
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  • Causes and intentions.Bruce J. MacLennan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):519-520.
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  • Dennett's instrumentalism.William G. Lycan - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):518.
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  • The scope and ingenuity of evolutionary systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368.
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