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  1. Quantum propensities and the brain-mind connection.Henry P. Stapp - 1991 - Foundations of Physics 21 (12):1451-77.
    It is argued that an adequate scientific treatment of biological systems requires the use of an ontological interpretation of quantum mechanics, and that the propensity interpretation proposed by Popper and others, when applied to the brain, leads to a natural representation of conscious process within the quantum-mechanical description of brain process. Thus quantum mechanics, unlike classical mechanics, has a natural place for consciousness and, moreover, in a sense to be discussed, even requires it.
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  • Thought and thought experiments.David Cole - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (May):431-44.
    Thought experiments have been used by philosophers for centuries, especially in the study of personal identity where they appear to have been used extensively and indiscriminately. Despite their prevalence, the use of thought experiments in this area of philosophy has been criticized in recent times. Bernard Williams criticizes the conclusions that are drawn from some experiments, and retells one of these experiments from a different perspective, a retelling which leads to a seemingly opposing result. Wilkes criticizes the method of thought (...)
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  • Panglossian functionalism and the philosophy of mind.Elliott Sober - 1985 - Synthese 64 (August):165-93.
    I want to explore what happens to two philosophical issues when we assume that the mind, a functional device, is to be understood by the same sort of functional analysis that guides biological investigation of other organismic systems and characteristics. The first problem area concerns the concept of rationality, its connection with reliability and reproductive success, and the status of rationality hypotheses in attribution of beliefs. It has been argued that ascribing beliefs to someone requires the assumption that that person (...)
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  • The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.
    In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.
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  • The functional role of consciousness: A phenomenological approach.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 3 (2):171-93.
    In this paper, a theoretical account of the functional role of consciousness in the cognitive system of normal subjects is developed. The account is based upon an approach to consciousness that is drawn from the phenomenological tradition. On this approach, consciousness is essentially peripheral self-awareness, in a sense to be duly explained. It will be argued that the functional role of consciousness, so construed, is to provide the subject with just enough information about her ongoing experience to make it possible (...)
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  • (1 other version)Reductive explanation and the "explanatory gap".Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (2):153-174.
    Can phenomenal consciousness be given a reductive natural explanation? Exponents of an.
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  • Visual imagery and the limits of comprehension.Marc Krellenstein - 1994 - Dissertation, New School for Social Research
    I examined the proposition that there are psychological limits on what scientific problems can be solved, and that these limits may be based on a failure to be able to produce imagable, observation-based models for any possible solution, a position suggested by philosopher Colin McGinn in an argument attempting to prove that the mind-body problem is unsolvable. I examined another likely candidate for an unsolvable problem -- the ultimate origin of the universe (i.e., what might have preceded the Big Bang (...)
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  • Too much attention, too little self. [REVIEW]Carolyn Dicey Jennings - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):475-480.
    This is a good time for such a substantial book on Buddhaghosa. His ideas may be more difficult to digest than those of contemporary authors, but Ganeri convincingly argues for their relevance. Together with Ganeri’s considerable interpretive and philosophical work, Buddhaghosa’s view helps to fill out a perspective that is popular in cognitive science, in which the self is replaced by systems. In this case, the self is replaced by systems of attention, a view that Ganeri calls ‘Attentionalism.’ In this (...)
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  • Answering questions about consciousness by modeling perception as covert behavior.Gustav Markkula - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • Hylomorphism and Resurrection.William Jaworski - 2013 - European Journal for Philosophy of Religion 5 (1):197-224.
    Hylomorphism provides an attractive framework for addressing issues in philosophical anthropology. After describing a hylomorphic theory that dovetails with current work in philosophy of mind and in scientific disciplines such as biology and neuroscience, I discuss how this theory meshes with Christian eschatology, the doctrine of resurrection in particular.
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  • Semantic Properties and the Computational Model of Mind.Randall Kirk Campbell - 1990 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    Much of the contemporary research in cognitive psychology presupposes an information processing or computational model of human cognitive processes. On this view cognitive states are characterized as relations to internally inscribed representations. Jerry Fodor and Zenon Pylyshyn have argued that those representations have a combinatorial syntax and a compositional semantics, and Fodor has argued that the individuation of representations according to semantic type corresponds, roughly, to individuation according to syntactic type. ;I investigate whether this computational model requires us to appeal, (...)
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  • Sensation, Introspection, and the Phenomenal.Jonathan Ellis - 2012 - In Jonathan Ellis & Daniel Guevara (eds.), Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Mind. , US: Oxford University Press.
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  • On the Claim that a Table-Lookup Program Could Pass the Turing Test.Drew McDermott - 2014 - Minds and Machines 24 (2):143-188.
    The claim has often been made that passing the Turing Test would not be sufficient to prove that a computer program was intelligent because a trivial program could do it, namely, the “Humongous-Table (HT) Program”, which simply looks up in a table what to say next. This claim is examined in detail. Three ground rules are argued for: (1) That the HT program must be exhaustive, and not be based on some vaguely imagined set of tricks. (2) That the HT (...)
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  • The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.
    Could there be a cognitive zombie – that is, a creature with the capacity for cognition, but no capacity for consciousness? Searle argues that there cannot be a cognitive zombie because there cannot be an intentional zombie: on this view, there is a connection between consciousness and cognition that is derived from a more fundamental connection between consciousness and intentionality. However, I argue that there are good empirical reasons for rejecting the proposed connection between consciousness and intentionality. Instead, I argue (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • Functionalism.Janet Levin - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Functionalism in the philosophy of mind is the doctrine that what makes something a mental state of a particular type does not depend on its internal constitution, but rather on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system of which it is a part. This doctrine is rooted in Aristotle's conception of the soul, and has antecedents in Hobbes's conception of the mind as a “calculating machine”, but it has become fully articulated (and popularly endorsed) only (...)
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  • The chinese room argument.David Cole - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Is consciousness important?Kathleen V. Wilkes - 1984 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35 (September):223-43.
    The paper discusses the utility of the notion of consciousness for the behavioural and brain sciences. It describes four distinctively different senses of 'conscious', and argues that to cope with the heterogeneous phenomena loosely indicated thereby, these sciences not only do not but should not discuss them in terms of 'consciousness'. It is thus suggested that 'the problem' allegedly posed to scientists by consciousness is unreal; one need neither adopt a realist stance with respect to it, nor include the term (...)
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  • Personal memories.Marina Trakas - 2015 - Dissertation, Macquarie University
    This thesis is intended to analyze a mental phenomenon widely neglected in current philosophical discussions: personal memories. The first part presents a general framework to better understand what personal memories are, how we access our personal past and what we access about our personal past. Chapter 1 introduces traditional theories of memory: direct realism and representationalism in their different versions, as well as some objections. I defend here a particular form of representationalism that is based on the distinction between content, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Tyler Burge on disjunctivism.John Mcdowell - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):259-279.
    In McDowell, I responded to Burge's attack on disjunctivism. In Burge Burge rejects my response. He stands by his main claim that disjunctivism is incompatible with the science of perception, and in a supplementary spirit he argues against the detail of my attempt to defend disjunctivism. Here I explain how disjunctivism is compatible with the science, and I respond to some of Burge's supplementary arguments.
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  • A Short History of the Philosophy of Consciousness in the Twentieth Century.Tim Crane - 2017 - In Amy Kind (ed.), Philosophy of Mind in the Twentieth and Twenty-First Centuries: The History of the Philosophy of Mind, Volume 6. New York: Routledge.
    In this paper, it is argued that the late twentieth century conception of consciousness in analytic philosophy emerged from the idea of consciousness as givenness, via the behaviourist idea of “raw feels”. In the post-behaviourist period in philosophy, this resulted in the division of states of mind into essentially unconscious propositional attitudes plus the phenomenal residue of qualia: intrinsic, ineffable and inefficacious sensory states. It is striking how little in the important questions about consciousness depends on this conception, or on (...)
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  • What’s in a Mind?Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1987 - Synthese 70 (January):97-122.
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  • (1 other version)Perception without awareness.Fred Dretske - 2006 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual experience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 147--180.
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  • Consciousness: Only at the personal level.Matthew Elton - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content (...)
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  • Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.
    Relying on a range of now-familiar thought-experiments, it has seemed to many philosophers that phenomenal consciousness is beyond the scope of reductive explanation. (Phenomenal consciousness is a form of state-consciousness, which contrasts with creature-consciousness, or perceptual-consciousness. The different forms of state-consciousness include various kinds of access-consciousness, both first-order and higher-order--see Rosenthal, 1986; Block, 1995; Lycan, 1996; Carruthers, 2000. Phenomenal consciousness is the property that mental states have when it is like something to possess them, or when they have subjectively-accessible feels; (...)
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness and Intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Theories of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.
    Phenomenal consciousness is the property mental states, events, and processes have when, and only when, there is something it is like for their subject to undergo them, or be in them. What it is like to have a conscious experience is customarily referred to as the experience’s phenomenal character. Theories of consciousness attempt to account for this phenomenal character. This article surveys the currently prominent theories, paying special attention to the various attempts to explain a state’s phenomenal character in terms (...)
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  • (1 other version)Consciousness and intentionality.Charles Siewert - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • What change blindness teaches about consciousness.Fred Dretske - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):215–220.
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  • Asynchronous Introspection Theory: The Underpinnings of Phenomenal Consciousness in Temporal Illusion.Shuo Chen, Changle Zhou, Jing Li & Hua Peng - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (2):315-330.
    A new theory of the neuropsychological underpinnings of phenomenal consciousness, “asynchronous introspection theory,” is proposed that emphasizes asynchrony between different neurocognitive processes. We provide a detailed explanation of how a mind might arrive at a cognitive structure isomorphic to the cognitive structure that would emerge from experiential qualia. The theory suggests that a temporal illusion is created because of the mismatch between the real physical timeline and the neurally constructed timeline composed inside a person’s brain. This temporal illusion leads to (...)
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  • (1 other version)Higher-order theories of consciousness.Peter Carruthers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Sub-phenomenology.David A. Jopling - 1996 - Human Studies 19 (2):153-73.
    This paper argues that cognitive psychology's practice of explaining mental processes in terms which avoid invoking phenomenology, and the person-level self-conception with which it is associated in common sense psychology, leads to a hybrid Cartesian dualism. Because phenomenology is considered to be fundamentally irrelevant in any scientific explanation of the mind, the person-level is regarded as scientifically invisible: it is a ghost-like housing for sub-personal computational cognition. The problem of explaining how the sub-personal and sub-phenomenological machinery of mind is related (...)
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  • A critique of information processing theories of consciousness.Valerie Gray Hardcastle - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (1):89-107.
    Information processing theories in psychology give rise to executive theories of consciousness. Roughly speaking, these theories maintain that consciousness is a centralized processor that we use when processing novel or complex stimuli. The computational assumptions driving the executive theories are closely tied to the computer metaphor. However, those who take the metaphor serious — as I believe psychologists who advocate the executive theories do — end up accepting too particular a notion of a computing device. In this essay, I examine (...)
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  • What is ‘Representation’? – a Debate Between Tyler Burge and John McDowell.Sofia Miguens - 2020 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 11 (2).
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  • A crítica de Mcdowell à concepção dennettiana da percepção: será que ver é julgar?Sofia Miguens - 2010 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 22 (30):195.
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  • Metaphysics of normativity.Pedro S. Williams - unknown
    This work represents an interdisciplinary attempt at the development of a-- scientific theory of norms and normativity. Normativity, understood in its most general interpretation as value determinations and prescriptions, has traditionally been troublesome to account by science and difficult to “place” within a scientific worldview. Such an accomplishment is attempted by the joining in conversation of two bodies of literature. The first of these is Steve Fuller’s naturalist epistemology and the second corresponds to the situated study of cognition, along with (...)
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  • Toward an ontological interpretation of Dennett's theory.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369.
    While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use (...)
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  • Role, not content: Comments on David Rosenthal's "consciousness, content, and metacognitive judgments".Georges Rey - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):224-230.
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  • Making consciousness safe for neuroscience.Andrew Brook - 2005 - In Andrew Brook & Kathleen Akins (eds.), Cognition and the Brain: The Philosophy and Neuroscience Movement. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 397.
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  • Actions, cognition and the self.Peter Slezak - 1986 - Synthese 66 (3):405 - 435.
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  • Names, Descriptions, and Assertion.Ray Buchanan - 2014 - In Zsu-Wei Hung (ed.), Communicative Action. Springer. pp. 03-15.
    According to Millian Descriptivism, while the semantic content of a linguistically simple proper name is just its referent, we often use sentences containing such expressions “to make assertions…that are, in part, descriptive” (Soames 2008). Against this view, I show, following Ted Sider and David Braun (2006), that simple sentences containing names are never used to assert descriptively enriched propositions. In addition, I offer a diagnosis as to where the argument for Millian Descriptivism goes wrong. Once we appreciate the distinctive way (...)
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  • Precis of "Phenomenal Consciousness: A Naturalistic Theory".Peter Carruthers - 2001 - SWIF Philosophy of Mind Review 2 (1).
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  • Artificial Intelligence as a Possible Tool for Discovering Laws of Logic.David Isles - 1978 - Cognitive Science 2 (4):329-360.
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  • Co-opting holograms.Daniel C. Dennett - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (2):232-233.
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