The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349 (2007)
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Abstract
In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories
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Consciousness Explained.DENNETT, Daniel C.

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