The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness

Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349 (2007)
Download Edit this record How to cite View on PhilPapers
Abstract
In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories
PhilPapers/Archive ID
PROTTC-2
Upload history
Archival date: 2017-11-04
View other versions
Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
618 (#12,019)

6 months
37 (#22,984)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?