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  1. How Beliefs Are Like Colors.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania
    Teresa believes in God. Maggie’s wife believes that the Earth is flat, and also that Maggie should be home from work by now. Anouk—a cat—believes it is dinner time. This dissertation is about what believing is: it concerns what, exactly, ordinary people are attributing to Teresa, Maggie’s wife, and Anouk when affirming that they are believers. Part I distinguishes the attitudes of belief that people attribute to each other (and other animals) in ordinary life from the cognitive states of belief (...)
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  • How Many Concepts of Consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.
    With some help from the commentators, a few adjustments to the characterizations of A-consciousness and P-consciousness can avoid some trivial cases of one without the other. But it still seems that the case for the existence of P without A is stronger than that for A without P. If indeed there can be P without A, but not A without P, this would be a remarkable result that would need explanation.
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  • Feeling of Knowing and Phenomenal Consciousness.Tiziana Zalla & Adriano P. Palma - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-272.
    In Feeling of Knowing cases, subjects have a form of consciousness about the presence of a content without having access to it. If this phenomenon can be correctly interpreted as having to do with consciousness, then there would be a P-conscious mental experience which is dissociated from access.
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  • More on Prosopagnosia.Andrew W. Young - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):271-271.
    Some cases of prosopagnosia involve a highly circumscribed loss of A-consciousness. When seen in this way they offer further support for the arguments made in Block's target article.
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  • Should We Continue to Study Consciousness?Richard M. Warren - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):270-271.
    Block has attempted to reduce the confusion and controversy concerning the term “consciousness” by suggesting that there are two forms or types of consciousness, each of which has several characteristics or properties. This suggestion appears to further becloud the topic, however. Perhaps consciousness cannot be defined adequately and should not be considered as a topic that can be studied scientifically.
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  • Consciousness is Not a Natural Kind.J. van Brakel - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):269-270.
    Blocks distinction between “phenomenal feel” consciousness and “thought/cognition” consciousness is a cultural construction. Consciousness is not a natural kind. Some crosscultural data are presented to support this.
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  • Blindsight, Orgasm, and Representational Overlap.Michael Tye - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):268-269.
    It is argued that there is no fallacy in the reasoning in the example of the thirsty blindsight subject, on one reconstruction of that reasoning. Neither the case of orgasm nor the case of a visual versus an auditory experience as of something overheard shows that phenomenal content is not representational.
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  • What is an Agent That It Experiences P-Consciousness? And What is P-Consciousness That It Moves an Agent?Roger N. Shepard - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):267-268.
    If phenomenal consciousness is distinct from the computationally based access-consciousness that controls overt behavior, how can I tell which things enjoy phenomenal consciousness? And if phenomenal consciousness 'plays no role in controlling overt behavior, how do human bodies come to write target articles arguing for the existence of phenomenal consciousness?
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  • Block's Philosophical Anosognosia.G. Rey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):266-267.
    Block's P-/A-consciousness distinction rules out P's involving a specific kind of cognitive access and commits him to a “strong” Pconsciousness. This not only confounds plausible research in the area but betrays an anosognosia about Wittgenstein's diagnosis about our philosophical “introspection” of mysterious inner processes.
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  • Conscious and Nonconscious Control of Action.Antti Revonsuo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):265-266.
    I criticize Block's examples of P-consciousness and A-consciousness for being flawed and the notion of A-consciousness for not being a notion of consciousness at all. I argue that an empirically important distinction can be made between behavior that is supported by an underlying conscious experience and behavior that is brought about by nonconscious action-control mechanisms. This distinction is different from that made by Block.
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  • How Access-Consciousness Might Be a Kind of Consiousness.Thomas Natsoulas - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):264-265.
    In response to the objection that his “access-consciousness” is not really consciousness but a matter of the availability of certain information for certain kinds of processing, Block will probably have to argue that consciousness in a more basic, familiar, traditional sense is an essential component of any instance of access-consciousness and thus justifies the name.
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  • Phenomenal and Attentional Consciousness May Be Inextricable.Adam Morton - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):263-264.
    In common sense consciousness has a fairly determinate content – the way an experience feels, the line of thought being consciously followed. The determinacy of the object may be achieved by linking Block's two concepts, so that as long as we hold on to the determinacy of content we are unable to separate P and A.
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  • We've Only Just Begun.William G. Lycan - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):262-263.
    Block contends that the concept of consciousness is a mongrel concept and that researchers go astray by conflating different notions of “consciousness.” This is certainly true. In fact, it is truer than Block acknowledges, because his own notion of P-consciousness runs together two, or arguably three, quite different and separable features of a sensory state.
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  • Access Denied.Dan Lloyd - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-262.
    The information processing that constitutes accessconsciousness is not sufficient to make a representational state conscious in any sense. Standard examples of computation without consciousness undermine A-consciousness, and Block's cases seem to derive their plausibility from a lurking phenomenal awareness. That is, people and other minded systems seem to have access-consciousness only insofar as the state accessed is a phenomenal one, or the state resulting from access is phenomenal, or both.
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  • Phenomenal Access: A Moving Target.Joseph Levine - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):261-261.
    Basically agreeing with Block regarding the need for a distinction between P- and A-consciousness, I characterize the problem somewhat diflerently, relating it more directly to the explanatory gap. I also speculate on the relation between the two forms of consciousness, arguing that some notion of access is essentially involved in phenomenal experience.
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  • Access and What It is Like.Bernard W. Kobes - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):260-260.
    Block's cases of superblindsight, the pneumatic drill, and the Sperling experiments do not show that P-consciousness and Aconsciousness can come apart. On certain tendentious but not implausible construals of the concepts of P- and A-consciousness, they refer to the same psychological phenomenon.
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  • Triangulating Phenomenal Consciousness.Patricia Kitcher - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):259-260.
    This commentary offers two criticisms of Block's account of phenomenal consciousness and a brief sketch of a rival account. The negative points are that monitoring consciousness also involves the possession of certain states and that phenomenal consciousness inevitably involves some sort of monitoring. My positive suggestion is that “phenomenal consciousness” may refer to our ability to monitor the rich but preconceptual states that retain perceptual information for complex processing.
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  • On Distinguishing Phenomenal Consciousness From the Representational Functions of Mind.Leonard D. Katz - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):258-259.
    One can share Block's aim of distinguishing “phenomenal” experience from cognitive function and agree with much in his views, yet hold that the inclusion of representational content within phenomenal content, if only in certain spatial cases, obscures this distinction. It may also exclude some modular theories, although it is interestingly suggestive of what may be the limits of the phenomenal penetration of the representational mind.
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  • Blocking Out the Distinction Between Sensation and Perception: Superblindsight and the Case of Helen.Nicholas Humphrey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):257-258.
    Block's notion of P-consciousness catches too much in its net. He would do better to exclude all states that do not have a sensory component. I question what he says about my work with the “blind” monkey, Helen.
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  • Phenomenal Fallacies and Conflations.Gilbert Harman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):256-257.
    A “fallacy” is something like the sense-datum fallacy, involving a logically invalid argument. A “conflation” is something like Block's conflation of the raw feel of an experience with what it is like to have the experience. Trivially, a self is conscious of something only if it accesses it. Substantive issues concern the nature of the conscious self and the nature of access.
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  • Guilty Consciousness.George Graham - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):255-256.
    Should we distinguish between access and phenomenal consciousness? Block says yes and that various pathologies of consciousness support and clarify the distinction. The commentary charge that the distinction is neither supported nor clarified by the clinical data. It recommends an alternative reading of the data and urges Block to clarify the distinction.
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  • Is Consciousness of Perception Really Separable From Perception?Martha J. Farah - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):254-255.
    Although not the main point of his target article, Block defends the view that perception and awareness of perception could be functions of different brain systems. I will argue that the available data do not support this view, and that Block's defense of the view rests on problematic eonstruals of the “executive system” and of the components of information-processing models.
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  • Breakthrough on the Consciousness Front or Much Ado About Nothing?N. F. Dixon - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):253-254.
    Propositions as to the nature of consciousness, based on disorders of perception that result from brain damage, and taking insufficient account of the numerous ways in which normal subjects may deviate from that “usual” sequence of events risk increasing rather than diminishing any existing confusion about the function of consciousness.
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  • More Empirical Cases to Break the Accord of Phenomenal and Access-Consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.
    Additional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.
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  • Evidence That Phenomenal Consciousness is the Same as Access Consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-249.
    Block seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.
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  • Perception-Consciousness and Action-Consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247-248.
    Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good, old-fashioned introspection.
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  • Consciousness, Accessibility, and the Mesh Between Psychology and Neuroscience.Ned Block - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (5):481--548.
    How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural machinery of the cognitive access that underlies reports of phenomenal consciousness? We can see the problem in stark form if we ask how we could tell whether representations inside a Fodorian module are phenomenally conscious. The methodology would seem straightforward: find the neural natural kinds that are the basis of phenomenal consciousness in clear cases when subjects are completely confident and we have no reason to doubt their (...)
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  • Self-Knowledge, Choice Blindness, and Confabulation.Hayley F. Webster - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherst
    There are two kinds of epistemic theories about self-knowledge: the traditional account, and the inferentialist account. According to the traditional view of self-knowledge, we have privileged access to our propositional attitudes. “Privileged access” means that one can gain knowledge of one’s own propositional attitudes directly via an exclusive, first-personal method called introspection. On the other hand, the inferentialist view of self-knowledge postulates that we don’t have privileged access to our propositional attitudes and must infer or self-attribute them instead. In this (...)
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  • Odpovědi přátelům.Tomas Hribek - 2017 - Filosofie Dnes 9 (2):91-110.
    [Replies to My Friends] This is an answer to the critics of my book WHAT IT'S LIKE, OR WHAT IT'S ABOUT? THE PLACE OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE MATERIAL WORLD (2017). I proceed from the least to the most serious objections. I start with Jakub Mihálik’s defense of Russellian Monism against my claim that it is not a genuine alternative to standard dualism and materialism. In reply, I claim this is a side issue to the central aim of my book, which (...)
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  • A Connectionist Theory of Phenomenal Experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
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  • Cognitive Science and Phenomenal Consciousness: A Dilemma, and How to Avoid It.Gerard O'Brien & Jon Opie - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):269-86.
    When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...)
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  • On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
    Consciousness is a mongrel concept: there are a number of very different "consciousnesses." Phenomenal consciousness is experience; the phenomenally conscious aspect of a state is what it is like to be in that state. The mark of access-consciousness, by contrast, is availability for use in reasoning and rationally guiding speech and action. These concepts are often partly or totally conflated, with bad results. This target article uses as an example a form of reasoning about a function of "consciousness" based on (...)
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  • The Disunity of Consciousness.Gerard O'Brien & Jonathan Opie - 1998 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 76 (3):378-95.
    It is commonplace for both philosophers and cognitive scientists to express their allegiance to the "unity of consciousness". This is the claim that a subject’s phenomenal consciousness, at any one moment in time, is a single thing. This view has had a major influence on computational theories of consciousness. In particular, what we call single-track theories dominate the literature, theories which contend that our conscious experience is the result of a single consciousness-making process or mechanism in the brain. We argue (...)
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  • Inverted Qualia.Alex Byrne - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Qualia inversion thought experiments are ubiquitous in contemporary philosophy of mind. The most popular kind is one or another variant of Locke's hypothetical case of.
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  • On the Matter of Robot Minds.Brian P. McLaughlin & David Rose - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy.
    The view that phenomenally conscious robots are on the horizon often rests on a certain philosophical view about consciousness, one we call “nomological behaviorism.” The view entails that, as a matter of nomological necessity, if a robot had exactly the same patterns of dispositions to peripheral behavior as a phenomenally conscious being, then the robot would be phenomenally conscious; indeed it would have all and only the states of phenomenal consciousness that the phenomenally conscious being in question has. We experimentally (...)
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  • The Five Marks of the Mental.Tuomas K. Pernu - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
    The mental realm seems different to the physical realm; the mental is thought to be dependent on, yet distinct from the physical. But how, exactly, are the two realms supposed to be different, and what, exactly, creates the seemingly insurmountable juxtaposition between the mental and the physical? This review identifies and discusses five marks of the mental, features that set characteristically mental phenomena apart from the characteristically physical phenomena. These five marks (intentionality, consciousness, free will, teleology, and normativity) are not (...)
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  • Fixing Functionalism.Bruce Katz - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (3):87-118.
    Functionalism, which views consciousness as the product of the processing of stimuli by the brain, is perhaps the dominant view among researchers in the cognitive sciences and associated fields. However, as a workable scientific model of consciousness, it has been marred by a singular lack of tangible success, except at the broadest levels of explanation. This paper argues that this is not an accident, and that in its standard construal it is simply too unwieldy to assume the burden of full-fledged (...)
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  • A Defense of Cartesian Materialism.Jonathan Opie - 1999 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59 (4):939 - 963.
    One of the principal tasks Dennett sets himself in Consciousness Explained is to demolish the Cartesian theater model of phenomenal consciousness, which in its contemporary garb takes the form of Cartesian materialism: the idea that conscious experience is a process of presentation realized in the physical materials of the brain. The now standard response to Dennett is that, in focusing on Cartesian materialism, he attacks an impossibly naive account of consciousness held by no one currently working in cognitive science or (...)
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  • "Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknown
    This is a bibliography of books and articles on consciousness in philosophy, cognitive science, and neuroscience over the last 30 years. There are three main sections, devoted to monographs, edited collections of papers, and articles. The first two of these sections are each divided into three subsections containing books in each of the main areas of research. The third section is divided into 12 subsections, with 10 subject headings for philosophical articles along with two additional subsections for articles in cognitive (...)
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  • V. Consciousness, Interpretation, and Higher-Order-Thought.David Rosenthal - unknown
    Few contemporary researchers in psychology, philosophy, and the cognitive sciences have any doubt about whether mental phenomena occur without being conscious. There is extensive and convincing clinical and experimental evidence for the existence of thoughts, desires, and related mental states that aren’t conscious. We characterize thoughts, desires, intentions, expectations, hopes, and many other mental states in terms of the things they are about and, more fully, in terms of their content, as captured by a sentence nominalization, such as a clause (...)
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  • Dennett on Consciousness: Realism Without the Hysterics.Francis Fallon - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):35-44.
    Dennett’s theory of consciousness is often misread as broadly anti-realist. His aversion to ontology encourages readers to form their own interpretations, and the rhetoric he employs often seems to support the anti-realist reading. Dennett does offer defenses against the anti-realist charge, but these are piecemeal and diffuse. This paper examines Dennett’s most current expression, which proves insufficient on its own as a resolution to the ontological dispute. Drawing on related discussions in an attempt to find a resolution leads to a (...)
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  • Self-Deception, Interpretation and Consciousness.Paul Noordhof - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):75-100.
    I argue that the extant theories of self-deception face a counterexample which shows the essential role of instability in the face of attentive consciousness in characterising self-deception. I argue further that this poses a challenge to the interpretist approach to the mental. I consider two revisions of the interpretist approach which might be thought to deal with this challenge and outline why they are unsuccessful. The discussion reveals a more general difficulty for Interpretism. Principles of reasoning—in particular, the requirement of (...)
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  • Consciousness Explained.Sonia Sedivy - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):455-483.
    The paper argues that Daniel Dennett’s reductive account of consciousness in Consciousness Explained goes against theoretical commitments driving much of his previous work. I focus on considerations for the plurality of distinctive explanation of ourselves, as they have been articulated in Dennett's earlier work, and argue that Dennett's reductive framework is not adequately supported in the face of these considerations. The paper details tensions in Dennett’s work and shows how Consciousness Explained departs from the diagnoses of the mind/body problem offered (...)
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  • Subjectivity, Multiple Drafts and the Inconceivability of Zombies and the Inverted Spectrum in This World.Elizabeth Schier - 2019 - Topoi 38 (4):845-853.
    Proponents of the hard problem of consciousness argue that the zombie and inverted spectrum thought experiments demonstrate that consciousness cannot be physical. They present scenarios designed to demonstrate that it is conceivable that a physical replica of someone can have radically different or no conscious experiences, that such an experience-less replica is possible and therefore that materialism is false. I will argue that once one understands the limitations that the physics of this world puts on cognitive systems, zombies and the (...)
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  • Toward an Ontological Interpretation of Dennett's Theory.Michael V. Antony - 2002 - Philosophia 29 (1-4):343-369.
    While "Consciousness Explained" has received an enormous amount of attention since its publication, there is still little agreement on what Dennett’s account of consciousness is. Most interpreters treat his view as an instance of one or another of the standard ontological positions (functionalism, behaviorism, eliminativism, instrumentalism). I believe a different metaphysical account underlies Dennett’s view, one that is important though ill-understood. In the paper I attempt to point in the direction of a proper characterization of that account through the use (...)
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  • The Path Not Taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.
    The differences Block attempts to capture with his putative distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness are more directly and perspicuously handled in terms of differences in richness of content and degree of influence. Block's critiques, based on his misbegotten distinction, evaporate on closer inspection.
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  • Consciousness Without Conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  • Identifying Phenomenal Consciousness.Elizabeth Schier - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):216-222.
    This paper examines the possibility of finding evidence that phenomenal consciousness is independent of access. The suggestion reviewed is that we should look for isomorphisms between phenomenal and neural activation spaces. It is argued that the fact that phenomenal spaces are mapped via verbal report is no problem for this methodology. The fact that activation and phenomenal space are mapped via different means does not mean that they cannot be identified. The paper finishes by examining how data addressing this theoretical (...)
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  • Consciousness: Only at the Personal Level.Matthew Elton - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):25-42.
    I claim that consciousness, just as thought or action, is only to be found at the personal level of explanation. Dennett's account is often taken to be at odds with this view, as it is seen as explicating consciousness in terms of sub-personal processes. Against this reading, and especially as it is developed by John McDowell, I argue that Dennett's work is best understood as maintaining a sharp personal/sub-personal distinction. To see this, however, we need to understand better what content (...)
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