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  1. (1 other version)Philosophy of psychiatry.Dominic Murphy - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Psychiatry beyond the brain: externalism, mental health, and autistic spectrum disorder.Tom Roberts, Joel Krueger & Shane Glackin - 2019 - Philosophy Psychiatry and Psychology 26 (3):E-51-E68.
    Externalist theories hold that a comprehensive understanding of mental disorder cannot be achieved unless we attend to factors that lie outside of the head: neural explanations alone will not fully capture the complex dependencies that exist between an individual’s psychiatric condition and her social, cultural, and material environment. Here, we firstly offer a taxonomy of ways in which the externalist viewpoint can be understood, and unpack its commitments concerning the nature and physical realization of mental disorder. Secondly, we apply a (...)
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  • Schizophrenia and the Scaffolded Self.Joel Krueger - 2020 - Topoi 39 (3):597-609.
    A family of recent externalist approaches in philosophy of mind argues that our psychological capacities are synchronically and diachronically “scaffolded” by external resources. I consider how these “scaffolded” approaches might inform debates in phenomenological psychopathology. I first introduce the idea of “affective scaffolding” and make some taxonomic distinctions. Next, I use schizophrenia as a case study to argue—along with others in phenomenological psychopathology—that schizophrenia is fundamentally a self-disturbance. However, I offer a subtle reconfiguration of these approaches. I argue that schizophrenia (...)
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  • The Body Social: An Enactive Approach to the Self.Kyselo Miriam - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-16.
    This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between (...)
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  • Out of our skulls: How the extended mind thesis can extend psychiatry.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (8):1160-1174.
    The thesis that mental states extend beyond the skull, otherwise known as the extended mind thesis, has attracted considerable philosophical attention and support. It has also been accused of lacking practical import. At the same time, the field of psychiatry has remained largely unacquainted with ExM, tending to rely instead upon what ExM proponents would consider to be outdated models of the mind. ExM and psychiatry, therefore, have much to offer one another, but the connection between the two has remained (...)
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  • Extended emotions.Joel Krueger & Thomas Szanto - 2016 - Philosophy Compass 11 (12):863-878.
    Until recently, philosophers and psychologists conceived of emotions as brain- and body-bound affairs. But researchers have started to challenge this internalist and individualist orthodoxy. A rapidly growing body of work suggests that some emotions incorporate external resources and thus extend beyond the neurophysiological confines of organisms; some even argue that emotions can be socially extended and shared by multiple agents. Call this the extended emotions thesis. In this article, we consider different ways of understanding ExE in philosophy, psychology, and the (...)
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  • Externalist Psychiatry.Will Davies - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):290-296.
    Psychiatry widely assumes an internalist biomedical model of mental illness. I argue that many of psychiatry’s diagnostic categories involve an implicit commitment to constitutive externalism about mental illness. Some of these categories are socially externalist in nature.
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  • A New Argument Against Libertarian Free Will?David Widerker - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):296-306.
    In this paper, I present an argument that shows that the belief in libertarian freedom is inconsistent with two assumptions widely accepted by those who are physicalists with regard to the relation between the mental and the physical - that mental properties are distinct from physical properties, and that mental properties supervene on physical properties. After presenting the argument, I trace its implications for the question of the compatibility of libertarian free will and physicalism in general.
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  • Mental Disorder (Illness).Jennifer Radden & Jonathan Y. Tsou - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Mental disorder (earlier entitled “illness” or “disease”) is ascribed to deviations from normal thoughts, reasoning, feelings, attitudes, and actions that are considered socially or personally dysfunctional and apt for treatment. Schizophrenia, depression, and bipolar disorder are core examples. The concept of mental disorder plays a role in many domains, including medicine, social sciences such as psychology and anthropology, and the humanities, including literature and philosophy. Philosophical discussions are the primary focus of the present entry, which differs from the entry on (...)
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  • Collectively ill: a preliminary case that groups can have psychiatric disorders.Ginger A. Hoffman - 2019 - Synthese 196 (6):2217-2241.
    In the 2000s, several psychiatrists cited the lack of relational disorders in the DSM-IV as one of the two most glaring gaps in psychiatric nosology, and campaigned for their inclusion in the DSM-5. This campaign failed, however, presumably in part due to serious “ontological concerns” haunting such disorders. Here, I offer a path to quell such ontological concerns, adding to previous conceptual work by Jerome Wakefield and Christian Perring. Specifically, I adduce reasons to think that collective disorders are compatible with (...)
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  • The enactive approach and disorders of the self - the case of schizophrenia.Miriam Kyselo - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (4):591-616.
    The paper discusses two recent approaches to schizophrenia, a phenomenological and a neuroscientific approach, illustrating how new directions in philosophy and cognitive science can elaborate accounts of psychopathologies of the self. It is argued that the notion of the minimal and bodily self underlying these approaches is still limited since it downplays the relevance of social interactions and relations for the formation of a coherent sense of self. These approaches also illustrate that we still lack an account of how 1st (...)
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  • Recent developments for naturalizing the mind.Tim Thornton - 2011 - Current Opinion in Psychiatry 24:502–506.
    The philosophy of mind and psychiatry seem to be complementary disciplines investigating the same central issues. What is the nature of the mind, of the brain and body, and of their relation? Much of the work of both disciplines is concerned with those central issues.
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  • Is externalism really a threat to biological psychiatry?M. Cristina Amoretti - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):606-617.
    1. In her latest book (Jefferson, 2022), “Are Mental Disorders Brain Disorders?”, Anneli Jefferson (AJ) argues that mental disorders can be considered brain disorders when they involve brain dysfun...
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