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Two Improvements to the Intentional Stance Theory: Hutto and Satne on Naturalizing Content.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (3):579-591.details
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Conscious intending as self-programming.Marc Slors - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (1):94-113.details
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Discrimination without indication: Why Dretske can't lean on learning.Carol Slater - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (2):163-80.details
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Are blind babies delayed in achieving social understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.details
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Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
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Structural content: A naturalistic approach to implicit belief.Paul Skokowski - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):362-369.details
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Networks with Attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Society 22 (3):461-470.details
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Networks with attitudes.Paul Skokowski - 2009 - AI and Society 23 (4):461-470.details
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Observing a superposition.Paul Skokowski - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7107-7129.details
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Is the Pain in Jane Felt Mainly in Her Brain?Paul Skokowski - 2007 - The Harvard Review of Philosophy 15 (1):58-71.details
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Can computers carry content "inexplicitly"?Paul G. Skokowski - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (3):333-44.details
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Metaethics, teleosemantics and the function of moral judgements.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Biology and Philosophy 27 (5):639-662.details
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Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
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Group Action Without Group Minds.Kenneth Silver - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):321-342.details
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Knowing children's minds.Michael Siegal - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):79-80.details
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Special access lies down with theory-theory.Sydney Shoemaker - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):78-79.details
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Reward Prediction Error Signals are Meta‐Representational.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):314-341.details
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Naturalising Representational Content.Nicholas Shea - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (5):496-509.details
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Neural signalling of probabilistic vectors.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (5):902-913.details
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Content in Simple Signalling Systems.Nicholas Shea, Peter Godfrey-Smith & Rosa Cao - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1009-1035.details
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Why we view the brain as a computer.Oron Shagrir - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):393-416.details
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The nature of nature: Rethinking naturalistic theories of intentionality.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (3):309-322.details
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Structural Representations and the Brain.Oron Shagrir - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (3):519-545.details
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Russellian Representationalism and the Stygian Hues.William A. Sharp - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (2):777-797.details
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Making it mental: in search for the golden mean of the extended cognition controversy.Itay Shani - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):1-26.details
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In defense of the semantic view of computation.Oron Shagrir - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4083-4108.details
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Intension and representation: Quine’s indeterminacy thesis revisited.Itay Shani - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (4):415 – 440.details
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Dynamics and Cognition.Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2013 - Minds and Machines 23 (3):353-375.details
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Computation and intentionality: A recipe for epistemic impasse.Itay Shani - 2005 - Minds and Machines 15 (2):207-228.details
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Aim that Bow! An Interactivist Gaze at the Problem of Intentional Tracking.Itay Shani - 2011 - Axiomathes 21 (1):67-97.details
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A review of Frederick Adams and Kenneth Aizawa, the Bounds of cognition. [REVIEW]Lawrence A. Shapiro - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (2):267-273.details
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Turing Patterns and Biological Explanation.Maria Serban - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (47):529-552.details
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A unified account of information, misinformation, and disinformation.Sille Obelitz Søe - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5929-5949.details
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The realistic stance.John R. Searle - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):527.details
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The Metaphysics of Rule-Following.Markus E. Schlosser - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (3):345-369.details
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The Crazyist Metaphysics of Mind.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):665-682.details
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Searles kritik am funktionalismus — eine untersuchung Des chinesischzimmers.Jürgen Schröder - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (2):321-336.details
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Reflection, reason, and free will.Timothy Schroeder - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):77 – 84.details
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Representation and desire: A philosophical error with consequences for theory-of-mind research.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1999 - Philosophical Psychology 12 (2):157-180.details
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Practical rationality is a problem in the philosophy of mind.Timothy Schroeder - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):394-409.details
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Monsters Among Us.Timothy Schroeder - 2001 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 31 (sup1):167-184.details
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If materialism is true, the United States is probably conscious.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1697-1721.details
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How Frogs See the World: Putting Millikan’s Teleosemantics to the Test.Peter Schulte - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):483-496.details
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Describing behavior: A new label for an old wine?Wolfgang M. Schleidt - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):288-289.details
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Desire.Tim Schroeder - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 1 (6):631-639.details
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A recipe for concept similarity.Tim Schroeder - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (1):68-91.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Agent-causation and agential control.Markus Ernst Schlosser - 2008 - Philosophical Explorations 11 (1):3-21.details
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