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  1. Can “I” Prevent You From Entering My Mind?Marc Champagne - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):145-162.
    Shaun Gallagher has actively looked into the possibility that psychopathologies involving “thought insertion” might supply a counterexample to the Cartesian principle according to which one can always recognize one’s own thoughts as one’s own. Animated by a general distrust of a priori demonstrations, Gallagher is convinced that pitting clinical cases against philosophical arguments is a worthwhile endeavor. There is no doubt that, if true, a falsification of the immunity to error through misidentification would entail drastic revisions in how we conceive (...)
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  • First Person Representations Need a Methodology Based on Simulation or Theory.Robert M. Gordon - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):130-131.
    Although their thesis is generally sound, Barresi & Moore give insufficient attention to the need for a methodology, whether simulation based or theory-based, for choosing among alternative possible matches of first person and third person information. This choice must be sensitive to contextual information, including past behavior. Moreover, apart from simulation or theory, first person information would not help predict future behavior.
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  • Content and Context of Perception.David Woodruff Smith - 1984 - Synthese 61 (October):61-88.
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  • Perceptual Reference.Izchak Miller - 1984 - Synthese 61 (October):35-60.
    Philosophical interest in the structure of perception is motivated by questions such as these: How does perception function to constrain and justify our empirical theories? How is it possible to perceive an extended process, when at any given moment of our perceiving it only one of its temporal phases is impinging on our senses? What determines the object or objects of perception - those things our experiences are about? The need to answer these and other questions about perception in a (...)
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  • Consciousness in Action.David Woodruff Smith - 1992 - Synthese 90 (1):119-43.
    A phenomenology of action is outlined, analyzing the structure of volition, kinesthesis, and perception in the experience of action, and, finally, the experience of embodiment in action. The intentionality of action is contrasted with that of thought and perception in regard to the role of the body, and the relations between an action, the experience of acting, and the context of the action are specified.
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  • The Value of Relatedness in Existential Psychotherapy and Phenomenological Enquiry.Ernesto Spinelli - 2006 - Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology 6 (sup1):1-8.
    Existential psychotherapy places pivotal significance upon the inter-relational aspects of human experience. By so doing, the therapeutic relationship itself becomes the principal means through which the client’s presenting symptoms and disorders are disclosed as direct expressions and outcomes of the client’s overall “way of being” rather than as isolated and disruptive impediments. At the same time, existential therapy emphasises the actual relationship that emerges between psychotherapist and client and argues that it is via the contrast and comparison of this lived (...)
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  • Husserl's Psychology of Arithmetic.Carlo Ierna - 2012 - Bulletin d'Analyse Phénoménologique 8 (1):97-120.
    In 1913, in a draft for a new Preface for the second edition of the Logical Investigations, Edmund Husserl reveals to his readers that "The source of all my studies and the first source of my epistemological difficul­ties lies in my first works on the philosophy of arithmetic and mathematics in general", i.e. his Habilitationsschrift and the Philosophy of Arithmetic: "I carefully studied the consciousness constituting the amount, first the collec­tive consciousness (consciousness of quantity, of multiplicity) in its simplest and (...)
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  • Logical Investigations Volume 1.Edmund Husserl - 2001 - Routledge.
    Edmund Husserl is the founder of phenomenology and the Logical Investigations is his most famous work. It had a decisive impact on twentieth century philosophy and is one of few works to have influenced both continental and analytic philosophy. This is the first time both volumes have been available in paperback. They include a new introduction by Dermot Moran, placing the Investigations in historical context and bringing out their contemporary philosophical importance. These editions include a new preface by Sir Michael (...)
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  • The Habitus, Coping Practices, and the Search for the Ground of Action.Kevin M. Cahill - 2016 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 46 (5):498-524.
    The article shows how in Outline of a Theory of Practice Pierre Bourdieu relies on a kind of philosophical myth in his attempt to dispel structuralist accounts of action. Section 2 is a summary of Bourdieu’s use of the concept of habitus against intellectualism and structuralism. Schatzki’s criticism of Bourdieu from a purportedly Wittgensteinian perspective is also examined. Section 3 relates Bourdieu’s use of habitus to a debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell about the role of concepts in action. (...)
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  • Cognitive Ecology.Edwin Hutchins - 2010 - Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):705-715.
    Cognitive ecology is the study of cognitive phenomena in context. In particular, it points to the web of mutual dependence among the elements of a cognitive ecosystem. At least three fields were taking a deeply ecological approach to cognition 30 years ago: Gibson’s ecological psychology, Bateson’s ecology of mind, and Soviet cultural-historical activity theory. The ideas developed in those projects have now found a place in modern views of embodied, situated, distributed cognition. As cognitive theory continues to shift from units (...)
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  • Leben Als Kreatives Antworten.Jianjun Li - 2015 - Dissertation, Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
    This dissertation is an investigation of temporality and time in light of Bernhard Waldenfels’ responsive phenomenology. Both intentionality, a classical concept in the phenomenolgy of Husserl, and responsivity, a concept developed by Waldenfels, are approaches to the riddle of time. Time is the main concern of metaphysical and religious discourse and must be taken into account in every consideraton of freedom. The dissertation consists of three main parts, which are divided into 49 chapters. In the First Part, “Otherness and Corporeality,” (...)
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  • Intentionality.Pierre Jacob - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Intentionality is the power of minds to be about, to represent, or to stand for, things, properties and states of affairs. The puzzles of intentionality lie at the interface between the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of language. The word itself, which is of medieval Scholastic origin, was rehabilitated by the philosopher Franz Brentano towards the end of the nineteenth century. ‘Intentionality’ is a philosopher's word. It derives from the Latin word intentio, which in turn derives from the verb (...)
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  • Formal Ontology, Common Sense, and Cognitive Science.Barry Smith - 1995 - International Journal of Human-Computer Studies 43 (5-6):641–667.
    Common sense is on the one hand a certain set of processes of natural cognition - of speaking, reasoning, seeing, and so on. On the other hand common sense is a system of beliefs (of folk physics, folk psychology and so on). Over against both of these is the world of common sense, the world of objects to which the processes of natural cognition and the corresponding belief-contents standardly relate. What are the structures of this world? How does the scientific (...)
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  • Understanding Self and Other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  • Are Blind Babies Delayed in Achieving Social Understanding?Carol Slater - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):141-142.
    Barresi & Moore's account predicts that infants deprived of visual input will be delayed in achieving social understanding, a hypothesis that receives some support from studies of language use. by blind children. It is proposed that recently developed false belief and appearance/reality tasks be used to explore this issue further. Three possibly distracting conceptual issues are also discussed.
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  • Omitting the Second Person in Social Understanding.Vasudevi Reddy - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):140-141.
    Barresi & Moore do not consider information about intentional relations available within emotional engagement with others and do not see that others are perceived in the second as well as the third person. Recognising second person information forces recognition of similarities and connections not otherwise available. A developmental framework built on the assumption of the complete separateness of self and other is inevitably flawed.
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  • Intentional Schema Will Not Do the Work of a Theory of Mind.David Premack & Ann James Premack - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):138-140.
    Barresi & Moore's “intentional schema” will not do the work of “theory of mind.” Their model will account neither for fundamental facts of social competence, such as the social attributions of the 10-month-old infant, nor the possibility that, though having a theory of mind, the chimpanzee's theory is “weaker” than the human's.
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  • Ontogeny, Evolution, and Folk Psychology.Daniel J. Povinelli, Mia C. Zebouni & Christopher G. Prince - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):137-138.
    Barresi & Moore assume an equivalence between ontogenetic and evolutionaiy transformations of social understanding. The mechanisms of evolution allow for novel structures to arise, both through terminal addition and through the onset of novel pathways at time points that precede the end points of ancestral pathways. Terminal addition may not be the appropriate model for the evolution of human object-directed imitation, intermodal equivalence, or joint attention.
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  • Social Relations and Understanding the Intentional Self.Annerieke Oosterwegel - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):136-136.
    Although Barresi & Moore could have grounded their framework more explicitly in existing models, they offer a provocative testbed for the assumptions of symbolic interactionism and further thinking about self-regulation, especially in autistics.
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  • Four-Year-Old Humans Are Different: Why?Katherine Nelson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):134-135.
    The intentionality schema is an abstraction that relates phylogenetic and ontogenetic sequences of social understanding, but it also obscures the differences between humans and other primates. In particular, it ignores human social developmental and communicative history and the important roles that language plays in human understanding of others' intentional states.
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  • Understanding That Looking Causes Knowing.David R. Olson & Bruce Homer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):135-135.
    Barresi & Moore provide an impressive account of how the coordination of first and third person information about the self and other could produce an account of intentional relations. They are less explicit as to how the child comes to understand the basic epistemic relation between experience and knowledge, that is, how informational access causes belief. We suggest one route.
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  • Understanding Minds and Selves.R. Peter Hobson - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):132-132.
    Barresi & Moore provide a welcome focus on children's abilities to integrate first and third person information about intentional relations but they pay insufficient attention to the origins of children's understanding of the nature of subjective orientations vis-à-vis a shared world and the potential significance of such understanding as a source of domain-general information-processing capacities.
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  • Self-Knowledge, Knowledge of Other Minds, and Kinesthetic-Visual Matching.Robert W. Mitchell - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-133.
    The “intentional schema” seems identical to or dependent upon kinesthetic–visual matching, both of which account for similar empirical findings. The intentional schema, however, fails to account for variability in children's understanding of false belief and differences in children's understanding of self and other in pretense.
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  • Imagination and Imitation: Input, Acid Test, or Alchemy?C. M. Heyes - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):131-132.
    Immediate imitation is likely to be a major, direct input to Barresi & Moore's level 2 competence, but deferred imitation is unlikely to play a key role in the transition to level 3, because the attribution of first person knowledge is neither a necessary cause nor an obvious consequence of deferred imitation, and deferred imitation does not correlate phylogenetically with capacities that more plausibly either yield or reflect a concept of intentional agency.
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  • Rhesus Monkeys Are Radical Behaviorists.Gordon G. Gallup - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-129.
    The data reviewed in Barresi & Moore's treatment of social understanding is recast in terms of a model of social intelligence that was advanced some time ago. When it comes to their analysis of the behavior of other individuals, most primates appear to function as radical behaviorists, whereas chimpanzees and older infants show evidence of becoming primitive cognitive psychologists.
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  • Second Person Intentional Relations and the Evolution of Social Understanding.Juan Carlos Gomez - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):129-130.
    Second person intentional relations, involving intentional activities directed at the perceptor, are qualitatively different from first and third person relations. They generate a peculiar, bidirectional kind of intentionality, especially in the realm of visual perception. Systems specialized in dealing with this have been selected by evolution. These systems can be considered to be the evolutionary precursors to the human theory of mind.
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  • Moral Competence is Cognitive but (Perhaps) Nonmodular.Susan Dwyer - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):128-129.
    Barresi & Moore's account has at least two implications for moral psychology. First, it appears to provide support for cognitive theories of moral competence. Second, their claim that the development of social understanding depends upondomain-generalchanges in cognitive ability appears to oppose the idea that moral competence is under-pinned by a moral module.
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  • On the Dangers of Oversimulation.Gergely Csibra & György Gergely - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):127-128.
    Barresi & Moore fail to provide a satisfactory account for the development of social understanding because of their ambiguous characterization of the relationship between the intentional schema and shared intentional activities, their underestimation of the representational capacities of infants, and their overreliance on the simulationist assumption that understanding others is tantamount to sharing their experience.
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  • An Ambiguity.Jennifer Church - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):126-127.
    The difference between first and third person information may be thought of as a difference in either informationalcontentor informationalmodality. Each option faces some problems. I try to sort out some of these issues and raise a question about the explanatory force of the notion of a schema.
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  • Language and its Role in Understanding Intentional Relations: Research Tool or Mechanism of Development?Nancy Budwig & Michael Bamberg - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):125-126.
    In our commentary we elaborate on Barresi & Moore's use of language as a tool. In particular, we highlight the importance of cognitive linguistic research with its emphasis on the relation between morpnosyntax and intentional schemes. We also speculate about how language itself might play a role in children's integration of first and third person knowledge.
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  • Development of Social Emotions and Constructive Agents.Aaron Ben Ze'ev & Keith Oatley - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):124-125.
    The psychology of emotions illuminates the questions of intentional capacities raised by Barresi & Moore. Complex emotions require the development of a sense of self and are based on social comparisons between mainly imagined objects. The fourth level in B&M's framework requires something like a constructive agent rather than a mental agent.
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  • Can Children with Autism Integrate First and Third Person Representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.
    Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information, and in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
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  • Comparative Cognitive Studies, Not Folk Phylogeny, Please.Colin Allen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):122-123.
    Barresi & Moore provide a useful tool for the comparative study of social cognition that could, however, be improved by more subtle analysis of first person information about intentional relations. Knowledge of misrepresentation also needs to be better handled within the theory. I urge skepticism about B&M's sweeping phylogenetic claims.
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  • Intentional Relations and Social Understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations. However, through the integration of these (...)
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  • Dreyfus on Heidegger's Critique of Husserl's Intentionality: A Review.Napoleon Mabaquiao Jr - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1).
    This paper primarily disputes Dreyfus’s account of Heidegger’s critique of Husserl’s theory of intentionality. Specifically, it raises objections to the three central claims of such an account; namely: that Searle’s theory of intentional action can be used as a stand-in for Husserl’s; that Heidegger rejects the primordiality of the intentionality of consciousness; and that Heidegger distinguishes between conscious and unconscious types of intentional actions and he privileges the latter over the former. I show the first to be unwarranted owing to (...)
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  • Husserl, Language and the Ontology of the Act.Barry Smith - 1987 - In Dino Buzzetti & M. Ferriani (eds.), Speculative Grammar, Universal Grammar, and Philosophical Analysis of Language. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. pp. 205-227.
    The ontology of language is concerned with the relations between uses of language, both overt and covert, and other entities, whether in the world or in the mind of the thinking subject. We attempt a first survey of the sorts of relations which might come into question for such an ontology, including: relations between referring uses of expressions and their objects, relations between the use of a (true) sentence and that in the world which makes it true, relations between mental (...)
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  • Book Review: Normativity and Phenomenology in Husserl and Heidegger, Written by Steven Crowell. [REVIEW]Susi Ferrarello - 2014 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 45 (2):251-257.
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  • Neurofenomenologia: Metodologiczne Lekarstwo Na Trudny Problem.Francisco Varela - 2010 - Avant: Trends in Interdisciplinary Studies 1 (1):31-75.
    This paper responds to the issues raised by D. Chalmers by offering a research direction which is quite radical because of the way in which methodological principles are linked to scientific studies of consciousness. Neuro-phenomenology is the name I use here to designate a quest to marry modern cognitive science and a disciplined approach to human experience, thereby placing myself in the lineage of the continental tradition of Phenomenology. My claim is that the so-called hard problem that animates these Special (...)
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  • Utjelovljeni Um. O Komputacijskim, Evolucijskim I Filozofskim Tumačenjima Spoznaje.Klaus Mainzer - 2006 - Filozofska Istrazivanja 26 (2):405-421.
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  • Naturalizing Dasein. Aporias of the Neo-Heideggerian Approach in Cognitive Science.Jethro Masís - 2014 - Cosmos and History 10 (2):158-181.
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  • Motivation and Horizon: Phenomenal Intentionality in Husserl.Philip J. Walsh - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):410-435.
    This paper argues for a Husserlian account of phenomenal intentionality. Experience is intentional insofar as it presents a mind-independent, objective world. Its doing so is a matter of the way it hangs together, its having a certain structure. But in order for the intentionality in question to be properly understood as phenomenal intentionality, this structure must inhere in experience as a phenomenal feature. Husserl’s concept of horizon designates this intentionality-bestowing experiential structure, while his concept of motivation designates the unique phenomenal (...)
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  • Phenomenal Intentionality and the Problem of Cognitive Contact.A. Young Christopher - unknown
    Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality. After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be a relation to. I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most prominent proponents, the tracking theorists—pointing out some challenges such views face, and concluding (...)
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  • Between Internalism and Externalism: Husserl’s Account of Intentionality.Lilian Alweiss - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (1):53-78.
    There is a strong consensus among analytic philosophers that Husserl is an internalist and that his internalism must be understood in conjunction with his methodological solipsism. This paper focuses on Husserl's early work the, Logical Investigations , and explores whether such a reading is justified. It shows that Husserl is not a methodological solipsist: He neither believes that meaning can be reduced to the individual, nor does he assign an explanatory role for meaning to the subject. Explanatory priority is assigned (...)
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  • Phenomenological Claims and the Myth of the Given.Jean-Michel Roy - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):1-32.
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  • Husserl’s Hyletic Data and Phenomenal Consciousness.Kenneth Williford - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (3):501-519.
    In the Logical Investigations, Ideas I and many other texts, Husserl maintains that perceptual consciousness involves the intentional “animation” or interpretation of sensory data or hyle, e.g., “color-data,” “tone-data,” and algedonic data. These data are not intrinsically representational nor are they normally themselves objects of representation, though we can attend to them in reflection. These data are “immanent” in consciousness; they survive the phenomenological reduction. They partly ground the intuitive or “in-the-flesh” aspect of perception, and they have a determinacy of (...)
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  • The Transcendental and the Psychological.John J. Drummond - 2008 - Husserl Studies 24 (3):193-204.
    This paper explores the emergence of the distinctions between the transcendental and the psychological and, correlatively, between phenomenology and psychology that emerge in The Idea of Phenomenology. It is argued that this first attempt to draw these distinctions reveals that the conception of transcendental phenomenology remains infected by elements of the earlier conception of descriptive psychology and that only later does Husserl move to a more adequate—but perhaps not yet fully purified—conception of the transcendental.
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  • Reduction, Externalism and Immanence in Husserl and Heidegger.Felix O’Murchadha - 2008 - Synthese 160 (3):375-395.
    This paper argues that the Husserl—Heidegger relationship is systematically misunderstood when framed in terms of a distinction between internalism and externalism. Both philosophers, it is argued, employ the phenomenological reduction to immanence as a fundamental methodological instrument. After first outlining the assumptions regarding inner and outer and the individual and the social from which recent epistemological interpretations of phenomenology begin, I turn to the question of Husserl's internalism. I argue that Husserl can only be understood as an internalist on the (...)
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  • Acta Cum Fundamentis in Re.Barry Smith - 1984 - Dialectica 38 (2‐3):157-178.
    It will be the thesis of this paper that there are among our mental acts some which fall into the category of real material relations. That is: some acts are necessarily such as to involve a plurality of objects as their relata or fundamenta. Suppose Bruno walks into his study and sees a cat. To describe the seeing, here, as a relation, is to affirm that it serves somehow to tie Bruno to the cat. Bruno's act of seeing, unlike his (...)
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  • Signification et essence. Les Leçons de 1908 de Husserl sur sa doctrine de la signification.Denis Fisette - 1991 - Dialogue 30 (1-2):33-49.
    Je prends ici comme prétexte la parution aux éditions Nijhoff des Leçons professées par E. Husserl durant le semestre d'été 1908 à Göttingen sur sa doctrine de la signification, Vorlesungen ueber Bedeutungslehre Sommersemester 1908 (1987), afin de faire le point sur les changements qui interviennent durant cette période concernant sa conception de la signification. L'importance du contenu de ces Leçons a déjà été signalée par quelques phénoménologues dont G. Küng (1973), R. Bernet (1979). D. W. Smith et R. McIntyre (1982) (...)
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  • But What is the Intentional Schema?Adam Morton - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):133-134.
    The intentional schema may not be sufficiently characterized to make questions about its role in individual and species development intelligible. The idea of metarepresentation may perhaps give it enough content. The importance of metarepresentation itself, however, can be called into question.
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