In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. While these wide accounts override traditional methodological individualism, the study of cognition has already progressed beyond these proposed perspectives towards building integrated explanations of the mechanisms involved, including not only internal submechanisms but also interactions with others, groups, cognitive artifacts, and their environment. The claim is substantiated with reference to recent developments in the (...) study of “mindreading” and debates on emotions. We claim that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals towards the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences. (shrink)

The article presents the interdisciplinary approach of Edwin Hutchins, analyzing his conception of distributed cognition as probably the most important and lasting contribution of anthropology to the repertoire of theoretical tools in cognitive science. At the same time, this conception resulted in one of the most interesting relationships between cognitive science and social sciences. These relationships are made possible by the assumptions of Hutchins’ conception, which directly contribute to interdisciplinary collaboration. His account of distributed cognition has enormous potential, allowing the (...) integration of research into cognitive and social processes. This is also because it breaks with methodological individualism. (shrink)

Artykuł ten jest recenzją książki „Mechanizmy predykcyjne i ich normatywność”, skoncentrowaną na trzech zakresach tej publikacji. Pierwszy zakres obejmuje kontekst wydawniczy, czyli kwestię zapotrzebowania na taką pracę, biorąc pod uwagę język publikacji, jej dostępności itd. Drugi zakres dotyczy akademickiego potencjału tej książki jako obszernego opracowania koncepcji przetwarzania predykcyjnego. Trzeci zakres natomiast wiąże się z główną ambicją Autora książki i jednocześnie najbardziej wymagającym wątkiem tej pracy, jako studium problemu normatywności w ujęciu koncepcji przetwarzania predykcyjnego i wyjaśniania (neo)mechanistycznego.

My basic research question – well beyond the scope of this book – is what the relationships between cognitive processes and cultural structures and practices are. Here, I get closer to answering this question in the following five steps: (1) I present cognitive ecology as a research tradition in cognitive science, characteristic of the approaches to wide cognition, i.e., embodied, embedded, extended, ecological psychology, enactivism, etc. (2) I distinguish two dimensions of the distributed cognition approach: as a theoretical framework and (...) as a task model, focusing on the former. This distinction has so far eluded cognitive science theorists, and this approach has not been sufficiently analysed as a potential theory of cognitive science in general and the basis for its integration, being reduced to the dimension of the task model. (3) I discuss approaches in research on interactions in distributed cognitive systems, focusing more on the notion of external representations, and mostly on the notion of affordance. When assessing the potential of the latter, I look for consistency in what is crucial for understanding the interactions, between ecological psychology and design research. (4) I analyze the up to now underestimated potential of the distributed cognition approach in the dispute over the bounds of cognitive processes. (5) I identify and assess the analogies between the distributed cognition approach and the neo-mechanistic model of explanation that has become popular in cognitive science, and indicate possible benefits for the integration of the latter. As one can see, I am not trying to fully answer the question about the relationship between cognition and culture, but rather assess to what extent cognitive science in its current form is capable of. (shrink)