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  1. Recognizing Strong Random Reals.Daniel Osherson - 2008 - Review of Symbolic Logic 1 (1):56-63.
    1. Characterizing randomness. Consider a physical process that, if suitably idealized, generates an indefinite sequence of independent random bits. One such process might be radioactive decay of a lump of uranium whose mass is kept at just the level needed to ensure that the probability is one-half that no alpha particle is emitted in the nth microsecond of the experiment. Let us think of the bits as drawn from {0, 1} and denote the resulting sequence by x with coordinates x0, (...)
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  • On the Observational Equivalence of Continuous-Time Deterministic and Indeterministic Descriptions.Werndl Charlotte - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):193-225.
    On the observational equivalence of continuous-time deterministic and indeterministic descriptions Content Type Journal Article Pages 193-225 DOI 10.1007/s13194-010-0011-5 Authors Charlotte Werndl, Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE UK Journal European Journal for Philosophy of Science Online ISSN 1879-4920 Print ISSN 1879-4912 Journal Volume Volume 1 Journal Issue Volume 1, Number 2.
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  • Did God Know It? God’s Relation to a World of Chance and Randomness.Benedikt Paul Göcke - 2015 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 78 (2):233-254.
    A common type of argument against the existence of God is to argue that certain essential features associated with the existence of God are inconsistent with certain other features to be found in the actual world. for an analysis of the different ways to deploy the term “God” in philosophical and theological discourse and for an analysis of the logical form of arguments for and against the existence of God.) A recent example of this type of argument against the existence (...)
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  • Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity.J. Robert G. Williams - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420.
    John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong. I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne's challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis's first (non-chancy) (...)
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  • Epistemological Limits to Scientific Prediction: The Problem of Uncertainty.Amanda Guillan - 2014 - Open Journal of Philosophy 4 (4):510-517.
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  • Causation, Randomness, and Pseudo-Randomness in John Venn's Logic of Chance.Byron E. Wall - 2005 - History and Philosophy of Logic 26 (4):299-319.
    In 1866, the young John Venn published The Logic of Chance, motivated largely by the desire to correct what he saw as deep fallacies in the reasoning of historical determinists such as Henry Buckle and in the optimistic heralding of a true social science by Adolphe Quetelet. Venn accepted the inevitable determinism implied by the physical sciences, but denied that the stable social statistics cited by Buckle and Quetelet implied a similar determinism in human actions. Venn maintained that probability statements (...)
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  • Chances, Counterfactuals, and Similarity.Robert Williams - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):385-420.
    John Hawthorne in a recent paper takes issue with Lewisian accounts of counterfactuals, when relevant laws of nature are chancy. I respond to his arguments on behalf of the Lewisian, and conclude that while some can be rebutted, the case against the original Lewisian account is strong.I develop a neo-Lewisian account of what makes for closeness of worlds. I argue that my revised version avoids Hawthorne’s challenges. I argue that this is closer to the spirit of Lewis’s first (non-chancy) proposal (...)
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  • On Bertrand's Paradox.Sorin Bangu - 2010 - Analysis 70 (1):30-35.
    The Principle of Indifference is a central element of the ‘classical’ conception of probability, but, for all its strong intuitive appeal, it is widely believed that it faces a devastating objection: the so-called (by Poincare´) ‘Bertrand paradoxes’ (in essence, cases in which the same probability question receives different answers). The puzzle has fascinated many since its discovery, and a series of clever solutions (followed promptly by equally clever rebuttals) have been proposed. However, despite the long-standing interest in this problem, an (...)
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  • Randomness: Off with its Heads.Aleksandar Aksentijevic - 2017 - Mind and Society 16 (1-2):1-15.
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  • The Metaphysical Character of the Criticisms Raised Against the Use of Probability for Dealing with Uncertainty in Artificial Intelligence.Carlotta Piscopo & Mauro Birattari - 2008 - Minds and Machines 18 (2):273-288.
    In artificial intelligence (AI), a number of criticisms were raised against the use of probability for dealing with uncertainty. All these criticisms, except what in this article we call the non-adequacy claim, have been eventually confuted. The non-adequacy claim is an exception because, unlike the other criticisms, it is exquisitely philosophical and, possibly for this reason, it was not discussed in the technical literature. A lack of clarity and understanding of this claim had a major impact on AI. Indeed, mostly (...)
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  • What Are the New Implications of Chaos for Unpredictability?Charlotte Werndl - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (1):195-220.
    From the beginning of chaos research until today, the unpredictability of chaos has been a central theme. It is widely believed and claimed by philosophers, mathematicians and physicists alike that chaos has a new implication for unpredictability, meaning that chaotic systems are unpredictable in a way that other deterministic systems are not. Hence, one might expect that the question ‘What are the new implications of chaos for unpredictability?’ has already been answered in a satisfactory way. However, this is not the (...)
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