I argue that Bohmian mechanics cannot reasonably be claimed to be a deterministic theory. If one assumes the “quantum equilibrium distribution” provided by the wave function of the universe, Bohmian mechanics requires an external random oracle in order to describe the algorithmic randomness properties of typical outcome sequences of long runs of repeated identical experiments. This oracle lies beyond the scope of Bohmian mechanics, including the impossibility of explaining the randomness property in question from “random” initial conditions. Thus the advantages (...) of Bohmian mechanics over other interpretations of quantum mechanics, if any, must lie at an ontological level, and in its potential to derive the quantum equilibrium distribution and hence the Born rule. (shrink)

For time-independent fields the Aharonov-Bohm effect has been obtained by idealizing the coordinate space as multiply-connected and using representations of its fundamental homotopy group to provide information on what is physically identified as the magnetic flux. With a time-dependent field, multiple-connectedness introduces the same degree of ambiguity; by taking into account electromagnetic fields induced by the time dependence, full physical behavior is again recovered once a representation is selected. The selection depends on a single arbitrary time (hence the so-called holonomies (...) are not unique), although no physical effects depend on the value of that particular time. These features can also be phrased in terms of the selection of self-adjoint extensions, thereby involving yet another question that has come up in this context, namely, boundary conditions for the wave function. (shrink)

Various fault modes of determinism in classical physics are outlined. It is shown how quantum mechanics can cure some forms of classical indeterminism. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of HPS, University of Pittsburgh, 1017 Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260; e‐mail: [email protected].

I show how classical and quantum physics approach the problem of randomness and probability. Contrary to popular opinions, neither we can prove that classical mechanics is a deterministic theory, nor that quantum mechanics is a nondeterministic one. In other words it is not possible to show that randomness in classical mechanics has a purely epistemic character and that of quantum mechanics an ontic one. Nevertheless, recent developments of quantum theory and increasing experimental possibilities to check its predictions call for returning (...) to the problem of comparing possibilities given by classical and quantum physics to accommodate and prove the existence of a `genuine randomness'. Recent results concerning `amplification of randomness' show that, in certain sense, quantum physics is in fact ‘more random’ that classical and outperforms it in producing a `truly random process'. (shrink)

There are many ontologies of the world or of specific phenomena such as time, matter, space, and quantum mechanics1. However, ontologies of information are rather rare. One of the reasons behind this is that information is most frequently associated with communication and computing, and not with ‘the furniture of the world’. But what would be the nature of an ontology of information? For it to be of significant import it should be amenable to formalization in a logico-grammatical formalism. A candidate (...) ontology satisfying such a requirement can be found in some of the ideas of K. Turek, presented in this paper. Turek outlines the ontology of information conceived of as a part of nature, and provides the ‘missing link’ to the Z axiomatic set theory, offering a proposal for developing a formal ontology of information both in its philosophical and logicogrammatical representations. (shrink)

How should we characterise the observable aspects of quantum theory? This paper argues that philosophers and physicists should jettison a standard dogma: that observables must be represented by self-adjoint or Hermitian operators. Four classes of non-standard observables are identified: normal operators, symmetric operators, real-spectrum operators, and none of these. The philosophical and physical implications of each are explored.

Two approaches to understanding the idealizations that arise in the Aharonov–Bohm effect are presented. It is argued that a common topological approach, which takes the non-simply connected electron configuration space to be an essential element in the explanation and understanding of the effect, is flawed. An alternative approach is outlined. Consequently, it is shown that the existence and uniqueness of self-adjoint extensions of symmetric operators in quantum mechanics have important implications for philosophical issues. Also, the alleged indispensable explanatory role of (...) said idealizations is examined via a minimal model explanatory scheme. Last, the idealizations involved in the AB effect are placed in a wider philosophical context via a short survey of part of the literature on infinite and essential idealizations. (shrink)

We call attention to different formulations of how physical laws relate to what is physically possible in the philosophical literature, and argue that it may be the case that determinism fails under one formulation but reigns under the other. Whether this is so depends on our view on the nature of laws, and may also depend on the inter-theoretical relationships among our best physical theories, or so shall we argue.

This is a review of the issue of randomness in quantum mechanics, with special emphasis on its ambiguity; for example, randomness has different antipodal relationships to determinism, computability, and compressibility. Following a philosophical discussion of randomness in general, I argue that deterministic interpretations of quantum mechanics are strictly speaking incompatible with the Born rule. I also stress the role of outliers, i.e. measurement outcomes that are not 1-random. Although these occur with low probability, their very existence implies that the no-signaling (...) principle used in proofs of randomness of outcomes of quantum-mechanical measurements should be reinterpreted statistically, like the second law of thermodynamics. In three appendices I discuss the Born rule and its status in both single and repeated experiments, review the notion of 1-randomness that in various guises was investigated by Kolmogorov and others and treat Bell’s Theorem and the Free Will Theorem with their implications for randomness. (shrink)

In this article I reply to Fleming׳s response to my ‘Time and quantum theory: a history and a prospectus.’ I take issue with two of his claims: (i) that quantum theory concerns the (potential) properties of eternally persisting objects; (ii) that there is an underdetermination problem for Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVMs). I advocate an event-first view which regards the probabilities supplied by quantum theory as probabilities for the occurrence of physical events rather than the possession of properties by persisting (...) objects. (shrink)

We argue that the truth of determinism is not an interpretation-free fact and we systematically overview relevant interpretational choices that are less known in the philosophical literature. After bypassing the well known interpretational problem that arises in quantum mechanics we identify three further questions about the representational role of the mathematical structures employed by physical theories. Finally we point out that even if we settle all representational issues the received view of physical possibility may also allow the truth of determinism (...) to depend on prior philosophical convictions, notably on one's philosophical account of the nature of laws. (shrink)

This essay considers and evaluates recent results and arguments from classical chaotic systems theory and non-relativistic quantum mechanics that pertain to the question of whether our world is deterministic or indeterministic. While the classical results are inconclusive, quantum mechanics is often assumed to establish indeterminism insofar as the measurement process involves an ineliminable stochastic element, even though the dynamics between two measurements is considered fully deterministic. While this latter claim concerning the Schrödinger evolution must be qualified, the former fully depends (...) on a resolution of the measurement problem. Two alleged proofs that nature is indeterministic, relying, in turn, on Gleason's theorem and Conway and Kochen's recent 'free will theorem', are shown to be wanting qua proofs of indeterminism. We are thus left with the conclusion that the determinism question remains open. (shrink)

The popular impression of Bohmian mechanics is that it is standard quantum mechanics with the addition of some extra gadgets---exact particle positions and a guiding equation for particle trajectories---the advantages being that the gadgets pave the way for a resolution of the measurement problem that eschews state vector reduction while restoring the determinism lost in standard quantum mechanics. In fact, the Bohmian mechanics departs in significant ways from standard quantum mechanics. By itself this is not a basis for criticism; indeed, (...) it makes Bohmian mechanics all the more interesting. But Bohmian mechanics is not, as the popular impression would have it, empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics in terms of probabilistic predictions for the outcomes of measurements of quantum observables. Indeed, in physically important applications to systems for which standard quantum mechanics delivers empirically well-confirmed probabilistic predictions, the sophisticated form of Bohmian mechanics designed to prove the global existence of Bohmian particle trajectories fails to deliver unequivocal predictions---of even a probabilistic variety---for the future behavior of said systems. Possible responses to this lacuna are discussed. (shrink)