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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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Causality.Jessica M. Wilson - 2005 - In Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer (eds.), The Philosophy of Science: An Encyclopedia. New York: Routledge. pp. 90--100.details
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Probability, confirmation, and the conjunction fallacy.Vincenzo Crupi, Branden Fitelson & Katya Tentori - 2007 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (2):182 – 199.details
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Preference-based arguments for probabilism.David Christensen - 2001 - Philosophy of Science 68 (3):356-376.details
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The newcomb problem: An unqualified resolution.Simon Burgess - 2004 - Synthese 138 (2):261 - 287.details
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Decision-theoretic paradoxes as voting paradoxes.Rachael Briggs - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (1):1-30.details
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Agency, Desire, and Changing Organizational Routines.Caleb Bernacchio - 2018 - Philosophy of Management 17 (3):279-301.details
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Bayesian Convergence and the Fair-Balance Paradox.Bengt Autzen - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):253-263.details
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How to confirm the disconfirmed. On conjunction fallacies and robust confirmation.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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How to Confirm the Conjunction of Disconfirmed Hypotheses.David Atkinson, Jeanne Peijnenburg & Theo Kuipers - 2009 - Philosophy of Science 76 (1):1-21.details
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No regrets, or: Edith piaf revamps decision theory.Frank Arntzenius - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (2):277-297.details
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A foundation for causal decision theory.Brad Armendt - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):3-19.details
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Infallibility in the Newcomb Problem.Arif Ahmed - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):261-273.details
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Arntzenius on ‘Why ain’cha rich?’.Arif Ahmed & Huw Price - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):15-30.details
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The 5 Questions.Wolfgang Spohn - 2005 - In Vincent F. Hendricks & John Symons (eds.), Formal Philosophy. Automatic Press/VIP.details
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Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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Decision theory, intelligent planning and counterfactuals.Michael John Shaffer - 2008 - Minds and Machines 19 (1):61-92.details
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Causal Decision Theory is Safe from Psychopaths.Timothy Luke Williamson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):665-685.details
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Equal Opportunity and Newcomb’s Problem.Ian Wells - 2019 - Mind 128 (510):429-457.details
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Psychological determinism and rationality.Ruth Weintraub - 1995 - Erkenntnis 43 (1):67-79.details
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A paradox of confirmation.Ruth Weintraub - 1988 - Erkenntnis 29 (2):169 - 180.details
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Gandalf’s solution to the Newcomb problem.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2643–2675.details
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Hempel's Raven paradox: A lacuna in the standard bayesian solution.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (3):545-560.details
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Objective chance, indicative conditionals and decision theory; or, how you can be Smart, rich and keep on smoking.Thomas C. Vinci - 1988 - Synthese 75 (1):83 - 105.details
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Standard and non-standard newcomb problems.W. J. Talbott - 1987 - Synthese 70 (3):415 - 458.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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Interventionist decision theory.Reuben Stern - 2017 - Synthese 194 (10):4133-4153.details
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Decision and Intervention.Reuben Stern - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):783-804.details
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Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):95-122.details
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Dependency equilibria.Wolfgang Spohn - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):775-789.details
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Why Take Both Boxes?Jack Spencer & Ian Wells - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (1):27-48.details
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Absence of evidence and evidence of absence: evidential transitivity in connection with fossils, fishing, fine-tuning, and firing squads.Elliott Sober - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (1):63-90.details
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Are theories of rationality empirically testable?Howard Smokler - 1990 - Synthese 82 (2):297 - 306.details
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Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb’s Malin Génie. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (3):277-303.details
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Deliberational equilibria.Brian Skyrms - 1986 - Topoi 5 (1):59-67.details
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Newcomb’s Problem and Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemmas.Christoph Schmidt-Petri - 2005 - Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1160-1173.details
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Is the conjunction fallacy tied to probabilistic confirmation?Jonah N. Schupbach - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):13-27.details
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Comparing Probabilistic Measures of Explanatory Power.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2011 - Philosophy of Science 78 (5):813-829.details
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Choice and conditional expected utility.Piers Rawling - 1993 - Synthese 94 (2):303 - 328.details
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Ratificationism without ratification: Jeffrey meets Savage.Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz - 1985 - Theory and Decision 19 (2):171-200.details
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Against causal decision theory.Huw Price - 1986 - Synthese 67 (2):195 - 212.details
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Freedom, Fiction and Evidential Decision Theory.Phyllis Kirstin McKay - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (3):393-407.details
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Reflective coherence and Newcomb problems: A simple solution.Gary Malinas - 1993 - Theory and Decision 35 (2):151-166.details
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Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.details
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The irrelevance of belief to rational action.Patrick Maher - 1986 - Erkenntnis 24 (3):363 - 384.details
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Preference reversal in Ellsberg problems.Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):187-207.details
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Causality in the logic of decision.Patrick Maher - 1987 - Theory and Decision 22 (2):155-172.details
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Intentions are Optimality Beliefs – But Optimizing What?Christoph Lumer - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):235-262.details
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Newcomb’s problem isn’t a choice dilemma.Zhanglyu Li & Frank Zenker - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5125-5143.details
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