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  1. Émotions fortes et constructionnisme faible.Luc Faucher - 1999 - Philosophiques 26 (1):1-33.
    RÉSUMÉ De l'avis de plusieurs, il existe une tension entre le modèle « naturaliste » des émotions qui inspire les psychologues évolutionnistes et le modèle des constructionnistes sociaux. D'un côté, il semble que les émotions sont innées, rigides et panculturelles ; de l'autre, elles sont conçues comme des artefacts culturels, changeant au gré des arrière-plans culturels. Nous examinons chacune des deux approches et montrons que l'approche naturaliste n'est pas incompatible avec une forme de constructionnisme faible, en ce que la première (...)
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  • You can cheat people, but not nature!John Barresi - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):544-545.
    The psychological mechanisms implicated in psychopathy do not limit their activity to those behaviors that support a cheater strategy in social games. They result in a number of other clearly maladaptive behaviors that do not directly involve other individuals. Thus, any gains that might arise from the use of a cheater strategy in social situations are probably lost elsewhere.
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  • A neuropsychology of deception and self-deception.Roger A. Drake - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):552-553.
    As more criminals are imprisoned, other individuals change their behavior to replace them, as predicted by the theory of strategic behavior. The physiological correlates of sociopathy suggest that research in cognitive neuroscience can lead toward a solution. Promising pathways include building upon current knowledge of self-deceit, the independence of positive and negative emotions, the lateralization of risk and caution, and the conditions promoting prosocial behavior.
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  • An evaluation of Mealey's hypotheses based on psychopathy checklist: Identified groups.David S. Kosson & Joseph P. Newman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):562-563.
    Although Mealey's account provides several interesting hypotheses, her integration across disparate samples renders the value of her explanation for psychopathy ambiguous. Recent evidence on Psychopathy Checklist-identified samples (Hare, 1991) suggests primary emotional and cognitive deficits inconsistent with her model. Whereas high-anxious psychopaths display interpersonal deficits consistent with Mealey's hypotheses, low-anxious psychopaths' deficits appear more sensitive to situational parameters than predicted.
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  • Touchstones of abnormal personality theory.Richard W. J. Neufeld - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):567-568.
    Strengths of Mealey's target article are its implementation of results from game-theoretic analyses and its potential links with other formal developments. In recent dynamic decision/choice models, reduced salience of avoidance tendencies, said to typify primary sociopaths, has quantifiable consequences for response latencies and choices. Also, formal models of stress effects on information processing predict selected effects of hypoarousability.
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  • Sociopathy within and between small groups.David Sloan Wilson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):577-577.
    If sociopathy is a biological adaptation, it probably evolved in small social groups in which individuals lacked the social mobility required for a con-man strategy to work. On the other hand, conflicts between groups may have provided a large niche for sociopathy throughout human history.
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  • Extending arousal theory and reflecting on biosocial approaches to social science.Lee Ellis - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):554-554.
    This commentary extends arousal theory to suggest an explanation for the well-established inverse correlation between church attendance and involvement in crime. In addition, the results of two surveys of social scientists are reviewed to reveal just how little impact the biosocial/sociobiological perspective has had thus far on social science.
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  • The epigenesis of sociopathy.Aurelio José Figueredo - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):556-557.
    Mealey distinguishes two types of sociopathy: (1) or obligate, and (2) or facultative. Either sociopathy evolved twice, or one form is derived from the other, e.g., through: (1) genetic assimilation generating polymorphism in the relative strength of biases favoring the development of otherwise facultative strategies, or (2) independently heritable but strategically relevant characteristics biasing the optimal selection of facultative strategies.
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  • Genes, hormones, and gender in sociopathy.Katharine Hoyenga - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):560-560.
    Although serotonin, testosterone, and genes contribute to sociopathy, the relationships are probably indirect and subject to modifiers (e.g., present only under certain conditions of rearing and temperament). Age at menarche may be a marker variable as well as a causal factor. Since the genders differ in all four areas, sex differences in sociopathy represent a very complex interaction of these factors.
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  • Primary sociopathy (psychopathy) is a type, secondary is not.Linda Mealey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):579-599.
    Recent studies lend support to the two-pathway model of the evolution of sociopathy with evidence that: 1) psychopathy (primary sociopathy) is a discrete type and 2) in general, sociopaths have relatively high levels of reproductive success. Hare's Psychopathy Checklist may provide a start for the revision of terminology that will be necessary to distinguish between primary and secondary trajectories.
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  • Emotions and sociopathy.Robert Plutchik - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):570-571.
    Questions are raised about several issues discussed by Mealey: (1) the nature of the distinction between primary and secondary sociopaths, (2) some difficulties with a general arousal theory of criminality, and (3) the possible role of countervailing forces in the development of sociopathy. An important area that calls for attention is the patterning of different specific emotions in the lives of sociopaths as compared to other groups.
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  • The sociobiology of sociopathy: An integrated evolutionary model.Linda Mealey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18:523-541.
    Sociopaths are “outstanding” members of society in two senses: politically, they draw our attention because of the inordinate amount of crime they commit, and psychologically, they hold our fascination because most ofus cannot fathom the cold, detached way they repeatedly harm and manipulate others. Proximate explanations from behavior genetics, child development, personality theory, learning theory, and social psychology describe a complex interaction of genetic and physiological risk factors with demographic and micro environmental variables that predispose a portion of the population (...)
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  • Introduction: Modularity and the Nature of Emotions.Luc Faucher & Christine Tappolet - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 32.
    In this introduction, we give a brief overview of the main concepts of modularity that have been offered in recent literature. After this, we turn to a summary of the papers collected in this volume. Our primary aim is to explain how the modularity of emotion question relates to traditional debates in emotion theory.
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  • The Rationality of Grief.Carolyn Price - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):20-40.
    Donald Gustafson has argued that grief centres on a combination of belief and desire:The belief that the subject has suffered an irreparable loss.The desire that this should not be the case.And yet, as Gustafson points out, if the belief is true, the desire cannot be satisfied. Gustafson takes this to show that grief inevitably implies an irrational conflict between belief and desire.I offer a partial defence of grief against Gustafson's charge of irrationality. My defence rests on two elements. First, I (...)
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  • The adapted mind.Kim Sterelny - 1995 - Biology and Philosophy 10 (3):365-380.
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  • One Theory to Fit them All: The Search Hypothesis of Emotion Revisited.Yaniv Hanoch - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):135-145.
    In a recent paper, Dylan Evans proposed that emotions could help solve what has been known as ‘the frame problem’. In the process, he first questioned the utility of using the frame problem as a framework. After tackling this issue, he provided an alternative terminology to the frame problem—termed ‘the search hypothesis of emotion’—in order to re-examine how emotions aid rational agents. His new terminology, however, opens itself to other critiques. While accepting the basic tenets of his analysis, I question (...)
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  • Reconciling cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion: A representational proposal.Louis C. Charland - 1997 - Philosophy of Science 64 (4):555-579.
    The distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is entrenched in the literature on emotion and is openly used by individual emotion theorists when classifying their own theories and those of others. In this paper, I argue that the distinction between cognitive and perceptual theories of emotion is more pernicious than it is helpful, while at the same time insisting that there are nonetheless important perceptual and cognitive factors in emotion that need to be distinguished. A general representational metatheoretical (...)
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  • On the roles of false belief and recalcitrant fear in anorexia nervosa.Somogy Varga & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2023 - Mind and Language (5):1296-1313.
    The DSM‐5 highlights two essential psychological features of anorexia nervosa (AN): recalcitrant fear of gaining weight and body image disturbance. Prominent accounts grant false beliefs about body weight and shape a central role in the explanation of AN behavior. In this article, we propose a stronger emphasis on recalcitrant fear. We show that such fear can explain AN behavior without the intermediary of a false belief, and thus without the associated explanatory burdens and conceptual difficulties. We illustrate how shifting the (...)
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  • Does the Problem of Variability Justify Barrett’s Emotion Revolution?Raamy Majeed - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1421-1441.
    The problem of variability concerns the fact that empirical data does not support the existence of a coordinated set of biological markers, either in the body or the brain, which correspond to our folk emotion categories; categories like anger, happiness, sadness, disgust and fear. Barrett (2006a, b, 2013, 2016, 2017a, b) employs this fact to argue (i) against the faculty psychology approach to emotion, e.g. emotions are the products of emotion-specific mechanisms, or “modules”, and (ii) for the view that emotions (...)
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  • The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity.Raamy Majeed - 2022 - Philosophical Psychology 35 (4):546-568.
    The “puzzle” of emotional plasticity concerns making sense of two conflicting bodies of evidence: evidence that emotions often appear modular in key respects, and evidence that our emotions also often appear to transcend this modularity. In this paper, I argue a developmentalist approach to emotion, which builds on Karmiloff-Smith’s (1986, 1992, 1994, 2015) work on cognitive development, can help us dissolve this puzzle.
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  • The New LeDoux: Survival Circuits and the Surplus Meaning of ‘Fear’.Raamy Majeed - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):809-829.
    ABSTRACT LeDoux's pioneering work on the neurobiology of fear has played a crucial role in informing debates in the philosophy of emotion. For example, it plays a key part in Griffiths’ argument for why emotions don’t form a natural kind. Likewise, it is employed by Faucher and Tappolet to defend pro-emotion views, which claim that emotions aid reasoning. LeDoux, however, now argues that his work has been misread. He argues that using emotion terms, like ‘fear’, to describe neurocognitive data adds (...)
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  • Conserving Functions across Generations: Heredity in Light of Biological Organization.Matteo Mossio & Gaëlle Pontarotti - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (1):249-278.
    We develop a conceptual framework that connects biological heredity and organization. We refer to heredity as the cross-generation conservation of functional elements, defined as constraints subject to organizational closure. While hereditary objects are functional constituents of biological systems, any other entity that is stable across generations—and possibly involved in the recurrence of phenotypes—belongs to their environment. The central outcome of the organizational perspective consists in extending the scope of heredity beyond the genetic domain without merging it with the broad category (...)
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  • Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons.Kelly Epley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):256-282.
    Our emotional faculties respond to successes, gains, advantages, threats, losses, obstacles, and other personally significant objects or situations, producing positive or negative evaluations of them according to their perceived import. Being an evaluative response is a feature that emotions share with paradigm attitudes (beliefs, intentions, judgments, etc.). However, recently philosophers have been reluctant to treat emotions as attitudes. The usual reasons given have to do with the automaticity of emotions and their occasional recalcitrance. In this article, I argue that these (...)
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  • Does modularity undermine the pro‐emotion consensus?Raamy Majeed - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (3):277-292.
    There is a growing consensus that emotions contribute positively to human practical rationality. While arguments that defend this position often appeal to the modularity of emotion-generation mechanisms, these arguments are also susceptible to the criticism, e.g. by Jones (2006), that emotional modularity supports pessimism about the prospects of emotions contributing positively to practical rationality here and now. This paper aims to respond to this criticism by demonstrating how models of emotion processing can accommodate the sorts of cognitive influence required to (...)
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  • What Can Information Encapsulation Tell Us About Emotional Rationality?Raamy Majeed - 2019 - In Laura Candiotto (ed.), The Value of Emotions for Knowledge. Springer Verlag. pp. 51-69.
    What can features of cognitive architecture, e.g. the information encapsulation of certain emotion processing systems, tell us about emotional rationality? de Sousa proposes the following hypothesis: “the role of emotions is to supply the insufficiency of reason by imitating the encapsulation of perceptual modes” (de Sousa 1987: 195). Very roughly, emotion processing can sometimes occur in a way that is insensitive to what an agent already knows, and such processing can assist reasoning by restricting the response-options she considers. This paper (...)
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  • (1 other version)III. Basic Emotions, Complex Emotions, Machiavellian Emotions.Paul E. Griffiths - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:39-67.
    According to the distinguished philosopher Richard Wollheim, an emotion is an extended mental episode that originates when events in the world frustrate or satisfy a pre-existing desire (Wollheim, 1999). This leads the subject to form an attitude to the world which colours their future experience, leading them to attend to one aspect of things rather than another, and to view the things they attend to in one light rather than another. The idea that emotions arise from the satisfaction or frustration (...)
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  • (2 other versions)VI. Emotional Feelings and Intentionalism.Anthony Hatzimoysis - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 52:105-111.
    Emotions are Janus-faced: their focus may switch from how a person is feeling deep inside her, to the busy world of actions, words, or gestures whose perception currently affects her. The intimate relation between the ‘inside’ and the ‘outside’ seems to call for a redrawing of the traditional distinction of mental states between those that can look out to the world, and those that are, supposedly, irredeemably blind.
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Modularity of Emotion.Louis C. Charland - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5 (Supp.)):213-228.
    In a recent survey of contemporary philosophy of emotion, Ronald de Sousa states that "in recent years … emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science" (de Sousa 2003, 1). He then goes on to make the important observation that "in view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation (...)
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  • Is sociopathy a type or not? Will the “real” sociopathy please stand up?James Snyder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):575-576.
    The validity of the classification of “primary sociopaths” as a qualitatively distinct group in the general population is questioned. Cenetic variation in the experience and expression of emotions may play a role in the development of antisocial behavior. However, research clearly documents that socialization environments powerfully modify the expression of genetic biases in a manner that increases or decreases the risk for “sociopathy.”.
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  • Secondary sociopathy and opportunistic reproductive strategy.Jay Belsky - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):545-546.
    Mealey's analysis of secondary sociopathy has much in common with Belsky, Steinberg, and Draper's (1991) evolutionary theory of socialization. Both draw attention to the potential influence of early rearing in the promotion of a cold, detached, manipulative, and opportunistic style of relating to others and, in so doing, raise the question of whether secondary sociopathy represents a facultative reproductive strategy.
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  • Sociopathy or hyper-masculinity?Anne Campbell - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):548-549.
    Definitional slippage threatens to equate secondary sociopathy with mere criminality and leaves the status of noncriminal sociopaths ambiguous. Primary sociopathy appears to show more environmental contingency than would be implied by a strong genetic trait approach. A reinterpretation in terms of hypermasculinity and hypofemininity is compatible with the data.
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  • Psychopathy is a nonarbitrary class.Vernon L. Quinsey & Martin L. Lalumière - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):571-571.
    Recent evidence that psychopathy is a nonarbitrary population, such that the trait may be categorical rather than continuous, is consistent with Mealey's distinction between primary and secondary psychopaths. Thus, there are likely to be at least two routes to criminality, and psychopathic and nonpsychopathic criminals are likely to respond differently to interventions.
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  • The sociopathy of sociobiology.Wim E. Crusio - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):552-552.
    Mealey's evolutionary reasoning is logically flawed. Furthermore, the evidence presented in favor of a genetic contribution to the causation of sociopathy is overinterpreted. Given the potentially large societal impact of sociobiological speculation on the roots of criminality, more-than-usual caution in interpreting data is called for.
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  • Al Capone, discrete morphs, and complex dynamic systems.Douglas T. Kenrick & Stephanie Brown - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):560-561.
    We consider four mechanisms by which apparent discontinuities in the distribution of antisociality could arise: (1) executive genes or hormonal systems, (2) multiplicative interactions of predisposing factors, (3) environmental tracking into a limited number of social roles, and (4) cross-generational gene—environment interactions. A more explicit consideration of complex self-organizing dynamic systems may help us understand the maintenance of antisocial subpopulations.
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  • The role of attachment in the development and prevention of sociopathy.Marinus H. Van IJzendoorn - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):576-577.
    Mealey's sociobiological model of sociopathy could profit from attachment theory, in particular, the theory and research on the basis of the Adult Attachment Interview (Main & Goldwyn 1985–1993). Findings of an adult attachment study in a forensic psychiatric setting are summarized. Three attachment-oriented strategies for families, schools, and forensic settings are proposed to help reduce or prevent secondary sociopathy and criminal recidivism.
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  • Pleasure and displeasure from the body: Perspectives from exercise.Panteleimon Ekkekakis - 2003 - Cognition and Emotion 17 (2):213-239.
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  • Pathways to sociopathy: Twin analyses offer direction.Nancy L. Segal - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):574-575.
    Understanding the bases of complex behavioral phenotypes, such as sociopathy, is assisted by an evolutionary approach, in addition to other theoretical perspectives. Unraveling genetic and environmental factors underlying variant forms of sociopathy remains a key challenge for behavioral science investigators. Twin research methods (e.g., longitudinal analyses; twins reared apart) offer informative means of assessing novel hypotheses relevant to sociopathic behaviors.
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  • The sociopath: Cheater or warrior hawk?Kent G. Bailey - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):542-543.
    Mealey's excellent target article rests on several assumptions that may be questioned, including the overarching assumption that sociopathy reflects the failure of a small minority of males to cooperate with the larger group. I suggest that violent competition in ancestral bands cheatinggame was the primary evolutionary precursor of sociopathy. Today's violent sociopath is far more a than a failed cooperator.
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  • The arts and human nature: evolutionary aesthetics and the evolutionary status of art behaviours: Stephen Davies: The artful species: aesthetics, art, and evolution. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012.Anton Killin - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (4):703-718.
    This essay reviews one of the most recent books in a trend of new publications proffering evolutionary theorising about aesthetics and the arts—themes within an increasing literature on aspects of human life and human nature in terms of evolutionary theory. Stephen Davies’ The Artful Species links some of our aesthetic sensibilities with our evolved human nature and critically surveys the interdisciplinary debate regarding the evolutionary status of the arts. Davies’ engaging and accessible writing succeeds in demonstrating the maturity and scope (...)
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  • Consciousness and vision in man : where philosophy has gone wrong.David John Uings - unknown
    My central claim is that philosophers of mind have failed to take adequate account of empirical evidence regarding human consciousness and vision. Experiments on split-brain patients over the past fifty years reveal consciousness in both cerebral hemispheres. I claim specifically that (a) consciousness in the right hemisphere is inherited from our animal ancestors; (b) consciousness in the left hemisphere arose during human evolution in association with language; and (c) the existence of both forms of consciousness provides the best explanation for (...)
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  • Beyond the Basics: The Evolution and Development of Human Emotions.Robyn Bluhm - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):73-94.
    The suggestion that at least some emotions are modular captures a number of our intuitions about emotions: they are generally fast responses to a stimulus, they are involuntary, and they are easily distinguished from one another; we simply know that, for example, anger feels different than fear. Candidates for modular emotions are usually the so-called “basic” emotions - anger and fear are good examples of these. Defenders of emotion theories that focus on basic emotions, such as Paul Ekman in psychology (...)
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  • Cheaters never prosper, sometimes.H. Lorne Carmichael - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):549-550.
    In the Frank (1988) model, a small increase in the number of cheaters will soon be reversed. It is not clear that this prediction holds for sociopathy. There are also many attractive evolutionary models that do not admit a small, stable proportion of cheaters. Hence, without definitive evidence about the character of early human society, we cannot conclude that sociopathy has an evolutionary origin.
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  • Diathesis stress model or “Just So” story?Richard M. McFall, James T. Townsend & Richard J. Viken - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):565-566.
    Mealey's sociopathy model is an exemplar of popular diathesis-stress models. Although such models, when presented in descriptive language, offer the illusion of integrative explanation, their actual scientific value is very limited because they fail to make specific, quantitative, falsifiable predictions. Conceptual and quantitative weaknesses of such diathesis-stress models are discussed and the requirements for useful models are outlined.
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  • Moral judgments by alleged sociopaths as a means for coping with problems of definition and identification in Mealey's model.Yuval Wolf - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):577-578.
    Problems of definition and identification in the integrated evolutionary model of sociopathy are suggested by Schoenfeld's (1974) criticism of the field of race differences in intelligence. Moral judgments by those labeled primary and secondary sociopaths may offer a way to validate the assumptions of the model.
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  • Is the distinction between primary and secondary sociopaths a matter of degree, secondary traits, or nature vs. nurture?Marvin Zuckerman - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):578-579.
    Psychopathy has as its central traits socialization, sensation seeking, and impulsivity. These are combined in a supertrait: Impulsive Unsocialized Sensation Seeking (ImpUSS). Secondary types are defined by combinations of ImpUSS and neuroticism or sociability. All broad personality traits have both genetic and environmental determination, and therefore different etiologies (primary as genetic, secondary as environmental) for primary and secondary sociopathy are unlikely.
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  • Genetic issues in “the sociobiology of sociopathy”.Stephen C. Maxson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):565-565.
    A consideration of the genetics of sociopathy suggests the following. The author's Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS) types 2 to 4 are more likely than types 1 and 5 in crimes of violence, and there may not be an ESS for crimes of property or for sociopathy. Correlations between sociopathy and crimes of property are also more likely due to environmental than to genetic variants, and correlations between sociopathy and crimes of property are due more to environmental than genetic variants.
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  • The primary/secondary distinction of psychopathy: A clinical perspective.Gisli H. Gudjonsson - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):558-559.
    In this brief commentary the author concentrates on the treatment perspectives of Mealey's model. The main weakness of the model is that it does not provide a satisfactory theoretical connection between treatment and different types of target behavior. Even within the primary-secondary distinction, there are large individual differences that should not be overlooked in the planning of treatment.
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  • Dancing in the dark: Evolutionary psychology and the argument from design.Karola Stotz & Paul E. Griffiths - 2002 - In Steven J. Scher & Frederick Rauscher (eds.), Evolutionary Psychology: Alternative Approaches. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 135--160.
    The Narrow Evolutionary Psychology Movement represents itself as a major reorientation of the social/behavioral sciences, a group of sciences previously dominated by something called the ‘Standard Social Science Model’. Narrow Evolutionary Psychology alleges that the SSSM treated the mind, and particularly those aspects of the mind that exhibit cultural variation, as devoid of any marks of its evolutionary history. Adherents of Narrow Evolutionary Psychology often suggest that the SSSM owed more to ideology than to evidence. It was the child of (...)
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  • Feeling and representing: Computational theory and the modularity of affect.Louis C. Charland - 1995 - Synthese 105 (3):273-301.
    In this paper I review some leading developments in the empirical theory of affect. I argue that (1) affect is a distinct perceptual representation governed system, and (2) that there are significant modular factors in affect. The paper concludes with the observation thatfeeler (affective perceptual system) may be a natural kind within cognitive science. The main purpose of the paper is to explore some hitherto unappreciated connections between the theory of affect and the computational theory of mind.
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  • Psychopathology: Type or trait?H. J. Eysenck - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):555-556.
    Mealey proposes two categorical classes of sociopath, primary and secondary. I criticize this distinction on the basis that constructs of this kind have proved unrealistic in personality taxonomy and that dimensional systems capture reality much more successfully. I suggest how such a system could work in this particular context.
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