A phenomenological approach to anthropology should not propose a static definition of man, but inquire into specific human motivations, which never occur isolated. Therefore, the autonomy-dependency connection is presented as a possible human motivational ground. The notion of autonomy, presented with reference to the Kantian idea of the self-determining reason and to the Husserlian account of self-constitution, reveals in itself elements of dependency. On the other side, the notion of vulnerability and reliance is displayed through different approaches of Gehlen, MacIntyre (...) and Toombs in order to illustrate dependency not as a mere capitulation of the subject, but as one of its intrinsic possibilities, which does not exclude autonomous will. (shrink)

The concept of depth is central to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology and informed not only his philosophy of perception but also his thinking about psychology, art and politics. This article traces the ways the notion of depth appears in Merleau-Ponty’s thinking in these fields, contrasting it with Husserl’s own phenomenological investigations. The article starts with a comparison of the function of perception in Husserl’s phenomenology and then proceeds with an analysis of how the issue of depth reappears in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception, (...) phenomenology of art and political philosophy. I argue that while Husserl’s approach to phenomenology led him to analyses of aesthetics stemming from works of art as random examples, and to non-participation in politics, Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology leads to the opposite approach, inviting concrete criticism in art and active participation in politics. It is argued that Merleau-Ponty’s approach is more philosophically consistent. The choice of particular works of art, and the particular political engagements, can retrospectively clarify the transcendental phenomenological investigations themselves. (shrink)

The paper inquires Husserl’s immanent teleology of conscious life, conceived as a Teleologie der «tiefen» Assoziationen. The associative genesis entails synthetical processes in the primordial-associative field, driven by the general concept of interest. The resulting syntheses ground the various forms of judgments, both judgments on experience and predicative ones in general. Since the theory’s foundation relies on pre-predicative experience, then it must encompass its teleological dimension and, in this sense, the concept of evidence – pivotal in the theory – mirrors (...) the result of the synthesis of fulfilment. This latter, in turn, is driven in an asymptotic path towards a teleological idea of adequacy. This account expresses the complementary mirroring that characterizes the relationship between judging and teleology, without the need to separate teleology from reason. In order to highlight the significance of this framing, the paper is closed by a brief comparison with R. Millikan’s teleosemantic theory, whose concept of teleology is shown as flawed by the general concerns proper to naturalism. (shrink)

Phenomenology presents itself not as an explanation or interpretation of phenomena but as a description of them. Describing experience means making its internal structure explicit, which, in phenomenology, is an eidetic structure. The method of phenomenological explication or clarification is, however, by no means univocal. This paper aims to isolate the two fundamental ways in which phenomenological description is achieved. The first refers to a phenomenology of manifestation, based on the concept of determination or datum, which is realized in the (...) phenomenological-static approach and, in particular, on the concept of extensive quality. The second refers to a phenomenology of disposition, based on the concept of tension or force – which is realized in the genetic approach as well as in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception – and, in particular on the concept of intensive or forceful quality. The analysis of the difference between the two approaches allows us to introduce the crucial distinction between digital and analogue dimensions within phenomenology. (shrink)

The article analyzes the philosophical concept of the “porous self” of J. Rivera. The originality of this concept in the post-phenomenological project is determined by the role of theological constructions that modify the primal experience of self-consciousness. This modification allows us to interpret the phenomenological description of the human self as different from the classical — “porous” temporality, i.e., correlating through “two entrances”—the internal and external—with eternity. Within this approach, the primary phenomenon of the constitution of the "porous" self becomes (...) the inner word, which in the appeal to eternity turns out to be the original self-awareness of the self as a temporality. The secondary phenomenon of the constitution of the “porous” self is not the mundane temporality of M. Heidegger, but Epektasis as an intense striving towards the end of time in General. The worldly temporality of the self, transformed by faith, is phenomenologically revealed as open to eternity in each of its moments. The third phenomenon of the temporality of the self is Memoria, whose interpretation reveals how the structure of the inner consciousness of time by E. Husserl can be framed ontologically and harmoniously integrated into the theological concept. The article shows how, based on this understanding of both the internal and external openness of the “porous” self for eternity, the integral structure of its temporality is formed. The temporality of the porous self is a modification of Husserl’s time diagrams and the intertwining of two streams of temporality at the same time from past to future and from future to past, which itself constitutes a phenomenal field of events of self. This understanding of temporality sets new perspectives for the phenomenological analysis of subjectivity. (shrink)

Normative notions are central to Husserl’s account of intentionality: intending an object is a normative achievement, essentially admitting of fulfillment or disappointment. So is teleology: intentional conscious life is inseparable from a horizontal orientation toward “ideas in the Kantian sense.” How are they related? Is teleology essential for intentionality as a normative achievement? Or, in Husserl’s way of putting it, do relative truths “demand” ideal truths? This article explores some reasons for agreeing with Husserl that this is indeed the case. (...) In Sec. 2, I will identify a “normative turn” in Husserl’s account of the basic structure of perceptual intentionality and spell out the teleological character of this normative account. This sense of teleology is a minimal one. A more robust teleology, in the sense of an orientation toward infinite ideality, is then justified in Sec. 3 by virtue of its function in the constitution of genuine objectivity. In Sec. 4, I will turn to the noetic, especially the ego-oriented side of Husserl’s analysis, in order to clarify the normative force of infinite telos. All in all, I will argue that the normative and the teleological sides of the story are inextricably intertwined in Husserl’s account of intentional conscious life. (shrink)

Husserl’s transcendental reduction admits of two motivations: the general methodological ban on begging the question, and the principle that a typology of objects ought to be based on a typology of my ways of cognizing them. As Husserl’s ‘transcendental phenomenology’ agrees with the ‘linguistic phenomenology’ of many analytic philosophers in being at bottom an effort to understand what precisely we mean to say by asserting that there ‘exists’ a ‘consciousness-independent’ or ‘transcendent’ world, the ‘residue’ of transcendental reduction is my subjective (...) consciousness. My cognitive approaches to the latter and to that of somebody else are not only entirely different but ‘complementary’ in the sense of Bohr’s. In the course of searching for an identity criterion for temporal entities lacking a spatial localisation in the world, we can show that the allegedly noetic phenomenon of, say, my now seeing a cat is a noema, to wit, the cat-as-now-beingseen-by-me-in-such-and-such-a-manner. There is no sound base for postulating, over and above the noematic nature of my consciousness, a second, noetic, aspect thereof. (shrink)

The question of how we can know anything about ideal entities to which we do not have access through our senses has been a major concern in the philosophical tradition since Plato's Phaedo. This article focuses on the paradigmatic case of mathematical knowledge. Following a suggestion by Gödel, we employ concepts and ideas from Husserlian phenomenology to argue that mathematical objects – and ideal entities in general – are recognized in a process very closely related to ordinary perception. Our analysis (...) combines Husserl's insights into the nature of perception and the phenomena of evidence and justification with case studies of the role of intuition in axiomatic set theory. (shrink)

The paper addresses the methodological tensions between Husserl’s phenomenology and history by reinterpreting the Addendum III of the Krisis-work in view of genetic phenomenology. Thus, the paper starts out by retracing the traditional criticism against the unhistorical character of Husserl’s phenomenology as voiced by Heidegger, Adorno and others. Afterwards, it moves on to analyse the troubled relationship between static and genetic phenomenology, on the one hand, and between genetic phenomenology and empirical genesis, on the other hand. Finally, it arrives at (...) a step by step methodological reconstruction of Husserl’s considerations on the “origin of geometry”, which are regarded to be an application of the methods of genetic phenomenology to the field of history. (shrink)

This paper explores the nature of ourexperiences of values– ourvalueceptions. In the recent literature, two main standpoints have emerged. On the one hand, the ‘Meinongian’ side claims that axiological properties are experienced exclusively in emotions. On the other hand, the ‘Hildebrandian’ side contends that since valueceptions can be ‘cold’, they are not accomplished in emotions but rather reside in ‘value-feelings’ – emotions, in this framework, being conceived of asreactionsto the values thus revealed. The aim of the paper is to argue (...) that theHusserlianphenomenology of affectivity, especially as it is developed during his Göttingen period, can help to overcome these two accounts. I start by pointing out that, contrary to what most scholars have assumed so far, Husserl’s theory of valueception is not tantamount to Meinong’s, as it is very sensitive to ‘Hildebrandian’ arguments (Part 2). The core of the paper is then devoted to a systematic reconstruction of Husserl’s solution to this controversy. Drawing on the analogy between thing-perceptions and value-perceptions (Part 3), I show, first, that ‘cold’ valueceptions are to be identified with empty apprehensions (Auffassungen) of value, in which an emotion is notactually experiencedbut isanticipatedin such-and-such kinaesthetic circumstances (Part 4); second, that the realization of this anticipation amounts to thefulfillmentof the valueception (Part 5). As a result, Husserl acknowledges the relevance of ‘value-feelings’, yet his account appears more satisfactory than traditional ‘Hildebrandian’ theories in that it demystifies these ‘value-feelings’ by reducing them topotential emotions. (shrink)

There is currently no consensus about a general account of hallucination and its object. The problem of hallucination has de facto generated contrasting accounts of perception, led to opposing epistemic and metaphysical positions, and, most significantly, exposed a manifold of diverging views concerning the intentionality of experience, in general, and perceptual intentionality, in particular. In this article, I aim to clarify the controversial status, experiential possibility, and intentional structure of hallucination qua distinctive phenomenon. The analysis will first detect a phenomenological, (...) Husserlian-informed concept of hallucination in its irreducibility to other kinds and modes of sensory experience. This will set the theoretical basis to develop an account of hallucination by means of a morphological description of those diversified structures of intentional consciousness that lend themselves to generate hallucinatory appearances. I will then describe both the turning of certain kinds of intentional experience into hallucinatory perceptions and the status of hallucinatory objects. This will support the possibility of hallucination in a strict and rigorous sense, elucidate the enigmatic claim that ‘in hallucination we are conscious of something while nothing truly appears,’ and offer a seminal perspective concerning the alleged problem that hallucinations pose on perceptual intentionality. With the aid of some crucial distinctions, I will then argue that hallucinations do not affect perceptual intentionality as a dyadic, relational structure. (shrink)

In a paper entitled A Semantical Version of the Problem of Transcendental Idealism, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz gives a very impressive analysis of transcendental idealism. He approaches the matter using the tools of formal semantics developed by Alfred Tarski and draws a rather surprising conclusion. According to Ajdukiewicz, the idealist position, claiming that the world around us is ontologically dependent on our cognitive activity can be shown to be implausible on purely logical grounds. It is worth taking a closer look at this (...) insightful argument, since Ajdukiewicz’s analysis, if sound, has a relevance reaching far beyond purely historical questions concerning the right interpretation and proper assessment of past idealist doctrines. These days various species of idealism are thriving under such labels as ‘anti realism’ or ‘pragmatism’. Ajdukiewicz’s venerable paper goes to the very core of many contemporary metaphysical discussions. (shrink)

Essays on Husserl’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics sets out to fill up a lacuna in the present research on Husserl by presenting a precise account of Husserl’s work in the field of logic, of the philosophy of logic and of the philosophy of mathematics. The aim is to provide an in-depth reconstruction and analysis of the discussion between Husserl and his most important interlocutors, and to clarify pivotal ideas of Husserl’s by considering their reception and elaboration by some of (...) his disciples and followers, such as Oskar Becker and Jacob Klein, as well as their influence on some of the most significant logicians and mathematicians of the past century, such as Luitzen E. J. Brouwer, Rudolf Carnap, Kurt Gödel and Hermann Weyl. Most of the papers consider Husserl and another scholar – e.g. Leibniz, Kant, Bolzano, Brentano, Cantor, Frege – and trace out and contextualize lines of influence, points of contact, and points of disagreement. Each essay is written by an expert of the field, and the volume includes contributions both from the analytical tradition and from the phenomenological one. (shrink)

In this paper the relationship between phenomenology of perception and synthetic phenomenology is discussed. Synthetic phenomenology is presented on the basis of the issues in A.I. and Robotics that required to address the question of what enables artificial agents to have phenomenal access to the environment. Phenomenology of perception is construed as a theory with autonomous structure and domain, which can be embedded in a philosophical as well as a scientific theory. Two attempts at specifying the phenomenal content of artificial (...) agents are discussed. Concepts and experimental evidence on the independence of perception and the coordination of motion and appearances are set out to submit that phenomenology of perception makes a contribution to synthetic phenomenology. (shrink)

Modern empirical research considers happiness to be identical with a subjective feeling of pleasure. This refers to both assessments of actual satisfactions of need and representations of possible satisfactions of need. Thereby, the aspects of cognitive representations of happiness are mainly focused, while the performing subject remains disregarded. The phenomenological approach tries to counteract such a situation. Phenomenology allows us to differentiate ‘striving towards happiness’ and the ‘experienced happiness’ as different polarities of this phenomenon. Based on this three aspects can (...) be distinguished: the present experience of happiness as an experience of satisfying actual urgent needs; the temporally enduring form of satisfaction in the individual life; the ethical form of happiness as felicity implying the teleological determination of human existence realized through socialization. In this paper, these aspects are considered phenomenological through intentional genetic analysis and taking into account some psychoanalytic results. This article aims at showing that happiness, particularly in the ethical form of felicity, cannot be considered as merely an individual issue, but is rather closely related to the sociality of human experience and to the intersubjective constitution of our shared reality. (shrink)

Recent scholarship has shed more light on the relationship between Husserl and Lotze. And Husserl indeed claims of Lotze that “his inspired interpretation of the Platonic doctrine of Forms […] put up a bright first light and determined all further studies” ( 2002a, 297). In this paper I will try to answer the question what exactly Husserl saw in this “bright light”—the answer being much more complicated than “Platonism.” As I will show, Lotze misreads Plato, but in interesting ways, and (...) Husserl in turn misreads Lotze. In other words, this paper is about a misreading of a misreading—yet one fundamental for the development of phenomenology in that Husserl’s engagement with Lotze enabled him (a) to expand and differentiate his own anti-reductionism in regard to ideal entities, leading him to two forms of what he calls “Platonism,” one of which even runs contrary to Lotze’s own account, and (b) to conceive of a method to gain truths about the material apriori. After a brief introduction, I will discuss (1) Lotze’s interpretation of Plato, (2) what Husserl took from it, and finally (3) Plato’s Platonism, to substantiate my claims 1. (shrink)

This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be “twin-earthed” in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of space can be twin-earthed, (...) visual experience has a structure that means that it can only be the vehicle for representing entities with geometrical structures. (shrink)

In recent years phenomenology has attracted the interest of science, acquiring a role far beyond philosophy. Despite Husserl's clear denial of a possible naturalization of phenomenology, scientists from different fields have proposed its naturalization. To achieve this goal, different methodologies have been proposed. Most scientists seem to agree on the claim that phenomenology cannot be a science itself because it fails to respect one of the prerequisites of science, that is, the capacity to explain its phenomena. Phenomenology, thus, is forced (...) to remain a purely descriptive effort, preliminary to authentic scientific practice. I argue, instead, that the experimental development of phenomenology explains phenomena (that is, appearances and/or subjective experiences in first person account) and uses rigorous methods, conducts valid measurements, and can validate its results. The paper provides a variety of examples of how experimental phenomenology works. (shrink)

Based on Husserl’s distinction between mode of living presence (Modus der Leibhaftigkeit) and mode of certainty (Glaubensmodus der Gewißheit), which coincide in normal univocal perception, the paper argues for a distinction between two different types of accordance (Einstimmigkeit) in perceptual experience – local accordance and global accordance. While local accordance is characterized by the unfolding of appearances in agreement with lines of accordance instituted by recent perceptual apprehensions within a certain spatio-temporal domain, global accordance is characterized by the agreement between (...) appearances unfolding in local accordance with previous and simultaneous apprehensions concerning the spatio-temporal surroundings of this domain. As will be shown, to perceive something in local accordance amounts to perceiving it in the mode of living presence, while to perceive something in global accordance amounts to perceiving it in the belief mode of certainty (relative to a certain surrounding). In light of these considerations, an account of the perception of figments and immersion is put forward which does not invoke make-belief or the idea of an as-if-perception. (shrink)

Contemporary accounts on fictional emotions, i.e., emotions experienced towards objects we know to be fictional, are mainly concerned with explaining their rationality or lack thereof. In this context dominated by an interest in the role of belief, questions regarding their phenomenal quality have received far less attention: it is often assumed that they feel “similar” to emotions that target real objects. Against this background, this paper focuses on the possible specificities of fictional emotions’ qualitative feel. It starts by presenting what (...) I call the “phenomenological question” about the qualitative feel of fictional emotions (section 1) and by showing that this is irreducible to questions about their cognitive, intentional, evaluative, and embodied nature (section 2). Drawing on some insights from early phenomenologists, the next two sections elaborate criteria to distinguish between real and sham emotions on the one side (section 3) and between genuine and non-genuine emotions on the other (section 4). Finally, I apply this orthogonal distinction to the particular case of fictional emotions (section 5). The paper argues that fictional emotions are neither sham emotions nor quasi-emotions, but full-fledged emotional experiences, despite them displaying the distinctive phenomenology of emotions experienced as non-genuine. In the particular case of fictional emotions, they are non-genuine because our psychology is in fact in a state dominated by aesthetic enjoyment. (shrink)

Translated from: W.V.O.Quine, W. H. O. (1986): Philosophy of Logic. Second Edition. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England, 47-61.

In Critics of pure reason the notion of affection appears at first in the "Transcendental Aesthetic" and is unfolded on the notion of self-affection in the "Transcendental Analytic". Husserl, in manuscripts written from 1918, presents some developments of these Kantian notions. If by affection Kant explains that something can be given to the subject from the sensibility, that is, something that affects oneself from the external and the internal sense, however, Husserl extends the analysis of affection toward a broad spectrum (...) of underlying phenomena, such as volitive acts, imaginative acts, drives and affects. Husserl also analyzes from a phenomenological point of view the Kantian implicit condition that, if anything is given to the subject in the internal consciousness of time, the relationship to itself must be thought as a temporal process. I intend to show that Husserl’s analysis of affection and its modulations unveil possible theoretical directions departing from Kant, but in this step, involving a change of focus on the transcendental field, more specifically on the transcendental foundation of temporality. (shrink)