Based on an analysis of the theory of the movement of existence, this paper answers the following question: Where can one see the most important connections of philosophical and religious language in the most re-thought part of Jan Patočkaʼs thinking? The third movement of life is seen as a form of the true philosophical life, but also as a form with metaphysical responsibility. The movement of breakthrough, or actual self-comprehension, is the most important, because it leads to care for the (...) soul—and, according to Patočkaʼs analyses of inter­pretations of the Faust legend, it leads to care for the true immortality of soul. In the third movement of life, one lives an unsheltered life in openness to all which is not given and cannot be given, which is beyond all objective identification, and yet determines this world. In response to the mission in time (kairos), on the way to “asubjective” openness of the soul, in a dialogue which searches for truth and resists temptation, one can still find metaphysical responsibility and freedom. (shrink)

In this paper it is argued that there are relevant similarities of Aristotle's account of definition and Carnap's account of explication. To show this, first, Aristotle's conditions of adequacy for definitions are provided and an outline of the main critique put forward against Aristotle's account of definition is given. Subsequently, Carnap's conditions of adequacy for explications are presented and discussed. It is shown that Aristotle's conditions of extensional correctness can be interpreted against the backdrop of Carnap's condition of similarity once (...) one skips Aristotelian essentialism and takes in a Carnapian and more pragmatic stance. Finally, it is argued that, in general, a complementary rational reconstruction of both approaches allows for resolving problems of interpretational underdetermination. (shrink)

During the nineteenth century physiologists and clinicians developed several graphical recording systems for the mechanical registration of heart sounds. However, none of these replaced traditional methods of auscultation. The paper describes criticism of the aural sense as one of the driving forces behind the development of phonocardiography and analyses its variants from a technological and clinical perspective. Against the background of the physiological “method of curves,” the parameters that prevented the implementation of phonocardiography against overwhelming odds are highlighted. Contemporaries denied (...) specific evidence beyond auscultation. Many clinicians also feared that the art of auscultation was being undermined by the new, reproducible mechanical methods. The paper argues that phonocardiography was on the one hand regarded as impractical in clinical settings; on the other hand—and even more important—implicit practices, tacit knowledge and cultural models fostered skepticism against the new method. The argument of “self-evidence”—often connected to medical images, curves, graphs or tables—was not valid for the visualization of cardiac sounds in the opinion of the promoters of acoustic heart sound registration and its individual interpretation. Rather, the acts of subjective hearing and objectively reporting what was heard seemed “self-evident” for pathophysiological characteristics and the development of a diagnosis. Therefore, auscultation and phonocardiography coexisted with different emphases. While auscultation remained the method of choice for a bedside diagnosis, phonocardiography played its role in differential diagnostics or research settings. (shrink)

In this book, William Brant inquires how violence is reduced. Social causes of violence are exposed. War, sexual domination, leadership, propagandizing and comedy are investigated. Legal systems are explored as reducers and implementers of violence and threats.

The paper investigates possible readings of the later Heisenberg's remarks on the nature of quantum states. It discusses, in particular, whether Heisenberg should be seen as a proponent of the epistemic conception of states – the view that quantum states are not descriptions of quantum systems but rather reflect the state assigning observers' epistemic relations to these systems. On the one hand, it seems plausible that Heisenberg subscribes to that view, given how he defends the notorious "collapse of the wave (...) function" by relating it to a sudden change in the epistemic situation of the observer registering a measured result. On the other hand, his remarks on quantum probabilities as "potentia" or "objective tendencies" are difficult to reconcile with such a reading. The accounts that are attributed to Heisenberg by the different possible readings considered are subjected to closer scrutiny; at the same time, their respective virtues and problems are discussed. _German_ Diese Arbeit untersucht mögliche Lesarten von Heisenbergs späten Bemerkungen über die Natur von Quantenzuständen. Insbesondere wird die Frage diskutiert, ob Heisenberg als Vertreter der epistemischen Auffassung von Quantenzuständen gelten kann – der Idee, dass Quantenzustände nicht Beschreibungen der objektiven Eigenschaften von Quantensystemen sind sondern die epistemischen Beziehungen von Beobachtern zu diesen Systemen widerspiegeln. Einerseits erscheint es plausibel, dass Heisenberg dieser Sichtweise zustimmt, wenn man sich ansieht, wie er den berüchtigten,,Kollaps der Wellenfunktion" verteidigt, indem er ihn mit einer plötzlichen Änderung in der Kenntnis des ein Messergebnis registrierenden Beobachters in Zusammenhang bringt. Andererseits sind seine Bemerkungen über quantenmechanische Wahrscheinlichkeiten als,,Potentia" oder,,objektive Tendenzen" mit einer solchen Lesart nur schwer in Einklang zu bringen. Die Positionen, die Heisenberg den verschiedenen möglichen Lesarten zufolge vertritt, werden eingehenden Untersuchungen unterzogen; gleichzeitig werden ihre jeweiligen Vorzüge und Probleme diskutiert. (shrink)

The article deals with Kant’s doctrine of genius, presented in the Critique of the Power of Judgment, in connection with the latest discussion of which author of that time could have a decisive influence on Kant’s conception. In the first section, I reconstruct the line of Kant’s argument in CPJ §§ 46-50 where he explicates the nature of genius and show that its characteristics such as contrast to rules, the complementarity of taste, spirit as a principle of aesthetic ideas, the (...) proportion between the power of imagination and understanding become constitutive for his theory. In the second section, I refer to opinio communis in the research literature that Kant formed his theory of genius under the influence of the Scottish philosopher Alexander Gerard’s Essay on Genius. This opinion is shared by the vast majority of contemporary researchers. Still, its origins go back to the monograph of O. Schlapp. At the same time, other researchers claim that C. F. Gellert, or merely German philosophy of the XVIII century, had a significant influence on Kant’s theory. In the third section, on the example of Kant’s four propositions about genius head, the productive power of imagination, the proportion of understanding and the power of imagination, the difference of genius and scientific talent), I claim that similar views were common among various German and foreign authors of that time. Based on this, I argue that Kant’s conception of genius as a complex theory cannot be reduced to the influence of one author or one tradition. Hence its correct reconstruction should consider the rich and diverse material from different sources from aesthetics, poetics, rhetoric, art, and literature up to metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper I adopt Aquinas’ explanation of passivity and activity by means of acts remaining in the agent and acts passing over into external matter. I use it to propose a divide between immanent-type and transcendent-type acts. I then touch upon a grammatical distinction between three kinds of verbs. To argue for the activity and passivity of affectivity I refer to the group that includes acts of transcendent-type and whose verbs in both voices possess affective meaning. In the end (...) I focus on cases in which an act of affective f-ing is mirrored in its object as being affectively f-ed. (shrink)

In this paper, we trace the conceptual history of the term ?metamathematics? in the nineteenth century. It is well known that Hilbert introduced the term for his proof-theoretic enterprise in about 1922. But he was verifiably inspired by an earlier usage of the phrase in the 1870s. After outlining Hilbert's understanding of the term, we will explore the lines of inducement and elucidate the different meanings of ?metamathematics? in the final decades of the nineteenth century. Finally, we will investigate the (...) earlier occurrences and come to the conclusion that the conceptual prehistory of the Hilbertian notion of metamathematics dates back to 1870, whereas the history of the word starts in 1799 at the latest. What is this: metamathematics? It is something amazing everybody, [?] since it makes the mind dizzy and withdraws thinking its sole fulcrum.1 1 Brunner 1898, p. 832: ?Was ist das: Metamathematik? Es ist etwas, was einen Jeden in das äusserste Staunen versetzt, [?] was das Gehirn schwindlig macht und dem Denken seinen einzigen Stütz- und Angelpunkt zu entziehen droht? (shrink)

For Jizang (549−623), a prominent philosophical exponent of Chinese Madhyamaka, all things are empty of determinate form or nature. Given anything X, no linguistic item can truly and conclusively be applied to X in the sense of positing a determinate form or nature therein. This philosophy of ontic indeterminacy is connected closely with his notion of the Way (dao), which seems to indicate a kind of ineffable principle of reality. However, Jizang also equates the Way with nonacquisition as a conscious (...) state of freedom from any attachment and definite understanding whatsoever. The issue then becomes pressing as to how we are to understand Jizang's notion of the Way. Does it indicate some metaphysical principle or reality? Is it actually a skilful expedient to lead one to the consummate state of complete spiritual freedom? How is this issue related to Jizang's conception of ontic indeterminacy? In this book chapter, I examine Jizang's key writings in an attempt to clarify his ontological position. (shrink)

El objetivo principal de este artículo es diseñar un método para detectar qué cosas pueden considerarse “evidentes”. Comienza analizando cómo se ha entendido la evidencia en la tradición aristotélica y tomista hasta nuestros días. Después del estudio histórico, en el Capítulo III se procede a realizar un análisis sistemático de la noción de evidencia y sus clases. En este trabajo se descubren diez características que aparecen en las cosas evidentes (en las ideas, en los primeros principios, nociones más básicas, pruebas, (...) etc.). Definidas estas diez características, la forma de diseñar una prueba de evidencia resulta fácil. El Capítulo IV hace esto: primero se diseña un test negativo, que muestra que algún argumento no es evidente, y luego un test positivo, que indica que alguna idea, principio, prueba, etc. parece ser evidente. Terminamos este trabajo con algunas consideraciones sobre cómo este test-dual puede funcionar en la ciencia del derecho. (shrink)

In a late notation from 1932, Husserl emphasizes the fact that a broad concept of “apperception” should also include, alongside his usual examples, the apprehension of objects as bearers of an individual or inter-subjective past, specifically “indicated” with them; thus, he distinguishes between apperceptions “appresenting” a simultaneous content (co-presentations), anticipatory apperceptions pointing to future incidents, and retrospective apperceptions referring to “ad-memorized” ( hinzuerinnert , ad - memoriert ) features and events. The latter sort of apperceptions are involved not only in (...) our apprehension of historical traces and relics, but also in that of causal relations, familiar objects, and cultural objects in general. Following several later notations of Husserl concerning the topic of “apperceptions,” this paper outlines the specific intentional structure of retrospective or evocative apperceptions, analyzing their various possible forms. (shrink)

Two terms in the Kantian lexicon derives from the Latin metaphysical tradition of the res: Realität and Wirklichkeit. The first one expresses one of the categ...

The ArgumentThe history of psychology, like other human science subjects, should attend to the meaning of words understood as relationships of reference and value within discourse. It should seek to identify and defend a history centered on representations of knowledge. The history of the word “inhibition” in nineteenth-century Europe illustrates the potential of such an approach. This word was significant in mediating between physiological and psychological knowledge and between technical and everyday understanding. Further, this word indicated the presence of a (...) common discourse structuring ways of thought about order, whether in technology, moral activity, or experimental psycho-physiology. Writing history as the history of discourse suggests several difficulties; these are considered briefly. Nevertheless attention to language and meaning makes it possible to integrate the history of psychology with intellectual history and thereby to broaden its potential audience. (shrink)

In this second article, I look at the history of the creation of the “Encyclopedia of Artistic Terminology” within the State Academy of the Artistic Sciences. I analyze various versions of the encyclopedia’s conception proposed by Wassily Kandinsky and Gustav Shpet and also at the theoretical bases for these conceptions. I then show how the work on the Encyclopedia was connected with the institutional transformations in the Academy. A key factor in the work on the Encyclopedia was the extensive discussions (...) of the fundamental aesthetic terms that took place in the Philosophy Department and in sections of GAKhN. As the dynamics of the discussions also determined changes in the conception of the Encyclopedia, so work on it shifted more and more from a project for creating a new system of aesthetic concepts to a reconstruction of the “history of concepts.” Such a transition marked the main vector of the development of European discussions about aesthetic concepts—from the creation of systems of aesthetic categories to historical reflection on the semantic transformations of categories. In conclusion, I investigate the cessation of work on the Encyclopedia in 1929 in response to the outside ideological pressure and the elimination of the possibility for autonomous theoretical work within the walls of the Academy. (shrink)

After describing the philosophical background of Kerry’s work, an account is given of the way Kerry proposed to supplement Bolzano’s conception of logic with a psychological account of the mental acts underlying mathematical judgements.In his writings Kerry criticized Frege’s work and Kerry’s views were then attacked by Frege.The following two issues were central to this controversy: the relation between the content of a concept and the object of a concept; the logical roles of the definite article.Not only did Frege in (...) 1892 offer an unconvincing solution to Kerry’s puzzle concerning “the concept horse” but he also overlooked the many criticisms levelled by Kerry against the notion of an extension on which his own definition of number was based. (shrink)

The paper argues that a prevalent conception of power in the educational sciences is detrimental to pedagogy both as a field of practice and as a discipline and inept as a scientific concept from an epistemological standpoint. The designation of this power concept as ‘aethereal’ can provide the education theoretical discourses with a means to analyze and criticize positions and arguments that have undermined the autonomy of education since the establishment of Foucauldian thinking in the educational sciences. First, this article (...) argues that the pedagogical notion of the educable child depends on the concepts of individuality, plasticity, and autonomy within the framework of a negative ontology. Second, it problematizes the effects of the substitution of these concepts in the postmodern power-critical educational sciences for pedagogy in general and the child as its key concept in particular. The politicized child is conceived of as subjugated, passive, vulnerable, and what is crucial: as a thing-like, i.e. pedagogically ineducable but only powerfully moldable identity. Third, it analyses the philosophical basis of this shift towards the politicization of the child by introducing the concept of ‘aethereal power’. The article concludes with a sociological reflection on the societal dimension of this fundamental transformation of education and hints at the emerging post-critical pedagogy as a possible remedy. (shrink)

El objetivo del siguiente artículo consiste en aclarar el rechazo heideggeriano de la idea de reflexión como método del filosofar. La necesidad de tal elucidación radica en lo contraintuitivo de esta tesis y en los problemas interpretativos que esta crítica presenta en Ser y tiempo. Para resolverlos el artículo realiza un breve examen histórico-conceptual de la reflexión mediante el cual se diferencian dos sentidos del concepto: el sentido psicológico y trascendental. Gracias a esta distinción se confía exponer sistemáticamente la doble (...) crítica de Ser y tiempo a este concepto, aclarando así los motivos que articulan el rechazo heideggeriano de la misma idea de reflexión. (shrink)

Der soziotechnische Wandel bringt neue Phänomene des Zufalls hervor, die sich den üblichen Strategien des Umgangs mit Risiken und Unsicherheit entziehen. Diese Akzidenzphänomene sind prinzipiell unvorhersehbar und in ihrer komplexen Effektgesamtheit jenseits von Kalkulation und Antizipation. Eine allgemeine Verzukünftigung unseres Weltbezuges mit spezifischen weitreichenden Problemen ist die Folge und lässt klassische Agenturen des Risikomanagements und der Unsicherheitsbewältigung an ihre Leistungsgrenzen stoßen. Bruno Gransche zeigt, dass Philosophie und Zukunftsforschung gemeinsam großes Potenzial aufweisen, hier zu helfen.

Nous savons bien aujourd'hui que, dès l'Antiquité, leCorpus Aristoteli-cuma été constitué, mis en ordre et commenté de manière à faire ressortir, en tout, la cohérence des doctrines du Stagirite, dont ses écrits, tels qu'il nous les a laissés, ne portaient pas la marque évidente. Le sentiment que ce travail de mise en forme, poursuivi par la tradition, devait avoir oblitéré quelque chose de la nature de la pensée aristotélicienne conduisit à soulever la question qui sert d'intitulé à la présente étude.