Switch to: References

Citations of:

Some New Monadic Value Predicates

Nicolas Espinoza

American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (1):31-37 (2009)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.

Population Axiology and the Possibility of a Fourth Category of Absolute Value.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Economics and Philosophy 36 (1):81-110.details Critical-Range Utilitarianism is a variant of Total Utilitarianism which can avoid both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Sadistic Conclusion in population ethics. Yet Standard Critical-Range Utilitarianism entails the Weak Sadistic Conclusion, that is, it entails that each population consisting of lives at a bad well-being level is not worse than some population consisting of lives at a good well-being level. In this paper, I defend a version of Critical-Range Utilitarianism which does not entail the Weak Sadistic Conclusion. This is made (...) Download Export citation Bookmark 24 citations
Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):854-864.details Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as ‘good’, in terms of dyadic value relations, such as ‘better’. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do. Download Export citation Bookmark 7 citations
In defense of value incomparability: A reply to Dorr, Nebel, and Zuehl.Erik Carlson & Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Noûs.details Cian Dorr, Jacob Nebel, and Jake Zuehl have argued that no objects are incomparable in value. One set of arguments they offer depart from a principle they call ‘Strong Monotonicity’, which states that if x is good and y is not good, then x is better than y. In this article, we respond to those arguments, thereby defending the possibility of value incomparability. Download Export citation Bookmark
The Possibility of Undistinguishedness.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):609-613.details It is natural to assume that every value bearer must be good, bad, or neutral. This paper argues that this assumption is false if value incomparability is possible. More precisely, if value incommensurability is possible, then there is a fourth category of absolute value, in addition to the good, the bad, and the neutral. Download Export citation Bookmark 2 citations
No Outcome Is Good, Bad, or Evaluatively Neutral for Anyone.Michael Rabenberg - 2024 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 21 (5-6):654-670.details I argue that no outcome is good, bad, or evaluatively neutral for anyone. My argument concerns non-comparative personal evaluative properties alone; it does not support (say) the conclusion that no outcome is better for anyone than any other outcome. First I argue that there is a sequence of outcomes with the following properties, and that the existence of such a sequence supports the conclusion that no outcome is good for anyone: (i) the first member of the sequence is good for (...) Download Export citation Bookmark
Comparing values : essays on comparability, transitivity, and vagueness.Nicolas Espinoza - unknowndetails The primary aim of this thesis is to examine some of the arguments that have been leveled against the idea that all value bearing entities are comparable. A secondary aim is to investigate some putative properties of the relation ‘better than', especially transitivity and vagueness. Also, some of the consequences of accepting incomparability are investigated, both with regards to other value theoretical issues, such as the implications for monadic value predicates, and with regards to more applied issues, such as the (...) Download Export citation Bookmark

1