Providing a possible worlds semantics for a logic involves choosing a class of possible worlds models, and setting up a truth definition connecting formulas of the logic with statements about these models. This scheme is so flexible that a danger arises: perhaps, any (reasonable) logic whatsoever can be modelled in this way. Thus, the enterprise would lose its essential tension. Fortunately, it may be shown that the so-called incompleteness-examples from modal logic resist possible worlds modelling, even in the above wider (...) sense. More systematically, we investigate the interplay of truth definitions and model conditions, proving a preservation theorem characterizing those types of truth definition which generate the minimal modal logic. (shrink)

In the modal literature various notions of completeness have been studied for normal modal logics. Four of these are defined here, viz. (plain) completeness, first-order completeness, canonicity and possession of the finite model property — and their connections are studied. Up to one important exception, all possible inclusion relations are either proved or disproved. Hopefully, this helps to establish some order in the jungle of concepts concerning modal logics. In the course of the exposition, the interesting properties of first-order definability (...) and preservation under ultrafilter extensions are introduced and studied as well. (shrink)

This book offers a concise introduction to both proof-theory and algebraic methods, the core of the syntactic and semantic study of logic respectively. The importance of combining these two has been increasingly recognized in recent years. It highlights the contrasts between the deep, concrete results using the former and the general, abstract ones using the latter. Covering modal logics, many-valued logics, superintuitionistic and substructural logics, together with their algebraic semantics, the book also provides an introduction to nonclassical logic for undergraduate (...) or graduate level courses.The book is divided into two parts: Proof Theory in Part I and Algebra in Logic in Part II. Part I presents sequent systems and discusses cut elimination and its applications in detail. It also provides simplified proof of cut elimination, making the topic more accessible. The last chapter of Part I is devoted to clarification of the classes of logics that are discussed in the second part. Part II focuses on algebraic semantics for these logics. At the same time, it is a gentle introduction to the basics of algebraic logic and universal algebra with many examples of their applications in logic. Part II can be read independently of Part I, with only minimum knowledge required, and as such is suitable as a textbook for short introductory courses on algebra in logic. (shrink)

Our concern is the completeness problem for spi-logics, that is, sets of implications between strictly positive formulas built from propositional variables, conjunction and modal diamond operators. Originated in logic, algebra and computer science, spi-logics have two natural semantics: meet-semilattices with monotone operators providing Birkhoff-style calculi and first-order relational structures (aka Kripke frames) often used as the intended structures in applications. Here we lay foundations for a completeness theory that aims to answer the question whether the two semantics define the same (...) consequence relations for a given spi-logic. (shrink)

We introduce partial Esakia morphisms, well partial Esakia morphisms, and strong partial Esakia morphisms between Esakia spaces and show that they provide the dual description of (∧, →) homomorphisms, (∧, →, 0) homomorphisms, and (∧, →, ∨) homomorphisms between Heyting algebras, thus establishing a generalization of Esakia duality. This yields an algebraic characterization of Zakharyaschev’s subreductions, cofinal subreductions, dense subreductions, and the closed domain condition. As a consequence, we obtain a new simplified proof (which is algebraic in nature) of Zakharyaschev’s (...) theorem that each intermediate logic can be axiomatized by canonical formulas. (shrink)

This paper examines "moderate modal skepticism", a form of skepticism about metaphysical modality defended by Peter van Inwagen in order to blunt the force of certain modal arguments in the philosophy of religion. Van Inwagen’s argument for moderate modal skepticism assumes Yablo's (1993) influential world-based epistemology of possibility. We raise two problems for this epistemology of possibility, which undermine van Inwagen's argument. We then consider how one might motivate moderate modal skepticism by relying on a different epistemology of possibility, which (...) does not face these problems: Williamson’s (2007: ch. 5) counterfactual-based epistemology. Two ways of motivating moderate modal skepticism within that framework are found unpromising. Nevertheless, we also find a way of vindicating an epistemological thesis that, while weaker than moderate modal skepticism, is strong enough to support the methodological moral van Inwagen wishes to draw. (shrink)

Section 1 recalls a point noted by A. N. Prior forty years ago: that a certain formula in the language of a purely implicational intermediate logic investigated by R. A. Bull is unprovable in that logic but provable in the extension of the logic by the usual axioms for conjunction, once this connective is added to the language. Section 2 reminds us that every formula is interdeducible with (i.e. added to intuitionistic logic, yields the same intermediate logic as) some conjunction-free (...) formula. Thus it would seem that any detour going via formulas with conjunction can be avoided, which raises a puzzle: how is this consistent with the point from Section 1? Sections 3 and 4 raise and discuss this puzzle. In fact, the puzzle turns out on closer inspection not to be so puzzling after all, but it does serve as a convenient centrepiece around which to organize a discussion of the phenomenon illustrated by the Bull–Prior example. Section 5 notes that Prior's observation can be extended to the case of the result of adding disjunction to Bull's logic, while Section 6 includes some further remarks aimed at diagnosing one source of possible residual puzzlement. A subtext of our discussion—spanning several of the notes—is that this work by Bull and Prior has been overlooked, their results having to be rediscovered, by many algebraists and logicians in more recent years. (shrink)

We develop a method for showing that various modal logics that are valid in their countably generated canonical Kripke frames must also be valid in their uncountably generated ones. This is applied to many systems, including the logics of finite width, and a broader class of multimodal logics of ‘finite achronal width’ that are introduced here.

In the modal literature various notions of "completeness" have been studied for normal modal logics. Four of these are defined here, viz. completeness, first-order completeness, canonicity and possession of the finite model property -- and their connections are studied. Up to one important exception, all possible inclusion relations are either proved or disproved. Hopefully, this helps to establish some order in the jungle of concepts concerning modal logics. In the course of the exposition, the interesting properties of first-order definability and (...) preservation under ultrafilter extensions are introduced and studied as well. (shrink)

This paper concerns modal logics appearing from the temporal ordering of domains in two-dimensional Minkowski spacetime. As R. Goldblatt has proved recently, the logic of the whole plane isS4.2. We consider closed or open convex polygons and closed or open domains bounded by simple differentiable curves; this leads to the logics:S4,S4.1,S4.2 orS4.1.2.

In this article, we tell a story about incompleteness in modal logic. The story weaves together an article of van Benthem, “Syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness theorems,” and a longstanding open question: whether every normal modal logic can be characterized by a class of completely additive modal algebras, or as we call them, ${\cal V}$-baos. Using a first-order reformulation of the property of complete additivity, we prove that the modal logic that starred in van Benthem’s article resolves the open question (...) in the negative. In addition, for the case of bimodal logic, we show that there is a naturally occurring logic that is incomplete with respect to ${\cal V}$-baos, namely the provability logic $GLB$. We also show that even logics that are unsound with respect to such algebras do not have to be more complex than the classical propositional calculus. On the other hand, we observe that it is undecidable whether a syntactically defined logic is ${\cal V}$-complete. After these results, we generalize the Blok Dichotomy to degrees of ${\cal V}$-incompleteness. In the end, we return to van Benthem’s theme of syntactic aspects of modal incompleteness. (shrink)

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 BASIC MODAL LOGIC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.

An old conjecture of modal logics states that every splitting of the major systems K4, S4, G and Grz has the finite model property. In this paper we will prove that all iterated splittings of G have fmp, whereas in the other cases we will give explicit counterexamples. We also introduce a proof technique which will give a positive answer for large classes of splitting frames. The proof works by establishing a rather strong property of these splitting frames namely that (...) they preserve the finite model property in the following sense. Whenever an extension Λ has fmp so does the splitting Λ/f of Λ by f. Although we will also see that this method has its limitations because there are frames lacking this property, it has several desirable side effects. For example, properties such as compactness, decidability and others can be shown to be preserved in a similar way and effective bounds for the size of models can be given. Moreover, all methods and proofs are constructive. (shrink)

This book offers a state-of-the-art introduction to the basic techniques and results of neighborhood semantics for modal logic. In addition to presenting the relevant technical background, it highlights both the pitfalls and potential uses of neighborhood models – an interesting class of mathematical structures that were originally introduced to provide a semantics for weak systems of modal logic. In addition, the book discusses a broad range of topics, including standard modal logic results ; bisimulations for neighborhood models and other model-theoretic (...) constructions; comparisons with other semantics for modal logic ; neighborhood semantics for first-order modal logic, applications in game theory ; applications in epistemic logic ; and non-normal modal logics with dynamic modalities. The book can be used as the primary text for seminars on philosophical logic focused on non-normal modal logics; as a supplemental text for courses on modal logic, logic in AI, or philosophical logic ; or as the primary source for researchers interested in learning about the uses of neighborhood semantics in philosophical logic and game theory. (shrink)

We consider modal logics whose intermediate fragments lie between the logic of infinite problems [20] and the Medvedev logic of finite problems [15]. There is continuum of such logics [19]. We prove that none of them is finitely axiomatizable. The proof is based on methods from [12] and makes use of some graph-theoretic constructions (operations on coverings, and colourings).

Questions connected with the admissibility of rules of inference and the solvability of the substitution problem for modal and intuitionistic logic are considered in an algebraic framework. The main result is the decidability of the universal theory of the free modal algebra imageω extended in signature by adding constants for free generators. As corollaries we obtain: there exists an algorithm for the recognition of admissibility of rules with parameters in the modal system Grz, the substitution problem for Grz and for (...) the intuitionistic calculus H is decidable, intuitionistic propositional calculus H is decidable with respect to admissibility . A semantical criterion for the admissibility of rules of inference in Grz is given. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that hybrid logic is the deductive setting most natural for Kripke semantics. We do so by investigating hybrid axiomatics for a variety of systems, ranging from the basic hybrid language (a decidable system with the same complexity as orthodox propositional modal logic) to the strong Priorean language (which offers full first-order expressivity).We show that hybrid logic offers a genuinely first-order perspective on Kripke semantics: it is possible to define base logics which extend automatically to a (...) wide variety of frame classes and to prove completeness using the Henkin method. In the weaker languages, this requires the use of non-orthodox rules. We discuss these rules in detail and prove non-eliminability and eliminability results. We also show how another type of rule, which reflects the structure of the strong Priorean language, can be employed to give an even wider coverage of frame classes. We show that this deductive apparatus gets progressively simpler as we work our way up the expressivity hierarchy, and conclude the paper by showing that the approach transfers to first-order hybrid logic. (shrink)

Theoria , the international Swedish philosophy journal, was founded in 1935. Its contributors in the first 75 years include the major Swedish philosophers from this period and in addition a long list of international philosophers, including A. J. Ayer, C. D. Broad, Ernst Cassirer, Hector Neri Castañeda, Arthur C. Danto, Donald Davidson, Nelson Goodman, R. M. Hare, Carl G. Hempel, Jaakko Hintikka, Saul Kripke, Henry E. Kyburg, Keith Lehrer, Isaac Levi, David Lewis, Gerald MacCallum, Richard Montague, Otto Neurath, Arthur N. (...) Prior, W. V. Quine, Nicholas Rescher, Ernest Sosa, Robert C. Stalnaker, P. F. Strawson, Patrick Suppes, Johan van Benthem, Georg Henrik von Wright and many others. Hempel's confirmation paradoxes, Ross's deontic paradox, Montague's universal grammar and Lindström's theorem are among the contributions to philosophy that were first published in Theoria. (shrink)

We present two finitely axiomatized modal propositional logics, one betweenTandS4 and the other an extension ofS4, which are incomplete with respect to the neighbourhood or Scott-Montague semantics.Throughout this paper we are referring to logics which contain all the classical connectives and only one modal connective □ (unary), no propositional constants, all classical tautologies, and which are closed under the rules of modus ponens (MP), substitution, and the rule RE (fromA↔Binfer αA↔ □B). Such logics are calledclassicalby Segerberg [6]. Classical logics which (...) contain the formula □p∧ □q→ □(p∧q) (denoted byK) and its “converse,” □{p∧q)→ □p∧ □q(denoted byR) are called regular;regularlogics which are closed under the rule of necessitation, RN (fromAinfer □A), are callednormal. The logics that we are particularly concerned with are all normal, although some of our results will be true for all regular or all classical logics. It is well known thatKandRand closure under RN imply closure under RE and also that normal logics are also those logics closed under RN and containing □{p→q) → {□p→ □q). (shrink)

Modal logics are studied in their algebraic disguise of varieties of so-called modal algebras. This enables us to apply strong results of a universal algebraic nature, notably those obtained by B. Jonsson. It is shown that the degree of incompleteness with respect to Kripke semantics of any modal logic containing the axiom □ p → p or containing an axiom of the form $\square^mp \leftrightarrow\square^{m + 1}p$ for some natural number m is 2 ℵ 0 . Furthermore, we show that (...) there exists an immediate predecessor of classical logic (axiomatized by $p \leftrightarrow \square p$ ) which is not characterized by any finite algebra. The existence of modal logics having 2 ℵ 0 immediate predecessors is established. In contrast with these results we prove that the lattice of extensions of S4 behaves much better: a logic extending S4 is characterized by a finite algebra iff it has finitely many extensions and any such logic has only finitely many immediate predecessors, all of which are characterized by a finite algebra. (shrink)

We define analogues of modal Sahlqvist formulas for the modal mu-calculus, and prove a correspondence theorem for them.

Providing a possible worlds semantics for a logic involves choosing a class of possible worlds models, and setting up a truth definition connecting formulas of the logic with statements about these models. This scheme is so flexible that a danger arises: perhaps, any logic whatsoever can be modelled in this way. Thus, the enterprise would lose its essential 'tension'. Fortunately, it may be shown that the so-called 'incompleteness-examples' from modal logic resist possible worlds modelling, even in the above wider sense. (...) More systematically, we investigate the interplay of truth definitions and model conditions, proving a preservation theorem characterizing those types of truth definition which generate the minimal modal logic. (shrink)

Journal of Mathematical Logic, Volume 22, Issue 03, December 2022. In this paper, we show that there exist (continuum many) varieties of bi-Heyting algebras that are not generated by their complete members. It follows that there exist (continuum many) extensions of the Heyting–Brouwer logic [math] that are topologically incomplete. This result provides further insight into the long-standing open problem of Kuznetsov by yielding a negative solution of the reformulation of the problem from extensions of [math] to extensions of [math].

This paper specifies classes of framesmaximally omnitemporally characteristic for Thomas' normal modal logicT 2 + and for each logic in the ascending chain of Segerberg logics investigated by Segerberg and Hughes and Cresswell. It is shown that distinct a,scending chains of generalized Segerberg logics can be constructed from eachT n + logic (n 2). The set containing allT n + and Segerberg logics can be totally- (linearly-) ordered but not well-ordered by the inclusion relation. The order type of this ordered (...) set is *( + 1). Throughout the paper my approach is fundamentally semantical. (shrink)

Sufficient syntactic conditions for canonicity in intermediate and intuitionistic modal logics are given. We present a new technique which does not require semantic first-order reduction and which is constructive in the sense that it works in an intuitionistic metatheory through a model without points which is classically isomorphic to the usual canonical model.

In this paper thecanonicalmodal logics, a kind of complete modal logics introduced in K. Fine [4] and R. I. Goldblatt [5], will be characterized semantically using the concept of anultrafilter extension, an operation on frames inspired by the algebraic theory of modal logic. Theorem 8 of R. I. Goldblatt and S. K. Thomason [6] characterizing the modally definable Σ⊿-elementary classes of frames will follow as a corollary. A second corollary is Theorem 2 of [4] which states that any complete modal (...) logic defining a Σ⊿-elementary class of frames is canonical.The main tool in obtaining these results is the duality between modal algebras and general frames developed in R. I. Goldblatt [5]. The relevant notions and results from this theory will be stated in §2. The concept of a canonical modal logic is introduced and motivated in §3, which also contains the above-mentioned theorems. In §4, a kind of appendix to the preceding discussion, preservation of first-order sentences under ultrafilter extensions is discussed.The modal language to be considered here has an infinite supply of proposition letters, a propositional constant ⊥, the usual Boolean operators ¬, ∨, ∨, →, and ↔ —with ¬ and ∨ regarded as primitives—and the two unary modal operators ◇ and □ — ◇ being regarded as primitive. Modal formulas will be denoted by lower case Greek letters, sets of formulas by Greek capitals. (shrink)

Prioritized bases, i.e., weakly ordered sets of sentences, have been used for specifying an agent’s ‘basic’ or ‘explicit’ beliefs, or alternatively for compactly encoding an agent’s belief state without the claim that the elements of a base are in any sense basic. This paper focuses on the second interpretation and shows how a shifting of priorities in prioritized bases can be used for a simple, constructive and intuitive way of representing a large variety of methods for the change of belief (...) states—methods that have usually been characterized semantically by a system-of-spheres modeling. Among the methods represented are ‘radical’, ‘conservative’ and ‘moderate’ revision, ‘revision by comparison’ in its raising and lowering variants, as well as various constructions for belief expansion and contraction. Importantly, none of these methods makes any use of numbers. (shrink)

This paper presents a generalization of Fine’s completeness theorem for transitive logics of finite width, and proves the Kripke completeness of transitive logics of finite “suc-eq-width”. The frame condition for each finite suc-eq-width axiom requires, in rooted transitive frames, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points with different proper successors. The paper also presents a generalization of Rybakov’s completeness theorem for transitive logics of prefinite width, and proves the Kripke completeness of transitive logics of prefinite “suc-eq-width”. The (...) frame condition for each prefinite suc-eq-width axiom requires, in rooted transitive frames, a finite upper bound of cardinality for antichains of points that have a finite lower bound of depth and have different proper successors. We will construct continuums of transitive logics of finite suc-eq-width but not of finite width, and continuums of those of prefinite suc-eq-width but not of prefinite width. This shows that our new completeness results cover uncountably many more logics than Fine’s theorem and Rybakov’s theorem respectively. (shrink)