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Switch to: References
Citations of:
Knowledge and Belief in Republic V
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 60 (2):121-39 (1978)
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Few arguments from the past have stirred up as much interest as Aristotle’s “Third man” and not so many texts have received as much attention as its account in chapter 22 of the Sophistici elenchi. And yet, several issues about both remain highly controversial, starting from the very nature of the argument at stake and the exact signification of some of its features. The essay provides a close commentary of the text, dealing with its main difficulties and suggesting an overall (...) |
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This paper argues for the presence in Plato’s work of a conception of thinking central to which is what I call the Transparency View. According to this view, in order for a subject to think of a given object, the subject must represent that object just as it is, without inaccuracy or distortion. I examine the ways in which this conception influences Plato’s epistemology and metaphysics and explore some ramifications for contemporary views about mental content. |
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There is a mystery right at the heart of Plato ’s famous doctrine of the three parts of the soul, as this doctrine is presented in the Republic, Phaedrus and Timaeus: just what is a soul ‘part’? Republic IV tells us a way to distinguish soul parts, namely by the Principle of Opposites : since ‘the same thing will not do or undergo opposites in the same respect, in relation to the same thing, at the same time’, whenever we find (...) |
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A distinction between knowledge and belief is set out and justified at the end of Book V of Plato’s Republic. The justification is intended to establish the claim of the philosophers to rule in an ideal state. I set out the argument and explain why considerable disagreement remains about the nature of the distinction and the assumptions on which it rests. I discuss the main options for interpreting the justification, briefly assessing their strengths and weaknesses. I conclude with comments on (...) |
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In this paper, I explore two possible readings of Republic IV, 439c2-d8, and of Plato’s claim that the just soul is governed by its rational element. My aim is to argue against a “desiderative” interpretation of the passage, according to which the motivational strength of rational desires depends on a set of desires given in advance and produced independently of reason. As an alternative, I advance a “cognitivist” reading according to which the rational desires of the just soul have as (...) |
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In this paper I examine Socrates’ argument that presupposes an audience familiar with Forms and explains why the sight-lovers are not philosophers. It is divided into three parts: the first part (476a1–6) shows why each Form is one in number; the second part (476a6–9) distinguishes Forms from their sensible appearances; and the third part (476a10–d6) draws an analogy between philosophers – people being awake and sight-lovers – people being asleep. Remarkably, the argument works only for opposites, which are mistakenly identified (...) |
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It is widely accepted that ruling is the sole prerogative of Plato’s philosopher-rulers because they alone possess knowledge (ἐπιστήμη). This knowledge is knowledge of the Good, taken to be the only knowledge there is in Kallipolis. Let us call this the sufficiency condition thesis (the SCT). In this paper, I challenge this consensus. I cast doubt on the adequacy of the SCT, arguing that part of the training and education of the philosopher-rulers involves their gaining practical wisdom (φρόνησις) and experience (...) |
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Corrective intervention in Plato's metaphysics replacing the standard view of Plato as a metaphysical dualist with a novel and revolutionary paradigm of unitary pluralism in a single reality built on ontological diversity. |
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La exposición y crítica de las doctrinas antiguas tiene un lugar importante en los escritos de Aristóteles. Sin embargo, ciertas dudas se han vuelto corrientes acerca de la confiabilidad de sus descripciones. Más aún, se ha sostenido que Aristóteles deforma la comprensión histórica a través de la introducción de conceptos y términos propios. En este libro se aborda el problema a través de un análisis de las críticas que Aristóteles dirige a la teoría platónica de las Ideas, que permite explicar (...) |
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Pour Platon l'instrument principal de la connaissance philosophique est le logos, non seulement dans le sens général de « raison », mais aussi dans le sens spécifique de connaissance qui se réalise au moyen du « discours », c'est à dire d'une raison qui possède un caractère foncièrement linguistique. Cela semble impliquer que le logos a une nature entièrement transparente à soi même, et par conséquent, comme on peut le déduire de l'analyse consacrée dans le Théétète à la théorie du (...) |
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The central notion of Aristotle's metaphysical system is his concept of substance, which he explicates by means of a number of technical concepts, one of which is being prior in being. Unfortunately, the interpretation of priority in being has proven particularly controversial. In the Categories and the Metaphysics, Aristotle claims that compound substances can be without things in other categories and not vice versa. If we adopt an existential interpretation of the verb ‘to be’ in these claims, it is hard (...) |
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A puzzle about false judgement is raised in the Theaetetus (187d-200c), but not successfully answered there. On the proposed account, the confusion that explicitly vitiates Theaetetus’ final attempt to define knowledge is already at work implicitly in this puzzle. Theaetetus shares popular assumptions about knowledge (epistēmē), but also accepts that there are cognitive constraints on judgement (doxa): the puzzle arises because he fails to distinguish the one cognitive condition from the other. |
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ABSTRACTAt least in some dialogues, Plato has been thought to hold the so-called Two Worlds Theory, according to which there can be belief but not knowledge about sensibles, and knowledge but not belief about forms. The Phaedo is one such dialogue. In this paper, I explore some key passages that might be thought to support TW, and ask whether they in fact do so. I also consider the related issue of whether the Phaedo argues that, if knowledge is possible at (...) |
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There is a problem about belief and knowledge in Plato's epistemology that has exercised serious students of Plato only to settle into a recent orthodoxy. Guthrie characterizes the problem and its current resolution this way: ‘In the Meno doxa appeared to be a dim apprehension of the same objects of which knowledge is a clear and complete understanding … in the Republic each is directed to different objects, knowledge to the Forms and doxa to the sensible world alone … at (...) |
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This chapter discusses the first part of Aristotle's Posterior Analytics A-33, 88b30-89a10. I claim that Aristotle is not concerned with an epistemological distinction between knowledge and belief in general. He is rather making a contrast between scientific knowledge (which is equivalent to explanation by the primarily appropriate cause) and some explanatory beliefs that falls short of capturing the primarily appropriate cause. |
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The Eleatic Visitor speaks forcefully when he insists, ‘Necessarily, whenever there is speech, it is speech of something; it is impossible for it not to be of something’. For ‘if it were not of anything, it would not be speech at all; for we showed that it is impossible for there to be speech that is speech of nothing’. Presumably, at 263c10, when he claims to have ‘shown’ that it is impossible for speech to be of nothing, the Visitor is (...) |
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In Aristotle's views on cognition a series of terms – hupolêpsis, doxa, and epistêmê – play key roles. But it has not been noticed that each of these comes in two kinds – one unqualified and the other qualified. When these and their interrelations are properly explored, a deeply systematic picture of cognition emerges, in which doxa is best understood as ‘belief’, hupolêpsis as ‘supposition’, and epistêmê as a sort of belief, so that – contrary to orthodoxy – we can (...) |
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El propósito de este ensayo es presentar una interpretación deflacionaria de la línea dividida en República VI-VII. Argumento que una parte importante de las dificultades existentes entre la διάνοια y la νόησις radica en el hecho de que se leen las diferentes secciones de la línea dividida como si fueran compartimientos cerrados. Mi afirmación es que uno de los problemas cruciales y de difícil solución es cómo entender que un alma que opere según la νόησις pueda llevar a cabo sus (...) |
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This article offers a new formulation of the Socratic principle known as the Principle of the Sovereignty of Virtue. It is divided in three sections. In the first section I criticize Vlastos’ formulation of the PSV. In the second section I present the weighing model of practical deliberation, introduce the concepts of reason for action, simple reason, sufficient reason and conclusive reason that were offered by Thomas Scanlon in Being realistic about reasons, and then I adapt these concepts so as (...) |
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It is often claimed that Plato’s definition of knowledge as “true opinion with an account” is in agreement with the contemporary analysis of knowledge as “justified true belief”. Some scholars disagree with the attribution of JTB to Plato. I analyze three influential arguments against the assumption of Plato’s agreement with JTB, and refute them. Then I provide my own argument against the assumption. I argue that the contemporary interpretation of the JTB formula understands “belief” not in the sense of an (...) |
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In this paper I discuss the problem of the meanings of the verb ‘be’ in Plato’s Timaeus. My claim is that, at least in that dialogue, existence emerges as the main and autonomous meaning of the verb ‘be’, contrary to the widespread view first defended in a series of studies by Charles Kahn according to which, in the Greek language and in Plato’s philosophy, the verb ‘be’ basically has a copulative-predicative and, more specifically, a truth-related meaning. I consider and examine (...) |
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A discussão nos livros dos Tópicos giram em torno dos debates dialéticos e seus elementos. Aristóteles discorre sobre os gêneros, as propriedades e os chamados acidentes e suas relações predicativas em categorias. Interessa-nos, sobretudo, compreender o papel desempenhado pela Definição e qual sua relação com os demais instrumentos para a dialética. |
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In Republic V, Plato distinguishes two different cognitive powers, knowledge and belief, which operate differently on different types of object. I argue that in Republic VI Plato modifies this account, and claims that there is a single cognitive power, which under different circumstances behaves either as knowledge or as belief. I show that the circumstances which turn true belief into knowledge are the provision of an individuation account of the object of belief, which reveals the ontological status and the nature (...) |
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