In several manuscripts, written between 1894 and 1897, Twardowski developed a new theory of judgement with two types of judgement: existential and relational judgements. In Zur Lehre he tried to stay within a Brentanian framework, although he introduced the distinction between content and object in the theory of judgement. The introduction of this distinction forced Twardowski to revise further Brentano'stheory.His changes concerned judgements about relations and about non-present objects. The latter are considered special cases of relational judgements. The existential judgements (...) are analysed in a Brentanian way; whereas relational judgements are analysed in a Brentanian way only as far as the act is concerned, but not when it comes to the object: the object of a relational judgement is a relationship. With this notion of relationship Twardowski comes close to introducing a concept of state of affairs for the object of (relational) judgements. (shrink)

This essay describes computational semantic networks for a philosophical audience and surveys several approaches to semantic-network semantics. In particular, propositional semantic networks are discussed; it is argued that only a fully intensional, Meinongian semantics is appropriate for them; and several Meinongian systems are presented.

Noneism a is form of Meinongianism, proposed by Richard Routley and developed and improved by Graham Priest in his widely discussed book Towards Non-Being. Priest's noneism is based upon the double move of building a worlds semantics including impossible worlds, besides possible ones, and admitting a new comprehension principle for objects, differerent from the ones proposed in other kinds of neo-Meinongian theories, such as Parsons' and Zalta's. The new principle has no restrictions on the sets of properties that can deliver (...) objects, but parameterizes the having of properties by objects to worlds. Modality is therefore explicitly built in - so the approach can be conveniently labeled as "modal noneism". In this paper, I put modal noneism to work by testing it against classical issues in modal logic and semantics. It turns out that - perhaps surprisingly - the theory performs well in problems of transworld identity, which are frequently considered to be the difficult ones in the literature; faces a limitation, albeit not a severe one, when one comes to transworld individuation, which is often taken as an easy issue, if not a pseudo-problem; and may stumble upon a real trouble when dealing with what I shall call 'extensionally indiscernible entities' - particular nonexistent objects modal noneism is committed to. (shrink)

In the twentieth century three approaches to modality dominated. One denied its legitimacy. A second made language the source of modality. The third treats possible worlds as the source of truth for modal propositions Meinong’s account of modality is quite different from all of these. Like the last it has an ontological basis, but it eschews worlds in favour of a rich one-world ontology of objects and states of affairs, many of which notoriously fail to exist and some even more (...) notoriously fail to be possible. We lay out the ontological basis of Meinong’s system and show how he accommodates standard modal notions. Two peculiarities of his system are investigated: his preference of possibility over necessity, and his treatment of degrees of possibility, which allows him to subsume probability theory in his account. (shrink)

The contrast between real and fictional characters in our thinking needs further elaboration. In this commentary on Eco’s look at the ontology of the semiotic object, I suggest that human semiotic construction entails constant modulation of the relationship between the states of the real and fictional characters in irreversible time. Literary characters are examples of crystallized fictions which function as semiotic anchors in the fluid construction — by the readers — of their understandings of the world. Literary characters are thus (...) fictions that are real in their functions — while the actual reality of meaningmaking consists of ever new fictions of fluid (transitory) nature. Eco’s ontological look at the contrast of the semiotic object with perceptual objects (Gegenstände) in Alexius Meinong’s theorizing needs to be complemented by the semiotic subject. Cultural mythologies of human societies set the stage for such invention and maintenance of such dynamic unity of fictionally real and realistically fictional characters. (shrink)

Przedmiotem artykułu jest status ontologiczny światów możliwych oraz niemożliwych. Zgodnie z jedną ze współczesnych wersji meinongianizmu, o ile świat aktualny jest przedmiotem istniejącym, o tyle światy czysto możliwe oraz niemożliwe uznawane są za przedmioty nieistniejące. Zwolennicy tego podejścia twierdzą ponadto, że światom nieaktualnym nie przysługuje żaden inny rodzaj istnienia.Celem artykułu jest wskazanie na problematyczne konsekwencje wspomnianego stanowiska oraz zarysowanie poglądu alternatywnego, który oparty jest na pluralizmie ontologicznym, tj. na poglądzie uznającym wielość rodzajów istnienia.

Even though Richard Routley is known as a proponent of so-callednuclear Meinongianism (in his terminology, noneism), the details of hisview in Exploring Meinong’s Jungle and Beyond (1980) have not attractedmuch attention. In this paper, I critically examine two notablebut less known features of Meinongianism in Routley (1980) which particularlyconcern a core claim of nuclear Meinongianism that so-calledCharacterization Principle (CP) is applicable to nuclear properties(in his terminology, characterizing properties) but not to extranuclearproperties (in his terminology, noncharacterizing properties): The firstone is his (...) ‘double determination’ argument for restricting the class ofproperties to which CP is applicable; and the second is his expansionof the class of nuclear properties in terms of the supposition operator s.Firstly, I will show that the double determination argument fails, since,for some extranuclear properties, the argument fails to justify that CPis not applicable to them, and, moreover, the argument unintendedlyshows that CP is not applicable to some nuclear properties. Secondly,based on the idea that the supposition operator, combined with anyproperty f, forms the intensional property of being assumed to havef, I will give a formal treatment of the supposition operator withinthe framework of world semantics. We will see that this interpretationgoes beyond Routley’s original nuclear Meinongianism and assimilateshis view with modal Meinongianism proposed by Priest (2005, 2016). (shrink)