This paper undertakes two projects: Firstly, it offers a new account of the so-called deontological conception of epistemic justification (DCEJ). Secondly, it brings out the basic weaknesses of DCEJ, thus accounted for. It concludes that strong reasons speak against its acceptance. The new account takes it departure from William Alston’s influential work. Section 1 argues that a fair account of DCEJ is only achieved by modifying Alston’s account and brings out the crucial difference between DCEJ and the less radical position (...) of epistemic deontologism. Section 2 starts by setting up two fundamental problems for proponents of DCEJ to solve. It argues further that proponents of DCEJ may not convincingly solve those problems by appeal to a notion of permissible belief. Section 3 investigates, whether an appeal to the notion of blameless belief may help DCEJ overcome its central problems. It argues that, even if an appeal to the notion of blameless belief has advantages over an appeal to the notion of permissible belief, DCEJ cannot convincingly overcome the problems set up for it. Further, it is brought out that DCEJ commits its proponents to a problematic non-standard view regarding the intrinsic value of epistemic justification. Section 4 concludes that DCEJ is not the natural conception of epistemic justification, that Alston takes it to be. However, its problems do not leave a scratch on epistemic deontologism, properly conceived. (shrink)

In this paper I shall presuppose that: logic and epistemology are disciplines which supply us with normative statements pertaining to states of belief. as such, logic and epistemology have implications concerning what we ought and ought not to believe. as such, logic and epistemology presuppose that there is some sense in which a person controls what he believes — some sense in which ‘can’ has a place in contexts where one comes to believe things.

In this paper, I explore the relationship between epistemic rationality and instrumental rationality, and I attempt to delineate their respective roles in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. My primary concern is with the instrumentalist conception of epistemic rationality: the view that epistemic rationality is simply a species of instrumental rationality, viz. instrumental rationality in the service of one's cognitive or epistemic goals. After sketching the relevance of the instrumentalist conception to debates over naturalism and 'the ethics of belief', I argue (...) that, despite enjoying considerable popularity among both epistemologists and philosophers of science, it is ultimately indefensible. Having thus argued for the distinctness of epistemic and instrumental rationality, I attempt to clarify the role played by each in typical instances of theoretical reasoning. I suggest that being theoretically rational--that is, being proficient with respect to theoretical reasoning--is best construed as a hybrid virtue, inasmuch as it involves manifesting sensitivity to two very different kinds of reasons. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore the question of whether the expected consequences of holding a belief can affect the rationality of doing so. Special attention is given to various ways in which one might attempt to exert some measure of control over what one believes and the normative status of the beliefs that result from the successful execution of such projects. I argue that the lessons which emerge from thinking about the case ofbelief have important implications for the way we (...) should think about the rationality of a number of other propositional attitudes,such as regret, desire, and fear. Finally,I suggest that a lack of clarity with respect to the relevant issues has given rise to a number of rather serious philosophical mistakes. (shrink)

الأهداف: هدفت هذه الملقالة إلى رصد العلاقة الجدلية القائمة بين الملعرفةا لعلمية والتكنولوجيا، من خلال محاولة الكشف عن الارتباط بينهما والوقوف عند أوجه التداخل والتأثير، وإبراز حدود هذه العالقة وخصائصها وأبعادها العلميةوالاجتماعية . المهجية: تبنت الدراسة مقاربة تحليلية ذات طابع سوسيو­ أنثربولوجي. من أجل ذلك جرى الوقوف عند مفهوم الملعرفة، ولملعرفة العلمية، كما جرى استدعاء مجموعةمن المواقف النظرية في تخصصات مختلفة لتبيان أثر الملعرفة العلمية في التطور التكنولوجي عبر العصور. النتائج: توصلت الدراسة إلى عدة نتائج أهمها: أن البحث العلمي ساهم (...) على نحو كبير في بناء التقنية على نحو عام، وبالمقابل فإن هذه التكنولوجيا هي انعكاس واضح المعالم لكل إنتاجات وتصورات العلم والملعرفة العلمية. الخلاصة: خلصت الدراسة إلى التشاوج الذي يلي كلا من الملعرفة والتقنية؛ فكما أن العلم يتدخل لإيجاد حلول لبعض المشاكل التي قد تنتج عن الاستعمال المفرط أو غير السليم للتكنولوجيا، لذلك يعد تدخل البحث العلمي في علاقته بالجوانب التقنية، وخاصة المصنعة، أمرا بالغ الأهمية، من أجل توجيه وتصحيح مسار الإنتاجات التكنولوجية لتكون مصدر راحة وسعادة للإلنسان، فإن التقنية بدورها أسهمت على نحو كبير في تقدم البحث العلمي وعملت على تحقيق سبل راحة وسعادة هذا الأخير. (shrink)

Epistemic nihilism for inquiry is the claim that there are no epistemic norms of inquiry. Epistemic nihilism was once the received stance towards inquiry, and I argue that it should be taken seriously again. My argument is that the same considerations which led us away from epistemic nihilism in the case of belief not only cannot refute epistemic nihilism for inquiry, but in fact may well support it. These include the argument from non-existence that there are no non-epistemic reasons for (...) belief; the linguistic argument that epistemic norms of belief are needed to capture the semantics of ordinary epistemic talk; and the argument from theoretical roles that epistemic norms are needed to play key theoretical roles for rational belief. I conclude by sketching an alternative Gibbardian picture on which norms of inquiry are all-things-considered norms governing action. (shrink)

Why does knowledge matter? Two answers have been influential in the recent literature. One is that it has value: knowledge is one of the goods. Another is that it plays a significant normative role: knowledge is the norm of action, belief, assertion, or the like. This paper discusses whether one can derive one of the claims from the other. That is, whether assuming the idea that knowledge has value — and some defensible general hypotheses about norms and values —, we (...) could derive the claim that it plays the alleged normative role. Or whether, assuming that knowledge does play that role — and some defensible general hypotheses —, we could derive the claim that it has value. It argues that the route from Value to Norms is unsuccessful. The main problem here is that the idea that knowledge has value does not seem enough to derive the idea that one should act on what one knows. It finds the route from Norms to Value more promising, though a complete path is missing. The main idea here is that knowledge is good because it is normatively required to do good things, such as believing the truth and acting in view of true propositions. But since not all normative conditions for doing something good is itself good, we still lack an explanation of why knowledge would be so. The paper finally suggests an alternative perspective, on which we do not try to derive the idea that knowledge has value from its normative role, but rather use its normative role to explain away the idea that it has value. (shrink)

The “ ethics of belief” refers to a cluster of questions at the intersection of epistemology, philosophy of mind, psychology, and ethics. The central question in the debate is whether there are norms of some sort governing our habits of belief formation, belief maintenance, and belief relinquishment. Is it ever or always morally wrong to hold a belief on insufficient evidence? Is it ever or always morally right to believe on the basis of sufficient evidence, or to withhold belief in (...) the perceived absence of it? Is it ever or always obligatory to seek out all available epistemic evidence for a belief? Are there some ways of obtaining evidence that are themselves immoral or imprudent? -/-. (shrink)

There are many important connections between epistemic justification and moral justification. A recent example of such connections is offered by Sosa’s AAA model for the normative evaluation of epistemic performances. In order to count as knowledge, a belief has to be Accurate in attaining the truth, the subject has to be Adroit or competent for such task, and the belief has to be Apt in the sense that the accuracy of the belief has to manifest the adroitness of the subject. (...) In addition, full knowledge would require full-aptness, which is obtained when the aim of aptness is achieved in an apt way. We have here a clear definition of the model. But the application of the model to particular performances is not so clear. Both the identification of a particular performance as a case of epistemic performance and the assessment of its aptness, or full-aptness, are strongly relative to intentional descriptions paying attention to contextual factors and personal aspects. Here is where we can find close proximity with ethics. An epistemic analog to the ethical problem of double effects appears. In our paper, we analyze that problem in detail, extracting some consequences. (shrink)

Knowledge is important for us, human beings, for a variety of reasons, starting with trivial but necessary reasons to live your life. Western man also has a collective project that is constitutive of its culture: science; and the aim of science is to gather knowledge about the world in its broadest meaning: from the origin of a particular disease to the origin of man, life, planet Earth and the universe, from why the orbits move as they do to why a (...) mass of people behaves differently from individuals, from why the sky is blue to why the sea is salty, from why the climate seems to change to why rainbows appear, etc. etc. The quest to understand what knowledge is, is as old as philosophy itself, and the philosophy o. (shrink)

Situations where it is not obvious which of two incompatible actions we ought to perform are commonplace. As has frequently been noted in the contemporary literature, a similar issue seems to arise in the field of beliefs. Cases of doxastic divergence are cases in which the subject seems subject to two divergent oughts to believe: an epistemic and a practical ought to believe. This article supports the moderate pragmatist view according to which subjects ought, all things considered, to hold the (...) practically right belief in, at least, some cases of doxastic divergence. Unlike many defences of pragmatism, this paper does not aim to overcome exclusivism (briefly, the view that only epistemic, but not practical, considerations have an influence on what a subject ought to believe). Another major challenge that pragmatism faces is to show that the epistemic and the practical ought to believe are comparable. This article makes a case for their comparability. (shrink)

This article offers an introduction to the recent debate on the nature of epistemic normativity and its relationship to ethical normativity in analytic epistemology. The revival of that traditional epistemological theme has been mostly welcomed as refreshing in epistemological circles. The aims of the article are to acquaint readers with the questions and terminology of the debate, to indicate the basic positions in the debate and their respective problems, and to suggest some new clarifications for the relevant terms in the (...) debate which are perceived as lacking. Without taking any specific position in the debate, this article hopes to show that the question of ethical elements in epistemic normativity is indeed relevant for epistemology and that it opens that discipline for the more traditional topic of the role of the subject’s responsibility in his or her intellectual life. (shrink)