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  1. Moral Responsibility and the Problem of Induced Pro-Attitudes.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1996 - Dialogue 35 (4):703-720.
    The problem of induced pro-attitudes is simply this: why is action which ultimately issues from pro-attitudes such as desires, volitions, and goals, induced by techniques such as direct manipulation of the brain, hypnosis, or “value engineering,” frequently regarded as action for which its agent cannot be held morally responsible? The problem is of interest for several reasons. Ferdinand Schoeman, for instance, believes that the problem poses a resolvable but challenging predicament for compatibilists: if agents can be held morally responsible for (...)
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  • Learning to Act.Jan Bransen - 2016 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 3 (1):11-35.
    In this paper I argue that to understand minded agency – the capacity we typically find instantiated in instances of human behaviour that could sensibly be questioned by asking “What did you do?” – one needs to understand childhood, i.e. the trajectory of learning to act. I discuss two different types of trajectory, both of which seem to take place during childhood and both of which might be considered crucial to learning to act: a growth of bodily control (GBC) and (...)
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  • Responsibility, manipulation and ownership: Reflections on the Fischer/Ravizza program.Neal Judisch - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):115-130.
    John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza have constructed a theory of moral responsibility according to which agents are responsible only if they take responsibility in a particular way. Crucial to taking responsibility is coming to adopt a certain set of beliefs about oneself, such as the belief that one is a legitimate target of attitudes like gratitude and resentment, praise and blame. Moreover, agents must come to adopt this belief in a way that is ‘appropriately based’ upon their evidence, if (...)
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  • Responsibility Regarding the Unthinkable.Michael J. Zimmerman - 1995 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 20 (1):204-223.
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  • Moral responsibility and history revisited.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (5):463 - 475.
    Compatibilists about determinism and moral responsibility disagree with one another about the bearing of agents’ histories on whether or not they are morally responsible for some of their actions. Some stories about manipulated agents prompt such disagreements. In this article, I call attention to some of the main features of my own “history-sensitive” compatibilist proposal about moral responsibility, and I argue that arguments advanced by Michael McKenna and Manuel Vargas leave that proposal unscathed.
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  • On the importance of history for responsible agency.Manuel Vargas - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):351-382.
    In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...)
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  • Initial Design, Manipulation, and Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer - 2021 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 15 (2):255-270.
    This is a critical notice of Alfred Mele’s, Manipulated Agents: A Window to Moral Responsibility. I agree with Mele that moral responsibility is a historical phenomenon, but give some considerations in favor of a positive, rather than negative, historical condition for moral responsibility. I focus on Mele’s Zygote Argument, which is intended to present a challenge for compatibilism. I contend that the challenge can be met, and I offer an error theory of the appeal of the Zygote Argument.
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  • Responsibility and manipulation.John Martin Fischer - 2004 - The Journal of Ethics 8 (2):145-177.
    I address various critiques of the approach to moral responsibility sketched in previous work by Ravizza and Fischer. I especially focus on the key issues pertaining to manipulation.
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  • Anomalous monism.Steven Yalowitz - 2005 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Autonomy beyond Voluntarism: In Defense of Hierarchy.Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2000 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):225-256.
    We have conflicting pre-philosophical intuitions about what it means ‘to be true to ourselves.’ On the one hand, autonomy and authenticity seem closely connected to the lucidity of reflectiveness; on the other, they seem tightly interwoven with the immediacy of unreflectiveness. As opposed to a ‘Platonic’ intuition about the inferiority of the unexamined life, we have an equally strong ‘Nietzschean’ intuition about the corrosiveness of the examined life. Broadly speaking, the first intuition is more akin to the tradition of the (...)
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  • (1 other version)Libertarian free will and CNC manipulation.Ishtiyaque Haji & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2001 - Dialectica 55 (3):221-238.
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  • Thinking: The Life of the Mind I. London: Martin Secker and Warburg Limited. Aune, Bruce (1967)“Hypotheticals and 'Can': Another Look,” Analysis, 27 (June), pp. 191–195. Repr. in Gary Watson (ed.)(1982), pp. 36–41. Austin, John L.(1956)“Ifs and Cans,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 42, pp. [REVIEW]Jan Bransen & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 1978 - Philosophy 28 (1):1-18.
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  • Blameworthiness, character, and cultural norms.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1996 - Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (3):116-135.
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  • Indeterminism, explanation, and luck.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2000 - The Journal of Ethics 4 (3):211-235.
    I first adumbrate pertinent aspectsof Robert Kane''s libertarian theory of free choice oraction and an objection of luck that has been levelledagainst the theory. I then consider Kane''s recentresponses to this objection. To meet these responses,I argue that the view that undetermined choices (ofthe sort implied by Kane''s theory) are a matter ofluck is associated with a view about actionexplanation, to wit: when Jones does A and hisdoing of A is undetermined, and when hiscounterpart, Jones*, in the nearest possibleworld in (...)
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  • Reasons-responsiveness and ownership-of-agency: Fischer and Ravizza's historicist theory of responsibility. [REVIEW]David Zimmerman - 2002 - The Journal of Ethics 6 (3):199-234.
    No one has done more than John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza to advance our understanding of the important dispute in the theory of responsibility between structuralists and historicists. This makes it all the more important to take the measure of Responsibility and Control, their most recent contribution to the historicist side of the discussion. In this paper I examine some novel features of their most recent version of responsiblity-historicism, especially their new notions of "moderate reasons-responsiveness" and "ownership-of-agency." Fischer and (...)
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  • Authentic Springs of Action and Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):239 - 261.
    What is the connection between action that is caused by inauthentic antecedent springs of action, such as surreptitiously engineered-in desires and beliefs, and moral obligation? If, for example, an agent performs an action that derives from such antecedent springs can it be that the agent is not obligated to perform this action owing to the inauthenticity of its causal antecedents? I defend an affirmative response, assuming that we morally ought to bring about the states of affairs that occur in the (...)
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  • Alfred R. Mele, Autonomous Agents: From Self-Control to Autonomy (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), viii + 271 pp. [REVIEW]John Martin Fischer - 1999 - Noûs 33 (1):133-143.
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  • Incompatibilism’s Threat to Worldly Value: Source Incompatibilism, Desert, and Pleasure.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (3):621-645.
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  • Responsibility and Control. [REVIEW]John J. Davenport - 2000 - Faith and Philosophy 17 (3):384-395.
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