- A critique of Frankfurt-libertarianism.Kevin Timpe - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (2):189-202.details
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Moral Competence, Moral Blame, and Protest.Matthew Talbert - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (1):89-109.details
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Ability, Foreknowledge, and Explanatory Dependence.Philip Swenson - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (4):658-671.details
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Reasons and Impossibility.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):351-384.details
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The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Moral Responsibility.Helen Steward - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):241-271.details
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Fairness, Agency and the Flicker of Freedom.Helen Steward - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):64 - 93.details
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Semi-compatibilism and stalemate.Daniel Speak - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):95-102.details
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Moral responsibility: The difference of Strawson, and the difference it should make.Andrew Sneddon - 2005 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 8 (3):239-264.details
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Abortion, Property, and Liberty.William Simkulet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (4):373-383.details
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Mad, bad, or disagreeing? On moral competence and responsibility.Maureen Sie - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):262 – 281.details
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The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424.details
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Robustness Revised: Frankfurt Cases and the Right Kind of Power to Do Otherwise.Seth Shabo - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (1):89-106.details
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It wasn’t up to Jones: unavoidable actions and intensional contexts in Frankfurt examples.Seth Shabo - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):379-399.details
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Flickers of freedom and modes of action: A reply to Timpe.Seth Shabo - 2007 - Philosophia 35 (1):63-74.details
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Action explanation and the free will debate: How incompatibilist arguments go wrong1.Scott Sehon - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):351-368.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271 - 283.details
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Weak reasons-responsiveness meets its match: in defense of David Widerker’s attack on PAP.Ira M. Schnall - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (2):271-283.details
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Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.details
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Determinism and the Paradox of Predictability.Stefan Rummens & Stefaan E. Cuypers - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (2):233-249.details
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The limits of limited-blockage Frankfurt-style cases.Michael Robinson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (3):429-446.details
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Modified Frankfurt-type counterexamples and flickers of freedom.Michael Robinson - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (2):177-194.details
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Free Will and Contextualism.Steven Rieber - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):223-252.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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Frankfurt examples, derivative responsibility, and the timing objection1.Derk Pereboom - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):298-315.details
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Can’t We All Just be Compatibilists?: A Critical Study of John Martin Fischer’s My Way.John Perry - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (2):157-166.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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Pereboom on the Frankfurt cases.David Palmer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 153 (2):261 - 272.details
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Freedom With a Human Face.Timothy O'Connor - 2005 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29 (1):207-227.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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Explaining Away Incompatibilist Intuitions.Dylan Murray & Eddy Nahmias - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (2):434-467.details
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Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.details
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Moral responsibility and agents' histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161 - 181.details
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Moral responsibility and agents’ histories.Alfred Mele - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):161-181.details
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Free will and moral responsibility: does either require the other?Alfred Mele - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (3):297-309.details
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Agents' abilities.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - Noûs 37 (3):447–470.details
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Reasons reactivity and incompatibilist intuitions.Michael McKenna - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):131-143.details
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Our evolving beliefs about evolved misbelief.Ryan T. McKay & Daniel C. Dennett - 2009 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):541.details
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Manipulation Arguments, Basic Desert, and Moral Responsibility: Assessing Derk Pereboom’s Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Michael McKenna - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):575-589.details
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Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.details
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Collective responsibility and an agent meaning theory.Michael McKenna - 2006 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 30 (1):16–34.details
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XV—Intelligent Capacities.Victoria McGeer - 2018 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 118 (3):347–376.details
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Companions in innocence: defending a new methodological assumption for theorizing about moral responsibility.Kelly McCormick - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):515-533.details
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Compatibilism and personal identity.Benjamin Matheson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (2):317-334.details
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Fatalism, incompatibilism, and the power to do otherwise.Penelope Mackie - 2003 - Noûs 37 (4):672-689.details
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Counterfactuals and the fixity of the past.Penelope Mackie - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):1-19.details
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Frankfurt, responsibility, and reflexivity.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):369-382.details
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Recent work on free will and moral responsibility.Neil Levy & Michael McKenna - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (1):96-133.details
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Vihvelin and Fischer on ‘Pre-decisional’ Intervention.Simon Kittle - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (4):987-997.details
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Moral Responsibility and Foundationalism.Stephen Kershnar - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (2):381-402.details
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