- Narrow Structuralism: Paving a Middle Path Between Cummins and Millikan.Matthew J. Nestor - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):109-123.details
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Has Fodor Really Changed His Mind on Narrow Content?Murat Aydede - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (3-4):422-458.details
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(1 other version)Language of thought hypothesis: State of the art.Murat Aydede - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Review. On the contrary: Critical essays, 1987-1997. PM Churchland, PS Churchland.Alice Drewery - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3):507-511.details
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(1 other version)Troubles with Wittgenstein?Sophie Haroutunian‐Gordon - 1988 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 20 (1):7–11.details
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Retracing our steps: Fodor’s new old way with concept acquisition. [REVIEW]John Sarnecki - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (40):41-73.details
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Neural constraints in cognitive science.Keith Butler - 1994 - Minds and Machines 4 (2):129-62.details
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The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology.Richard Montgomery - 1990 - Synthese 85 (November):279-314.details
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Functionalism, mental causation, and the problem of metaphysically necessary effects.Robert D. Rupert - 2006 - Noûs 40 (2):256-83.details
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Does epistemological holism lead to meaning holism?Cesare Cozzo - 2002 - Topoi 21 (1-2):25-45.details
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Narrow content: Fodor's folly.Fred Adams, David Drebushenko, Gary Fuller & Robert Stecker - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):213-29.details
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Putnam, Searle, and externalism.Amir Horowitz - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 81 (1):27-69.details
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Belief attribution in science: Folk psychology under theoretical stress.J. D. Trout - 1991 - Synthese 87 (June):379-400.details
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(1 other version)The language of thought hypothesis.Murat Aydede - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Implicit bias, ideological bias, and epistemic risks in philosophy.Uwe Peters - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (3):393-419.details
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(1 other version)Personal and sub‐personal; A difference without a distinction.José Luis Bermúdez - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (1):63-82.details
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Functional role and intentionality.Amir Horowitz - 1992 - Theoria 58 (2-3):197-218.details
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An Argument Against Fodorian Inner Sentence Theories of Belief and Desire.Adam Pautz - manuscriptdetails
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(1 other version)Review of Paul M. Churchland and Patricia Smith Churchland: On the Contrary: Critical Essays, 1987-1997. [REVIEW]Paul M. Churchland, Patricia S. Churchland & Alice Drewery - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (3):507-511.details
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The best test theory of extension: First principle(s).Robert D. Rupert - 1999 - Mind and Language 14 (3):321–355.details
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Why cognitive science is not formalized folk psychology.Martin Pickering & Nick Chater - 1995 - Minds and Machines 5 (3):309-337.details
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Computational functionalism.Tom Polger - 2009 - In Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Narrow content, context of thought, and asymmetric dependence.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-42.details
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Acceptance, belief and cognition.A. Max Jarvie - unknowndetails
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Holism about meaning and about evidence: In defence of W. V. Quine. [REVIEW]S. Okasha - 2000 - Erkenntnis 52 (1):39-61.details
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(1 other version)Troubles with Wittgenstein?Sophie Haroutunian‐Gordon - 1988 - Educational Philosophy and Theory 20 (1):7-11.details
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Realism and evidence in the philosophy of mind.Laura Jane Bennett - unknowndetails
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Narrow Content, Context of Thought and Asymmetric Dependency.Paul Bernier - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (3):327-342.details
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