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A phone in a basket looks like a knife in a cup: Role-filler independence in visual processing.Alon Hafri, Michael Bonner, Barbara Landau & Chaz Firestone - 2024 - Open Mind.details
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How to read minds.Tim Bayne - 2012 - In Sarah Richmond, Geraint Rees & Sarah J. L. Edwards (eds.), I know what you're thinking: brain imaging and mental privacy. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 41.details
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Public Charades, or How the Enactivist Can Tell Apart Pretense from Non-pretense.Marco Facchin & Zuzanna Rucińska - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-23.details
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Louise Barrett, beyond the brain: how body and environment shape animal and human minds: Princeton University Press, 2011. 304 pp., ISBN: 9781400838349, $29.95. [REVIEW]Mirko Farina - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (3):415-421.details
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Cognitive Penetration: Inference or Fabrication?Lu Teng - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):547-563.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Computers Are Syntax All the Way Down: Reply to Bozşahin.William J. Rapaport - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):227-237.details
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The Iconic-Symbolic Spectrum.Gabriel Greenberg - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (4):579-627.details
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The Justificatory Power of Memory Experience.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 5.details
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Human presencing: an alternative perspective on human embodiment and its implications for technology.Marie-Theres Fester-Seeger - forthcoming - AI and Society:1-19.details
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The representational theory of mind and common sense psychology.Raquel Krempel - 2021 - Aufklärung 8.details
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Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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The Unity of Wittgenstein's Philosophy: Necessity, Intelligibility, and Normativity.José Medina - 2002 - State University of New York Press.details
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Representational Kinds.Joulia Smortchkova & Michael Murez - 2020 - In Joulia Smortchkova, Krzysztof Dołrega & Tobias Schlicht (eds.), What Are Mental Representations? New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Linguistic Determinism and the Innate Basis of Number.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 2005 - In Peter Carruthers, Stephen Laurence & Stephen P. Stich (eds.), The Innate Mind: Structure and Contents. New York, US: Oxford University Press on Demand.details
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Merleau-Ponty and the transcendental problem of bodily agency.Rasmus Thybo Jensen - 2013 - In Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran (eds.), The Phenomenology of Embodied Subjectivity, Contributions to Phenomenology 71. Springer. pp. 43-61.details
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Connecting Information with Scientific Method: Darwin’s Significance for Epistemology.Matthias Kuhle & Sabine Kuhle - 2010 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 41 (2):333-357.details
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Music, Mind and Programs.Lelio Camilleri - 1986 - Diogenes 34 (133):47-59.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Epistemic Thought Experiments and Intuitions.Manhal Hamdo - 2023 - Springer Verlag.details
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Experiment-Driven Rationalism.Daniele Bruno Garancini - 2024 - Synthese 203 (109):1-27.details
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The uses and abuses of the personal/subpersonal distinction.Zoe Drayson - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):1-18.details
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Clusters: On the structure of lexical concepts.Agustín Vicente - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (1):79-106.details
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Normativity of Meaning: An Inferentialist Argument.Shuhei Shimamura & Tuomo Tiisala - 2023 - Synthese 202 (4):1-21.details
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Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. pp. 192-213.details
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How Can a Symbol System Come into Being?David Lumsden - 2005 - Dialogue 44 (1):87-96.details
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Methodological solipsism considered as a research strategy in cognitive psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):63-73.details
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Methodological solipsism: replies to commentators.J. A. Fodor - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):99-109.details
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Putting together connectionism – again.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):59-74.details
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Nonhuman intentional systems.H. S. Terrace - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):378-379.details
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A better way to deal with selection.B. F. Skinner - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-378.details
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Steps toward an ethological science.Mark S. Seidenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):377-377.details
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Content and consciousness versus the International stance.Alexander Rosenberg - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-376.details
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Intentions and adaptations.H. L. Roitblat - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):375-375.details
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International plovers or just dump brids?Carolyn A. Ristau - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-375.details
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The International stance faces backward.Howard Rachlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):373-373.details
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Dennett's rational animals: And how behavorism overlooked them.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):372-373.details
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Parlez-vous baboon, Bwana Sherlock?E. W. Menzel - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):371-372.details
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Adaptation and satisficing.John Maynard Smith - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):370-371.details
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Intentions as goads.David McFarland - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):369-370.details
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The scope and ingenuity of evolutionary systems.Dan Lloyd - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):368-369.details
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Elementary errors about evolution.Richard C. Lewontin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):367-368.details
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Dennett' “Panglossian paradigm”.Alison Jolly - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-367.details
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The adaptiveness_ of _mentalism?.Nicholas Humphrey - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):366-366.details
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Belief accripton, parsimony, and rationality.John Hell - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-366.details
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Adaptationist theorizing and intentional system theory.Gilbert Harman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):365-365.details
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Thinking about animal thoughts.Donald R. Griffin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):364-364.details
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Denoting and demoting international systems.George Graham - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):363-364.details
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Lloyd Morgan's canon in evolutionary context.Michael T. Ghiselin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):362-363.details
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