- What Else Justification Could Be1.Martin Smith - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):10-31.details
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Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief.Philip A. Ebert & Martin Smith - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.details
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The problem of logical omniscience, the preface paradox, and doxastic commitments.Niels Skovgaard-Olsen - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3):917-939.details
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Foley’s Threshold View of Belief and the Safety Condition on Knowledge.Michael J. Shaffer - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (4):589-594.details
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Rational stability under pragmatic encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.details
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Optimality justifications and the optimality principle: New tools for foundation‐theoretic epistemology.Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Noûs 56 (4):972-999.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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A Note on the Epistemological Value of Pretense Imagination.Tom Schoonen - 2021 - Episteme:1-20.details
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The epistemic virtues of consistency.Sharon Ryan - 1996 - Synthese 109 (2):121-141.details
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What is the aim of models in formal epistemology?Matheus de Lima Rui - 2022 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 26 (1):135-152.details
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What it takes to believe.Daniel Rothschild - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1345-1362.details
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Lockean Beliefs, Dutch Books, and Scoring Systems.Daniel Rothschild - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1979-1995.details
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Introduction: Outright Belief and Degrees of Belief.Martin Smith Philip A. Ebert - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):305-308.details
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Full Belief and Loose Speech.Sarah Moss - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):255-291.details
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What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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II—Peter Milne: What is the Normative Role of Logic?Peter Milne - 2009 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 83 (1):269-298.details
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Goodness, availability, and argument structure.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2021 - Synthese 198:10395-10427.details
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The Decision-Theoretic Lockean Thesis.Dustin Troy Locke - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):28-54.details
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Public Announcements, Public Lies and Recoveries.Kai Li & Jan van Eijck - 2022 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 31 (3):423-450.details
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Propositional Reasoning that Tracks Probabilistic Reasoning.Hanti Lin & Kevin Kelly - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):957-981.details
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An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy.Hannes Leitgeb & Richard Pettigrew - 2010 - Philosophy of Science 77 (2):236-272.details
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Toward a Lockean Unification of Formal and Traditional Epistemology.Matthew Brandon Lee & Paul Silva - 2022 - Episteme 19 (1):111-129.details
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On the Arbitrariness Objection to the Threshold View.Matthew Lee - 2017 - Dialogue 56 (1):143-158.details
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Intellectual Humility: Lessons from the Preface Paradox.Jonathan L. Kvanvig - 2016 - Res Philosophica 93 (3):1-532.details
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Reasoning Without the Conjunction Closure.Alicja Kowalewska - forthcoming - Episteme:1-14.details
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Credence as doxastic tendency.Dominik Kauss - 2020 - Synthese 197 (10):4495-4518.details
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Context-sensitivity and the Preface Paradox for credence.Dominik Kauss - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7303-7320.details
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Believing the improbable.Mark Kaplan - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):117 - 146.details
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Closure, credence and rationality: a problem for non-belief hinge epistemology.Matt Jope - 2019 - Synthese (Suppl 15):1-11.details
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Dependent philosophical majorities and the skeptical argument from disagreement.Rasmus Jaksland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-24.details
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The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth G. Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):1–13.details
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Teaching & Learning Guide for: The Relationship Between Belief and Credence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6):e12670.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Contra counterfactism.Alan Hájek - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):181-210.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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A New Angle on the Knobe Effect: Intentionality Correlates with Blame, not with Praise.Frank Hindriks, Igor Douven & Henrik Singmann - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (2):204-220.details
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Revising Probabilities and Full Beliefs.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1005-1039.details
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Attitudinal strength as distance to withholding.Andrew T. Forcehimes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):963-981.details
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Attitudes Toward Epistemic Risk and the Value of Experiments.Don Fallis - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):215-246.details
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The Logic of Conditional Belief.Benjamin Eva - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):759-779.details
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Resolving Peer Disagreements Through Imprecise Probabilities.Lee Elkin & Gregory Wheeler - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):260-278.details
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No Match Point for the Permissibility Account.Anna-Maria Asunta Eder - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):657-673.details
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The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.details
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The Lottery Paradox and Our Epistemic Goal.Igor Douven - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (2):204-225.details
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The evidential support theory of conditionals.Igor Douven - 2008 - Synthese 164 (1):19-44.details
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Quantum probabilities and the conjunction principle.Igor Douven & Jos Uffink - 2012 - Synthese 184 (1):109-114.details
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Nelkin on the lottery paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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Nelkin on the Lottery Paradox.Igor Douven - 2003 - Philosophical Review 112 (3):395-404.details
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