How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment

Philosophical Quarterly (forthcoming)
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Abstract
Belief-credence dualism is the view that we have both beliefs and credences and neither attitude is reducible to the other. Pragmatic encroachment is the view that stakes alone can affect the epistemic rationality of states like knowledge or justified belief. In this paper, I argue that dualism offers a unique explanation of pragmatic encroachment cases. First, I explain pragmatic encroachment and what motivates it. Then, I explain dualism and outline a particular argument for dualism. Finally, I show how dualism can explain the intuitions that underlie pragmatic encroachment. My basic proposal is that in high stakes cases, it is not that one cannot rationally believe that p; instead, one ought not to rely on one’s belief that p. One should rather rely on one’s credence in p. I conclude that we need not commit ourselves to pragmatic encroachment in order to explain the intuitiveness of the cases that motivate it.
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First archival date: 2018-12-12
Latest version: 3 (2019-02-20)
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References found in this work BETA
Knowledge in an Uncertain World.Fantl, Jeremy & McGrath, Matthew
Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.Kahneman, Daniel; Slovic, Paul & Tversky, Amos (eds.)
Knowing Full Well.Sosa, Ernest

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