- Alternative possibilities, luck, and moral responsibility.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2003 - The Journal of Ethics 7 (3):253-275.details
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A Riddle regarding Omissions.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1992 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 22 (4):485 - 502.details
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At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies: Hornsby's Account of Action.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.details
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The language game of responsible agency and the problem of free will: How can epistemic dualism be reconciled with ontological monism?Jürgen Habermas - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (1):13 – 50.details
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The importance of self‐knowledge for free action.Joseph Gurrola - 2023 - European Journal of Philosophy 31 (4):996-1013.details
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Causing Global Warming.Mattias Gunnemyr - 2019 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (2):399-424.details
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Sublating the free will problematic: powers, agency and causal determination.Ruth Groff - 2019 - Synthese 196 (1):179-200.details
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Traps and gaps in action explanation: Theoretical problems of a psychology of human action.Werner Greve - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (2):435-451.details
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Free will and rational coherency.Patricia Greenspan - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):185-200.details
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The standard argument for blame incompatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):697-726.details
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'Ought' and Ability.P. A. Graham & Peter Graham - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (3):337-382.details
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Dueling Interveners: A Challenge to Frankfurt's Conception of Free Will and Acting Freely.Jason Gray - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):56-61.details
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The principle of alternative possibilities.Phillip Gosselin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (March):91-104.details
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The Principle of Alternate Possibilities.Phillip Gosselin - 1987 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 17 (1):91-104.details
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Is there a freedom requirement for moral responsibility?Phillip D. Gosselin - 1979 - Dialogue 18 (3):289-306.details
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What is the Difference between Weakness of Will and Compulsion?August Gorman - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):37-52.details
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When Monitoring Facilitates Trust.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):557-571.details
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What do we owe to intelligent robots?John-Stewart Gordon - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (1):209-223.details
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Moral Status and Intelligent Robots.John-Stewart Gordon & David J. Gunkel - 2021 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 60 (1):88-117.details
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When Monitoring Facilitates Trust.Emma C. Gordon - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (4):557-571.details
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Demystifying the Deep Self View.August Gorman - 2022 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (4):390-414.details
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What kind of determination is compatible with what kind of freedom? – A reply to Marcelo Fischborn.Gilberto Gomes - 2019 - Filosofia Unisinos 20 (2):113-127.details
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Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.details
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Stumping For Widerker.Stewart Goetz - 1999 - Faith and Philosophy 16 (1):83-89.details
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Stump on Libertarianism and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities.Stewart Goetz - 2001 - Faith and Philosophy 18 (1):93-101.details
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My Way. [REVIEW]Stewart Goetz - 2008 - Faith and Philosophy 25 (2):221-226.details
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More on blameworthiness and alternative possibilities.G. C. Goddu - 2006 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (1):69-75.details
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Are social mechanisms the antonym of laws?Amparo Gómez Rodríguez - 2015 - Epistemologia 38 (1):31-46.details
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The (near) necessity of alternate possibilities for moral responsibility.Richard M. Glatz - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):257-272.details
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Maybe Some Other Time.Martin Glazier - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):197-212.details
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On Mele and Robb’s Indeterministic Frankfurt-Style Case.Carl Ginet & David Palmer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):440-446.details
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Making the Cut: What Could Be Evidence for a ‘Minimal Definition of the Neurorights’?Frederic Gilbert & Ingrid Russo - 2023 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 14 (4):382-384.details
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Ethics of patient activation: exploring its relation to personal responsibility, autonomy and health disparities.Sophia H. Gibert, David DeGrazia & Marion Danis - 2017 - Journal of Medical Ethics 43 (10):670-675.details
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Closed-Loop Deep Brain Stimulation and Its Compatibility With Autonomous Agency.Sophia H. Gibert - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (2):88-90.details
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Who owns what? Some reflections on the foundation of political philosophy.Lloyd P. Gerson - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):81-105.details
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Frankfurt-Style Cases and the Question Begging Charge.Gerald Harrison - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (2):273-282.details
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Quantum no-go theorems and consciousness.Danko D. Georgiev - 2013 - Axiomathes 23 (4):683-695.details
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Free will as a higher‐level phenomenon?Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 9 (3):177-187.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Diverging lay intuitions about concepts related to free will in arbitrary and deliberate decisions.Jake Gavenas, Pamela Hieronymi & Uri Maoz - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 106 (C):103434.details
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How Successful is Naturalism?Georg Gasser (ed.) - 2007 - Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag.details
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Fischer-style Compatibilism.Michael Garnett - 2013 - Analysis 73 (2):387-397.details
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Genetic ties: Are they morally binding?Giuliana Fuscaldo - 2006 - Bioethics 20 (2):64–76.details
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Aquinas and the Epistemic Condition for Moral Responsibility.Peter Furlong - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (1):43-65.details
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Frankfurt cases and overdetermination.Eric Funkhouser - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 341-369.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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Robot sex and consent: Is consent to sex between a robot and a human conceivable, possible, and desirable?Lily Frank & Sven Nyholm - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):305-323.details
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Neo-Frankfurtians and buffer cases: The new challenge to the principle of alternative possibilities.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):189–207.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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