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  1. BIID–Aqua Fortis for Scientific Explanations of Psychic Phenomena?Sabine Müller - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (1):3-4.
    The term body integrity identity disorder (BIID) describes the extremely rare phenomenon of persons who desire the amputation of one or more healthy limbs or who desire a paralysis. Some of these persons mutilate themselves; others ask surgeons for an amputation or for the transection of their spinal cord. Psychologists and physicians explain this phenomenon in quite different ways; but a successful psychotherapeutic or pharmaceutical therapy is not known. Lobbies of persons suffering from BIID explain the desire for amputation in (...)
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  • Audience Effects In Consumption.Metin M. Coşgel - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (1):19.
    Consider how your consumption would change if you were stranded on a deserted island. Isolation would eliminate all social influences on your consumption decisions, even for the same choice set. You might decide not to consume cosmetics, curtains, or neckties, and pay less attention to the style or color of your clothes, car, or furniture. These choices might not matter as much to you anymore, for you would not have to consider the reactions of other individuals to your consumption. Similarly, (...)
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  • Darwinism and determinism.Michael Ruse - 1987 - Zygon 22 (4):419-442.
    Does Darwinism generally, and human sociobiology in particular, lead to an unwarranted (and possibly socially offensive) determinism? I argue that one must separate out different senses of determinism, and that once one has done this, a Darwinian approach to human nature can be seen to shed important light on our intuitions about free will, constraint, and control.
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  • The Many Faces of Autonomy.H. Tristram Engelhardt - 2001 - Health Care Analysis 9 (3):283-297.
    The challenge in maintaining patient autonomy regarding medical decision-making and confidentiality lies not only in control over information transferred to and regarding patients, but in the ambiguity of autonomy itself. post-modernity is characterized by the recognition of not just numerous accounts of autonomy, but by the inability in a principled fashion to select one as canonical. Autonomy is understood as a good, a right-making condition, and an element of human flourishing. In each case, it can have a different content, depending (...)
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  • Is There Value in Identifying Individual Genetic Predispositions to violence?David Wasserman - 2004 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 32 (1):24-33.
    In this article I want to ask what we should do, either collectively or individually, if we could identify by genetic and family profding the 12% of the male population likely to commit almost half the violent crime in our society. What if we could identify some individuals in that 12% not only at birth, but in utero, or before implantation? I will explain the source of these figures later; for now, I will use them only to provide a concrete (...)
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  • Personal Projects as the Foundation for Basic Rights.Loren Lomasky - 1984 - Social Philosophy and Policy 1 (2):35.
    A theory of basic moral rights ought to aim at telling us who the beings are that have rights and of what those rights consist. It may, however, seek to achieve that goal via an indirect route. In this paper I shall attempt a strategy of indirection. The first stage of the argument is a consideration of why moral theory can allow any place at all to rights. Acknowledging rights can be inconvenient. An otherwise desirable outcome is blocked if the (...)
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  • Identification and the Idea of an Alternative of Oneself.Jan Bransen - 1996 - European Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):1-16.
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  • Autonomy and autonomy competencies: a practical and relational approach.Kim Atkins - 2006 - Nursing Philosophy 7 (4):205-215.
    This essay will address a general philosophical concern about autonomy, namely, that a conception of autonomy focused on freedom of the will alone is inadequate, once we consider the effects of oppressive forms of socialization on individuals’ formation of choices. In response to this problem, I will present a brief overview of Diana Meyers’s account of autonomy as relational and practical. On this view, autonomy consists in a set of socially acquired practical competencies in self-discovery, self-definition, self-knowledge, and self-direction. This (...)
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  • Reasons-responsiveness, alternative possibilities, and manipulation arguments against compatibilism: Reflections on John Martin Fischer's my way.Derk Pereboom - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (3):198-212.
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  • Alternative Possibilities and the Failure of the Counterexample Strategy.Michael S. McKenna - 1997 - Journal of Social Philosophy 28 (3):71-85.
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  • Reply to Adler, Cox and Corlett.Michael Levin - 1994 - Journal of Social Philosophy 25 (1):5-19.
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  • Blameworthiness, character, and cultural norms.Ishtiyaque Haji - 1996 - Journal of Social Philosophy 27 (3):116-135.
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  • Relational Individualism and Feminist Therapy.Jennifer Radden - 1996 - Hypatia 11 (3):71 - 96.
    My aim here is to clarify the practice of honoring and validating the relational model of self which plays an important role in feminist therapy. This practice rests on a tangle of psychological claims, moral and political values, and mental health norms which require analysis. Also, severe pathology affects the relative "relationality" of the self. By understanding it we can better understand the senses of autonomy compatible with and even required for a desired relationality.
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  • The Transformations of Persons.Amélie Oksenberg Rorty - 1973 - Philosophy 48 (185):261 - 275.
    In Book IV of The Odyssey , Menelaus tells Telemachus as much as he knows of Odysseus' wanderings. He reports that Odysseus, wanting to learn the end of his travels and needing directions for returning safely home through the dangerous seas, captured Proteus and held fast to him, though Proteus transformed himself into a bearded lion, a snake, a leopard, a bear, running water and finally into a flowering tree. Proteus eventually wearied, and consented to tell Odysseus something of what (...)
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  • On Moral Understanding.David Levy - 2004 - Dissertation, University of London
    I provide an explanation of moral understanding. I begin by describing decisions, es- pecially moral ones. I detail ways in which deviations from an ideal of decision-making occur. I link deviations to characteristic critical judgments, e.g. being cavalier, banal, coura- geous, etc. Moral judgments are among these and carry a particular personal gravity. The question I entertain in following chapters is: how do they carry this gravity? In answering the question, I try “external” accounts of moral understanding. I distin- guish (...)
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  • Substantively Constrained Choice and Deference.Jules Holroyd - 2010 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 7 (2):180-199.
    Substantive accounts of autonomy place value constraints on the objects of autonomous choice. According to such views, not all sober and competent choices can be autonomous: some things simply cannot be autonomously chosen. Such an account is developed and appealed to, by Thomas Hill Jr, in order to explain the intuitively troubling nature of choices for deferential roles. Such choices are not consistent with the value of self-respect, it is claimed. In this paper I argue that Hill's attempt to explain (...)
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  • Whose Argumentative Burden, which Incompatibilist Arguments?—Getting the Dialectic Right.Michael McKenna - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):429-443.
    Kadri Vihvelin has recently argued that between compatibilists and incompatibilists, the incompatibilists have a greater dialectical burden than compatibilists. According to her, both must show that free will is possible, but beyond this the incompatibilists must also show that no deterministic worlds are free will worlds. Thus, according to Vihvelin, so long as it is established that free will is possible, all the compatibilist must do is show that the incompatibilists' arguments are ineffective. I resist Vihvelin's assessment of the dialectical (...)
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  • The Origin of Man Behind the Veil of Ignorance: A Psychobiological Approach.Ferdinand Fellmann - 2010 - Biological Theory 5 (3):240-245.
    The pair-bond model of human origin proposed by Lovejoy in his “Reexamining Human Origins in Light of Ardipithecus ramidus” combines fossil records with the unique sexual behavior of modern humans. This construct, however, seems to lack an emotionally important element. By connecting ovulatory crypsis with frontal copulation and face-to-face contact, the transition to the complexity and subtlety of human emotional life becomes more evident. Reproductive success and emotional representation are considered as two interacting levels in the phylogenetic scale. Thus, the (...)
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  • Free will and the mind–body problem.Bernard Berofsky - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
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  • On the moral value of physical activity: Body and soul in Plato's account of virtue.David Carr - 2010 - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy 4 (1):3 – 15.
    It is arguable that some of the most profound and perennial issues and problems of philosophy concerning the nature of human agency, the role of reason and knowledge in such agency and the moral status and place of responsibility in human action and conduct receive their sharpest definition in Plato's specific discussion in the Republic of the human value of physical activities. From this viewpoint alone, Plato's exploration of this issue might be considered a locus classicus in the philosophy of (...)
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  • Uncompromising source incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (2):349-383.
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  • Responsibility Ascriptions in Technology Development and Engineering: Three Perspectives. [REVIEW]Neelke Doorn - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (1):69-90.
    In the last decades increasing attention is paid to the topic of responsibility in technology development and engineering. The discussion of this topic is often guided by questions related to liability and blameworthiness. Recent discussions in engineering ethics call for a reconsideration of the traditional quest for responsibility. Rather than on alleged wrongdoing and blaming, the focus should shift to more socially responsible engineering, some authors argue. The present paper aims at exploring the different approaches to responsibility in order to (...)
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  • Caring and incapacity.Jeffrey Seidman - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):301 - 322.
    This essay seeks to explain a morally important class of psychological incapacity—the class of what Bernard Williams has called “incapacities of character.” I argue for two main claims: (1) Caring is the underlying psychological disposition that gives rise to incapacities of character. (2) In competent, rational adults, caring is, in part, a cognitive and deliberative disposition. Caring is a mental state which disposes an agent to believe certain considerations to be good reasons for deliberation and action. And caring is a (...)
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  • The fate of the direct argument and the case for incompatibilism.Seth Shabo - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 150 (3):405-424.
    In this paper, I distinguish causal from logical versions of the direct argument for incompatibilism. I argue that, contrary to appearances, causal versions are better equipped to withstand an important recent challenge to the direct-argument strategy. The challenge involves arguing that support for the argument’s pivotal inference principle falls short just when it is needed most, namely when a deterministic series runs through an agent’s unimpaired deliberations. I then argue that, while there are limits to what causal versions can accomplish, (...)
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  • Self-knowledge and rationality.Thomas Spitzley - 2009 - Erkenntnis 71 (1):73 - 88.
    The topic of this article is the dependency or, maybe, the interdependency of rationality and self-knowledge. Here two questions may be distinguished, viz. (1) whether being rational is a necessary condition for a creature to have self-knowledge, and (2) whether having self-knowledge is a necessary condition for a creature to be rational. After a brief explication of what I mean by self-knowledge, I deal with the first question. There I defend the Davidsonian position, according to which rationality is, indeed, a (...)
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  • “Tätigsein und die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the first-person perspective).Lynne Rudder Baker - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen?: Ein Akttheoretischer Zugang. Onto Verlag.
    It is no news that you and I are agents as well as persons. Agency and personhood are surely connected, but it is not obvious just how they are connected. I believe that being a person and being an agent are intimately linked by what I call a ‘first-person perspective’: All persons and all agents have first-person perspectives. Even so, the connection between personhood and agency is not altogether straightforward. There are different kinds of agents, and there are different kinds (...)
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  • First-personal aspects of agency.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (1-2):1-16.
    Abstract: On standard accounts, actions are caused by reasons (Davidson), and reasons are taken to be neural phenomena. Since neural phenomena are wholly understandable from a third-person perspective, standard views have no room for any ineliminable first-personal elements in an account of the causation of action. This article aims to show that first-person perspectives play essential roles in both human and nonhuman agency. Nonhuman agents have rudimentary first-person perspectives, whereas human agents—at least rational agents and moral agents—have robust first-person perspectives. (...)
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  • Living with reason.Ross Poole - 1992 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):199 – 217.
    The aim of this paper is to identify and partially defend a form of practical reason involved in a number of central cases of human action. Against the claims of rational choice theory that reasoning about action is primarily instrumental, it argues for a form of practical reason which allows for the indeterminate, open?ended and creative nature of the most important examples of human action. Rational choice theory not only gives a distorted account of the reasoning involved in these cases; (...)
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  • Autonomy and chronic illness: Not two components but many.Camilla Scanlan & Ian H. Kerridge - 2009 - American Journal of Bioethics 9 (2):40 – 42.
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  • Structures of agency: essays.Michael Bratman - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    This is a collection of published and unpublished essays by distinguished philosopher Michael E. Bratman of Stanford University. They revolve around his influential theory, know as the "planning theory of intention and agency." Bratman's primary concern is with what he calls "strong" forms of human agency--including forms of human agency that are the target of our talk about self-determination, self-government, and autonomy. These essays are unified and cohesive in theme, and will be of interest to philosophers in ethics and metaphysics.
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  • Frankfurt's argument against alternative possibilities: Looking beyond the examples.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):770-793.
    Harry Frankfurt dramatically shaped the debates over freedom and responsibility by arguing that the sort of freedom germane to responsibility does not involve the freedom to do otherwise. His argument turns upon an example meant to disprove the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: A person is morally responsible for what she has done only if she could have done otherwise. Debate over Frankfurt's argument has turned almost exclusively on the success of the example meant to defeat it. But there is more (...)
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  • The myth of source.Bernard Berofsky - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (4):3 - 18.
    If determinism is a threat to freedom, that threat derives solely from its alleged eradication of power. The source incompatibilist mistakenly supposes that special views about the self are required to insure that we are the ultimate source of and in control of our decisions and actions. Source incompatibilism fails whether it takes the form of Robert Kane’s event-causal libertarianism or the various agent-causal varieties defended by Derk Pereboom and Randolph Clarke. It is argued that the sort of control free (...)
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  • Will neuroscientific discoveries about free will and selfhood change our ethical practices?Chris Kaposy - 2008 - Neuroethics 2 (1):51-59.
    Over the past few years, a number of authors in the new field of neuroethics have claimed that there is an ethical challenge presented by the likelihood that the findings of neuroscience will undermine many common assumptions about human agency and selfhood. These authors claim that neuroscience shows that human agents have no free will, and that our sense of being a “self” is an illusory construction of our brains. Furthermore, some commentators predict that our ethical practices of assigning moral (...)
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  • Respecting persons, respecting preferences.Mikhail Valdman - 2007 - Utilitas 19 (1):21-46.
    In this article, I argue that the state has a prima facie obligation to help its citizens satisfy their autonomous preferences. I argue that this obligation is grounded in the state's obligation to respect its citizens as persons, and that part of what is involved in respecting someone as a person is helping her satisfy her autonomous preferences. I argue that that which makes preferences autonomous is also that which makes them, and not their non-autonomous counterparts, worthy of respect. In (...)
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  • A Hard-line Reply to Pereboom’s Four-Case Manipulation Argument.Michael Mckenna - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (1):142-159.
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  • Saying good-bye to the direct argument the right way.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (3):349-383.
    Peter van Inwagen contends that nonresponsibility transfers across deterministic relations. Suppose it does. If the facts of the past and the laws of nature entail every truth about what one does, and no one is even in part morally responsible for the past and the laws, then no one is even in part morally responsible for what one does. This argument, the Direct Argument, has drawn various critics, who have attempted to produce counterexamples to its core inference principle. This article (...)
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  • Absent, full and partial responsibility of the psychopaths.Andrei G. Zavaliy - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (1):87–103.
    The research into the typical behavioral pattern, motivational structure, and the value system of psychopaths can shed light on at least three aspects related to the analysis of the moral agency. First, it can help elucidating the emotive and cognitive conditions necessary for moral performance. Secondly, it can provide empirical evidence supporting the externalist theories of moral motivation. Finally, it can bring into greater focus our intuitive notion of the limits of moral responsibility. In this paper I shall concentrate on (...)
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  • Racial cognition and the ethics of implicit bias.Daniel Kelly & Erica Roedder - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (3):522–540.
    We first describe recent empirical research on racial cognition, particularly work on implicit racial biases that suggests they are widespread, that they can coexist with explicitly avowed anti-racist and tolerant attitudes, and that they influence behavior in a variety of subtle but troubling ways. We then consider a cluster of questions that the existence and character of implicit racial biases raise for moral theory. First, is it morally condemnable to harbor an implicit racial bias? Second, ought each of us to (...)
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  • Solving the most valuable player problem.Stephen Kershnar - 2008 - Journal of Social Philosophy 39 (1):141–159.
    In this essay, I argue for the claim that the MVP is the player who provides the greatest net benefit to his team. I then argued for the following model of a player’s net benefit to her team. (1) A person’s, X’s, net benefit to the team is a function of the difference in team success when X plays and when her actual or likely backup plays. I argued that this model best satisfies our intuitions, measures actual value rather than (...)
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  • What’s Wrong with Motive Manipulation?Eric M. Cave - 2006 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):129-144.
    Consider manipulation in which one agent, avoiding force, threat, or fraud mobilizes some non-concern motive of another so as to induce this other to behave or move differently than she would otherwise have behaved or moved, given her circumstances and her initial ranking of concerns. As an instance, imagine that I get us to miss the opening of a play that I have grudgingly agreed to attend by engaging your sublimated compulsive tendency to check the stove when we are halfway (...)
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  • What rationality adds to animal morality.Bruce N. Waller - 1997 - Biology and Philosophy 12 (3):341-356.
    Philosophical tradition demands rational reflection as a condition for genuine moral acts. But the grounds for that requirement are untenable, and when the requirement is dropped morality comes into clearer view as a naturally developing phenomenon that is not confined to human beings and does not require higher-level rational reflective processes. Rational consideration of rules and duties can enhance and extend moral behavior, but rationality is not necessary for morality and (contrary to the Kantian tradition represented by Thomas Nagel) morality (...)
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  • Suppes predicates for meta-ranking structures.Marcelo Tsuji - 1997 - Synthese 112 (2):281-299.
    In this paper the general notion of Bourbaki structures, interpreted in terms of Suppes predicates, will be used to axiomatize a system of meta-rankings in the sense introduced by A. K. Sen. It will be argued that this axiomatization must take place in a Kantian-ruled world in order to provide a link between meta-rankings and individual actions.Dedicated to Prof. Francisco A. Doria on his 50th birthday.
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  • Moral responsibility and tourette syndrome.Timothy Schroeder - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):106–123.
    Philosophers generally assume that individuals with Tourette syndrome are not responsible for their Tourettic tics, and so not blameworthy for any harm their tics might cause. Yet this assumption is based largely on ignorance of the lived experience of Tourette syndrome. Individuals with Tourette syndrome often experience their tics as freely chosen and reason-responsive. Yet it still seems wrong to treat a Tourettic individual’s tic as on a moral par with others’ actions. In this paper, I examine the options and (...)
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  • The two senses of desire.Wayne A. Davis - 1984 - Philosophical Studies 45 (2):181-195.
    It has often been said that 'desire' is ambiguous. I do not believe the case for this has been made thoroughly enough, however. The claim typically occurs in the course of defending controversial philosophical theses, such as that intention entails desire, where it tends to look ad hoc. There is need, therefore, for a thorough and single-minded exploration of the ambiguity. I believe the results will be more profound than might be suspected.
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  • On Sen's second-order preferences, morals, and decision theory.Friedel Bolle - 1983 - Erkenntnis 20 (2):195 - 205.
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  • The control of actions by agents.Fred Vollmer - 1995 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 25 (2):175–190.
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  • Voluntariness, suffering and euthanasia.Martin Van Hees - 2003 - Philosophical Explorations 6 (1):50 – 64.
    Dutch euthanasia legislation states that an act of euthanasia is only permissible if it is based on a voluntary request made in a situation of unbearable suffering to which there are no alternatives.The central question of this article is whether these criteria can be satisfied simultaneously. In an analysis of several (partly overlapping) definitions of voluntariness it is argued that there are circumstances in which this question should be answered negatively.The possible incompatibility of the criteria reveals a tension between different (...)
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  • Practical reason and ethics above the line.Christopher Tollefsen - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (1):67-87.
    In John McDowell's recent Woodbridge Lectures at Columbia University, he characterizes Wilfrid Sellars's master thought, in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, as drawing a line between two types of characterizations of states that occur in people's mental lives: Above the line are placings in the logical space of reasons, and below it are characterizations that do not do that (McDowell, 1998, p. 433). In this essay, I ask what would be required for ethics to be above the line. More (...)
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  • Faulty judgment, expert opinion, and decision-making capacity.Michel Silberfeld & David Checkland - 1999 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (4):377-393.
    An assessment of decision-making capacity is the accepted procedure for determining when a person is not competent. An inferential gap exists between the criteria for capacity specific abilities and the legal requirements to understand relevant information and appreciate the consequences of a decision. This gap extends to causal influences on a person'scapacity to decide. Using a published case of depression, we illustrate that assessors' uses of diagnostic information is frequently not up to the task of bridging this inferential gap in (...)
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  • Consumer autonomy and sufficiency of gmf labeling.Helena Siipi & Susanne Uusitalo - 2008 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 21 (4):353-369.
    Individuals’ food choices are intimately connected to their self-images and world views. Some dietary choices adopted by consumers pose restrictions on their use of genetically modified food (GMF). It is quite generally agreed that some kind of labeling is necessary for respecting consumers’ autonomy of choice regarding GMF. In this paper, we ask whether the current practice of mandatory labeling of GMF products in the European Union is a sufficient administrative procedure for respecting consumers’ autonomy. Three issues concerning this question (...)
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