Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. The Unity of Perceptual Content.Indrek Reiland - 2023 - Philosophical Quarterly 74 (3):941-961.
    Representationalists hold that perceptual experience is a conscious representational state with content, something which is accurate or inaccurate in certain conditions. The most common version of Representationalism takes perceptual content to be singular in the object-place and otherwise consisting of attribution of properties (Singularism/Attributionism). Schellenberg has recently developed a version on which perceptual content is singular even in the property-place in containing a de re mode of presentation of a property-instance (Particularism). In this paper, I show that Particularism faces a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Naïve realism, imagination and hallucination.Takuya Niikawa - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.
    Naïve realists hold that the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience is in part constituted by environmental objects that the subject is perceiving. Although naïve realism is well-motivated by considering the cognitive and epistemic roles of the phenomenology of veridical perceptual experience, it is considered difficult to explain hallucinatory and imaginative experiences. This paper provides three arguments to address these explanatory problems systematically on behalf of naïve realism. First, I argue that the imagination view of hallucination (IH), which states that hallucinations (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Singular Experiences (With and Without Objects).Angela Mendelovici - 2024 - In Robert French & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Roles of Representations in Visual Perception. Springer.
    Perceptual experiences seem to in some sense have singular contents. For example, a perceptual experience of a dog as fluffy seems to represent some particular dog as being fluffy. There are important phenomenological, intuitive, and semantic considerations for thinking that perceptual experiences represent singular contents, but there are also important phenomenological, epistemic, and metaphysical considerations for thinking that they do not. This paper proposes a two-tier picture of the content of singular perceptual experiences that is based on phenomenal intentionality theories (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Phenomenally-grounded Intentionality for Naïve Realists.Giulia Martina - 2022 - Phenomenology and Mind 22 (22):138.
    In this paper, I outline a disjunctivist proposal for understanding the intentionality of perceptions and hallucinations within a naïve realist framework. For the case of genuine perceptual experience, naïve realists can endorse a version of the view that their intentionality is phenomenally-grounded: perceptual experiences have intentionality in virtue of being relations of conscious acquaintance to aspects of the mind-independent environment. By contrast, hallucinations have intentionality dependently or derivatively, in virtue of their indiscriminability from, or similarity with respect to, perceptual experiences. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.
    When one visually hallucinates, the object of one’s hallucination is not before one’s eyes. On the standard view, that is because the object of hallucination does not exist, and so is not anywhere. Many different defenses of the standard view are on offer; each have problems. This paper defends the view that there is always an object of hallucination—a physical object, sometimes with spatiotemporally scattered parts.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Incompetent perceivers, distinguishable hallucinations, and perceptual phenomenology. Some problems for activity views of perception.Alfonso Anaya - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):88-107.
    There is a recent surge in interest in agential accounts of perception, i.e. accounts where activity plays a central role in accounting for the nature of perceptions. Within this camp, Lisa Miracch...
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perceptual experiences of particularity.Błażej Skrzypulec - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1881-1907.
    Philosophers of perception often claim that usual perceptual experiences not only present particulars but also phenomenally present them as particulars. Nevertheless, despite the initial plausibility of this thesis, it is not clear what exactly it means to say that particularity is phenomenally presented. The paper aims to provide a deeper analysis of the claim that perceptual experiences phenomenally present objects as particulars. In doing so, I distinguish two theses regarding phenomenally presented particularity: Generic Particularity and Specific Particularity. According to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • What should the sensorimotor enactivist say about dreams?Michael Barkasi - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):243-261.
    Dreams provide a compelling problem for sensorimotor enactivists like Alva Noë: they seem to replicate our perceptual experiences without sensorimotor interaction with distal sensory stimuli. Noë has responded by saying that dreams actually fail to replicate perceptual experiences in virtue of their lack of detail and stability. Noë's opponents have replied by pointing out that some dreams are richly detailed and stable, and that instability and a lack of detail in dreams can anyway be explained in terms of the underlying (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Sensible Over-Determination.Umrao Sethi - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (280):588-616.
    I develop a view of perception that does justice to Price's intuition that all sensory experience acquaints us with sensible qualities like colour and shape. Contrary to the received opinion, I argue that we can respect this intuition while insisting that ordinary perception puts us in direct contact with the mind-independent world. In other words, Price's intuition is compatible with naïve realism. Both hallucinations and ordinary perceptions acquaint us with instances of the same kinds of sensible qualities. While the instances (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   20 citations  
  • Naïve realism and phenomenal similarity.Sam Clarke & Alfonso Anaya - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (5):885-902.
    It has been claimed that naïve realism predicts phenomenological similarities where there are none and, thereby, mischaracterises the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. If true, this undercuts a key motivation for the view. Here, we defend naïve realism against this charge, proposing that such arguments fail (three times over). In so doing, we highlight a more general problem with critiques of naïve realism that target the purported phenomenological predictions of the view. The problem is: naïve realism, broadly construed, doesn’t make (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Metaphysics of Sensory Experience.Craig French - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (4):523-528.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Reviving the naïve realist approach to memory.André Sant'Anna & Michael Barkasi - 2022 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 3.
    The viability of a naïve realist theory of memory was a lively debate for philosophers of mind in the first half of the twentieth century. More recently, though, naïve realism has been largely abandoned as a non-starter in the memory literature, with representationalism being the standard view held by philosophers of memory. But rather than being carefully argued, the dismissal of naïve realism is an assumption that sits at the back of much recent theorizing in the philosophy of memory. In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • An assembled message: Matthen on the content of perceptual experience.Max Minden Ribeiro - 2023 - Synthese 202 (2):1-21.
    Mohan Matthen holds that visual perceptual content is divided into descriptive and referential elements. Descriptive content is our awareness of sensory features belonging to objects located in the visual field. Matthen conceives of this in terms of an image. The referential element is a demonstrative form of content, by which we pick out those objects as particulars and assert their physical presence. Matthen terms this ‘the feeling of presence’. Together, they make up the ‘assembled message’ that visual states present to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A new case of the Myth of the Given?Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2022 - Theoria 88 (5):927-942.
    For some years now, an increasing number of philosophers have been holding that what is given in perception are the physical objects of our surroundings. This is the view called, among others names, “the Relational View”. Basically, this view consists in the claim that experience is not representational, it is not a matter of the subject's taking things in the world to be this or that way; rather, it is just a matter of being presented with things, of being in (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perception as a contentful relation.Daniel E. Kalpokas - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (2):740-754.
    European Journal of Philosophy, Volume 30, Issue 2, Page 740-754, June 2022.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The possible worlds theory of visual experience.Edward W. Averill & Joseph Gottlieb - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1781-1810.
    When we watch movies, or are tricked by a trompe-l'oeil painting, we seem to be visually representing possible worlds; often non-actual possible worlds. This suggests that we really can visually represent possible worlds. The suggested claim is refined and developed here into a theory of visual experience that holds that all visual experiences, both veridical and non-veridical, represent possible worlds, many of which are non-actual.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark