This paper presents a systematic study of the prehistory of the traditional subsystems of second-order arithmetic that feature prominently in the reverse mathematics program of Friedman and Simpson. We look in particular at: (i) the long arc from Poincar\'e to Feferman as concerns arithmetic definability and provability, (ii) the interplay between finitism and the formalization of analysis in the lecture notes and publications of Hilbert and Bernays, (iii) the uncertainty as to the constructive status of principles equivalent to Weak K\"onig's (...) Lemma, and (iv) the large-scale intellectual backdrop to arithmetical transfinite recursion in descriptive set theory and its effectivization by Borel, Lusin, Addison, and others. (shrink)

We represent truth sets for a variety of the well known semantic theories of truth as those sets consisting of all sentences for which a player has a winning strategy in an infinite two person game. The classifications of the games considered here are simple, those over the natural model of arithmetic being all within the arithmetical class of $\Sum_{3}^{0}$.

We consider Borel equivalence relations E induced by actions of the infinite symmetric group, or equivalently the isomorphism relation on classes of countable models of bounded Scott rank. We relate the descriptive complexity of the equivalence relation to the nature of its complete invariants. A typical theorem is that E is potentially Π03 iff the invariants are countable sets of reals, it is potentially Π04 iff the invariants are countable sets of countable sets of reals, and so on. The proofs (...) use various techniques, including Vaught transforms, changing topologies, and the Scott analysis of countable models. (shrink)

Because of its capacity to characterize mathematical concepts and structures?a capacity which first-order languages clearly lack?second-order languages recommend themselves as a convenient framework for much of mathematics, including set theory. This paper is about the credentials of second-order logic:the reasons for it to be considered logic, its relations with set theory, and especially the efficacy with which it performs its role of the underlying logic of set theory.

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to (...) be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

We show that each of Δ13-CA0 + Σ13-IND and Π12-CA0 + Π13-TI proves Δ03-Det and that neither Σ31-IND nor Π13-TI can be dropped. We also show that neither Δ13-CA0 + Σ1∞-IND nor Π12-CA0 + Π1∞-TI proves Σ03-Det. Moreover, we prove that none of Δ21-CA0, Σ31-IND and Π21-TI is provable in Δ11-Det0 = ACA0 + Δ11-Det.

This paper is essentially the author's Gödel Lecture at the ASL Logic Colloquium '09 in Sofia extended and supplemented by material from some other papers. After a brief description of traditional reverse mathematics, a computational approach to is presented. There are then discussions of some interactions between reverse mathematics and the major branches of mathematical logic in terms of the techniques they supply as well as theorems for analysis. The emphasis here is on ones that lie outside the usual main (...) systems of reverse mathematics. While retaining the usual base theory and working still within second order arithmetic, theorems are described that range from those far below the usual systems to ones far above. (shrink)

We prove Fraïssé’s conjecture within the system of Π11-comprehension. Furthermore, we prove that Fraïssé’s conjecture follows from the Δ20-bqo-ness of 3 over the system of Arithmetic Transfinite Recursion, and that the Δ20-bqo-ness of 3 is a Π21-statement strictly weaker than Π11-comprehension.

We determine the consistency strength of determinacy for projective games of length ω^2. Our main theorem is that $\Pi _{n + 1}^1$-determinacy for games of length ω^2 implies the existence of a model of set theory with ω + n Woodin cardinals. In a first step, we show that this hypothesis implies that there is a countable set of reals A such that M_n(A), the canonical inner model for n Woodin cardinals constructed over A, satisfies $A = R$ and the (...) Axiom of Determinacy. Then we argue how to obtain a model with ω + n Woodin cardinal from this. We also show how the proof can be adapted to investigate the consistency strength of determinacy for games of length ω^2 with payoff in $R^R\Pi _1^1$ or with σ-projective payoff. (shrink)

We analyze the set-theoretic strength of determinacy for levels of the Borel hierarchy of the form$\Sigma _{1 + \alpha + 3}^0 $, forα<ω1. Well-known results of H. Friedman and D.A. Martin have shown this determinacy to requireα+ 1 iterations of the Power Set Axiom, but we ask what additional ambient set theory is strictly necessary. To this end, we isolate a family of weak reflection principles, Π1-RAPα, whose consistency strength corresponds exactly to the logical strength of${\rm{\Sigma }}_{1 + \alpha + (...) 3}^0 $determinacy, for$\alpha < \omega _1^{CK} $. This yields a characterization of the levels ofLby or at which winning strategies in these games must be constructed. Whenα= 0, we have the following concise result: The leastθso that all winning strategies in${\rm{\Sigma }}_4^0 $games belong toLθ+1is the least so that$L_\theta \models {\rm{``}}{\cal P}\left$exists, and all wellfounded trees are ranked”. (shrink)

We prove a number of results motivated by global questions of uniformity in computabi- lity theory, and universality of countable Borel equivalence relations. Our main technical tool is a game for constructing functions on free products of countable groups. We begin by investigating the notion of uniform universality, first proposed by Montalbán, Reimann and Slaman. This notion is a strengthened form of a countable Borel equivalence relation being universal, which we conjecture is equivalent to the usual notion. With this additional (...) uniformity hypothesis, we can answer many questions concerning how countable groups, probability measures, the subset relation, and increasing unions interact with universality. For many natural classes of countable Borel equivalence relations, we can also classify exactly which are uniformly universal. We also show the existence of refinements of Martin’s ultrafilter on Turing invariant Borel sets to the invariant Borel sets of equivalence relations that are much finer than Turing equivalence. For example, we construct such an ultrafilter for the orbit equivalence relation of the shift action of the free group on countably many generators. These ultrafilters imply a number of structural properties for these equivalence relations. (shrink)

The present paper discusses a proposal which says,roughly and with several qualifications, that thecollection of mathematical truths is identical withthe set of theorems of ZFC. It is argued that thisproposal is not as easily dismissed as outright falseor philosophically incoherent as one might think. Some morals of this are drawn for the concept ofmathematical knowledge.

This article serves to present a large mathematical perspective and historical basis for the Axiom of Replacement as well as to affirm its importance as a central axiom of modern set theory.

From the hypothesis that all Turing closed games are determined we prove: (1) the Continuum Hypothesis and (2) every subset of ℵ1 is constructible from a real.

This essay defends the following two claims: (1) liraitation-of-size reasoning yields enough sets to meet the needs of most mathematicians; (2) set formation and mereological fusion share enough logical features to justify placing both in the genus composition (even when the components of a set are taken to be its members rather than its subsets).

We show, assuming weak large cardinals, that in the context of games of length \ with moves coming from a proper class, clopen determinacy is strictly weaker than open determinacy. The proof amounts to an analysis of a certain level of L that exists under large cardinal assumptions weaker than an inaccessible. Our argument is sufficiently general to give a family of determinacy separation results applying in any setting where the universal class is sufficiently closed; e.g., in third, seventh, or (...) \\)th order arithmetic. We also prove bounds on the strength of Borel determinacy for proper class games. These results answer questions of Gitman and Hamkins. (shrink)

In Baire space N = ω ω we define a sequence of equivalence relations $\langle E_\nu| \nu , each E v being Σ 1 1 with classes in Π 0 1 + ν + 1 and such that (i) E ν does not have perfectly many classes, and (ii) N/E ν is countable iff $\omega^L_\nu . This construction can be extended cofinally in (δ 1 3 ) L . A new proof is given of a theorem of Hausdorff on partitions (...) of R into ω 1 many Π 0 3 sets. (shrink)

Leon Horsten has recently claimed that the class of mathematical truths coincides with the class of theorems of ZFC. I argue that the naturalistic character of Horsten’s proposal undermines his contention that this claim constitutes an analogue of a thesis that Daniel Isaacson has advanced for PA. I argue, moreover, that Horsten’s defence of his claim against an obvious objection makes use of a distinction which is not available to him given his naturalistic approach. I suggest a way out of (...) the objection which is in line with the naturalistic spirit of Horsten’s proposal but which further weakens the analogy with Isaacson’s Thesis. I conclude by evaluating the prospects for providing an analogue of Isaacson’s Thesis for ZFC. (shrink)

The present paper aims at showing that there are times when set theoretical knowledge increases in a non-cumulative way. In other words, what we call ‘set theory’ is not one theory which grows by simple addition of a theorem after the other, but a finite sequence of theories T1, ..., Tn in which Ti+1, for 1 ≤ i < n, supersedes Ti. This thesis has a great philosophical significance because it implies that there is a sense in which mathematical theories, (...) like the theories belonging to the empirical sciences, are fallible and that, consequently, mathematical knowledge has a quasi-empirical nature. The way I have chosen to provide evidence in favour of the correctness of the main thesis of this article consists in arguing that Cantor–Zermelo set theory is a Lakatosian Mathematical Research Programme (MRP). (shrink)

Here, we analyse some recent applications of set theory to topology and argue that set theory is not only the closed domain where mathematics is usually founded, but also a flexible framework where imperfect intuitions can be precisely formalized and technically elaborated before they possibly migrate toward other branches. This apparently new role is mostly reminiscent of the one played by other external fields like theoretical physics, and we think that it could contribute to revitalize the interest in set theory (...) in the future. (shrink)

The interaction between large cardinals, determinacy of two-person perfect information games, and inner model theory has been a singularly powerful driving force in modern set theory during the last three decades. For the outsider the intellectual excitement is often tempered by the somewhat daunting technicalities, and the seeming length of study needed to understand the flow of ideas. The purpose of this article is to try and give a short, albeit rather rough, guide to the broad lines of development.

It is shown that the determinacy of $G_{\delta \sigma }$ games of length $\omega ^2$ is equivalent to the existence of a transitive model of ${\mathsf {KP}} + {\mathsf {AD}} + \Pi _1\textrm {-MI}_{\mathbb {R}}$ containing $\mathbb {R}$. Here, $\Pi _1\textrm {-MI}_{\mathbb {R}}$ is the axiom asserting that every monotone $\Pi _1$ operator on the real numbers has an inductive fixpoint.

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion-theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed iterations of the Turing jump but below ATR $_{0}$. There is a long history of proof-theoretic principles which are THAs. Until the papers reported on in this communication, there was only one mathematical example. Barnes, Goh, and Shore [1] analyze an array of ubiquity theorems in graph theory descended from Halin’s [9] work on rays in graphs. They (...) seem to be typical applications of ACA $_{0}$ but are actually THAs. These results answer Question 30 of Montalbán’s Open Questions in Reverse Mathematics [19] and supply several other natural principles of different and unusual levels of complexity.This work led in [25] to a new neighborhood of the reverse mathematical zoo: almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis. When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own are very weak. Denizens both mathematical and logical are provided. Generalizations of several conservativity classes are defined and these ATHAs as well as many other principles are shown to be conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion-theoretic ways as well. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in [19] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second-order arithmetic. (shrink)

This book brings together philosophers, mathematicians and logicians to penetrate important problems in the philosophy and foundations of mathematics. In philosophy, one has been concerned with the opposition between constructivism and classical mathematics and the different ontological and epistemological views that are reflected in this opposition. The dominant foundational framework for current mathematics is classical logic and set theory with the axiom of choice. This framework is, however, laden with philosophical difficulties. One important alternative foundational programme that is actively pursued (...) today is predicativistic constructivism based on Martin-Löf type theory. Associated philosophical foundations are meaning theories in the tradition of Wittgenstein, Dummett, Prawitz and Martin-Löf. What is the relation between proof-theoretical semantics in the tradition of Gentzen, Prawitz, and Martin-Löf and Wittgensteinian or other accounts of meaning-as-use? What can proof-theoretical analyses tell us about the scope and limits of constructive and predicative mathematics? (shrink)

We show that a theory of autonomous iterated Ramseyness based on second order arithmetic (SOA) is proof-theoretically equivalent to ${\Pi^1_2}$ -comprehension. The property of Ramsey is defined as follows. Let X be a set of real numbers, i.e. a set of infinite sets of natural numbers. We call a set H of natural numbers homogeneous for X if either all infinite subsets of H are in X or all infinite subsets of H are not in X. X has the property (...) of Ramsey if there exists a set which is homogeneous for X. The property of Ramsey is considered in reverse mathematics to compare the strength of subsystems of SOA. To characterize the system of ${\Pi^1_2}$ -comprehension in terms of Ramseyness we introduce a system of autonomous iterated Ramseyness, called R-calculus. We augment the language of SOA with additional set terms (called R-terms) ${R\vec{x}X\phi(\vec{x},X)}$ for each first order formula ${\phi(\vec{x},X)}$ (where φ may contain further R-terms). The R-calculus is a system which comprises comprehension for all first order formulas (which may contain R-terms or other set parameters) and defining axioms for the R-terms which claim that for each ${\vec{x}}$ , we can remove finitely many elements from the set ${R\vec{x}X\phi(\vec{x},X)}$ such that the remaining set is homogeneous for ${\{{X}{\phi(\vec{x},X)\}}}$ . We show that the R-calculus proves the same ${\Pi^1_1}$ -sentences as the system of ${\Pi^1_2}$ -comprehension. (shrink)

We consider a seemingly weaker form of $\Delta ^{1}_{1}$ Turing determinacy.Let $2 \leqslant \rho < \omega _{1}^{\mathsf {CK}}$, $\textrm{Weak-Turing-Det}_{\rho }$ is the statement:Every $\Delta ^{1}_{1}$ set of reals cofinal in the Turing degrees contains two Turing distinct, $\Delta ^{0}_{\rho }$ -equivalent reals.We show in $\mathsf {ZF}^-$ : $\textrm{Weak-Turing-Det}_{\rho }$ implies: for every $\nu < \omega _{1}^{\mathsf {CK}}$ there is a transitive model ${M \models \mathsf {ZF}^{-} + \textrm{``}\aleph _{\nu } \textrm{ exists''.}}$ As a corollary:If every cofinal $\Delta ^{1}_{1}$ set of (...) Turing degrees contains both a degree and its jump, then for every $\nu < \omega_1^{\mathsf{CK}}$, there is atransitive model: $M \models \mathsf{ZF}^{-} + \textrm{``}\aleph_\nu \textrm{ exists''.}$ •With a simple proof, this improves upon a well-known result of Harvey Friedman on the strength of Borel determinacy.•Invoking Tony Martin’s proof of Borel determinacy, $\textrm{Weak-Turing-Det}_{\rho }$ implies $\Delta ^{1}_{1}$ determinacy.•We show further that, assuming $\Delta ^{1}_{1}$ Turing determinacy, or Borel Turing determinacy, as needed:–Every cofinal $\Sigma ^{1}_{1}$ set of Turing degrees contains a “hyp-Turing cone”: ${\{x \in \mathcal {D} \mid d_{0} \leqslant _{T} x \leqslant _{h} d_{0} \}}$.–For a sequence $_{k < \omega }$ of analytic sets of Turing degrees, cofinal in $\mathcal {D}$, $\bigcap _{k} A_{k}$ is cofinal in $\mathcal {D}$. (shrink)

Theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (THAs) occupy an unusual neighborhood in the realms of reverse mathematics and recursion theoretic complexity. They lie above all the fixed (recursive) iterations of the Turing Jump but below ATR $_{0}$ (and so $\Pi _{1}^{1}$ -CA $_{0}$ or the hyperjump). There is a long history of proof theoretic principles which are THAs. Until Barnes, Goh, and Shore [ta] revealed an array of theorems in graph theory living in this neighborhood, there was only one mathematical denizen. In (...) this paper we introduce a new neighborhood of theorems which are almost theorems of hyperarithmetic analysis (ATHAs). When combined with ACA $_{0}$ they are THAs but on their own they are very weak. We generalize several conservativity classes ( $\Pi _{1}^{1}$, r- $\Pi _{2}^{1}$, and Tanaka) and show that all our examples (and many others) are conservative over RCA $_{0}$ in all these senses and weak in other recursion theoretic ways as well. We provide denizens, both mathematical and logical. These results answer a question raised by Hirschfeldt and reported in Montalbán [2011] by providing a long list of pairs of principles one of which is very weak over RCA $_{0}$ but over ACA $_{0}$ is equivalent to the other which may be strong (THA) or very strong going up a standard hierarchy and at the end being stronger than full second order arithmetic. (shrink)

The use of Extended Logics to replace ordinary second order definability in Kleene’s Ramified Analytical Hierarchy is investigated. This mirrors a similar investigation of Kennedy, Magidor and Väänänen [11] where Gödel’s universe L of constructible sets is subjected to similar variance. Enhancing second order definability allows models to be defined which may or may not coincide with the original Kleene hierarchy in domain. Extending the logic with game quantifiers, and assuming strong axioms of infinity, we obtain minimal correct models of (...) analysis. A wide spectrum of models can be so generated from abstract definability notions: one may take an abstract Spector Class and extract an extended logic for it. The resultant structure is then a minimal model of the given kind of definability. (shrink)