This article discusses relations among the multiple levels of analysis present in macro-sociological explanation—i.e., relations of individual, structural, and institutional processes. It also criticizes the doctrinal insistence upon single-level individualistic explanation found in some prominent contemporary sociological theory. For illustrative material the article returns to intellectual uses of Weber's "Protestant Ethic thesis," showing how an artificial version has been employed as a kind of proof text for the alleged scientific necessity of individualist explanation. Our alternative exposition renders the discussion of (...) Protestantism and capitalism in an explicitly multilevel way, distinguishing possible individual-level, social-organizational, and institutional linkages. The causal processes involved are distinct ones, with the more structural and institutional forms neither captured nor attainable by individual-level thinking. We argue more generally that "methodological individualisms" confuse issues of explanation with issues about microfoundations. This persistent intellectual conflation may be rooted in the broader folk models of liberal individualism. (shrink)

The new science of Complexity explains that limited knowledge prevents societies from predicting and controlling their developments. But Complexity further suggests that nature uses the limits of knowledge to evolve, which turns an apparent obstacle into an opportunity to reevaluate governmental institutions. As in nature, the limits of knowledge lead social systems to evolve by individuating, liberating, and empowering their members. Societies individuate and liberate their members to probe environments and exploit opportunities. Societies empower individuals to globalize their findings which (...) requires constitutionally constraining governmental powers. Societies that respect human rights thus gain selective advantage. Showing that what nature is models what societies ought to be, Complexity may finesse the "naturalistic fallacy" of Hume and Moore. (shrink)

Understanding religion requires explaining why supernatural beliefs, devotions, and rituals are both universal and variable across cultures, and why religion is so often associated with both large-scale cooperation and enduring group conflict. Emerging lines of research suggest that these oppositions result from the convergence of three processes. First, the interaction of certain reliably developing cognitive processes, such as our ability to infer the presence of intentional agents, favors—as an evolutionary by-product—the spread of certain kinds of counterintuitive concepts. Second, participation in (...) rituals and devotions involving costly displays exploits various aspects of our evolved psychology to deepen people's commitment to both supernatural agents and religious communities. Third, competition among societies and organizations with different faith-based beliefs and practices has increasingly connected religion with both within-group prosociality and between-group enmity. This connection has strengthened dramatically in recent millennia, as part of the evolution of complex societies, and is important to understanding cooperation and conflict in today's world. (shrink)

Negotiating proves a precarious ability. The development of the arts of compromise and negotiating is not self-evident. Confrontation, flight and direct physical attack prove much more tempting in human history. How did these skills develop? The typical power and dependency network that evolved in western Europe in particular, is a significant factor. Different patterns of emotion management emerged in interaction with changing power balances. These patterns bred the skills of negotiating and compromise.

This article presents an overview of Oswald Spengler's theory of civilization based upon his `first' and `second' philosophies of history. The `late' Spengler left behind his more aesthetic and historicist understanding of civilization, turning to philosophical anthropology. Spengler lost confidence that a new great culture would someday emerge. While Samuel Huntington in The Clash of Civilizations argues that civilizational pluralism is growing and anticipates a non-Western civilization eventually succeeding a West in decline, dialog with Spengler suggests otherwise.

The concept of the axial age, initially proposed by the philosopher Karl Jaspers to refer to a period in the first millennium BCE that saw the rise of major religious and philosophical figures and ideas throughout Eurasia, has gained an established position in a number of fields, including historical sociology, cultural sociology, and the sociology of religion. We explore whether the notion of an “axial age” has historical and intellectual cogency, or whether the authors who use the label of a (...) more free-floating “axiality” to connote varied “breakthroughs” in human experience may have a more compelling case. Throughout, we draw attention to ways in which uses of the axial age concept in contemporary social science vary in these and other respects. In the conclusion, we reflect on the value of the concept and its current uses and their utility in making sense of human experience. (shrink)

Much social theory takes for granted the core conceit of modern culture, that modern actors-individuals, organizations, nation states-are autochthonous and natural entities, no longer really embedded in culture. Accordingly, while there is much abstract metatheory about "actors" and their "agency," there is arguably little theory about the topic. This article offers direct arguments about how the modern (European, now global) cultural system constructs the modern actor as an authorized agent for various interests via an ongoing relocation into society of agency (...) originally located in transcendental authority or in natural forces environing the social system. We see this authorized agentic capability as an essential feature of what modern theory and culture call an "actor," and one that, when analyzed, helps greatly in explaining a number of otherwise anomalous or little analyzed features of modern individuals, organizations, and states. These features include their isomorphism and standardization, their internal decoupling, their extraordinarily complex structuration, and their capacity for prolific collective action. (shrink)

Se adapta al título del libro de Andre Gunder Frank para proponer un esquema de conjunto de la historia americana desde una visión no eurocéntrica y desde la historia mundial. El acento no se coloca en la relación del continente con la Europa mediterránea o atlántica, ni en procesos endógenos, sino en los contactos que mantuvo con las otras civilizaciones del Viejo Mundo: África, la Europa oriental, Rusia, el Medio Oriente, India, China y el Pacífico. Se argumenta que antes de (...) la llegada europea hubo una etapa fuertemente influida por las relaciones con Asia. Éstas continuaron aún en época colonial, en términos comerciales, demográficos y artísticos, junto a una fuerte inmigración e influencia cultural africana. Si bien la independencia supuso una serie de ilusiones sobre el fomento de las relaciones con Asia, el siglo xix fue de creciente influencia europea (demográfica, militar, política, económica, cultural). El esquema propuesto puede servir para entender mejor los procesos por los cuales en nuestros días América, como el resto del mundo, está entrando nuevamente en la órbita asiática. (shrink)

(1993). Social Evolution: Paradigms and problems. World Futures: Vol. 38, Theoretical Achievements and Practical Applications of General Evolutionary Theory, pp. 1-16.

Under the impact of `postcolonial' critique, it is increasingly assumed in radical social theory that traditional disciplines like sociology remain palpably Eurocentric. However, this important challenge is typically advanced at a very general level, often lacking adequate instantiation. In this article some general formulations of the problem of Eurocentrism are connected to the work of three pairs of theorists in historical sociology. Foregrounding recent approaches to the classic `rise of the West' question, these authors are probed for either substantive or (...) `meta-theoretical' expressions of Eurocentrism. Overall I argue that charging sociology with Eurocentrism is problematical, partly due to continuing uncertainty about the status of the concept of ideology in social science. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to explore how, and to what extent, Italian thought – by its focalization on pre-modern theoretical issues and its distance from classical modern topics, such as the philosophy of conscience or the transcendence of language – can offer a different insight on contemporary social theory and critical theory, after the dissolution of the idea of totality as a foundational concept of modernity. In the last decades, a frame named ‘Italian theory’ has started to circulate (...) in international theoretical debates, often with the aim of replacing the exhausted paradigms of poststructuralism, postmodernism and deconstructionism. Indeed, ‘Italian thought’ seems to offer new insights, thinking about the ‘post-totality’ era in a different way. In the article we present a synthetic cartography of Italian thought and we analyse the way in which it can contribute to design new horizons for social theory. (shrink)

Prehistoric archaeology, which in the American academic structure is part of anthropology, has always included and continues to include the study of social aspects of technology, particularly of technological innovation. Despite early calls for their inclusion in the field of science, technology, and society, however, archaeologists and their research have not, by and large, been integrated into this new discipline. This article is a renewed appeal for the use of archaeology in studying issues of technology and society. An example drawn (...) from prehistoric Europe illustrates how archaeology can provide a fresh perspective on social aspects of technological innovation, as well as specific data for cross-cultural comparison. (shrink)

Although the historical process of globalization has promoted the nation-state as a universal cultural form, national ideologies are far from uniform. This article explores how the competing discourses of citizenship and nation-hood evolved in Southeastern Europe throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By comparing the articulation of Serb, Greek and Bulgarian identities, the essay examines how regional historical factors led to the concept of nationhood becoming central to the formation of national identity among the region's Eastern Orthodox Christians. It demonstrates (...) that the subsequent regional national rivalries have been the consequence of the local peoples' route towards modernity, and cannot be attributed to a 'clash of civilizations'. Rather, the history of Southeastern Europe suggests that the production of heterogeneity is inherent in the globalization process. (shrink)