It is known that the set of intermediate propositional logics that can prove their own completeness theorems is exactly those which prove every instance of the principle of testability, ¬ϕ ∨ ¬¬ϕ. Such logics are called reflexive. This paper classifies reflexive intermediate logics in the first-order case: a first-order logic is reflexive if and only if it proves every instance of the principle of double negation shift and the metatheory created from it proves every instance of the principle of testability.

We give a simple proof-theoretic argument showing that Glivenko’s theorem for propositional logic and its version for predicate logic follow as an easy consequence of the deduction theorem, which also proves some Glivenko type theorems relating intermediate predicate logics between intuitionistic and classical logic. We consider two schemata, the double negation shift (DNS) and the one consisting of instances of the principle of excluded middle for sentences (REM). We prove that both schemata combined derive classical logic, while each one of (...) them provides a strictly weaker intermediate logic, and neither of them is derivable from the other. We show that over every intermediate logic there exists a maximal intermediate logic for which Glivenko’s theorem holds. We deduce as well a characterization of DNS, as the weakest (with respect to derivability) scheme that added to REM derives classical logic. (shrink)

This paper investigates various interpretations of HPC (Heyting's predicate calculus) and mainly of HPC0 (Heyting's propositional calculus) in Post systems.§1 recalls some background material concerning HPC including the Kripke and Beth interpretations, and later sections study the various interpretations available.

Predicate extensions of the intermediate logic of the weak excluded middle and of the modal logic S4.2 are introduced and investigated. In particular it is shown that some of them are characterized by subclasses of the class of directed frames with either constant or nested domains.

Along the same line as that in Ono (Ann Pure Appl Logic 161:246–250, 2009), a proof-theoretic approach to Glivenko theorems is developed here for substructural predicate logics relative not only to classical predicate logic but also to arbitrary involutive substructural predicate logics over intuitionistic linear predicate logic without exponentials QFLe. It is shown that there exists the weakest logic over QFLe among substructural predicate logics for which the Glivenko theorem holds. Negative translations of substructural predicate logics are studied by using (...) the same approach. First, a negative translation, called extended Kuroda translation is introduced. Then a translation result of an arbitrary involutive substructural predicate logics over QFLe is shown, and the existence of the weakest logic is proved among such logics for which the extended Kuroda translation works. They are obtained by a slight modification of the proof of the Glivenko theorem. Relations of our extended Kuroda translation with other standard negative translations will be discussed. Lastly, algebraic aspects of these results will be mentioned briefly. In this way, a clear and comprehensive understanding of Glivenko theorems and negative translations will be obtained from a substructural viewpoint. (shrink)

In this article we deal with Glivenko type theorems for intuitionistic modal logics over Prior's MIPC. We examine the problems which appear in proving Glivenko type theorems when passing from the intuitionistic propositional logic Intto MIPC. As a result we obtain two different versions of Glivenko's theorem for logics over MIPC. Since MIPCcan be thought of as a one-variable fragment of the intuitionistic predicate logic Q-Int, one of the versions of Glivenko's theorem for logics over MIPCis closely related to that (...) for intermediate predicate logics obtained by Umezawa [27] and Gabbay [15]. Another one is rather surprising. (shrink)

Some properties of Kripke-sheaf semantics for super-intuitionistic predicate logics are shown. The concept ofp-morphisms between Kripke sheaves is introduced. It is shown that if there exists ap-morphism from a Kripke sheaf 1 into 2 then the logic characterized by 1 is contained in the logic characterized by 2. Examples of Kripke-sheaf complete and finitely axiomatizable super-intuitionistic (and intermediate) predicate logics each of which is Kripke-frame incomplete are given. A correction to the author's previous paper Kripke bundles for intermediate predicate logics (...) and Kripke frames for intuitionistic modal logics (Studia Logica, 49(1990), pp. 289–306 ) is stated. (shrink)

Let denote a first‐order logic in a language that contains infinitely many constant symbols and also containing intuitionistic logic. By, we mean the associated logic axiomatized by the double negation of the universal closure of the axioms of plus. We shall show that if is strongly complete for a class of Kripke models, then is strongly complete for the class of Kripke models that are ultimately in.

The completeness w.r.t. Kripke frames with equality (or, equivalently, w.r.t. Kripke sheaves, [ 8 ] or [4, Sect. 3.6]) is established for three superintuitionistic predicate logics: ( Q - H + D *), ( Q - H + D *&K), ( Q - H + D *& K & J ). Here Q - H is intuitionistic predicate logic, J is the principle of the weak excluded middle, K is Kuroda’s axiom, and D * (cf. [ 12 ]) is a (...) weakened version of the well-known constant domains principle D . Namely, the formula D states that any individual has ancestors in earlier worlds, and D * states that any individual has $${\neg\neg}$$ -ancestors (i.e., ancestors up to $${\neg\neg}$$ -equality) in earlier worlds. In particular, the logic ( Q - H + D *& K & J ) is the Kripke sheaf completion of ( Q - H + E & K & J ), where E is a version of Markov’s principle (cf. [ 12 ]). On the other hand, we show that the logic ( Q - H + D *& J ) is incomplete w.r.t. Kripke sheaves. (shrink)

A method for constructing continua of logics squeezed between some intermediate predicate logics, developed by Suzuki [8], is modified and applied to intervals of the form [L, L+ ¬¬S], where Lis a predicate logic, Sis a closed predicate formula. This solves one of the problems from Suzuki's paper.