In the last decade the systems approach to agricultural research has begun to subsume the older reductionist approaches. However, proponents of the systems approach often accept without critical examination a number of features that were inherited from previously accepted approaches. In particular, supporters of the systems approach frequently ignore the ironies and tragedies that are a part of all human endeavors. They may also fail to consider that all actual systems are temporally and spatially bounded. By incorporating such features into (...) a systems perspective, it becomes possible to consider them as involving the manipulation of things, the reconstruction of institutions, and the reformulation of policies in accordance with democratic goals and objectives as part of a single web of interrelationships. (shrink)

This paper has three aims: first, to redeem some of Freud's most fundamental insights, so courageous and revolutionary that they were not even entirely appealing and intelligible to Freud himself; not understanding their teacher, Freud's disciples systematically distorted or suppressed his boldest speculations. By concentrating on an early Buddhist text of great profundity it is hoped to push our understanding of Freud beyond Freud himself. The exotic nature of this text makes it an especially powerful instrument for cutting through the (...) conservatism and resistance of venerable Freudian doctrine; secondly, to make more accessible a text which will encourage Western thinkers to do some serious thinking in the Buddhist way; and thirdly to examine the relationship between id and ego; it is shown why and how the egological construction (ego/superego) blocks the spontaneity of libidinal fulfillment. The role of representation in time-consciousness is also explored. (shrink)

Romanian pedagogical theory rests on the assumption that any educational content can be taught and learned faster and better by recourse to a battery of teaching methods. In the present study we question that assumption and show that the methods generally recommended have no didactic merits when it comes to teaching philosophy and the human sciences. In order to prove that we commence by rendering manifest the origins, the specificity and the presuppositions of the teaching methods described in the literature. (...) Afterwards we determine the specificity of the objects of study of philosophy and the human sciences in general. On these bases we develop a series of three arguments that show why, given the particularity of both, the recourse to methods for teaching philosophy and the human sciences is inadequate. (shrink)

This paper proposes a teaching alternative that can encourage the ethical reflective sensibility among students of social entrepreneurship. It does so by exploring the possibility of using religious parables as narratives that can be analysed from Ricoeur’s hermeneutics to provoke and encourage ethical discussions in social entrepreneurship courses. To illustrate this argument, the paper makes use of a parable from the New Testament as an example of a religious narrative that can be used to prompt discussions about social entrepreneurs’ ethical (...) dilemmas. The paper adds to the limited works that consider the teaching of ethics within social entrepreneurship education. It also advances studies that seek alternative strategies to teaching ethics in business contexts, making these strategies discernible for discussion within the broader business and management literature. (shrink)

Challenging a long-standing assumption of the separation of ethical from poetic activity, this essay develops the basis for a theory of moral life as inherently and radically creative. A range of contemporary post-Kantian ethicists--including Ricoeur, Nussbaum, Kearney, and Gutiérrez--are employed to make the argument that moral practice requires a fundamental capability for creative transformation, imagination, and social renewal. In addition, this poetic moral capability can finally be understood only from the primordial religious point of view of the mystery of Creation (...) as such. Humanity as an image of its Creator is called to the endless impossible possibility of the re-creation of its own complex, plural, and fallen social world. Such a perspective is opposed to views of moral life as the application of law-like principles or the recovery of past moral histories. Without a better understanding of moral life's radically creative imperative, we miss a vital element of social relations' distinctive humanity. (shrink)

This book critically examines Freud's own detailed arguments for his major explanatory and therapeutic principles, the current neorevisionist versions of psychoanalysis, and the hermeneuticists' reconstruction of Freud's theory and therapy as an alternative to what they claim was a “scientistic” misconstrual of the psychoanalytic enterprise. The clinical case for Freud's cornerstone theory of repression – the claim that psychic conflict plays a causal role in producing neuroses, dreams, and bungled actions – turns out to be ill-founded for two main reasons: (...) Even if clinical data were valid, the method of free association has failed to support the psychoanalytic theory of unconscious motivation; Clinical data tend in any case to be artifacts of the analyst's self-fulfilling expectations, thus losing much of their evidential value. The hypothesis that psychoanalytic treatment is in reality a placebo poses a serious challenge to the assumption that insight is a key causal factor when therapy is successful. This challenge has yet to be met by psychoanalysts. Similar conclusions undermine the neorevisionist versions of psychoanalysis. The most influential hermeneuticists, on the other hand, are shown to have imposed an alien philosophy on psychoanalysis, partly through their reliance on gross misconceptions of the natural sciences. Karl Popper's criticism of the Freudian corpus as empirically untestable has misjudged its evidential weaknesses, which are more subtle. If there exists empirical evidence for the principal psychoanalytic doctrines, it cannot be obtained without well-designed extraclinical studies of a kind that have for the most part yet to be attempted. (shrink)

In this paper I trace Ricoeur’s reflections on ideology and utopia from his Lectures on Ideology and Utopia, first delivered in 1975, to his later writings on selfhood and the just from the 1990s. The thread that I follow begins from the closing lines of Ricoeur’s Lectures, wherein he suggests that “practical wisdom” (or phronesis) may provide an answer to the paradox of ideology. Taking this suggestion as my point of departure, I reread Ricoeur’s earlier solution to this problem back (...) from the vantage point of his later writings, where his conception of phronesis is further developed. Although these later writings are not immediately concerned with ideology, Ricoeur’s idea of “phronetic judgment” can still be understood within the earlier problematic. As I argue, Ricoeur’s concept of phronetic judgment helps to consolidate his earlier solution to the problem of ideology within his later, more systematic reflections on ethics, politics, and practical philosophy. Although Ricoeur’s reflections on ideology and utopia have been subject to considerable scrutiny, commentators typically discuss them within the context of his writings from the same period. The longer view that I adopt here therefore not only sheds light on questions of continuity in Ricoeur’s political thought, but may also stimulate further interest in his contribution to ideology critique and contemporary critical theory more broadly. (shrink)

This paper is a presentation of Russian translation of the article « La Défenestration » by Marc Richir. In this paper we depict the philosophical context in which the article was written and define its place in the totality of Richir’s works. Our main goal is to help the reader to understand the features of Richir’s complex thought and to give explicit definition to the term “defenestration.” The defenestration, understood as a philosophical concept, is a process of reconsideration of major (...) phenomenological presuppositions. Thus, we distinguish three main steps of defenestration basing on Richir’s critique of previous phenomenologists: 1) the abolition of the transcendental ego as a structure external to “the world”; 2) the rejection of the universe of beings as the one and only universe people inhabit ; 3) rethinking the phenomenalisation on the basis of “nothing” as a primary universe and, therefore, overcoming the classical dualism of the sensible and the intelligible. We conclude that by analyzing systems of previous philosophers through the concept of defenestration Richir in this early work determines the direction of his future philosophical research. (shrink)

The first book-length treatment of Paul Ricoeur's conception of philosophy as critical theory.

In the present text I address some problems regarding the hermeneutical project developed by Paul Ricœur. Hence, I attempt to highlight three issues which confine the difficulty in understanding Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutics, and to point out, as an example, that Ricœur’s “hermeneutics of historical consciousness” addresses a non-hermeneutic debate. The indirect thesis of my text is that one always has to consider Ricœur’s hermeneutics as a “work in progress” even when he clearly emphasizes that “the text” must be regarded as (...) the centre of hermeneutics and my main thesis is that one always has to pay particular attention to Ricœur’s non-hermeneutic insights when he addresses a hermeneutic problem. (shrink)

Plotinus developed a metaphorical approach to language that allowed him to offer a transcendent vision of God, a paradox that made clear how ineffably and incontrovertibly unclear God is – as is our relationship with Him. Ricoeur bridged the centuries by working intensively upon Plotinus in the 1950s-70s. He was seeking a philosophy of negation to help him understand the ways in which modern humans define themselves by lack, loss and longing and asked himself: ‘what is not-ness?’ Eventually Ricoeur abandoned (...) his search for a philosophy of negation that would explain the negative turn in modern life, and developed a model of language and of dialectic within which the negative was embedded. By fully integrating negation into various language forms (metaphor, dialectic) he was implementing the conviction that we have to accept that the negative (that which we want to reject) is an integral part of each of us: blame cannot be attributed to others. Through his negation project Ricoeur applied existential thinking to negative theology and gave its structural strangeness a new application. Using Plotinus he ensured that opposing existential concerns can in fact be brought into discussion, when we accept the impossibility of the unity for which we long. I propose that he even created a strange kind of analogue between negative theologies and existentialist problems, adapting the powerful provisionality of Plotinus’ dialectical and metaphorical devices, to help him address modern crises. Laclau believed that these crises can be solved, and Butler and Lorey concur, all three arguing for close attention to language, rhetoric and the people’s potential. In this context we can instructively apply Ricoeur’s adaptation of Plotinus to consider the emerging patterns around the Mediterranean, which we wish to negate and really must act upon: a mounting refugee crisis, the instability created by wars and an increasingly insecure workforce. The first step for a nation to take is to be able to talk about such matters and research on university campuses suggest that this is being inhibited by government regulatory practices. Attempts to reverse this trend render the extraordinary worlds of Plotinus and Ricoeur immensely useful. Using Plotinus he ensured that opposing existential concerns can in fact be brought into discussion, when we accept the impossibility of the unity for which we long. If we contrast this with the non-dialogic, argumentative and polarised discourse of populist political parties across Europe and round Plotinus’ Mediterranean, we can see how potent it could be to re-introduce Ricoeur’s response to Plotinus into modern discourse. (shrink)

The article presents possible applications of Paul Ricoeur’s theory in interpretation of legal texts and legally relevant human action. One should notice that Paul Ricoeur developed a comprehensive interpretation theory of two seemingly distant phenomena: literary texts and human action. When interrelating these issues, it becomes possible, on the basis of Ricoeur’s work, to construct a unified theory of the interpretation of legal texts and of legally relevant human action. What is provided by this theory for jurisprudence is the possibility (...) of formulating a comprehensive theory of application of law, well established in the ontology of the recipient of the legal text. It should be emphasised that the resulting benefits, outlined in the article become particularly noticeable when set against the background of the methodological weaknesses of legal positivism, concerning both the interpretation of law and a syllogistic model of its application. (shrink)

Although Ricoeur and Taylor are often grouped together, their conceptions of language, literature, and practical reason are very different. The first half of this essay focuses on Ricoeur's theory of triple mimesis and narrative, showing how his attempt to synthesize Kant, Husserl, and structuralism results in a formalism that blocks out the ontological, hermeneutical, and historical dimensions of literature and practical reason. The second half of the essay develops Taylor's ontological conception of public imagination and illustrates the dynamics of this (...) conception of language and interpretation by showing how literary works debate with each other over language, subjectivity, and reference. Narrative does not just order; it argues. (shrink)