Exact sciences are described as sciences whose theories are formalized. These are contrasted to inexact sciences, whose theories are not formalized. Formalization is described as a broader category than mathematization, involving any form/content distinction allowing forms, e.g., as represented in theoretical models, to be studied independently of the empirical content of a subject-matter domain. Exactness is a practice depending on the use of theories to control subject-matter domains and to align theoretical with empirical models and not merely a state of (...) a science. Inexact biological sciences tolerate a degree of “mismatch” between theoretical and empirical models and concepts. Three illustrations from biological sciences are discussed in which formalization is achieved by various means: Mendelism, Weismannism, and Darwinism. Frege’s idea of a “conceptual notation” is used to further characterize the notion of a form/content distinction. (shrink)

We develop a conceptual framework that connects biological heredity and organization. We refer to heredity as the cross-generation conservation of functional elements, defined as constraints subject to organizational closure. While hereditary objects are functional constituents of biological systems, any other entity that is stable across generations—and possibly involved in the recurrence of phenotypes—belongs to their environment. The central outcome of the organizational perspective consists in extending the scope of heredity beyond the genetic domain without merging it with the broad category (...) of cross-generation stability. After discussing some implications, we conclude with a reflection on the relationship between stability and variation. 1Introduction2From Extended Heredity to Cross-generation Stability 2.1Extending the scope of heredity: A brief state of the art2.2Rethinking heredity: Conceptual challenges3Biological Heredity in Light of Organization 3.1Biological organization within organisms and beyond3.2Extending organization in time3.3What is biological heredity?4Implications and Objections 4.1Heredity as a specific kind of cross-generation stability4.2Heredity at various levels of description4.3Non-functional and dysfunctional objects5Conclusions: From Conservation to Variation. (shrink)

Elsewhere I have argued that the most significant threat to scientific realism arises from what I call the problem of unconceived alternatives: the repeated failure of past scientists and scientific communities to even conceive of alternatives to extant scientific theories, even when such alternatives were both (1) well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and (2) sufficiently scientifically serious as to be actually embraced in the course of further investigation. In this paper I explore Francis Galton’s development and defense (...) of his “stirp” theory of inheritance and conclude that this particular historical example offers impressive support for the challenge posed by the problem of unconceived alternatives while simultaneously showing how we can make that challenge deeper and sharper. (shrink)

This paper aims to give an impression of how biologists, at the turn of the twentieth century, came to conceptualize and define the hidden entities presumed to govern the process of hereditary transmission. With that, the stage was set for the emergence of genetics as a biological discipline that came to dominate the life sciences of the twentieth century. The annus mirabilis of 1900, with its triple re-appreciation of Gregor Mendel’s work by the botanists Hugo de Vries, Carl Correns, and (...) Erich Tschermak, can be seen as the watershed after which theorizing about heredity and experimentation—selecting pure lines and Mendelian crossing—became tightly connected. As to concepts before this, this paper will analyze Carl von Nägeli’s ‘idioplasm’, Hugo de Vries’s ‘pangenes’, and August Weismann’s ‘germ plasm’. Carl Correns’s Anlagen and Wilhelm Johannsen’s ‘genes’ would replace them in the decade after 1900.Keywords: Idioplasm ; Pangenes ; Germ plasm ; Anlagen ; Gene; Genotype. (shrink)

Galton greeted Darwin's theory of pangenesis with enthusiasm, and tried to test the assumption that the hereditary particles circulate in the blood by transfusion experiments on rabbits. The failure of these experiments led him to reject this assumption, and in the 1870s he developed an alternative theory of heredity, which incorporated those parts of Darwin's theory that did not involve the transportation of hereditary particles throughout the system. He supposed that the fertilized ovum contains a large number of hereditary elements, (...) which he collectively called the "stirp," a few of which are patent, developing into particular cell types, while the rest remain latent; the latent elements can be transmitted to the next generation, while the patent elements, with rare exceptions, cannot since they have developed into cells. The problem with this theory is that it does not explain the similarity between parent and child unless there is a high correlation between latent and patent elements. Galton probably came to realize this problem during his subsequent statistical work on heredity, and he quietly dropped the idea that patent elements are not transmitted in Natural Inheritance (1889). Galton thought that brothers and sisters had identical stirps, and he attributed differences between them to variability in the choice of patent elements from the stirp, that is to say to developmental variability. He attributed the likeness of monozygotic twins to the similarity of their developmental environment. Galton's twin method was to track the life history changes of twins to see whether twins who were similar at birth diverged in dissimilar environments or whether twins who were dissimilar at birth converged in similar environments. It is quite different from the modern twin method of comparing the similarities between monozygotic and dizygotic twins, on the assumption that monozygotic twins are genetically identical whereas dizygotic twins are not. It has been argued that Galton foreshadowed Weismann's theory of the continuity of the germ-plasm, but this is only true in a weak sense. They both believed that the inheritance of acquired characters was either rare or impossible, but Galton did not forestall the essential part of Weismann's theory, that the germ-plasm of the zygote is doubled, with one part being reserved for the formation of the germ-cells. (shrink)

Textbook descriptions of the foundations of Genetics give the impression that besides Mendel’s no other research on heredity took place during the nineteenth century. However, the publication of the Origin of Species in 1859, and the criticism that it received, placed the study of heredity at the centre of biological thought. Consequently, Herbert Spencer, Charles Darwin himself, Francis Galton, William Keith Brooks, Carl von Nägeli, August Weismann, and Hugo de Vries attempted to develop theories of heredity under an evolutionary perspective, (...) and they were all influenced by each other in various ways. Nonetheless, only Nägeli became aware of Mendel’s experimental work; it has also been questioned whether Mendel even had the intention to develop a theory of heredity. In this article, a short presentation of these theories is made, based on the original writings. The major aim of this article is to suggest that Mendel was definitely not the only one studying heredity before 1900, if he even did this, as may be inferred by textbooks. Although his work had a major impact after 1900, it had no impact during the latter half of the nineteenth century when an active community of students of heredity emerged. Thus, textbooks should not only present the work of Mendel, but also provide a wider view of the actual history and a depiction of science as a social process. (shrink)

Physics matters less than we once thought to the making of Mendel. But it matters more than we tend to recognize to the making of Mendelism. This paper charts the variety of ways in which diverse kinds of physics impinged upon the Galtonian tradition which formed Mendelism’s matrix. The work of three Galtonians in particular is considered: Francis Galton himself, W. F. R. Weldon and William Bateson. One aim is to suggest that tracking influence from physics can bring into focus (...) important but now little-remembered flexibilities in the Galtonian tradition. Another is to show by example why generalizations about what happens when ‘physics’ meets ‘biology’ require caution. Even for a single research tradition in Britain in the decades around 1900, these categories were large, containing multitudes. (shrink)

En lo que sigue, se reconstruye el dominio de teorías relativas a la herencia biológica, propuestas durante el periodo 1865-1902. Se trata de un episodio científico de mucha controversia y audaces especulaciones, libres de los constreñimientos de un paradigma establecido. En consecuencia, surgieron propuestas muy diversas, para las cuales no empata bien la categoría metateórica de red. De cualquier manera, los elementos teóricos detectados sí guardan vínculos entre sí, debido a que comparten ciertas estructuras, y esto permite introducir mediante un (...) arreglo reticular la idea de dominio, donde la naturaleza de los vínculos no alude a especializaciones de leyes fundamentales sino a la secuencia en el armado de subestructuras. El trabajo explora esta posibilidad combinando el aparato del programa estructuralista con la técnica ordenadora denominada Análisis Formal de Conceptos : en concreto se aplica dicho procedimiento a una muestra de veinte reconstrucciones, de elementos teóricos relativos a la herencia entre 1865 y 1902. (shrink)

This article presents a reconstruction of the so-called classical, formal or Mendelian genetics, which is intended to be more complete and adequate than existing reconstructions. This reconstruction has been carried out with the instruments, duly modified and extended with respect to the case under consideration, of the structuralist conception of theories. The so-called Mendel’s Laws, as well as linkage genetics and gene mapping are formulated in a precise manner while the global structure of genetics is represented as a theory-net. These (...) results are of methodological, philosophical and didactical relevance. (shrink)

O argumento da inferência da melhor explicação enuncia que dado que uma evidência necessita de explicação e dado que uma hipótese, baseada em conhecimento anterior verdadeiro, ofereceu uma melhor explicação do que suas rivais para, conclui-se que temos boas razões para acreditar que H é verdadeira. Este argumento é apresentado com a finalidade de apresentar razões em favor da confiabilidade da metodologia científica: a melhor teoria teria emergido num contexto competitivo no qual foram eliminadas teorias rivais. Para antirrealistas, porém, este (...) argumento apresenta sérias deficiências. Um dos problemas deste argumento está na premissa, que descreve uma competição entre hipóteses rivais; de acordo com Kyle Stanford, o registro histórico mostra que a competição nem sempre teria ocorrido, já que algumas hipóteses rivais a uma hipótese proposta nem mesmo teriam sido concebidas, e portanto a confiabilidade da ciência não seria, ao menos em alguns casos, um produto de inferências eliminativas; com isso estaríamos diante do “problema das alternativas não concebidas”. Neste artigo pretendemos descrever sumariamente o argumento da inferência da melhor explicação. Em seguida, apresentamos o problema das alternativas não concebidas. Após, mostramos um estudo de caso oferecido por Stanford para uma defesa de sua posição. Por fim, na conclusão, apontamos um pequeno problema na proposta de Stanford. (shrink)