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  1. Disagreement about Taste: Commonality Presuppositions and Coordination.Teresa Marques & Manuel García-Carpintero - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (4):701-723.
    The paper confronts the disagreement argument for relativism about matters of taste, defending a specific form of contextualism. It is first considered whether the disagreement data might manifest an inviariantist attitude speakers pre-reflectively have. Semantic and ontological enlightenment should then make the impressions of disagreement vanish, or at least leave them as lingering ineffectual Müller-Lyer-like illusions; but it is granted to relativists that this does not fully happen. López de Sa’s appeal to presuppositions of commonality and Sundell’s appeal to metalinguistic (...)
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  • Social Ontology.Brian Epstein - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Social ontology is the study of the nature and properties of the social world. It is concerned with analyzing the various entities in the world that arise from social interaction. -/- A prominent topic in social ontology is the analysis of social groups. Do social groups exist at all? If so, what sorts of entities are they, and how are they created? Is a social group distinct from the collection of people who are its members, and if so, how is (...)
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  • A new look at joint attention and common knowledge.Barbora Siposova & Malinda Carpenter - 2019 - Cognition 189 (C):260-274.
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  • On the transformative character of collective intentionality and the uniqueness of the human.Andrea Kern & Henrike Moll - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):315-333.
    Current debates on collective intentionality focus on the cognitive capacities, attitudes, and mental states that enable individuals to take part in joint actions. It is typically assumed that collective intentionality is a capacity which is added to other, pre-existing, capacities of an individual and is exercised in cooperative activities like carrying a table or painting a house together. We call this the additive account because it portrays collective intentionality as a capacity that an individual possesses in addition to her capacity (...)
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  • Introduction: Empathy, Shared Emotions, and Social Identity.Thomas Szanto & Joel Krueger - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):153-162.
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  • The Body Social: An Enactive Approach to the Self.Kyselo Miriam - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:1-16.
    This paper takes a new look at an old question: what is the human self? It offers a proposal for theorizing the self from an enactive perspective as an autonomous system that is constituted through interpersonal relations. It addresses a prevalent issue in the philosophy of cognitive science: the body-social problem. Embodied and social approaches to cognitive identity are in mutual tension. On the one hand, embodied cognitive science risks a new form of methodological individualism, implying a dichotomy not between (...)
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  • Why the extended mind is nothing special but is central.Giulio Ongaro, Doug Hardman & Ivan Deschenaux - 2024 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 23 (4):841-863.
    The extended mind thesis states that the mind is not brain-bound but extends into the physical world. The philosophical debate around the thesis has mostly focused on extension towards epistemic artefacts, treating the phenomenon as a special capacity of the human organism to recruit external physical resources to solve individual tasks. This paper argues that if the mind extends to artefacts in the pursuit of individual tasks, it extends to other humans in the pursuit of collective tasks. Mind extension to (...)
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  • A World Unto Itself: Human Communication as Active Inference.Jared Vasil, Paul B. Badcock, Axel Constant, Karl Friston & Maxwell J. D. Ramstead - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11:480375.
    Recent theoretical work in developmental psychology suggests that humans are predisposed to align their mental states with those of other individuals. One way this manifests is in cooperative communication ; that is, intentional communication aimed at aligning individuals’ mental states with respect to events in their shared environment. This idea has received strong empirical support. The purpose of this paper is to extend this account by proposing an integrative model of the biobehavioral dynamics of cooperative communication. Our formulation is based (...)
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  • Agents' pivotality and reward fairness modulate sense of agency in cooperative joint action.Solène Le Bars, Alexandre Devaux, Tena Nevidal, Valérian Chambon & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2020 - Cognition 195 (C):104117.
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  • Beyond ‘Interaction’: How to Understand Social Effects on Social Cognition.Julius Schönherr & Evan Westra - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (1):27-52.
    In recent years, a number of philosophers and cognitive scientists have advocated for an ‘interactive turn’ in the methodology of social-cognition research: to become more ecologically valid, we must design experiments that are interactive, rather than merely observational. While the practical aim of improving ecological validity in the study of social cognition is laudable, we think that the notion of ‘interaction’ is not suitable for this task: as it is currently deployed in the social cognition literature, this notion leads to (...)
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  • Collective intentionality and socially extended minds.Mattia Gallotti & Bryce Huebner - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (3):247-264.
    There are many ways to advance our understanding of the human mind by studying different kinds of sociality. Our aim in this introduction is to situate claims about extended cognition within a broader framework of research on human sociality. We briefly discuss the existing landscape, focusing on ways of defending socially extended cognition. We then draw on resources from the recent literature on the socially extended mind, as well as the literature on collective intentionality, to provide a framework for thinking (...)
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  • The ‘Meeting of Bodies’: Empathy and Basic Forms of Shared Experiences.Anna Ciaunica - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):185-195.
    In recent years there has been an increasing focus on a crucial aspect of the ‘meeting of minds’ problem :160–165, 2013), namely the ability that human beings have for sharing different types of mental states such as emotions, intentions, and perceptual experiences. In this paper I examine what counts as basic forms of ‘shared experiences’ and focus on a relatively overlooked aspect of human embodiment, namely the fact that we start our journey into our experiential life within the experiencing body (...)
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  • The phenomenology of controlling a moving object with another person.John A. Dewey, Elisabeth Pacherie & Guenther Knoblich - 2014 - Cognition 132 (3):383-397.
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  • There are No Primitive We-Intentions.Alessandro Salice - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):695-715.
    John Searle’s account of collective intentions in action appears to have all the theoretical pros of the non-reductivist view on collective intentionality without the metaphysical cons of committing to the existence of group minds. According to Searle, when we collectively intend to do something together, we intend to cooperate in order to reach a collective goal. Intentions in the first-person plural form therefore have a particular psychological form or mode, for the we-intender conceives of his or her intended actions as (...)
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  • On the relationship of online and offline social cognition.Leonhard Schilbach - 2014 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 8.
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  • (1 other version)Training, Transformation and Education.David Bakhurst - 2015 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 76:301-327.
    In Mind and World, John McDowell concludes that human beings and, principally by their initiation into language. Such of human development typically represent first-language learning as a movement from a non-rationally secured conformity with correct practice, through increasing understanding, to a state of rational mastery of correct practice. Accordingly, they tend to invoke something like Wittgenstein's concept of training to explain the first stage of this process. This essay considers the cogency of this view of learning and development. I agree (...)
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  • Individualism versus interactionism about social understanding.Judith Martens & Tobias Schlicht - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):245-266.
    In the debate about the nature of social cognition we see a shift towards theories that explain social understanding through interaction. This paper discusses autopoietic enactivism and the we-mode approach in the light of such developments. We argue that a problem seems to arise for these theories: an interactionist account of social cognition makes the capacity of shared intentionality a presupposition of social understanding, while the capacity of engaging in scenes of shared intentionality in turn presupposes exactly the kind of (...)
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  • Self-Processing and the Default Mode Network: Interactions with the Mirror Neuron System.Istvan Molnar-Szakacs & Lucina Q. Uddin - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • Minding Theory of Mind.Melanie Yergeau & Bryce Huebner - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (3):273-296.
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  • (Re)conceptualizing the genesis of a “we is greater than me” psychological orientation: Sartre meets Tomasello.Lucia Angelino - 2022 - Journal of Social Ontology 8 (1):68–93.
    Drawing on many areas of expertise, from paleontology to psychology, Tomasello offers a plausible, evolutionary story abouthow our ancestors are likely to have developed cooperative behaviors and collaborative lifeways in order to survive and thrive.He also claims that this narrative explains why they would have begun to think in characteristically cooperative and moral ways,developing a “we is greater than me” [we>me] psychological orientation. Do the arguments offered support this extra claim? Thisarticle suggests that they do not. It seeks to alleviate (...)
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  • (1 other version)Towards a Mechanistically Neutral Account of Acting Jointly: The Notion of a Collective Goal.Stephen A. Butterfill & Corrado Sinigaglia - 2022 - Mind 132 (525):1-29.
    Many of the things we do are, or could be, done with others. Mundane examples favoured by philosophers include painting a house together (Bratman 1992), li.
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  • Embodied collaboration in small groups.Kellie Williamson & John Sutton - 2014 - In Charles T. Wolfe (ed.), Brain theory : essays in critical neurophilosophy. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 107-133.
    Being social creatures in a complex world, we do things together. We act jointly. While cooperation, in its broadest sense, can involve merely getting out of each other’s way, or refusing to deceive other people, it is also essential to human nature that it involves more active forms of collaboration and coordination (Tomasello 2009; Sterelny 2012). We collaborate with others in many ordinary activities which, though at times similar to those of other animals, take unique and diverse cultural and psychological (...)
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  • Introduction: Empathy and Collective Intentionality—The Social Philosophy of Edith Stein.Thomas Szanto & Dermot Moran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):445-461.
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  • Musical friends and foes: The social cognition of affiliation and control in improvised interactions.Jean-Julien Aucouturier & Clément Canonne - 2017 - Cognition 161:94-108.
    A recently emerging view in music cognition holds that music is not only social and participatory in its production, but also in its perception, i.e. that music is in fact perceived as the sonic trace of social rela- tions between a group of real or virtual agents. While this view appears compatible with a number of intriguing music cognitive phenomena, such as the links between beat entrainment and prosocial behaviour or between strong musical emotions and empathy, direct evidence is lacking (...)
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  • Is Collective Agency a Coherent Idea? Considerations from the Enactive Theory of Agency.Mog Stapleton & Tom Froese - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag. pp. 219-236.
    Whether collective agency is a coherent concept depends on the theory of agency that we choose to adopt. We argue that the enactive theory of agency developed by Barandiaran, Di Paolo and Rohde (2009) provides a principled way of grounding agency in biological organisms. However the importance of biological embodiment for the enactive approach might lead one to be skeptical as to whether artificial systems or collectives of individuals could instantiate genuine agency. To explore this issue we contrast the concept (...)
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  • What Can the Organization of the Brain’s Default Mode Network Tell us About Self-Knowledge?Joseph M. Moran, William M. Kelley & Todd F. Heatherton - 2013 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 7.
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  • Lost in the socially extended mind: Genuine intersubjectivity and disturbed self-other demarcation in schizophrenia.Tom Froese & Joel Krueger - 2020 - In Christian Tewes & Giovanni Stanghellini (eds.), Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. pp. 318-340.
    Much of the characteristic symptomatology of schizophrenia can be understood as resulting from a pervasive sense of disembodiment. The body is experienced as an external machine that needs to be controlled with explicit intentional commands, which in turn leads to severe difficulties in interacting with the world in a fluid and intuitive manner. In consequence, there is a characteristic dissociality: Others become problems to be solved by intellectual effort and no longer present opportunities for spontaneous interpersonal alignment. This dissociality goes (...)
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  • What is new with Artificial Intelligence? Human–agent interactions through the lens of social agency.Marine Pagliari, Valérian Chambon & Bruno Berberian - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13.
    In this article, we suggest that the study of social interactions and the development of a “sense of agency” in joint action can help determine the content of relevant explanations to be implemented in artificial systems to make them “explainable.” The introduction of automated systems, and more broadly of Artificial Intelligence, into many domains has profoundly changed the nature of human activity, as well as the subjective experience that agents have of their own actions and their consequences – an experience (...)
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  • The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Brain-to-Brain Coupling in the Gamma-Band as a Marker of Shared Intentionality.Paulo Barraza, Alejandro Pérez & Eugenio Rodríguez - 2020 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 14.
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  • Social cues to joint actions: the role of shared goals.Lucia M. Sacheli, Salvatore M. Aglioti & Matteo Candidi - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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  • A lineage explanation of human normative guidance: the coadaptive model of instrumental rationality and shared intentionality.Ivan Gonzalez-Cabrera - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-32.
    This paper aims to contribute to the existing literature on normative cognition by providing a lineage explanation of human social norm psychology. This approach builds upon theories of goal-directed behavioral control in the reinforcement learning and control literature, arguing that this form of control defines an important class of intentional normative mental states that are instrumental in nature. I defend the view that great ape capacities for instrumental reasoning and our capacity (or family of capacities) for shared intentionality coadapted to (...)
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  • Me and we: Metacognition and performance evaluation of joint actions.Robrecht P. R. D. van der Wel - 2015 - Cognition 140:49-59.
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  • Intuitions about joint commitment.John Michael & Stephen Butterfill - forthcoming - Philosophical Psychology.
    ABSTRACT In what sense is commitment essential to joint action, and do the participants in a joint action themselves perceive commitment as essential? Attempts to answer this question have so far been hampered by clashes of intuition. Perhaps this is because the intuitions in question have mostly been investigated using informal methods only. To explore this possibility, we adopted a more formal approach to testing intuitions about joint action, sampling naïve participants’ intuitions about experimentally controlled scenarios. This approach did reveal (...)
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  • Social task switching: On the automatic social engagement of executive functions.Veronica Dudarev & Ran R. Hassin - 2016 - Cognition 146 (C):223-228.
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  • Embodied Dyadic Interaction Increases Complexity of Neural Dynamics: A Minimal Agent-Based Simulation Model.Madhavun Candadai, Matt Setzler, Eduardo J. Izquierdo & Tom Froese - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • The Sense of Agency in Driving Automation.Wen Wen, Yoshihiro Kuroki & Hajime Asama - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10.
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  • One step forward, two steps back – not the Tango: comment on Gallotti and Frith.Ezequiel A. Di Paolo, Hanne De Jaegher & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7):303-304.
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  • A model-based approach to social ontology.Matti Sarkia - 2022 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 52 (3):175-203.
    This paper argues for theoretical modeling and model-construction as central (but not necessarily the only) types of activities that philosophers of social ontology (in the analytic tradition) engage in. This claim is defended through a detailed case study and revisionary interpretation of Raimo Tuomela’s account of the we-perspective. My interpretation is grounded in Ronald Giere’s account of scientific models, and argued to be compatible with, but less demanding than Tuomela’s own description of his account as a philosophical theory of the (...)
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  • The Role of the Third in the Genesis of a We-perspective.Lucia Angelino - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):185-203.
    According to a recent and prominent view, a ‘we-perspective’ arises out of a dyadic I-you relation involving a special form of reciprocity in which I relate to another as a you – as somebody who is also attending and addressing me. As important as this argument might be, one obvious limitation lies in that it typically applies to dyadic forms of ‘we’ which are bound to the here and now of face-to-face interactions between ‘ad hoc pairs of individuals’. Drawing inspiration (...)
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  • Cognising With Others in the We-Mode: a Defence of ‘First-Person Plural’ Social Cognition.Joe Higgins - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (4):803-824.
    The theory of we-mode cognition seeks to expand our understanding of the cognition involved in joint action, and therein claims to explain how we can have non-theoretical and non-simulative access to the minds of others (Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 160-165, 2013a, Gallotti and Frith Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 17: 304-305, 2013b). A basic tenet of this theory is that each individual jointly intends to accomplish some outcome together, requiring the adoption of a “first-person plural perspective” (Gallotti (...)
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  • We‐Experiences, Common Knowledge, and the Mode Approach to Collective Intentionality.Olle Blomberg - 2018 - Journal of Social Philosophy 49 (1):183-203.
    According to we-mode accounts of collective intentionality, an experience is a "we-experience"—that is, part of a jointly attentional episode—in virtue of the way or mode in which the content of the experience is given to the subject of experience. These accounts are supposed to explain how a we-experience can have the phenomenal character of being given to the subject "as ours" rather than merely "as my experience" (Zahavi 2015), and do so in a relatively conceptually and cognitively undemanding way. Galotti (...)
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  • An Account of Boeschian Cooperative Behaviour.Olle Blomberg - 1st ed. 2015 - In Catrin Misselhorn (ed.), Collective Agency and Cooperation in Natural and Artificial Systems. Springer Verlag.
    Philosophical accounts of joint action are often prefaced by the observation that there are two different senses in which several agents can intentionally perform an action Φ, such as go for a walk or capture the prey. The agents might intentionally Φ together, as a collective, or they might intentionally Φ in parallel, where Φ is distributively assigned to the agents, considered as a set of individuals. The accounts are supposed to characterise what is distinctive about activities in which several (...)
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  • Group-level traits emerge.Paul E. Smaldino - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (3):281-295.
    Most commentators supported the thesis of the target article, though there were also those who were less fully persuaded. I will begin with a response to the most critical commentaries. First, I will justify an evolutionary perspective that includes group organization and nongenetic inheritance. Next, I will discuss the concept of emergence. Following that, I will transition to an exploration of ideas and concerns brought up by some of the more supportive commentators. This will include a discussion of different types (...)
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  • Response to Di Paolo et al.: How, exactly, does it ‘just happen’? Interaction by magic.Mattia Gallotti & Chris D. Frith - 2013 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17 (7):304-305.
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  • Eye gaze as a means of giving and seeking information during musical interaction.Laura Bishop, Carlos Cancino-Chacón & Werner Goebl - 2019 - Consciousness and Cognition 68 (C):73-96.
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  • Mechanistic Explanation, Interdisciplinary Integration and Interpersonal Social Coordination.Matti Sarkia - 2024 - Social Epistemology 38 (2):173-193.
    Prominent research programs dealing with the nature and mechanisms of interpersonal social coordination have emerged in cognitive science, developmental psychology and evolutionary anthropology. I argue that the mechanistic approach to explanation in contemporary philosophy of science can facilitate interdisciplinary integration and division of labor between these different disciplinary research programs. By distinguishing phenomenal models from mechanistic models and structural decomposition from functional decomposition in the process of mechanism discovery, I argue that behavioral and cognitive scientists can make interlocking contributions to (...)
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  • Rational Agency without Self‐Knowledge: Could ‘We’ Replace ‘I’?Luke Roelofs - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):3-33.
    It has been claimed that we need singular self-knowledge to function properly as rational agents. I argue that this is not strictly true: agents in certain relations could dispense with singular self-knowledge and instead rely on plural self-knowledge. In defending the possibility of this kind of ‘selfless agent’, I thereby defend the possibility of a certain kind of ‘seamless’ collective agency; agency in a group of agents who have no singular self-knowledge, who do not know which member of the group (...)
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  • Contractualist tendencies and reasoning in moral judgment and decision making.Arthur Le Pargneux, Nick Chater & Hossam Zeitoun - 2024 - Cognition 249 (C):105838.
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  • Descriptive Phenomenology as an Alternative to Prevent the Theory-Ladenness of Observation in the Study of Animal Behavior: Opening towards an Etho-Phenomenology.Pascal Carlier - forthcoming - Biosemiotics:1-19.
    In ethology, and more generally in the study of animal behavior, observations are _theory-laden_. A review of theories of animal behavior reveals that the animal is a variable _object_, shaped by variable levels of causality. This approach to animal behavior, which differs radically from the way psychology studies human behavior, is a consequence of the difficulty of treating animals as _subjects_ in ethology, where they are most often studied _in the third person_. However, there is a subjectivist tradition in the (...)
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