- How to perform a nonbasic action.Mikayla Kelley - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1).details
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Avoidability and Libertarianism.Charlotte Katzoff - 1996 - Faith and Philosophy 13 (3):415-421.details
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Incompatibilism and ambiguity in the practical modalities.T. Kapitan - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):102-110.details
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Ability and cognition: A defense of compatibilism.Tomis Kapitan - 1991 - Philosophical Studies 63 (August):231-43.details
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Autonomy and manipulated freedom.Tomis Kapitan - 2000 - Philosopical Perspectives 14 (s14):81-104.details
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Determinismus und Verantwortung: Was kann das Konsequenzargument?Christoph Jäger - 2009 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 57 (1):119-131.details
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Weakness and compulsion: the essential difference.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (1):81-97.details
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Physical Determinism, Zygote-Manipulation and Responsible Agency.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (4):1525-1540.details
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Consciousness in act and action.Keith Hossack - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.details
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Does the unity of reason imply that epistemic justification is factive?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):691-700.details
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Agency and Embodiment: Groups, Human–Machine Interactions, and Virtual Realities.Johannes Himmelreich - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):197-213.details
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Critical notice: Timothy O'Connor, Persons and Causes.Eric Hiddleston - 2005 - Noûs 39 (3):541-56.details
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The Obligation Dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (1):37-61.details
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The principle of alternate possibilities and a defeated dilemma.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (2):179 – 201.details
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Reflections on the Incompatibilist’s Direct Argument.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2008 - Erkenntnis 68 (1):1 - 19.details
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Reason, Responsibility, and Free Will: Reply to My Critics. [REVIEW]Ishtiyaque Haji - 2012 - The Journal of Ethics 16 (2):175-209.details
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Luck’s Extended Reach.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):191-218.details
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Incompatibilism and Prudential Obligation.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):385-410.details
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Do Compatibilists Need Alternative Possibilities?Ishtiyaque Haji - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1085-1095.details
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Active control, agent-causation and free action.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (2):131-148.details
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At one with our actions, but at two with our bodies: Hornsby's Account of Action.Adrian Haddock - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):157 – 172.details
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A Strengthening of the Consequence Argument for Incompatibilism.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2017 - Analysis 77 (4):705-715.details
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The body in action.Thor Grunbaum - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (2):243-261.details
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Trying and the arguments from total failure.Thor Grünbaum - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (1):67-86.details
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Seeing what I am Doing.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):295-318.details
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Toe wiggling and starting cars: A re-examination of trying.O. H. Green - 1994 - Philosophia 23 (1-4):171-191.details
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Traps and gaps in action explanation: Theoretical problems of a psychology of human action.Werner Greve - 2001 - Psychological Review 108 (2):435-451.details
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The standard argument for blame incompatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):697-726.details
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Philosophy of action and philosophy of religion.Stewart Goetz - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (6):662–670.details
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Reasons Explanation: Further Defense of a Non-causal Account.Carl Ginet - 2016 - The Journal of Ethics 20 (1-3):219-228.details
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In Defense of a Non-Causal Account of Reasons Explanations.Carl Ginet - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):229 - 237.details
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Comments on Alfred Mele, Motivation and Agency – Discussion.Carl Ginet - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (3):261-272.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Action, Knowledge, and Will.Kim Frost - 2017 - Philosophical Review 126 (3):404-410.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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If Anyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist, then Everyone Should Be an Agent-Causalist.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1101-1131.details
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How should libertarians conceive of the location and role of indeterminism?Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):44 - 58.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Everyone thinks that an ability to do otherwise is necessary for free will and moral responsibility.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2091-2107.details
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A theory of the normative force of pleas.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 163 (2):479-502.details
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Reply: The free will revolution.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (2):145 – 156.details
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Responsibility and the Kinds of Freedom.John Martin Fischer - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):203 - 228.details
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Foreknowledge, Freedom, and the Fixity of the Past.John Martin Fischer - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (3):461-474.details
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Does the Consequence Argument Beg the Question?John Martin Fischer & Garrett Pendergraft - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):575-595.details
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Dennett on the basic argument.John Martin Fischer - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (4):427-435.details
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An Actual-Sequence Theology.John Martin Fischer - 2022 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 70 (1):49-78.details
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Reasons, Causes, and Chance-Incompatibilism.Markus E. Schlosser - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):335–347.details
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Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Enticing Reasons for Love.N. L. Engel-Hawbecker - 2021 - In Simon Cushing (ed.), New Philosophical Essays on Love and Loving. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 195-214.details
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Dennett and Taylor’s alleged refutation of the Consequence Argument.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Analysis 80 (3):426-433.details
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