This dissertation addresses the problem of how to evaluate and compare the theories that inform diverse approaches to psychotherapy. It is argued that the field needs a superordinate epistemology to provide legitimacy for its theories and for the clinical work that these theories guide. Such a superordinate epistemology would occupy a higher level of analysis than the theories it is used to evaluate. ;Using a constructivist framework, it is argued that much of the epistemological confusion currently characterizing clinical psychology can (...) be traced to a traditional failure to distinguish among levels of analysis when evaluating clinical psychology theories. It is demonstrated that evaluations of such theories often conflate theory and epistemology. ;The received view of a natural science epistemology and hermeneutics provide the usual terms in which epistemology is debated. These are found inadequate to fill the necessary role of superordinate epistemology. The received view is criticized, in part, for "bracketing" the domain of meaning, and hermeneutics is criticized, in part, for "bracketing" the domain of extra-linguistic reality. For these reasons, it is shown that neither of these approaches can be considered to be superordinate to clinical theories. ;Next, some preliminary theoretical groundwork for the development of a constructivist superordinate epistemology for clinical psychology is offered. The domain of clinical psychology is defined as the conjunction of the domains of meaning and reality. A constructivist reformulation of the role of empirical research and observational knowledge is outlined. A reconceptualization of clinical theories as narratives and "expert languages" is suggested as well. ;It is argued that theoretical propositions first should be evaluated according to whether they conform to observational knowledge about the unintentional constraints on human intentionality. Then theories should be evaluated according to the coherence of their accounts of the transactions between the domains of meaning and reality. The hermeneutic circle is suggested as a methodology for choosing among different interpretations in a given therapeutic encounter. ;Finally, some directions for future work are suggested. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the popularity of phenomenologies and the tensions that arise from their use as research methodologies in nursing. Among these tensions are: the troublesome issues of adapting a fundamentally philosophical means of understanding human being(s) for use as a more pragmatic and robust research approach in a practice discipline; the various types of phenomenology and the confusions that surround these and other interpretive methodologies, particularly within different intellectual and cultural traditions; and the need for nursing to (...) find a space in which it can give voice to aspects of its practice that are silenced in less existentially oriented methodologies. Although phenomenologies are currently popular and possibly fashionable in nursing, there are important issues in relation to their use in a methodological sense that remain to be addressed. (shrink)

Women are twice as likely to be diagnosed with a depressive disorder as men. Before trying to explain this difference, we must first understand how women experience depression. We explore the phenomenon of depression through women’s experiences, using Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method. An essential meaning structure describes the development of depression: The women find themselves entrapped in a personal mission which had backfired. Motivated by shame and guilt from the past, they overinvest in work or others’ emotions to relieve internal (...) pain. They feel deeply sensitive to, and responsible for, other persons’ distress while ignoring their own feelings and needs. Gradually their emotional body grows awry and acts in increasingly alienating and threatening ways. Ultimately they feel forced to submerge in their emotional body; they succumb to depression. We reflect on this structure on the basis of Minkowski, Scheler, Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, and in relation to contemporary research on depression. (shrink)

Within the Husserlian phenomenological philosophical tradition, description and interpretation co-exist. However, teaching the practice of phenomenological psychological research requires careful articulation of the differences between a descriptive and an interpretive relationship to what is provided by qualitative data. If as researchers we neglect the epistemological foundations of our work or avoid working through difficult methodological issues, then our work invites dismissal as inadequate science, undermining the effort to strongly establish psychology along qualitative lines. The first article in this two-part discussion (...) provides a Husserlian investigation of the meaning of ‘method’ for psychology as a human science. This investigation is undertaken in the light of some researchers’ appropriations of Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics in the service of non-methodical praxes. The second article will address some implications of the attempt to structure qualitative psychological research along ‘Gadamerian’ lines, taking seriously the references to Gadamer’s work made by researchers such as Van Manen and Smith. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 11, Edition 1 May 2011, 69-85. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the validity of phenomenology in the psychiatric setting. The phenomenological method - as a mode of research, a method of engagement between self and other, and a framework for approaching what it means to know - has found a legitimate home in therapeutic practice. Over the last century, phenomenology, as a philosophical endeavour and research method, has influenced a wide range of disciplines, including psychiatry. Phenomenology has enabled an enrichment of such practice through deepening the (...) way in which we can come to know the experiences of the other. This knowing-of-the-other is explored here within the context of psychiatric and clinica assessment. The question asked is: How best can we come to know those we work with? What method of engagement can be used to most completely come to understand and narrate the experiences of the individual, and how can this be applied in the context of an assessment aimed at psychiatric or psychological intervention? Elements of phenomenological praxis are presented as definitive of the most integral way of approaching the human subject. Husserlian and Heideggerian notions are explicated and related to phenomenological conceptions of intersubjectivity, in an effort to describe a phenomenology that can be used effectively within the psychiatric setting. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 7, Edition 1 May 2007. (shrink)

Throughout his career, William James defended personal consciousness. In his Principles of Psychology (1890), he declared that psychology is the scientific study of states of consciousness as such and that he intended to presume from the outset that the thinker was the thought. But while writing it, he had been investigating a dynamic psychology of the subconscious, which found a major place in his Gifford Lectures, published as The Varieties of Religious Experience in 1902. This was the clearest statement James (...) was able to make before he died with regard to his developing tripartite metaphysics of pragmatism, pluralism and radical empiricism, which essentially asked ‘Is a science of consciousness actually possible?’ James’s lineage in this regard, was inherited from an intuitive psychology of character formation that had been cast within a context of spiritual self-realization by the Swedenborgians and Transcendentalists of New England. Chief among these was his father, Henry James, Sr, and his godfather, Ralph Waldo Emerson. However, James was forced to square these ideas with the more rigorous scientific dictates of his day, which have endured to the present. As such, his ideas remain alive and vibrant, particularly among those arguing for the fusion of phenomenology, embodiment and cognitive neuroscience in the renewed search for a science of consciousness. (shrink)

The ultramodern condition represents the "third wave" in postmodernist-inspired philosophy and cultural practice. Two of ultramodernism's critical theoretical components are the human/social forces, flows, and assemblages that sustain transgression; and the human/social intensities, fluctuations, and thresholds that make transcendence possible as both will and way. In the ultramodern age, then, transcendence is about overcoming and transforming the conditions (i.e., forces, flows, and assemblages) that co-produce harm-generating (i.e., transgressive) tendencies. This manuscript problematizes transgression by way of ultramodern theory. This critical investigation (...) represents "the phenomenology of the shadow," or the ultramodern philosophy of harm. To contextualize this phenomenology and philosophy, the intellectual history of ultramodern thought is recounted. This includes a review of the shadow construct by way of its prominent socio-cultural, psychoanalytic, and political-economic currents; and a chronicling of the reification process (regarding risk, captivity, and harm) since the modernist era (i.e., the industrial revolution). The article concludes with some very speculative observations concerning "the phenomenology of the stranger," or the ultramodern philosophy of transcendence as both will and way. (shrink)

It is argued that the increasing interest in the use of phenomenological methods in sport psychology could help rescue research in this area from its current obsession with measurement and prediction. Phenomenology proceeds from a very different set of philosophical assumptions from the natural science approach that underlies most research and practice in sport psychology. Phenomenology insists that psychology should focus on meaning and investigate the essence of human experience. The concept of anxiety occupies a central position within phenomenological perspectives (...) in psychology. This paper examines the experience of anxiety in sport by drawing on applied sport psychology work undertaken with professional footballers in the English Premier League (EPL). The phenomenology of anxiety is considered by distinguishing between May's psychological account and Heidegger's philosophical perspective. Anxiety is viewed positively by both philosophical and psychological phenomenology due to its links to the idea of authenticity. This is discussed in depth in the paper and consideration will be given to how this connects to important sources of meaning and identity in sport, such as spirituality and religious belief. (shrink)

Abstract There have been increasingly popular claims that hermeneutics provides an epistemology that is appropriate and sufficient for psychotherapy. The purpose of this paper is to evaluate and explain those claims. Hermeneutics proves to provide terms that legitimize aspects of clinical expertise that have been most ignored within the traditional empiricist epistemology; namely, hermeneutics articulates and provides standards for therapeutic interpretations about clients? idiosyncratic intentions and also for using clinical theories that defy empirical test. Nonetheless, hermeneutics also proves to be (...) limited in its account of clinical knowledge. That is, clinicians who advocate hermeneutics have ruled out any legitimate basis on which clinical expertise can be influenced by knowledge about non?intentional constraints on psychological life. Yet, therapists must use such knowledge, especially that which concerns the non?intentional constraints imposed by human development. Thus, to realize its potential, hermeneutics should be embedded within a more comprehensive epistemology that includes compatible standards for knowledge about development. Finally, this paper concludes by proposing an outline for such an inclusive approach to clinical knowledge. (shrink)

This article is a continuation of the challenge begun by early phenomenologists of the reductionistic scientism of Natural Science Psychology. Inspired by five distinctions of Emmanuel Levinas, it seeks to bring a deeper interruption of the seemingly unalterable force of mainstream psychology to model itself after the hard sciences. Levinas distinguishes the experience of totality from infinity, need from desire, freedom as self-initiated and self-directed from freedom as invested by and for the Other, active agency from radical passivity, and the (...) said from saying. Five commonly accepted characteristics of science, objective, empirical, causal, reducible, and value neutral, are used to compare three approaches to psychology: Natural Science, Phenomenology , and Psychology for the Other. Using the definition of science, “knowing the phenomenon as it shows itself,” this paper argue that Natural Science Psychology is the least “scientific,” Phenomenological Psychology is more scientific, and Psychology for the Other is the most “scientific” with its ethical command to allow the Other to reveal her/himself. This extravagant but compelling claim is illustrated with descriptions of research and therapy. (shrink)

Historically, the suspension of presuppositions arose as part of the philosophical procedure of the transcendental reduction which, Husserl taught, led to the distinct realm of phenomenological research: pure consciousness. With such an origin, it may seem surprising that bracketing remains a methodological concept of modern phenomenological psychology, in which the focus is on the life-world. Such a focus of investigation is, on the face of it, incompatible with transcendental idealism. The gap was bridged largely by Merleau-Ponty, who found it possible (...) to interpret Husserl's later work in an existentialist way, and thus enabled the process of bracketing to refer, not to a turning away from the world and a concentration on detached consciousness, but to the resolve to set aside theories, research presuppositions, ready-made interpretations, etc., in order to reveal engaged, lived experience. This paper outlines the history of the suspension of presuppositions and discusses the scope and limitations of bracketing in its new sense within existential phenomenology. The emphasis is on research practice and on the phenomenological quest for entry into the life-world of the research participant. It is argued that the bracketing of presuppositions throughout the process of research should be a cardinal feature of phenomenological psychology. Of equal importance is the investigator's sensitive awareness that the investigation of the life-world and the phenomena which appear within it is a thoroughly interpersonal process, necessarily entailing the taken-for-granted assumptions implicit in all social interaction. These presuppositions are not open to bracketing. (shrink)

Phenomenological research on forgiving another is presented with a focus on impetus, outcome, and relationship to reconciliation. Preliminary implications for psychotherapeutic application of the distinction between forgiveness and reconciliation are introduced.

This article provides a historical overview of the Existential-Phenomenological tradition in psychiatry and psychotherapy, tracing its development from its origin in nineteenth and twentieth century philosophical thought, through its major European psychiatric proponents and schools, to its emergence as an influential approach in North America after World War II. The emphasis is on the implicit themes that provide continuity within this movement as well as on the distinctive contributions of individual thinkers. We conclude with a discussion of the present status (...) and future prospects of this tradition. (shrink)

In the psychology of teaching, teaching of knowledge is one of the central themes. The psychology of teaching itself is also knowledge, so that the psychology of teaching and the teaching of psychology mutually include each other. Here, I would like to consider a phenomenon in the art of questioning in teaching a literary work of art and would like to show its relevance to the psychology of teaching in general.

This article explicates, in a concrete, step-by-step manner, some procedures that can be followed in phenomenologically analyzing interview data. It also addresses a number of issues that are raised in relation to phenomenological research.

This study applied a method of assisted introspection to investigate the phenomenology of mathematical intuition arousal. The aim was to propose an essential structure for the intuitive experience of mathematics. To achieve an intersubjective comparison of different experiences, several contemporary mathematicians were interviewed in accordance with the elicitation interview method in order to collect pinpoint experiential descriptions. Data collection and analysis was then performed using steps similar to those outlined in the descriptive phenomenological method that led to a generic structure (...) that accounts for the intuition surge in the experience of mathematics which was found to have four irreducible structural moments. The interdependence of these moments shows that a perceptualist view of intuition in mathematics, as defended by Chudnoff, is relevant to the characterization of mathematical intuition. The philosophical consequences of this generic structure and its essential features are discussed in accordance with Husserl’s philosophy of ideal objects and theory of intuition. (shrink)

This article presents the tradition of phenomenologically founded psychological research that was originally initiated by Amedeo Giorgi. This data analysis method is inseparable from the broader project of establishing an autonomous phenomenologically based human scientific psychology. After recounting the history of the method from the 1960’s to the present, we explain the rationale for why we view data collection as a process that should be adaptable to the unique mode of appearance of each particular phenomenon being researched. The substance of (...) the article is then devoted to a detailed outline of the method’s whole-part-whole procedure of data analysis. We then offer a sample analysis of a brief description of an ordinary daydream. This is an anxiety daydream in response to the recent Covid-19 pandemic. We present this daydream analysis in full to show the concrete hands-on 5 step process through which the researcher explicated the participants’ expressions from the particular to the general. From this brief sample analysis, the researcher offers a first-person reflection on the data analysis process to offer the reader an introduction to the diacritical nature of phenomenological psychological elucidation. (shrink)

Recently, a book was published, the sole purpose of which was to discourage researchers from using the scientific phenomenological method. The author had previously been critical of nurses who had used the scientific phenomenological method but in the new book he goes after the originators of different methods of scientific phenomenological research and attempts to criticize them severely. In this review I defend only the scientific phenomenological method that is strictly based upon the thought of Edmund Husserl. Given the entirely (...) negative project of only critiquing phenomenologically grounded scientific research, one would expect the author to be sensitive to the cautions historians and philosophers of science speak about when one attempts to criticize concepts and procedures that belong to a different research community. Paley, an empiricist, uses empirical criteria to criticize phenomenological work.Moreover, given the entirely negative project of critiquing phenomenologically grounded scientific research one would expect the author to be knowledgeable about phenomenology and the innovative research practices used by a new research community. However, the author has only a thin, superficial understanding of phenomenology. One gets the impression that he only reads phenomenology in order to critique it. He displays an outsider’s understanding of it which means that his criticisms of it are faulty because he does not know how to think and dwell within the phenomenological framework; he does not understand “discovery-oriented” research and he keeps judging such research according to criteria from the “context of verification” perspective which are the wrong criteria for “discovery-oriented” research; he denigrates and reduces nursing research strategies because he interprets them to be based on pragmatic motivations only. He does not even grant that nurses can have authentic scientific motivations for seeking phenomenologically based methods; he uses unfair rhetorical strategies in the sense that he uses strategies himself that he criticizes when others use them. The review below documents what has been summarized here. (shrink)

There are an abundance of studies regarding the development of sexual identity and sexual orientation that have served as the foundational underpinnings for exploring sexual orientation development. To date, however, findings from these studies have failed to constitute a significant resource for understanding the gay man’s experience of acknowledging to himself that he is attracted to other men. By identifying the essential constituents of this experience, this existential-phenomenological study provides a starting point for further exploration. Written narrative accounts were obtained (...) from seven men who identified sexually as gay and a method of existential-phenomenological analysis was applied to reveal the prereflective constituents of the experience described. The analysis yielded a new perspective on the experience of gay men and their attraction to other men that has the capacity to change the way practising clinicians, educators, counsellors and future researchers treat and understand the Queer community. (shrink)

The human science or qualitative approaches to research have always argued that methodology must be determined by the subject matter under study. Yet the same approaches to data collection (i.e., the qualitative interview) and data analysis have been utilized by these approaches since their inception. The most essential lesson of van den Berg's metabletics is that no phenomenon is static or absolute. If human phenomena are ever-changing then the methodologies we use to study them must also change and adapt, so (...) that we can more fully and authentically capture their meaning structures. This paper will develop this argument, and demonstrate the limitation of interviews for the study of the changing nature of human phenomena, utilizing psychotherapy research as an example. (shrink)

The present study of the psychology of animal rights activists utilizes a qualitative analytic method based on two forms of data: a set of questionnaire protocols completed by grassroots activists and of autobiographical accounts by movement leaders. The resultant account keys on the following descriptives: an attitude of caring, suffering as an habitual object of perception, and the aggressive and skillful uncovering and investigation of instances of suffering. In a final section, the investigator discusses tensions and conflicts arising from these (...) three themes and various ways of attempting to resolve them. (shrink)

This work is a response to a request from the phenomenology group at Edith Cowan University. The paper is based on seminar discussions, experiences and ideas that have been contextualized within phenomenological literature. The notion of phenomenology as intervention has become increasingly apparent owing to the value of its practical applications in the human and social sciences. The paper explores the theme with special reference to research and psychotherapeutic interventions. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 1, Edition 2 September 2001.

Part of teaching the descriptive phenomenological psychological method is to assist students in grasping their previously unrecognized assumptions regarding the meaning of “science.” This paper is intended to address a variety of assumptions that are encountered when introducing students to the descriptive phenomenological psychological method pioneered by Giorgi. These assumptions are: 1) That the meaning of “science” is exhausted by empirical science, and therefore qualitative research, even if termed “human science,” is more akin to literature or art than methodical, scientific (...) inquiry; 2) That as a primarily aesthetic, poetic enterprise human scientific psychology need not attempt to achieve a degree of rigor and epistemological clarity analogous to that pursued by natural scientists; 3) That “objectivity” is a concept belonging to natural science, and therefore human science ought not to strive for objectivity because this would require “objectivizing” the human being; 4) That qualitative research must always adopt an “interpretive” approach, description being seen as merely a mode of interpretation. These assumptions are responded to from a perspective drawing primarily upon Husserl and Merleau-Ponty, but also upon Eagleton’s analysis of aestheticism. (shrink)

Police officers must be able to make an accurate appraisal of a lethal encounter and respond with appropriate force to mitigate the threat to their own lives and to the lives of others. Contemporary police deadly force training places the cadet in mock lethal encounters, which are designed to simulate those occurring in the real lives of law enforcement officers. This Reality Base Training is designed to provide cadets with experiences that require their reactions to be within the law, policies (...) and procedures, and ethics while undergoing a very stressful, emotional, and physically dynamic situation . Three police cadets provided written accounts of their deadly force training experiences in the RBT format. The descriptive phenomenological psychological method was used to analyze the data and to synthesize a general psychological structure of their experiences. The results reveal the perceptions, thoughts, feelings and behaviors reflecting the role of consciousness and psychological subjectivity in the participants’ understandings and decision-making in the simulated situations. (shrink)

Our aim with this descriptive phenomenological study was to identify and describe the essential meaning structure in the experience of postpartum depression . We interviewed four women diagnosed with major depression and analyzed the data with Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological method. Our analysis revealed two essential meaning structures of PPD. The first structure describes the mother as thrown into a looming, dangerous world, coupled with a restricted, heavy body that hindered her attunement to her baby. Tormented by anxiety, guilt and shame, (...) she tried to deal with her pain by analytical reflection and social isolation. The second structure describes sudden lapses into intense feelings of alienation from the self, the baby, and from the social and material world. With a distorted primordial self-awareness, the mother no longer felt that she existed as herself in the world. We reflect on these findings using the insights of Fuchs, Van den Berg, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. (shrink)

Having spent 40 years as a psychologist in academia with a minority perspective at odds with the culture of his profession, the author was requested to reflect upon his experiences in order to offer advice to younger colleagues of the same persuasion. There are indeed prices to be paid when one's values place one outside the established view within the discipline of psychology, but remaining true to oneself is never theless posited as the highest value. The chief drawback of marginality (...) is the lack of the possibility of being placed within a normative university setting where the training of the next generation of scholars with similar values can take place. Basically, one encounters the resistances that sociology of knowledge factors offer rather than intrinsic resistances to the minority theoretical perspective. Five theoretical notions that met political resistance are listed and seven advisory comments are offered for young potentially marginal psychologists. (shrink)

The current work takes a phenomenological approach to investigating the role of guilt in a sample of persons diagnosed with Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder . The role of guilt in OCD has been frequently noted in the literature, although infrequently studied as a factor in its own right. Typically, those studying OCD have found positive correlations between questionnaire measures of guilt and self-reported symptoms of OCD. Those working with sufferers have also found that OC clients in therapy report feelings of guilt with (...) respect to their symptoms. The present work investigates, in a qualitative way, the meaning of guilt for those with OCD. The presumed role of guilt is examined descriptively, with an eye to developing a more complete understanding of the relationship between feelings of guilt and OC symptoms in a sample of sufferers. Nine participants were recruited, and were interviewed using an unstructured approach. In terms of analysis, emphasis was placed on understanding the experience of guilt and OC symptoms as both were lived by sufferers, with a focus on the personal significance of guilt for study participants. Fifteen descriptive guilt/OCD themes were derived from interviews across the nine participants. Themes revealed a variety of connections that sufferers made between feelings of guilt and symptoms of OCD. A common description of the experience was also derived. The results suggest that the role of guilt in OCD is highly interpersonal in nature, and that feelings of guilt may precede, motivate, as well as be a consequence of, OC symptoms. The role of guilt for any given sufferer may also be highly idiosyncratic. (shrink)

Thomas Kuhn's thesis concerning the structure of scientific change was critically examined in relation to the historical problems of social science. The use and interpretation of Kuhn's ideas by psychologists was reviewed and found to center around the proliferation of theoretical views as paradigms, the viewing of theoretical differences as paradigm clashes, and efforts to affirm particular conceptions of psychology's past or future. Such use was seen as curbing discussion of fundamental issues, and to reflect a continuing neglect of the (...) foundational problems peculiar to social science. The relevance of Kuhn's work was seen to rest on a more critical view of his idea of “mature” science, better understanding of the type of social psychology upon which his thesis rests, and greater appreciation of his hermeneutic approach to social-historical analysis. (shrink)

One of the concerns of the existential-phenomenological tradition has been to examine the human implications of living in a world of proliferating technology. The pressure to become more specialised and efficient has become a powerful value and quest. Both contemporary culture and science enables a view of human identity which focuses on our 'parts' and the compartmentalisation of our lives into specialised 'bits'. This is a kind of abstraction which Psychology has also, at times, taken in its concern to mimic (...) the Natural Sciences. As such it may unconsciously collude with a cultural trend to view humans as objects like other objects and so, fit 'normatively' into the emerging world of specialised and efficient systems. The present paper examines how the findings of a phenomenological study of psychotherapy reflects a movement by people in psychotherapy to recover their sense of human identity in ways that always transcend any form of objectification. Their human complexity is somewhat restored as they move back towards the concrete details of their lives where the human order has its life. In addition to considering the implications of these findings for restoring the uniquely human dimensions of human identity, the paper will also consider the methodological role that an existential-phenomenological approach can play in supporting a broader view of science. In wishing to be faithful to the human order, it champions the value of the human individual as a starting point in human science and this includes a return to concrete experiences, the balance between unique variations and the ground that we share, and the movement from the particular to the general. As such, a phenomenologically-oriented psychology may have an important role to play in helping the broader sciences remember the 'human scale' of things. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology , Volume 2, Edition 1, April 2002. (shrink)

This is an empirical phenomenological inquiry into everyday experiences of daydreaming. The theoretical literature was found to be deficient in accounting for the ambiguity inherent to the phenomenon and lacking in concrete empirical descriptions. This study's phenomenological method was implemented in response to a body of natural scientific studies utilizing methods that were found to be inadequate to the task of comprehending and understanding the lived subjective experience of the phenomenon. From five subject interviews and their subsequent analysis via the (...) phenomenological method, the researcher was able to derive a general structural description of the experience of daydreaming. It was found that daydreaming is essentially the representation/enactment of a mood, the understanding of which is inseparable from the situated biographical project of the individual. As an act of consciousness it was described as a passive movement into two, distinct subject-world relationships, sustained by a directing-spectator position that is both detached and interfused with these two world relations. Details of these findings and their implications are discussed. (shrink)

Abstract Psychology's goal has been to become a science, taking the modern natural sciences as the model. It has not been understood that each science undergoes a transition from early disunification to later unification, that a fundmental dimension is involved that differentiates sciences. Psychology is a modern disunified science, distinguished by its chaotic knowledge and ways of operating. A philosophy of science based on modem unified science, as philosophies generally are, is inappropriate as a means of understanding psychology or of (...) guiding its development. We need a philosophy to describe the special problems of theory construction of modern disunified sciences, and to advance paths by which to work on those problems. Theory tasks to be undertaken in large quantities range from articles to reduce artificial diversity to the construction of grand unified theory. Psychology must begin those tasks, and it must understand its characteristics as a modern disunified science, if it is to make good decisions concerning its development and organization. Otherwise it will continue on its path towards fragmentation, an impenetrable obstacle to full development as a science and a profession. (shrink)

After a brief perusal of the various meanings of phenomenology in psychopathology, the contributions to schizophrenia of phenomenological psychology in the European sense are reviewed. The last twenty years are deemed fruitful and productive. Following the central themes and motives of this literature allows us to come to a different and perhaps wider understanding of schizophrenia than that proposed currently by mainstream psychiatry. These diverse investigations converge in seeing as the core of schizophrenia the disorders related to inter-subjectivity and ipseity (...) , in turn related to what Bleuler had once called Autism. Finally, a critical discussion of the limitations and the strengths of the phenomenological approach is offered. (shrink)

This article explores the phenomenology of mothers as they return to memorable photographs.[i] It reviews research on three mothers who articulate the lived experience of photographs, and how such experience might reveal basic ontological aspects of motherhood. The phenomenology of a mother’s memorable photographs discloses an aporia of human relationships that involves the connectedness she has with her children, and the awareness that her children have become separate individuals. These two themes – separateness and coexistence – are indissolubly at odds. (...) Each constitutes a mother’s potential lived experience of photographs as viewed in front of her. A concluding discussion reviews how each of these contradictory themes provides the necessary context for the other to arise, mutually presupposing the other. (shrink)

Martin Heidegger's account of attunement [Befindlichkeit] through mood [Stimmung] is unprecedented in the history of philosophy and groundbreaking vis-à-vis contemporary accounts of emotion. On his view, moods are not mere mental states that result from, arise out of, or are caused by our situation or context. Rather, moods are fundamental modes of existence that are disclosive of the way one is or finds oneself [sich befinden] in the world. Mood is one of the basic modes through which we experience the (...) world and through which the world is made present to us. Moreover, moods are the lenses through which things, people, animals, events, and aspects in the world matter to us. In this paper, I make the case that Heidegger's insights with respect to mood can and ought to be extended beyond the narrow scope of his fundamental ontology in which they were developed. I argue that contemporary accounts of mood within psychology ought to take these Heideggerian insights seriously and use them when defining, studying, evaluating, and drawing conclusions about the nature of moods. There are three sections to my paper. In section 1, I delineate Heidegger's account of mood. In section 2, I turn to some key studies on mood in psychology, and I elaborate upon some of the main shortcomings in this literature. In section 3, I suggest how psychology might benefit from understanding and utilizing a Heideggerian-inspired phenomenology of mood. (shrink)