In theCritique of Pure Reason,Kant argues for two principles that concern magnitudes. The first is the principle that ‘All intuitions are extensive magnitudes,’ which appears in the Axioms of Intuition (B202); the second is the principle that ‘In all appearances the real, which is an object of sensation, has an intensive magnitude, that is, a degree,’ which appears in the Anticipations of Perception (B207). A circle drawn in geometry and the space occupied by an object such as a book are (...) paradigm examples of extensive magnitudes, while the intensity of a light is a paradigm example of an intensive magnitude. These principles justify and explain the possibility of applying mathematics to objects of experience. The Axioms principle also explains the possibility of any mathematical cognition at all. (shrink)

This is a defense of Kant against the allegedly neglected alternative in his formulation of transcendental idealism. What sets it apart from the contributions of others who have spoken for Kant in this regard is the construction of a general interpretive framework — a reconstruction of the one Kant provides for transcendental idealism — as opposed to the development of an ad hoc defensive strategy for refuting the charges. Hence, comprehensive clarification instead of pointed rebuttal. The difference is between focusing (...) on the text and focusing on the problem. No doubt, doing both is not only possible but also required, as the problem is supposed to be in the text, but the point is that it is not there, and further, that we need not go anywhere else to show that it is not there. Thus, the approach is constructive rather than defensive, or more accurately, constructive as well as defensive. And the construction rests on what Kant actually said rather than on what he might have meant or on what he should have said instead. (shrink)

Call the idea that states of perceptual awareness have intentional content, and in virtue of that aim at or represent ways the world might be, the ‘Content View.’ I argue that though Kant is widely interpreted as endorsing the Content View there are significant problems for any such interpretation. I further argue that given the problems associated with attributing the Content View to Kant, interpreters should instead consider him as endorsing a form of acquaintance theory. Though perceptual acquaintance is controversial (...) in itself and in attribution to Kant, it promises to make sense of central claims within his critical philosophy. (shrink)

Abstract Both parties in the active philosophical debate concerning the conceptual character of perception trace their roots back to Kant's account of sensible intuition in the Critique of Pure Reason. This striking fact can be attributed to Kant's tendency both to assert and to deny the involvement of our conceptual capacities in sensible intuition. He appears to waver between these two positions in different passages, and can thus seem thoroughly confused on this issue. But this is not, in fact, the (...) case, for, as I will argue, the appearance of contradiction in his account stems from the failure of some commentators to pay sufficient attention to Kant's developmental approach to philosophy. Although he begins by asserting the independence of intuition, Kant proceeds from this nonconceptualist starting point to reveal a deeper connection between intuitions and concepts. On this reading, Kant's seemingly conflicting claims are actually the result of a careful and deliberate strategy for gradually convincing his readers of the conceptual nature of perception. (shrink)

El propósito de este artículo es examinar una dualidad en la concepción objetiva de la substancia de la Crítica de la razón pura de Kant. Con este fin se analiza el esquema trascendental de la categoría de substancia y accidente. Nuestra hipótesis es que en el texto kantiano pueden distinguirse dos diferentes concepciones de la substancia. Por un lado, las substancias1 son los objetos relativamente permanentes de nuestra experiencia cotidiana. Por otro lado, la substancia2 es la materia absolutamente permanente de (...) la que están compuestas las substancias1. Dado que las substancias1 son accidentes o modos de existir de la substancia2, ambas concepciones son parte de una teoría coherente. (shrink)

Famously, Kant describes space and time as infinite “given” magnitudes. An influential interpretative tradition reads this as a claim about phenomenological presence to the mind: in claiming that space and time are given, this reading holds, Kant means to claim that we have phenomenological access to space and time in our original intuitions of them. In this paper, I argue that we should instead understand givenness as a metaphysical notion. For Kant, space and time are ‘given’ in virtue of three (...) related facts: (i) they are necessary grounds of the existence of all other spatial and temporal possibilities; (ii) in virtue of being such grounds, they are metaphysically linked to all other represented spatiotemporal things; and (iii) as representations, space and time issue from the nature of our faculty of sensibility rather than from an arbitrary act of choice. Understanding givenness in this non-epistemological way helps us recover what is plausible in both ‘intellectualist’ and ‘anti-intellectualist’ readings of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Anti-intellectualists are correct that space and time are given in mere sensibility, but intellectualists are correct that we depend on the understanding for consciousness of space and time. (shrink)

Collection of papers presented at the 2nd and 3rd Budapest Seminar in Early Modern Philosophy.

In his first Kant book of 1929 Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics Martin Heidegger focusses, not surprisingly, on one of the two central themes from his two years earlier major book Being and Time — the question of the essence of time. It cannot be overseen that he tries to show that his conception of time is superior to Kant’s. Nevertheless, it is high time to examine whether Heidegger’s claim can bear up against a micro-hermeneutical and micro-analytical test. Such (...) an examination, to be fair and appropriate to the leading aspects of the two philosophers, has to bear in mind from the very beginning the deep differences of these leading aspects: Kant concentrates on the formal structure and the strictly subjective status of time as a form of intuition, Heidegger concentrates on the roles time plays in the daily human world orientation. Under these methodical and conceptional pre-suppositions a close examination must come the result, that both conceptions complement, even complete one another. Heidegger comes closer to the type of time-experience as it is exposed by St. Augustine, Kant exposes a strict analysis of the human way to conceive of the successive form of time. It is evidently possible for us today to continue on both paths. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze an ambiguity concealed in the concept of determination as used by Kant in his characterization of the transcendental schema as “transcendental time-determination”. We claim that, in this context, “determination” can be understood in a dynamic way as well as in a static manner. In the first case, transcendental schemata are procedures of synthesis or temporal determination of the empirical manifold. In the second case, transcendental schemata are the basic temporal properties or determinations produced by those (...) procedures. (shrink)

This paper discusses the use of certain terms associated to I. Kant’s account of inner experience. Inner experience is a subject matter relevant in Kant’s thought, which encompasses metaphysical and anthropological issues worthy of consideration. By examining the Critique of Pure Reason and the Anthropology from a pragmatic point of view, one can see the confused use of the terms: inner sense, empirical, pure, and transcendental apperception, discursive and intuitive self-consciousness, consciousness of oneself divided into reflection and apprehension, intellectual and (...) empirical consciousness of one’s existence. Therefore, I focus on the philosophical meaning of the previous terms and their relation to the problem of inner experience, which depends upon the outer experience. Finally, I deal with the problem of the content of inner sense, suggesting that its content does not correspond to a single, simple thing, but rather to a flux of inner representations. (shrink)