- Variety of Evidence.Jürgen Landes - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):183-223.details
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On Newtonian Induction.Ori Belkind - 2017 - Philosophy of Science 84 (4):677-697.details
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From Geometry to Conceptual Relativity.Thomas William Barrett & Hans Halvorson - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):1043-1063.details
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Representation and perspective in science.Bas C. Van Fraassen - 2007 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 11 (2):97-116.details
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Why There Can't Be a Logic of Induction.Stuart S. Glennan - 1994 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1994:78 - 86.details
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Ontological infidelity.Patrick Dieveney - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):1 - 12.details
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(1 other version)Why do the Laws Support Counterfactuals?Chris Dorst - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):545-566.details
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Curve Fitting, the Reliability of Inductive Inference, and the Error‐Statistical Approach.Aris Spanos - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (5):1046-1066.details
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(1 other version)History of Science and the Material Theory of Induction: Einstein’s Quanta, Mercury’s Perihelion.John Norton - 2011details
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Tacking by conjunction, genuine confirmation and convergence to certainty.Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 12 (3):1-18.details
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Theory-dependence, warranted reference, and the epistemic dimensions of realism.Frederick Kroon - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (2):173-191.details
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Cognitive values, theory choice, and pluralism : on the grounds and implications of philosophical diversity.Guy Stanwood Axtell - unknowndetails
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Reconsidering authority.Michael Strevens - 2007 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 3. Oxford University Press UK. pp. 294-330.details
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Theory Choice, Theory Change, and Inductive Truth-Conduciveness.Konstantin Genin & Kevin T. Kelly - 2018 - Studia Logica:1-41.details
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On Generalization of Definitional Equivalence to Languages with Non-Disjoint Signatures.Koen Lefever & Gergely Székely - unknowndetails
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Equivalent and Inequivalent Formulations of Classical Mechanics.Thomas William Barrett - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (4):1167-1199.details
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On Einstein Algebras and Relativistic Spacetimes.Sarita Rosenstock, Thomas William Barrett & James Owen Weatherall - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52 (Part B):309-316.details
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In Pursuit of Resistance: Pragmatic Recommendations for Doing Science within One’s Means. [REVIEW]Amy McLaughlin - 2011 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 1 (3):353-371.details
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How to be a scientific realist (if at all): a study of partial realism.Dean Peters - 2012 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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Is there a Bayesian justification of hypothetico‐deductive inference?Samir Okasha & Karim Thébault - 2020 - Noûs 54 (4):774-794.details
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Richard Swinburne, the existence of God, and exact numerical values.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):357-363.details
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(1 other version)The curve fitting problem: A solution.Peter Turney - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (4):509-530.details
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(1 other version)Commuting probability revisions: The uniformity rule. [REVIEW]Carl G. Wagner - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):349-364.details
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Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism.Michael J. Shaffer - 2012 - London and Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.details
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Acceptibility, Evidence, and Severity.Prasanta S. Bandyopadhyay & Gordon G. Brittan - 2006 - Synthese 148 (2):259-293.details
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On Generalization of Definitional Equivalence to Non-Disjoint Languages.Koen Lefever & Gergely Székely - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (4):709-729.details
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A non-probabilist principle of higher-order reasoning.William J. Talbott - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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On stance and rationality.Bas C. van Fraassen - 2011 - Synthese 178 (1):155 - 169.details
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Reconstruction of past Events from Memory: An Alternative to the Hypothetico-Deductive (H-D) Method.Sam S. Rakover - 2002 - Behavior and Philosophy 30:101 - 122.details
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